Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1943 )


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  •            THEATTORNEYGENERAL
    OFTEXAS
    .A,:,,
    :.
    Hon. F. B. Caudle               Opinion No. O-5094
    County Attorney                 Rex Can delinquent levee
    Franklin County                     improvement district
    Mount Vernon, Texas                 taxes be collected from
    a person who has purchased
    Dear Mr. Caudle:                    forfeited public school
    land from the State? And
    related questions.
    We have received and carefully considered your letter in
    which you request the opinion of this department on the
    matters stated+
    We think  a fair statement of your request and the facts
    set out therein is as follows:   Levee Improvement District
    No. 1 of Franklin County was created in 1917 and bonds, some
    of which are still outstanding, were issued the following
    -year.   Within the district is a tract or tracts of public
    sohool land, which land is to be forfeited by the Commissio~~~r
    of the General Land Office for nonpayment of interest due the
    State. You further state that the district has brought suit
    against the present owner to enforce payment of the delinquent
    levee improvement district taxes against the land.
    On the basis of the above faots you make inquiries which
    are substantially as follows:
    First:  If the land is forfeited to the State and the
    present owner should repurchase the land, or have his claim
    reinstated, what would be ,the status of the delinquent taxes
    due the district?
    Second: Could the delinquent taxes be enforaed against
    a person not having any rights under either Article 5326 or
    Article 5326a, V. A. C. S., who purohased from the State after
    forfeiture?
    Third: What would be the status of the outstanding bonds
    in either of the above situations?
    TO avoid the use of unnecessary language, we will use the
    term "present owner" as meaning any person given a right to
    repurchase forfeited land under Article 5326a, and as mean-
    ing any person given a right to reinstate his claims under
    Article 5326.
    i-   .-
    Hon. F. B. Caudle, page 2, O-5094
    Artiale 5326, V.A.C.S., as amended in 1941 by the
    ~_    ^
    47th Legislature, provides for the forfeiture of Public
    school land and the method and manner of reinstatement of
    claims "provided that no rights of third Persons may have
    intervened."
    Artiole 5326a, V.A.C.S., applies to Situations where
    public school land has been forfeited for nonpayment of
    interest accruing prior to November 1, 1925. It provides
    for the manner and method of revaluation and subsequent
    repurchase of land forfeited. This statuta also preserves
    "any lien, legal or equitable, in behalf of any person or
    the State, . s .'I
    The remedy of the present owner will be governed by
    one of the above statutes. Article 5326a clearly preserves
    the district's delinquent tax lien on repurchased land.
    However, the pertinent portion of this article before its
    amendment in 1926 read as follows:
    "Sec. 4. Whenever any land affeoted by ,this Act
    is repurchased under the rights of repurchase given
    herein, any lien, legal or equitable, and any valid
    contractual right in favor of any person or persons
    existing against, in and to said land or any part
    thereof at the time of forfeiture shallremain unimpaired
    and in full force and effect as if no such forfeiture
    had occurred."
    As against the contention that the quoted portion was
    not intended to and did not peserve liens in favor of the
    Sta.i;e,the Court of Civil Appeals in Gerlaoh Meraantile
    Co. v. State, 10 S.W. (ad) 10.35, writ of error refusud,
    held as follows:
    "In section 4 the Legislature was fixing the
    status of liens and contract rights affecting
    the land before the forfeiture.
    *IIn the present case the taxes here sued for
    were delinquent for years prior to the forfeiture,
    and we are now aalled upon to decide whether the
    lien of the state for suoh taxes was preserved by
    section 4.
    "It is not to 'be presumed that the Legisla-
    ture intended to cancel the taxes due the state, in
    fact, we think the presumption will be that it did
    not so intend; and, there bein nothing in the act
    whichexpressly shows an intent"ion to cancel, we are
    of the opinion that such was not the intention and
    that the tax lien was intended to be preserved, and
    therefore must answer the question in the affirmative."
    Hon. F. B. Caudle, pago 3, O-5094
    We believe the holding in the Gerlach case to be of
    value in construing Article 5326, whioh allows rainstate-
    ment of claims "provided that no rights of third persons
