Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1944 )


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  •        OFFICE   OF THE   ATTORNEY     GENERAL   OF   TEXAS
    AUSTIN
    honorable Den J. Dean
    District ntt;orney
    Ereckenridge, Texas
    Dear Sir:
    Your reoent letter
    partment on the follovlng
    be a delln-
    ju%ge% against
    the Court Reporter
    minor for a trans-
    atement of facts in the
    e absence of a pauper’s
    tlon of the Juvenile Delinquency Act,
    slature (1943), page 313; tirticle2338-
    Statutes, 1925, as amended, discloses no
    t dealing vlth costs where a child is ad-
    judged a delfiquent child. I!heAct does not contain any
    provision for ihe awarding or payment of costs. Delinquency
    proceedings under the statute are not criminal prosecutions --
    it Is a civil procedure and appeals are to the Court of Civil
    Appeals and to the Supreme Court.
    The Rules of Practice and Procedure in Civil Actions
    promulgated by the Supreme Court of the State are not appli-
    cable in delinquency proceedings. Rule 2 in part provides:
    Honorable Ben J. Dean, psge 2
    "These rules shall govern procedure in the
    justice, county, district and appellate courts
    of the State of Texas In all actions of a civil
    nature,       .   .   .’
    Now, the Juvenile iict sets up and establishes a
    new and distinct court, naming this court the Juvenile Court;
    and provides that such court be established in each county
    of the State and that It be a court of record, "having such
    jurisdiction as may be necessary to carr out the p~ovlsfons
    of this Act." (article 2338-1, Section 1 ).
    In In Re Dendy (1943), 175 9. W. (2%) 297, the
    ~marf.110Court of Civil Appeals at page 302, said:
    "The &t sets up a complete jurisdiction
    and proce%ure POP the hearing of juvenile delln-
    quency cases and there is no other law, civil or
    criminal, togovern such cases and situatlons as
    defined by the Act and placed within the exclu-
    sive jurisdiction of the juvenile court provided
    fcr in this tict. Nowhere does the Act provide
    that either criminal or civil procedure shall be
    folloved."
    Now, Section 21 of the Juvenlle Act provides that;
    'An 8pp8al may be taken by any party ag-
    grieved to the Court of Clvll Appeals, an% the
    case may be carried to the Supreme Court by writ
    of error JF upon certificate, as in other civil
    cases. Vritten notice of appeal shall be file%
    with-the Juvenile Court uithln Plve (5) days af-
    ter the entering of the order . . .(and in event
    of adverse judgment) the appellate court milypro-
    vide for a ?ecognimsnca bond.' (Underscoring
    ours)
    The right to oosts as of course is purely statu-
    Honorable Ben J1 Dean, page 3
    Security for costs must be given In causes or pro-
    ceedings falling within the requirement of controlling stat-
    ute?, .but they need not be given in causes or proceedings be-
    yond the &ope of such mandatory requirements, and under some
    provielons the matter vi11 rest in the sound dlscretlon of
    the court.   Costs, 20 C. J. S., 364, para. 126.
    It has been held that in the absence of a statu-
    tory  provision costs cannot be awarded in a proceeding in the
    uvenile  courts; Juvenile Courts and Offenders, 71~m. Jur.,
    $06, para. 45, note 9; Infants, 31 C. J.ITIb , pra. 24, note
    .39.
    In an annotation on “Wnat is an action vlthin the
    statutes requiring security for costs ” 
    131 A. 1
    . R. 1476,
    there is cited Noble vs. People (18771, 
    85 Ill. 336
    , vhereln
    it vas held that a statute requiring of non-residents a bond
    for costs was not applicable in bastardy proceedings by the
    mother against the putative father to compel him to bear part
    of the burden of the support of the child.
    In the case of Pierce County vs. Hagnuaon (1912)
    70 Wash. 639, 
    127 P. 302
    , an. Cas. 1914b, page 869, the
    Supreme Court of Uashihgton, in discussing the question of
    costs under the Juvenile Court Act of that state, said:
    “The juvenile court act makes no provision
    for the awarding or payment of costs, exeapt the
    pr~vislon authorlxlng the publication of notioe
    when the person standing in the position of nat-
    ural or legal guardian of the person of the al-
    leged delinquent child Is a non-resident, cr the
    Uhereabouts of such person 1s unknown. In 3ases
    of such publication of notice, It is provided
    that the coat of such publication shsll be paid
    by t.hecounty. another section provides for the
    payment by the cojmtg of salaries to probation
    officers. OtherwIse the set la silent OR the
    question of Sees and cnstu. The awarding and
    payment OS costs 1s purtl:Iy
    a matter of statutory
    regulation. The recover;iof oosts was unknovn
    to the common law, and no provision could be made
    for their payment, except as expressly authorized
    Honorable Ben J. Dean, page 4
    by statute.     This rule has been one of such uni-
