Retail Services WIS Corporation D/B/A Product Connections, Nathan Stout, Amanda Villa, and Katherine Palmer v. Crossmark, Inc. ( 2021 )

Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Opinion Filed May 4, 2021
In the
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-00937-CV
RETAIL SERVICES WIS CORPORATION D/B/A PRODUCT
CONNECTIONS, NATHAN STOUT, AMANDA VILLA,
AND KATHERINE PALMER, Appellants
V.
CROSSMARK, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 429-05122-2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Schenck, Reichek, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
Appellee Crossmark, Inc. filed this lawsuit after appellants Nathan Stout,
Amanda Villa, and Katherine Palmer left its employ and went to work for appellant
Retail Services WIS Corp. d/b/a Product Connections. In this accelerated
interlocutory appeal, appellants challenge the trial court’s order granting a temporary
injunction requested by Crossmark. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(4).
Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion when it signed the
temporary injunction order because (1) the order is overbroad and vague in violation
of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683, (2) Crossmark failed to satisfy the
requirements for injunctive relief, and (3) the portion of the temporary injunction
order granting Crossmark access to appellants’ electronic devices does not comply
with Texas law. We reverse the temporary injunction order in part and remand in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
Crossmark and Product Connections are competitors in the business of
providing large retailers with “in-store consumer experience” services, including
“public in-store demonstrations for consumers to directly interact with brand
spokespersons and sample a range of products.” Product Connections CEO Jim Rose
is a former Crossmark executive.
Crossmark filed this lawsuit on October 6, 2020, against appellants, Mr. Rose,
and two other former Crossmark employees, John Jason Gramling and Casey King.
The causes of action asserted were (1) “breach of contract/breach of non-disclosure
(actual and probable),” “breach of contract–non-solicitation,” and breach of
fiduciary duty against the former employee defendants; (2) “breach of contract–non-
compete” against Mr. Gramling, Mr. Stout, and Ms. Villa; (3) “violations of the
Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (actual and probable)” and conspiracy against all
defendants; (4) conversion against Product Connections; and (5) “tortious
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interference with contract” against Product Connections and Mr. Rose. Specifically,
Crossmark complained of improper solicitation of its employees and clients and
improper use of confidential information pertaining to its “digital
transformation/virtual engagement” product and strategy and its “playbook” that
“has taken decades to develop” and “includes a wealth of confidential information
such as best practices, protocols, operating procedures, manuals, training guides, and
other documents.”
Crossmark’s petition also sought several types of injunctive relief, including
a temporary injunction that would not only enjoin certain acts but also require the
defendants to produce company and personal digital storage devices for forensic
review by Crossmark’s expert.
The attachments to Crossmark’s petition included, among other things,
(1) contracts executed by Mr. Stout and Ms. Villa containing confidentiality, non-
compete, and non-solicitation provisions, and (2) a contract purportedly executed
electronically by Ms. Palmer containing confidentiality and non-solicitation
provisions. The non-compete provisions in those contracts applied for six months
after termination of employment and the non-solicitation provisions applied for one
year after employment terminated. There was no time limit on the confidentiality
provisions.
At the October 20, 2020 hearing on Crossmark’s application for a temporary
injunction, Crossmark presented evidence from four witnesses: Crossmark’s
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retained forensic expert, David Cowen; Crossmark executive vice president Bryan
Lynch; and Crossmark employees Cody Long and Becca Williams. Product
Connections called a single witness, Ms. King. The evidence also included the
employment contracts described above.
Mr. Cowen testified he is a managing director in cyber services at KPMG.
Crossmark retained him to conduct a forensic examination of a Crossmark
“Windows 10” laptop computer provided to Ms. King during her Crossmark
employment and “an external storage device otherwise known as a thumb drive” that
was “returned by Miss King upon request by Crossmark” after her termination date.
His examination showed that on June 12, 2020, Ms. King downloaded “a file that
appears to be the offer that she got from Product Connections” and “emptied her
recycle bin” by deleting more than 1,800 files placed in the bin during the previous
two years. On June 18, 2020, the thumb drive was plugged into Ms. King’s
Crossmark laptop and thirteen files were copied from the laptop onto the thumb
drive. A list of those files compiled by Mr. Cowen was admitted into evidence. Mr.
Cowen testified that subsequently, on June 30, 2020, and July 27, 2020, the thumb
drive was plugged into a “Mac computer, which is not her Crossmark computer” and
those files were “accessed.” On June 19, 2020, there was a Google search on Ms.
