Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1988 )


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  •               THE    ATTORNEY    GENERAL
    OF TEXAS
    August 24, 1988
    Honorable John T. Montford         Opinion No.   JM-945
    Chairman
    State Affairs Committee            Re: Interpretation of 1987
    Texas State Senate                 amendments to chapter    162
    P. 0. Box 12068                    of the Property    Code re-
    Austin, Texas   78711              garding construction   funds
    or trust funds   (RQ-1402)
    Dear Senator Montford:
    YOU ask seven questions about the provisions         of
    chapters 53 and 162 of the Property Code as amended by House
    Bill No. 1160 in 1987. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 578, at
    2283. House Bill 1160 mad-e various provisions       for the
    protection of subcontractors    and other beneficiaries   of
    funds paid or held under construction     contracts, and its
    provisions operate in conjunction with the overall scheme of
    Texas Mechanic's, Contractor's,   or Materialman's Lien Law,
    chapter 53, Property Code.
    Chapter 162, as amended by House Bill No. 1160,
    provides that construction  payments or loan receipts held
    for the purpose of paying for improvements of real property,
    are Vrust funds"1 which may not be used or diverted by the
    holder until those who have furnished labor or materials for
    such improvements have been paid.
    Section 53.085, added by House Bill No. 1160, provides
    that a seller, or a person who has furnished labor or mater-
    ials for an improvement shall, upon request and as a condi-
    tion of final payment, furnish the purchaser an affidavit
    1.   Section 162.004(b) of the Property Code provides:
    The Texas Trust Act (chapters 111 through 115) does
    not apply to any trust created under this chapter, nor
    does this chapter affect any provision    of the Texas
    Trust Act.
    p. 4760
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 2      (JEsg45)
    stating that he has fully paid those who have furnished  him
    labor or materials for the improvement.  If he has not fully
    paid, the affidavit must state how much is owed for such
    labor or materials and to whom.
    Your first question is:
    Do the 1987 ,amendments to Chapter  162,
    Property Code, affect prior law concerning
    the applicability of that chapter to trans-
    actions involving banks, savings and loans,
    or other lenders. If so, in what ways do
    they change prior law?
    We answer your first question     in the negative.    Section
    162.004(a)(l) of the Property Code provides that chapter 162
    of the code does not apply to 'Iabank, savings and loan, or
    other lender."    This provision,  formerly part of article
    5472e, V.T.C.S., was recodified in the Property Code without
    substantive change in 1983. Acts 1983, 68th beg., ch. 576,
    S 7 at 3730.   Nor was section 162.004(a)(l) amended in 1987
    by House Bill No. 1160. See RevublicBank D llas, N.A
    Interk 1. U.L     691 S.W.%605     (Tex. 1985:   (consid&izg
    sectio: 162.00;(a)(l)   as formerly incorporated in article
    5472e, V.T.C.S.).
    Your second question is:
    Do   'expenses directly   related to    the
    .construction or repair of the improvement'
    under Section 162.031(b),     Property   Code,
    include the trustee%      overhead and other
    expenses which, though not readily traceable
    to a particular job, are necessary to obtain-
    ing or completing the job (e.g., office rent,
    employee   salaries,   workers'   compensation
    insurance,   liability  insurance, communica-
    tions bill, etc.)?
    Section 162.031 was amended by House Bill No. 1160.      Prior
    to that amendment section 162.031 read:
    (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b),
    a trustee who, with intent to         defraud,
    directly   or   indirectly   retains,    uses,
    disburses, or otherwise diverts trust    funds
    without first fully paying   all obligations
    incurred by the trustee to the beneficiaries
    of the trust funds, has misapplied the trust
    funds.
    p. 4761
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 3    (m-945)
    P
    (b) A trustee mav use trust funds to vav
    the trustee's  reasonable  overhead exwenses
    that are directlv related to the construction
    or revair of the imvrovement.       (Emphasis
    added.)
    Section 162.031 now reads:
    (a) A trustee    who,   intentionally
    knowingly or with intent to defraud, direct::
    or indirectly retains, uses, disburses,      or
    otherwise diverts trust funds without     first
    fully paying    all current     or past     due
    obligations incurred by the trustee to the
    beneficiaries  of   t.he tNSt     funds,    has
    misapplied the trust funds.
