Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1942 )


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  • Gerald C. Mann
    ATX-GRNEY   GS.CIvERAI.
    Hon. James E. Eilday,           Opinion No. O-4429
    Director                        Re: Whether the described motor
    Motor Transportation            carrier operations are within House
    Mvision                         Bill No. 25p Chapter 290, Acts of
    Railroad Commission             the 47th Legislature, page 463..
    of Texas
    Austin, Texas
    Dear Sir:
    Your request letter of February 12, 1942, reads as
    follows:
    "1. Wholesale Grocery Company 'A' has its place of
    business in Laredo Texas. It buys a particular commod-
    ity from distributgr 'B' of this commodity in Houston,
    Texas. This commodity is always sold at a fixed price
    f.o.b. destination which in this case is Laredo Texas.
    Wholesale Company IAl sends its own private trucks of
    which it is the bona fide owner to Houston and trans-
    ports the commodity which it has purchased to its whole-
    sale house in Laredo. Subsequently distributor 'BP will
    credit Wholesale Company 'A' with an amount equal to the
    freight rate on the commodity transported from Houston to
    Laredo.
    "2. Oil Company 'A' at Houston, Texas.,will enter
    into a written contract with a second party hereinafter
    called 'Bl whereby *Bt agrees to distribute the petroleum
    products of oil company 'A' in a limited territory. 'B'
    is the bona fide owner of the motor vehicle used for dis-
    tribution. Oil Company 'A' pays 'Bl a commission or
    fixed price for making the distribution.
    "Based upon the foregoing facts please give us your
    opinion on the following:
    "(1) In No. 1 above, is Wholesale Company 'A' oper-
    ating for hire, and if so, is it exempted from regulation
    and/or prosecution by this Commission because of the terms
    and provisions of House Bill No. 25, Acts of the 47th Leg-
    islature, 1941, which amends Section 1 of Article qllb,
    which is commonly known as the Private Carrier Act?
    Hon. James E. Kilday~,page 2   (O-4429)
    "(2) In No. 1 above, is distributor IBt guilty of
    violating the,Motor Carrier Act in the way of aiding and
    abetting, or is it exempt because of House Bill No. 
    25, supra
    .
    "(3) In No. 2 above, is Oil Company 'A' conducting
    a for hire motor vehicle operation in violation of the
    Motor Carrier Law of Texas or is such operation exempted
    by House Bill No. 
    25, supra
    ?
    “(4) In No. 2 above, is 'Bl guilty of violating the
    Motor Carrier Law of Texas, or~is it exempted by House
    Bill 
    25, supra
    ?
    The trucks used by Wholesale Grocery Company llAwas
    described in your first hypothetical fact situation, are, in
    our opinion, within the definition of a contract carrier con-
    tained in the motor carrier law and are subject to the provi-
    sions of Article ollb, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes under
    the case of New Way Lumber Company vs. Smith, 96 S.W.(2dg 282,
    by the Supreme Court of Texas. In this case the,Supreme Court
    said:
    "Under the facts stated here the carrying of lumber
    owned by the company in its own trucks does not exempt
    it from the provisions of this law. This is not a case
    where the trucks are operated exclusively within the in-
    corporated limits of a town or city; nor is it a case
    where the price of the goods delivered is the same as
    those undelivered. On the contrary, it is clearly a case
    where the price of the lumber includes a direct charge
    for the delivery thereof. The carrying charge is based
    directly on the distance traveled and the weight of the
    truck. Since the company receives compensation for the
    delivery of the lumber, it clearly appears that the trucks
    used come under the definition of a 'contract carrier,'
    ,   and are subject to the provisions of Article 911b."
    House Bill No. 2!59Acts of the 47th Legislature, pro-
    vides that the terms "motor carrierv and "contract carrieP as
    defined in the original motor carrier act, should not include
    the following:
    "(a) Any person having a regular, separate, fixed,
    and established place of business, other than a transpor-
    tation business, where goods, wares9 and merchandise are
    kept in stock and are primarily and regularly bought from
    the public or sold to the public or manufactured or pro-
    cessed by such person in the ordinary course of the mer-
    cantile, manufacturing, or processing business, and who,
    Han, James E. Kildays page 3   (O-4429)
    merely incidental to the operation of such business,
    transports over the highways of this State such goods
    of which such person is the bona fide owner by means of a
    motor vehicle of which such person is the bona fide owner;"
    For Wholesale Company "A9w and the trucks it uses in
    the manner described by you, to be within the above exception
    and therefore without the definition of a contract carrier and
    the New Way Lumber Company 
    case, supra
    , it must, among other
    things, keep merchandise in stock wprimarily,and regularly
    bought from the public or sold to the public," From your state-
    ment it would appear that Wholesale Grocery Company "A" does
    not meet this condition. A wholesale grocery company does not
    keep merchandise in stock primarily and regularly bought from
    the public nor does it keep merchandise in stock primarily and
    regularly sold to the public. It is common knowledge that
    wholesale grocery companies sell to retailers and,not to the
    public.
    In consequence, House Bill No. 25 does not exempt
    wholesale grocery company I8
    A I1from the operation of the .motor
    carrier law as decided by the Supreme Court in the New Way Lum-
    ber Company case.
    In answer to your second question, it is our opinion
    that the Distributor is not exempt under House Bill No. 25.
    The following provisions of House Bill No. 25 are ap-
    plicable to the hypothetical fact situation secondly described
    in your letter:
    l'(c) Where merely incidental to a regular, separate,
    fixed9 and established business, other than a transporta-
    tion business, the transportation of employees, petroleum
    products, and incidental supplies used or sold in connec-
    tion with the wholesale or retail sale of such petroleum
    products from the refinery or place of production or place
    of storage to the place of storage or place of sale and
    distribution to the ultimate consumers in a motor vehicle
    owned and used exclusi````y,;by-,the
    .bona!tfide,';consignee
    or
    agent or such single &rketer or refiner;'a~s'wellas where
    merely incidental to a regular, separate, fixed and estab-
    lished business, other than a transportation business,
    the transportation of petroleum, employees, material, sup-
    plies, and equipment for use in the departments of the
    petroleum business by the bona fide owner thereof in a
    vehicle of which he~is the bona fide owner; bona fide con-
    signee or agent as used herein being hereby defined and
    construed, for the purpose of this Act, to mean a person
    under contract with a single principal to distribute
    Hon. James E. Kilday, page 4   (O-4429)
    petroleum products in a limited territory and only for
    such single principal;"
    .
    Assuming, about which you do not state, that Distri-
    butor nBlcis under contract with Oil Company "A" only, all
    of the conditions prescribed in this Section of House Bill No.
    25 exist in reference to Oil Company *'A"and Distributor "Bl10
    Your third and fourth questions are therefore answered in the
    affirmative: that is, that Oil Company "A" and Distributor
    "B*tare exempt under-House Bill No. 25.
    Yours very truly
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    By /s/ Zollie C. Steakley
    Zollie C. Steakley, Assistant
    APPROVED FEB 24, 1942
    /s/ Grover Sellers
    FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
    APPROVED: C&INIO&~NC;TTEE
    BY:          ,
    ZCS:ej:wb
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-4429

Judges: Gerald Mann

Filed Date: 7/2/1942

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017