Loneta Lindberg v. Michael Lindberg ( 2022 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 6, 2022
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-21-00481-CV
    LONETA LINDBERG, Appellant
    V.
    MICHAEL LINDBERG, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
    Rockwall County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-0808
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Nowell
    Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
    Appellant Loneta Lindberg appeals the judgment rendered in favor of appellee
    Michael Lindberg, her stepson, by Rockwall County Court at Law No. 1 (the trial
    court). The judgment terminated a life estate in property awarded to Loneta in a
    Family Settlement Agreement (FSA) as part of the probate of the estate of her late-
    husband, Charles A. Lindberg (decedent). In a single issue, Loneta contends the trial
    court lacked jurisdiction over Michael’s claims and, as such, the judgment is void.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    This case arises out of the probate of the Estate of Charles A. Lindberg
    (decedent) in Rockwall County Court at Law No. 1. Loneta is the decedent’s
    surviving spouse. Michael is the decedent’s son and Loneta’s stepson. During the
    probate proceedings, disputes arose between the beneficiaries and parties interested
    in the Estate concerning terms of the decedent’s Will and other matters. The probate
    action was ultimately resolved in June 2014 by issuance of a Judgment Declaring
    Heirship, a Special Warranty Deed, and a Family Settlement Agreement between
    the parties dated June 10, 2014 (FSA).
    Loneta and Michael voluntarily executed the FSA1, which addressed
    ownership of a home in Rockwall (the Property) purchased by Charles and Loneta
    during their marriage. The FSA provided that the Property would be conveyed to
    Michael by special warranty deed, and Loneta would have a life estate in the
    Property “as long as she occupies the Property as a homestead” and pays “all taxes
    on the home and will maintain the home during her life estate.” The FSA further
    provided that Loneta’s personal property and household effects will be removed
    from the Property within thirty days of termination of the life estate.
    The deed provides that the life estate carried with it “the duty of maintenance,
    upkeep, insurance and real property taxes . . . .” The deed further provides that
    1
    The decedent’s daughter, Karen D. Richard, was also a signatory to the FSA. Karen is now deceased
    and was not a party to the underlying proceeding.
    –2–
    Michael “may take all legal and equitable action to terminate the life estate” if
    Loneta “should fail to perform these duties and continue to fail to perform these
    duties for a period of ninety (90) days after written notice from [Michael] to do
    so . . . .”
    In the underlying proceeding, Michael sued to terminate the life estate and
    evict Loneta. Michael contended that Loneta breached the FSA by failing to pay the
    2019 property taxes and certain homeowner’s association (HOA) dues. Michael filed
    a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    In a single issue, Loneta contends the judgment is void because the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction over the action. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction
    is a question of law that we review de novo. Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control,
    Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 
    489 S.W.3d 448
    , 451 (Tex. 2016); Tex. Dep’t of Parks
    & Wildlife v. Miranda, 
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 226 (Tex. 2004); Chambers v. Pruitt, 
    241 S.W.3d 679
    , 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Here, Loneta argues that the
    underlying action was an action for recovery of real property that falls outside of the
    trial court’s statutorily-given jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 26.043(8) (“A
    county court does not have jurisdiction in a suit for the recovery of land.”). We
    disagree.
    To begin, this action does not involve the determination of title or the recovery
    of real property. Rather, Michael claimed Loneta breached the FSA and the terms of
    –3–
    the deed and sought summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. Section
    26.043(8) is, therefore, inapplicable here. Moreover, the trial court’s expanded
    statutory jurisdiction encompassed Michael’s claims.
    The trial court is one of two statutory county courts in Rockwall County. TEX.
    GOV’T CODE § 25.2011. The trial court’s jurisdiction is prescribed by sections
    25.0003 and 25.2012 of the government code. TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 25.003,
    25.2012. Section 25.0003 contains the general grant of jurisdiction and provides, in
    part, that statutory county courts have concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in
    civil cases in which the amount in controversy is between $500 and $250,000. Id. §
    25.0003(c)(1). As a statutory county court, the trial court also has expanded statutory
    jurisdiction. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.2012. Specifically, the trial court has the same
    jurisdiction provided by the state constitution and general law for district courts.
    TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.2012(a), 25.0003. The trial court’s expanded statutory
    jurisdiction excludes only four types of cases, none of which apply here. TEX. GOV’T
    CODE § 25.2012(b). If a specific statutory provision confers jurisdiction, the specific
    provision controls over the general limitation of section 26.043. Contemporary
    Contractors, Inc. v. Centerpoint Apt. Ltd. P/S, No. 05-13-00614-CV, 
    2014 WL 3051321
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
    Thielemann v. Kethan, 
    371 S.W.3d 286
    , 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
    pet. denied) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.0001(a))).
    –4–
    Michael’s breach of contract action falls within the trial court’s expanded
    jurisdiction. See Chambers, 
    241 S.W.3d at 684
     (county court had jurisdiction to
    decide breach of contract case). Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to decide
    the underlying case. We overrule Loneta’s sole appellate issue.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the parties’
    claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    210481f.p05                                /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
    ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
    JUSTICE
    –5–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    LONETA LINDBERG, Appellant                     On Appeal from the County Court at
    Law No. 1, Rockwall County, Texas
    No. 05-21-00481-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-0808.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
    MICHAEL LINDBERG, Appellee                     Kipness. Justices Pedersen, III and
    Nowell participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellee MICHAEL LINDBERG recover his costs of
    this appeal from appellant LONETA LINDBERG.
    Judgment entered this 6th day of June 2022.
    –6–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-21-00481-CV

Filed Date: 6/6/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2022