    (b) 1                                  to
    prosecution or other action brought under
    Subsection (a) that the trust funds not vaid
    to the beneficiaries of the trust were used
    bv the trustee to vav the trustee's    actual
    exnenses dlrectlv related to the construction
    or revair of the imvrovement or have been
    retained by the trustee, after notice to the
    beneficiary who has made a request for pay-
    ment, as a result of the trustee's reasonable
    belief that the beneficiary is not entitled
    to such funds or have been retained as
    authorized or required by Chapter 53.
    (c) It is also an affirmative defense to
    prosecution or  other action brought under
    Subsection (a) that the trustee paid the
    beneficiaries all trust funds which they are
    entitled to receive no later than 30 days
    following written  notice to the trustee of
    the filing of a criminal complaint or other
    notice of a pending criminal   investigation.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The bill analysis to House Bill No. 1160 indicates that
    section 162.031 was amended in response to the difficulties
    experienced by prosecutors in obtaining convictions.
    In McElrov V.   State, 
    720 S.W.2d 490
    (Tex. Crim. APP.
    1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals    affirmed the Dallas
    Appeals Court's reversal of a conviction under the provis-
    ions of section 162.031 as they appeared in former article
    5472e, V.T.C.S.    The Court of Criminal Appeals held that
    p. 4762
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 4     m-945)
    those provisions required the state to plead and prove that
    trust fund moneys had not been paid out for reasonable
    overhead expenses.   The court declined to reach the issue of
    the constitutionality, for purposes of criminal prosecution,
    of the %-easonable overhead" language, which two concurring
    judges in the lower Dallas court had found "vague on its
    face and thus void and unenforceable.11 ' &B      McElrov
    State, 
    667 S.W.2d 856
    , 869      (Tex. App. - Dallas      1981;
    (concurring opinion). The concurring opinion relied on the
    reasoning in Parks v. Libbv-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 
    195 N.E. 616
    , 622 (Ill. 1935): "[What is] deemed reasonable by one
    employer might well be considered unreasonable by another.")
    House Bill No. 1160 changed the words of the provision
    from "reasonable overhead" to "actual expenses,"   apparently
    in an effort to avoid a later judicial determination     that
    the provision was void for vagueness.    House Bill No. 1160
    also made the "actual expenses" provision     an affirmative
    defense, placing on criminal defendants the burden of prov-
    ing~ that expenditures were for "actual expenses" rather than
    requiring the state to prove that expenditures were not for
    actual expenses.    The words "directly related,"    however,
    were not altered when the prior language ltreasonable over-
    head directly   related" was changed to "actual expenses
    directly related."
    We do not believe that the requirement that expenses be
    "directly related" to the construction      or repair of the
    improvement means that expenses must necessarily be readily
    traceable to the improvement.     In considering   the phrase
    "reasonable overhead directly    related" in former article
    5472e, V.T.C.S.,    the court    in North Texas      Overating
    meers      Health Benefit Funds v. Dixie Masonarv. In c., 
    544 F. Supp. 516
    (N-D. Tex. 1982) stated, at 520:
    The expenses that cannot readily be traced to
    a   particular   project   are    nonetheless
    'directly related' if the job could not have
    been obtained or completed without them.
    .   .   .   .
    It only remains to be determined if     the
    method used to allocate expenses to each   job
    is proper.
    The court did not further discuss what would be a proper
    method of allocating expenses, finding only that no evidence
    had been presented "that the method used was unreasonable or
    unfair . . . .II 
    Id. at 520.
    p. 4763
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 5       (m-945)
    Discussions in both the House and Senate indicate the
    intended scope of the l'actual expenses" language added by
    House Bill No. 1160.
    Representative     Robnett:
    Do you intend that it is o.k. for a
    builder to pay his superintendent, secretary,
    computer,  pick-up tNCk,     office or    any
    administrative  expenses and other similar
    expenses related to the construction    of a
    home out of these trust funds?