    may have intervsned." We do not believe that this statute
    is intended to bar the tax liens of the State o,r any
    instrumentality thereof. We agree w'Lth the prfnrjfple
    announced in the Gerlaah case that since the statute does
    not show an express intention to cancel taxes, certainly
    such an intention will not be presumed, Further, we have
    grave doubts as to the power of the Legislature effectively
    to bar tax liens where the situation is one of reinstatement
    in view of the provisions of Article 3, Se&ion 55, of our
    State Constitution.
    The most recent construction of Article 5326 is found
    in Danciger v. State, 166 S. W. (2d) 914 (Sup. Ct.).
    The facts show that the State, Hudspeth County, a road
    district and two sohool districts were plaintfffs In a
    delinquent tax suit. The validity of the judgment fore-
    closing the various tax liens was questioned on appeal.
    The State, among 0the.r contentions, claimed the question
    was moot since the land had been forfeited to the State
    subsequent to the entrance of the judgment. The Supreme
    Court answered this contention as followsg
    II
    . 0 . Even if we assume that it (the land
    upon which the delinquent tax liens were foreclosed)
    hasbeen   forfeited, ft does not follow that the ques-
    tion is moot. If tha rights of +hird parties have
    not intervened, Danelger and Farley still have a
    right to reinstatement upon payment of the fnterest
    due, as provided in Ar%Icle 5326 of our statutes.
    Upon reinstatemeniY they would ,iake the property sub==
    jeet to all obligations to the State that were extant
    at the time the for.feiture occurred, Fnoludeng the
    judgment for the taxes, with foreclosure of the lien,
    and the land could then be sold in satisfaction of
    the judgment. . *If (Parenthe,tical matter added)
    In answer to yovar.fSrst q,uestion you are advised that
    if the present owner has his claims reinstated, or if he
    repurchases the land, he vsill ,take subject to the delinquent
    taxes of Levee Improvemen,t Distriot No. 1. of Franklin County.
    This Department has recwn~tZ$ ruled on your second
    question in Opinion No. O-5O629 a oopy of which we are
    enclosing. Your second qraestlon, in aoeordance with said
    opinion, is therefore answered In the negat.ive. However,
    we oall your attention to the remedies afforded the district
    against the former owner or owners, whl.chare set out Ln the
    opinion.
    We   next consider your third question,   Where the land is
    Hon. F. B. Caudle, page 4, O-5094
    repurchased or the claims of the present owner are
    reinstated, it is obvious that the bonds, and the rights
    of the bondholders, are not impaired in any particular.
    However, a different situation is presented when a
    new purchaser acquires the land. A close study of the
    applicable statutes, Articles 7972-8042, VI. A. C. S., shows
    that the bonds themselves are not a lien upon a particular
    traot of land but that the delinquent taxes do constitute
    such a lien. The rights of the bondholders rise no higher
    than those of the Levee Improvement District.   The bond-
    holder has no privity of contract with the taxpayer as his
    contract is with the district alone. See City and County
    of Dallas Levee Imp. Diet., ex rel Simond v. Allen, (D.C.N.D.
    of Texas), 
    17 F. Supp. 777
    .
    A bondholder is not a necessary party to a suit to
    oollect taxes, Glenn v. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island
    Levee District, 
    268 S.W. 452
    (Comm. App., opinion adopted
    by the Supreme Court), unless the right of the district to
    levy and collect any taxes at all is questioned.  Preston V.
    Anderson County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 2, 3, S. W. (2d) 888
    (Civ. APP.). The bondholder has no legal cause of action
    against the taxpayer to recover taxes due nor has the tax-
    payer any legal obligation toward the bondholder in that
    respect. Glenn v. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island Levee
    Imp. 
    Dist., supra
    .
    In view of the above authorities as to the status of
    bonds and bondholders, it is our opinion the bondholders have
    no rights with regard to land forfeited to the State and sold
    to a new purchaser.
    We   trust that the above fully answers the questions asked.
    Yours very truly
    ATTORNEY GENEHAL OF TEXAS
    s/ Woodrow Edwards
    BY        Woodrow Edwards
    wE:AMM; ok3                                   Assistant
    Enclosure
    Approved Opinion comiittee, by GPB, Chairman
    Approved May 7, 1943, by Attorney General of Texas
    s/ Gerald C. Mann
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-5094

Judges: Gerald Mann

Filed Date: 7/2/1943

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017