Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1942 )


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  • Hon. R. L. Thompson
    County Auditor
    Taylor Co,unty
    Abilene, Texas
    Dear Sir:
    Opinion Number O-4775
    Re: (.l)Liability of City of
    Abllene for pro rata part
    of,bonded indebtedness of
    common school district when
    city extends its limits to
    include part of territory
    of such district.
    (2) Liability of City of
    Abilene for taxes on pro-
    perty within limits of
    school 'districtpurchased
    by city for airport purposes.
    We are in receipt of your letter of recent
    date in which,you submit the following inquiry:
    'The City ,ofAbilene has Incorporated
    territory of a ConsolidaizedCommon School
    District which has an outstanding bonded
    indebtedness; and the City of Abilene has
    also purchased territory of this district
    which territory is not incorporated within
    city limits. The Mayor of Abilene ques-
    tions the City'sresponsibillty'of assuming
    its 'prorata part of,the outstanding bonded
    indebtedness of said Common School District.
    "Question:L Is the City of Abilene liable
    for pro rata part ofbonded indebtedness of
    Common School District which~pro,rata part
    is to be based upon valuationof entire dts-
    trict and territorydetached as set by the
    equalization board of Taylor County?
    .l ,
    Hon. R. L. Thompson, page 2 (O-4775)
    "Question 2. Sho,uldthe City continue to
    pay taxes on this purchased territory which
    has not been Incorporated?",
    You have furnished us with further information
    in your letter of November 4, as follows:
    "In reply to your letter,of November 2,
    1942 relative to further Information concern-
    ing tracts of land which have been detached
    from Common School District 29 of Taylor
    County and incorporated by the City of Abilene
    having been purchased by the City of Abilene.
    The schools of Abllene are bo,undedby the
    limits of the City of Abilene. The taxes for
    running the schools are levied by the city
    and certain amo,untsare allocated to the
    schools.
    "A portion of District 29 which was pur-
    chased by the City of Abilene has been in-
    corporated within the City limits of Abilene
    and Is a part of the.Abilene School system.
    And a part of this purcha8.ewas not for school
    purposes and,has not ,been incorporated within
    the.City of'Abllene. This last purChase was
    forthe purpose of adding adcJltiona1lands
    to the,Airport near Abilene.
    In answer to.yourquestion regarding the city's
    liability for its pro rata part of the bonded indebtedness
    of the common school district from which the territory
    was detached, we call your attention to Articles 2804 and
    2805, Revised Civil Statutes, which read as follows:
    "Art. 2804. Extending city limits to
    Include district.,- Whenever the limits of
    any incorporated city or town constituting
    an Independent school district are so ex-
    tended or enlarged as to embrace the whole
    or any part of any Independent or common
    school district adjacent to such Incorporated.
    city or town, that portion of such adjacent
    district so embraced within the corporate
    Hon. R. L. Thompson, page 3 (O-4775)      1
    limits of such incorporated city or town
    shall thereafter bedome,a part of,the lnde-
    pendent school district constituted by such
    incorporated city or 'town.
    "If within the portion of such district
    so embraced there should be situated any real
    property belonging to,such district, such city
    or town may acquire the same upon such terms as
    may be mutually agreed upon between the govern-
    ing body of such city or town and the author-
    ities of such distiiqt.
    ,"This 'artidleshall not 'applywhere it
    shall be determined at.an election held within
    s,uchcity or town by majority vote of those
    voting thereon that the territory or any por-
    tion thereof to be so embraced shall not
    thereby become a part of the independent school
    district .constitute&by such city or town, but
    shall be taken into the city limits for muni-
    cipal purposes only,.and shall remain for
    school purposesa portion of the adjacent in-
    dependent or common school district as 'though
    said city limits had not been extended. Acts
    ii",$.S.~l917, p. 35; Acts 2nd C.S. 1919, p.
    .
    "Art. 2805. Municipality assuming indebted-
    ness. - In all cases where a district is em-
    braced within an incorporated city or town, as
    provided in the preceding article; and in all
    cases where any town or village has been or
    may be Incorporated for free school purposes
    only and which shall include within the limits
    thereof any portion of any common school dis-
    trict which has an outstanding bonded indebted-