    Representative    Parker:
    I think, yes, I certainly do and I [want
    to] direct your attention,   Buzz -- I think
    it's important -- to that 'directly related'
    now. I think there has to be a -- maybe you
    might need to ask a 'but for' question.  And
    'but for' the construction would I need to
    spend this money. And if it's related to
    construction, I think it's exempted.    I do
    -.          not think it presents a problem.2
    House Floor Debate (Point of Order - Tape 112, Side     B,
    5-30-87).
    Mr. Johansen   [Executive Vice President      of
    Texas Association of Builders]:
    [W]hen you have a multiplicity of loans
    and a multiplicity of houses under construc-
    tion it's almost impossible to track that
    money through and to prove that X draw was
    paid on X house when you have other on-going
    expenses and overhead -- overhead items that
    you need to pay.
    Senator Parker:
    [Builders got in trouble under the old
    law] because they refused to keep .decent
    records . . . what is so difficult   about
    2. Representative     Parker was the sponsor of House Bill
    No. 1160.
    p. 4764
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 6       (JM-945)
    [it]. It ought not to be that hard to figure
    out some proportion of your overhead -- total
    overhead that goes to per day, per month, per
    man hour worked.
    Senate Committee Hearing, Tapes 2 and 3, 5-19-87.
    In light of the foregoing, we conclude, in response  to
    your second question, that the words of section     162.031,
    "actual expenses directly related to the construction     or
    repair of the improvement,"    include overhead   and other
    expenses which, though not readily traceable to a particular
    job, are necessary  to obtaining or completing the job, so
    long as the expenses are 10actual,l'A,    have in fact been
    incurred.
    Your third question is:
    Way a contractor,   subcontractor or owner
    who becomes a trustee also be a beneficiary
    of the trust if he has furnished labor or
    materials: and, may he pay himself      as a
    beneficiary on the same basis that he pays
    the other beneficiaries?
    We refer again to the language of section        162.031,
    quoted in full above in the discussion        of your second
    question. We believe that the language in subsection (a) of
    section 162.031 -- "obligations   incurred by the trustee to
    the beneficiaries" -- indicates that for purposes of chapter
    162, a trustee of a given trust fund is not also to be
    considered a beneficiary   of .the trust fund.    It would be
    anomalous to provide that a person could llincurllobligations
    to himself.     Moreover,  if a trustee     could also be a
    beneficiary of the trust fund he held, there would be no
    reason to provide in subsection    (b) that a trustee may set
    up as an affirmative defense to an action for diversion      of
    trust funds the fact that the funds were used to pay the
    Vrustee's actual expenses directly related to the construc-
    tion or repair."     If the trustee could be considered       a
    beneficiary of the trust funds he held, his payment of his
    own actual expenses on the project from the trust fund would
    be a lawful payment to a beneficiary under subsection      (a),
    and the provision of subsection (b) that such payment may be
    set up as an affirmative defense would be unnecessary.
    Thus, we conclude that the statutory scheme of chapter      162
    does not contemplate that a trustee of funds thereunder
    might also be considered a beneficiary of such funds within
    the meaning of the chapter's provisions.
    'p. 4765
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 7      (JM-945)
    Your fourth question is:
    If a trustee has paid all current or past
    due obligations  to beneficiaries   of trust
    funds, may remaining trust funds be used for
    any purpose, whether related or unrelated to
    the construction  of the repair or improve-
    ment?
    Subsection   (a) of section    162.031, quoted  in the
    discussion regarding your second question, indicates that if
    a trustee has "first fully [paid] all current or past due
    obligations incurred by the trustee to the beneficiaries,"
    he may then retain, use, disperse or otherwise divert moneys
    in the fund without   thereby misapplying the funds.     The
    words "current or past due" were added to the section's
    provisions by House Bill NO. 1160.3
    In the House discussion  on House Bill No. 160 on   May
    30, 1987, the following exchange took place:
    Representative   Parker:
    I assume if you pay your current or past
    due obligations, then I assume that if the
    rest is profit, I assume that you can use
    that.
    Representative   Heflin:
    So there would be no way that a person
    would have to set aside the profit  for a
    particular project until that project was
    absolutely complete,  if he stayed current
    with his obligations.