    versal appllcatlon that It has become the simple
    doctrine    of the court that coats are the creature
    of statutes    merely, and that the allowance of
    them in any case would depend entirely upon the
    terms of some statute.     It has also been held that
    there la no inherent pover in the court to award
    coata, and that they can be granted in any case
    or proceeding ac$ely by virtue of express atatu-
    tory authority.
    Continuing, the Supreme Court of the State of
    Washington, said:
    ‘The doctrine that costs cannot be avarded
    except as provided by statute, applies to crlmln-
    al as veil aa civil cases. In this respect the
    character of the proceedings creates no diatlnc-
    tion. In state v. Blackburn, 61nrk. 407, 33
    3. W. 529, where it vas sought to charge the
    county with coats in a baatardy proceeding, the
    court,   after laying down the rules that the lls-
    bility of county for costs In orlmlnal prosecu-
    tions rest alone on the statute, aoncludea by
    saying L ‘Cur aonclualon is that QO one la bound
    for coats, unless rendered so by some positive
    provision of law, or aa 0 neoeaaary lmpliortlon
    from provtalon of lavj and that neither the state
    nor the county la bound even by legal provlslona,
    unless it is speclSicAlfy or by necessary lmpll-
    cation named or referred to therein.’ This rule
    is supported by the Sollowing oases, and seema
    to be generally aoctpted as 8 true rule: . ...”
    (The court here cited numerous supporting decl-
    alona.)
    With further   reference    to the Dendy case, by the
    fimarllloCourt of Civil Appeals It will be noted that the
    Supreme Court on January 12, 1944, granted a vrlt of error
    in the case “on oonatructlon      of the act.” It ia set for sub-
    mission for February 2, 1944.
    me vish to again refer to section 21, Article 2338-
    1, wherein the Juvenile Delinquenoy Act provides that:
    ~Ronorable Ban J. Dean, page 5
    “hn appeal may be taken by any psrty ag-
    grieved to the Court of Civil wppeals and the
    case may be carried to the Supreme Court --, ”
    in other civil cases." (Underscoring ours)
    Though the Juvenile Delinquency ret set up a com-
    plete prooedure for the hearing of juvenile delinquency 0894s
    In the trial court, I. e., in the juvenile oourt of the ooun-
    m,       when the oaae is appealed to the Appellate court then
    the rules and the prooedural law provided for the appellate
    courts prevail (exodpt as to the giving of a bond, unless a
    recognizance bond be requested); 48 Section 21 of ths Act pro-
    vides for an appeal “as in other clvll oaaea.” Thus, vhen
    a case la appealed then insofar as the appellate procedure
    is conoern4d, the Rules of Praotloe and Procedure in Civil
    wctiona promulgated by the Supreme Court aa well as the per-
    tinent statutory provisions prevail.
    Rule 355 provides for an appeul by a pzrty unable
    to givs a coat bond and unless the aggrieved party complies
    with Rule 355 and files his pauper's affidavit, then he oan
    perfect his appeal solely in the abaDgerprovided for “as in
    other clvll cases.”
    To the first question we answer, 'NO."
    To the second question we answer, “No.”
    To the third question we answer as follows:
    (a) That th4 district clerk is not entitled to de-
    mand paymsnt of Sees as z condition precedent to delivery of
    transcript for tranamlasioa to ..ppellateCourt.
    (b) That tha court reporter has a Fight to require
    payment of fees aa a condition precedent to the delivery of
    transcript of evidence or statement of facts for trznsmla-
    sion to the Appellate Court, vhere an appeal is not perfect-
    ed In forms pauperir.
    The case of Maxfield v. The Pure Oil Compeny (1934),
    74 3. w. (213)145, by the Dsllas Court of Civil Appeals, is
    our 4uthOFity for our answers to the third question.
    Fry   v. Henrietta Independent School District (1X56), 9x811::
    2
    Honorable Ben J. Dean, page 6
    (2d) 245, the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals held: “that
    the adminlatrator must pay for the transcript of the evl-
    dence .re&ardless of the fact that he Is not required to give
    a bond on appeal.n
    The present rules of civil procedure do not con-
    flict with the authorities cited. These rules,    though super-
    seding the statutes are taken practically unchanged from the
    pertinent statutes.    Rule 378 provides for an agreed statement
    of the case aad of the facts proven and Rule 380 provides
    for a free statement of facts on appeal for paupers. ns here-
    inabove stated, these rules do not altar the authorities
    above cited for the Rules in this instance did not change
    the statute   upon which these authorities were based.
    Very   truly yours
    ATTORIQM GENERAL OF TEXAS
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-5786

Judges: Grover Sellers

Filed Date: 7/2/1944

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017