    ness; then such city, town or village shall
    become liable and bound for the payment of such
    proportion of the bonded indebtedness of such
    district as the assessed value of the portion
    thereof so included bears to the entire as-
    sessed value of the district from which the
    I   .
    Hon. R. L, Thompson, page 4   (O-4775)
    same was taken. The assessed values of the dis-
    tricts so included shall be those shown upon
    the last preceding county tax assessment roll
    after such districts are so Included; such
    incorporated city, town or village shall pay
    either directly or through the officers of such
    district the proportion of the interest and
    principal of such bonded indebtedness for which
    it Is liable. Id."
    It seems clear from the above that the City of
    Abilene assumes its proportionate part of the bonded
    indebtedness of the Common School District. The city
    has the right to tax the annexed territory for school
    purposes. Todd v. City of Houston, 
    276 S.W. 419
    .
    The answer to your second question, regarding
    the liability of the city for school taxes on the land
    purchased by the city to be added to the airport,
    depends upon whether or not the operation of an airport
    by a municipal corporation is a "public purpose'.
    The Constitution, Article 8, Section 2,
    authorizes the Legislature to exempt by general law
    public property used for public purposes.~
    We quote from the opinion of the Supreme
    Court in the case of Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston,
    63 Tex., exact page 23, as follows: "It is property held
    only for purposes essentially public, and may be said to
    be devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the
    public; indeed, it would.be hard to imagine a use more
    essentially public than is tha~tof a wharf which extends
    along the front of a city, and upon which Is received a
    large part of the articles which go to make up the inward
    and outward commerce of the State. It is a property
    which all persons and vessels have the right to use under
    proper regulations, and without the use of which the
    business of the city could not be conducted. That com-
    pensation is received for Its use does not withdraw from
    it its public ckaracter. Dillon on Municipal Corpora-
    tions, 103-113.
    The Supreme Court of Missouri, In passing'on
    the question as to whether the acquisition, improvement
    and development of land for an airport is a public purpose
    Hon. R. L. Thompson, page 5'(0-4475)
    in the case of Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W.(2d)
    1045, used the folloaing language: "An airport with its
    beacons, landing fields, runways and hangars is analogous
    to a harbor with its lights, wharves and docks;,the one
    is the landing place and haven,of ships that navigate the
    water, the other of those that navigate the air. With
    respect to the public ‘use which each subserves they are
    essentially of the same character." The same court in
    the same opinion made the.followlng observation: "The
    question of whether the ~acquisitlon and control of a
    municipal airport is a public purpose within the purview
    of the constitutional principle heretofore adverted to
    is obviously ,anew one. The courtswhich have had oc-
    casion to consider It have, however, answered in the af-
    firmative. City of Wichita v. 'Clapp, 
    125 Kan. 100
    , 104;
    State ex rel City of Lincoln v. Johnson State Auditor,
    
    220 N.W. 273
    ; State ex rel Hile v. City of Cleveland et
    al., 
    160 N.E. 241
    ; and no court of last resort, so far as
    we are advised, has ever held the contrary."
    In the case of.Clty of Abilene v. State, 113
    S,W.(2d) 631, Judge Funderburk said: "It is, therefore,
    our view that when the 'factsof a given case establish
    the ownership of property by a municipal corporation,
    which has been acquired for an authorized public purpose,
    and the purpose for which it is owned and held has not
    been abandoned, such property is to be regarded as used
    for public purposes, and the Legislature has the power $0
    provide by general law for its exemption from taxation.
    We conclude from the foregoing,authorities that
    the City of Abilene is not liable for taxes on the land
    purchased for an addition to its airport.
    Very truly yours
    APPROVED NOV 10, 1942
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    /a/ Grover Sellers
    Dy /s/ C. F. Gibson
    FIRST ASSISTANT                        C, F. Gibson
    ATTORNEY GENERAL                          Assistant
    CFG/s/am
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-4775

Judges: Gerald Mann

Filed Date: 7/2/1942

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017