    3. Section 162.005(2) defines current or past due
    obligations as "those obligations incurred or owed by the
    trustee for labor or materials furnished    in the direct
    prosecution of the work under the construction    contract
    prior to the receipt of the trust funds and which are due
    and payable by the trustee no later than 30 days following
    receipt of the trust funds."
    p. 4766
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 8         @M-945)
    Representative      Parker:
    I can tell you absolutely that that is not
    the intent of the bill.
    In response to your fourth question,    it is apparent
    from the ,House discussion    in connection with the added
    "current or past due obligations** language,   and from the
    plain meaning of the provision itself, that money  remaining
    in the fund after payment of current and past due obliga-
    tions can lawfully be diverted to other purposes     by the
    trustee.
    Your fifth question is:
    Does the notice requirement    in Section
    162.031(b), Property Code, apply only to the
    affirmative defense of funds retained by the
    trustee or does it also apply to the defense
    of use of funds to pay actual expenses
    directly  related to the construction     or
    repair?
    Section   162.031(b)    of the code states in part:
    (b) It is an affirmative     defense . . .
    that the trust funds not paid to the bene-
    ficiaries of the trust were used by the
    trustee to pay the trustee's actual expenses
    . . . or have been retained bv the trustee,
    after otice to the beneficiarv who has made
    a reguist  for payment, as a result of the
    trustee's   reasonable    belief   that    the
    beneficiary is not entitled to such funds or
    have been retained as authorized or required
    by Chapter 53.   (Emphasis added.)
    Prop. Code 5 162.031(b). The underlined phrase stating the
    notice requirement modifies only "have been retained."  The
    notice requirement in section 162.031(b) does not apply to
    the other two affirmative defenses there provided for: that
    the funds were used to pay the trustee's actual expenses
    directly related to the project, or were retained under the
    provisions of chapter 53 of the Property Code.
    p. 4767
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 9     (JM-945)
    Your sixth question is: -
    Does Section 53.085, Property Code, create
    a duty for a contractor to require affidavits
    from all persons     who furnish labor     or
    materials on a property?
    Section 53.085, which was added by House Bill No. 1160,
    1987, provides:
    AFFIDAVIT REQUIRED.   (a) Any person who
    furnishes labor or materials for the con-
    struction of improvements on real property
    shall, upon request and as a condition       of
    final payment   for such labor or materials,
    provide to the requesting      party, or its
    agent, an affidavit stating that such person
    has paid     each   of   his   subcontractors,
    laborers, or materialmen     in full for all
    labor and materials provided to him for the
    construction.   In the event that the person
    has not paid each of his subcontractors,
    laborers, or material-men in full, the person
    shall state in the affidavit the amount owed
    and the name of each subcontractor,   laborer,
    or materialman to whom such payment is owed.
    (b) The seller of any real            property
    shall, upon request by the purchaser or its
    agent prior to closing of the purchase         of
    such real property, provide to such purchaser
    or its agent, a written affidavit         stating
    that the seller has        paid each of       his
    contractors, laborers, or materialmen in full
    for all labor and materials provided to the
    seller for any construction of improvements
    on the real property   and that the seller     is
    not indebted     to any     person,   firm,    or
    corporation   by    reason     of    any     such
    construction.  In the event that the seller
    has not paid      each of his       contractors,
    laborers, or materialmen in full, the seller
    shall state in the affidavit the amount owed
    and the name of each contractor, laborer, or
    materialman to whom such payment is owed.
    (c) A person, including a seller, commits
    offense   if the person   intentionally,
    Eowingly,    or recklessly makes a false or
    misleading statement   in an affidavit  under
    p. 4768
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 10   (Jm-845)
    this section. An offense under this       section
    is a Class A misdemeanor.
    Subsection (a) of section 53.085 authorizes a person
    such as a contractor to request, as a condition of final
    payment, that "any person who furnishes labor or materials"
    for a construction project    furnish him an all-bills-paid
    affidavit or an a~ffidavit stating which bills remain unpaid.
    There is no indication    in the statutory language that a
    person such as a contractor is reauired to request or obtain
    such affidavits.
    Before paying a subcontraator, for example, a contract-
    or is entitled under section 53.085 to request that the sub-
    contractor as a condition   of final payment   furnish such
    affidavit to the contractor,    but the section does not
    require that the     contractor   request  or obtain    such
    affidavit.
    Similarly, if the contractor is seeking payment     from
    the,owner, for example, the owner is entitled, but is not
    required, under section 53.085 to request such affidavit
    from the contractor as a condition of payment.   In this case
    as well, there is nothing in section 53.085 to indicate that     .-
    the request for the contractor's affidavit    creates a duty
    for the contractor    to in turn request affidavits      from
    subcontractors, materialmen or others doing work under the
    contractor.   He may, but is not required, to request such
    affidavits.   We therefore answer your sixth question in the
    negative.
    Your seventh, and last, question is:
    In making an affidavit, does a contractor
    impliedly represent that it is based on re-
    ceiving affidavits from each of the persons
    from whom such affidavits may be required?
    We believe  it follows from our discussion    regarding
    your sixth question that the answer to your seventh question
    is ~No.~   Since a contractor   furnishing an affidavit    on
    request to the owner, for example,     is not required     to
    request affidavits from subcontractors, etc., working   under
    him, the contractor's affidavit cannot be read as impliedly
    representing that it is based on the affidavits       of his
    subcontractors, etc. A contractor may make his affidavit
    based on information obtained through other means than the
    affidavit  procedure  which under section 53.085 he         *
    entitled,  but not required,    to use.    Of course,     tit:
    contractor's affidavit may, if the contractor so chooses,
    4769
    .
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 11   m-945)
    ,--
    xv   sly represent that it-is based on the affidavits     of
    zhoLzsunder the contractor whose affidavits he has obtained.
    It might, moreover, be wise for the contractor to obtain the
    affidavits  of those under him and expressly        base his
    affidavit on the affidavits he has obtained, so as to avoid
    a penalty under subsection      (c) of section 53.085 for
    "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly11 making "a false or
    misleading statement."  But again, there is nothing in the
    controlling statutory provisions   which reouires   the con-
    tractor to obtain the affidavits of those under him, or
    which makes the contractor's  affidavit a representation   by
    implication  that he has in fact obtained        such   other
    affidavits and has based his affidavit on them.
    SUMMARY
    The 1987 amendments to chapter 162 of
    the Property Code do not affect prior law
    concerning the applicability of that chapter
    to banks,   savings   and loans, or    other
    lenders.
    In section  l62..031(b) of the Property
    Code "actual expenses directly related to the
    construction or repair of the improvement,"
    include overhead and other expenses which,
    though not readily traceable to a particular
    job, are necessary to obtaining or completing
    the job, so long as such expenses         are
    "actual," i.e., have in fact been incurred.
    A contractor, subcontractor or owner who
    becomes  a trustee of construction      funds
    within the meaning of chapter 162 may not
    also be considered   a beneficiary   of such
    funds within the meaning of that chapter.
    If a trustee has paid all current or
    past due obligations to beneficiaries        of
    trust funds under Property Code         section
    162.031, he may use remaining trust   funds for
    other lawful purposes whether       related or
    unrelated to the project in connection     with
    which the trust fund was created.
    Section    162.03‘1,   subsection   (b),
    requires notice to a beneficiary who has made
    a request for payment only where the trustee
    has retained    funds as a result of      the
    ,--              trustee's    reasonable   belief   that   the
    p. 4770
    Honorable John T. Montford - Page 12    (JM-945)
    beneficiary is not entitled to such funds.
    The notice requirement  in subsection (b) is
    not applicable   to the other     affirmative
    defenses provided for in that subsection.
    Section 53.085 does not require, but
    only entitles, a contractor to request, as a
    condition of final payment, affidavits   from
    all persons who have furnished      labor or
    materials on the project.
    In making  an affidavit   under section
    53.085, a contractor does not, by virtue  of
    that section,  impliedly represent  that his
    affidavit is based on affidavits from those
    persons from whom the contractor is entitled
    to request affidavits.
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    MARYKKLLKR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    mu MCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney 'General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLHY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, opinion Committee
    Prepared by William Walker
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 4771
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-945

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1988

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017