King’s Crossmark laptop for “how to delete Google Chrome cache,” and 57,000
Chrome cache entries were deleted. Mr. Cowen stated it is his understanding that
Ms. King was still working for Crossmark on June 19, 2020.
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Mr. Lynch testified Mr. Stout, Ms. Villa, and Ms. Palmer reported directly to
him while they were employed at Crossmark and Ms. King reported to him indirectly
through Ms. Palmer. All four employees worked on the “events team” for
Crossmark’s Client X,1 which Mr. Lynch oversaw. Mr. Lynch stated Crossmark’s
records show all four employees signed confidentiality agreements.
According to Mr. Lynch, the events team utilized information that Crossmark
considers confidential, including multiple playbooks and digital transformation
strategies. One such strategy is a “digital demo” product Crossmark began working
on in December 2019 and launched in May 2020, which replaces the product
demonstration associate with “an interface where the [consumer] is allowed to,
through the—the use of QR code, gain incremental knowledge.” Mr. Lynch testified
Crossmark’s digital demo product currently in stores “is just the tip of the iceberg”
and “is a multigenerational strategy” that Crossmark is working to enhance in
various ways it considers confidential. Both Ms. Palmer and Ms. King worked on
the digital demo product and digital transformation strategy. Ms. Palmer had a
central role in putting together the Client X presentation for the digital demo product.
Mr. Lynch stated Crossmark took multiple steps to protect the digital transformation
1
Appellee’s appellate brief and substantial portions of this appeal’s record were filed under seal.
Additionally, following oral submission in this Court, the trial court signed two permanent sealing orders
covering specified portions of the record. Regarding the sealed materials, we make “every effort to preserve
the confidentiality of the information the parties have designated as confidential,” MasterGuard L.P. v. Eco
Techs. Int’l, LLC, 441 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.), consistent with our obligation
to hand down a public opinion explaining our decisions based on the record. See Kartsotis v. Bloch, 503
S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).
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strategy documents and information it considered confidential, including limiting
access to electronic information and requiring employees to sign confidentiality
agreements. He stated this information would give a competitor “insight into what
we’re working on” and an opportunity “to cut corners and create a shortcut to allow
them to be able to compete effectively and potentially even, you know, take it further
faster than we are.”
Mr. Lynch stated those four employees left Crossmark at different times. Mr.
Stout and Ms. Villa left in August 2019. They resigned on the same day and both
told Mr. Lynch they were leaving for personal reasons. According to Mr. Lynch, Mr.
Stout denied any knowledge of Product Connections or WIS Corporation and denied
he was planning to work for either one. Neither Mr. Stout nor Ms. Villa mentioned
option-to-hire agreements they had negotiated with Product Connections. Ms.
Palmer resigned in January 2020 and told Mr. Lynch her new employer had asked
that she not publicize where she was going. Ms. King resigned in June 2020 and also
declined to share where she was going.
Mr. Lynch stated he became “concerned” when, less than a week after
Crossmark launched its digital demo product in May 2020, he saw on social media
that Product Connections was launching an “eerily similar execution” that was “a
very strong replica of the work we had been working on.” He stated the social media
video he saw “mirrored almost identically what we had done” in the Client X digital
demo presentation. Both Ms. Villa and Ms. Palmer appeared in the social media
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video. Related social media posts mentioned that Product Connections’ technology
was “patent pending.” Mr. Lynch also (1) testified that the names of “a lot” of the
files on the list of “accessed” thumb drive files described above suggested they
“might relate to work that Miss King did at Crossmark” and (2) explained that his
basis for that reasoning was that multiple file names on the list contained terms
pertaining to Crossmark’s Client X services.
Mr. Long testified that in June 2020, he was on furlough from Crossmark due
to the Covid-19 pandemic. Mr. Stout, a work acquaintance formerly at Crossmark,
sent him a LinkedIn message asking how he was doing. Mr. Stout’s LinkedIn
message asked Mr. Long to call him “to catch up” and stated, “I would suggest that
you don’t let people know I reached out to check up on you. Red flags or penalty
flags would come down everywhere.” When Mr. Long called him, Mr. Stout told
Mr. Long about a new position opening up at Product Connections that was similar
to Mr. Long’s current position at Crossmark. Mr. Stout told Mr. Long he had spoken
with customers and merchants in the industry, including specific Crossmark
customers, and Mr. Long “came highly recommended.” Mr. Stout asked him not to
tell people about their phone conversation and told him Mr. Gramling or Ms. Palmer
would “reach out” to him about the position.
Ms. Williams testified that prior to Ms. Villa’s departure from Crossmark, Ms.
Villa was her supervisor and they were friends. Ms. Williams stated Ms. Villa told
her “confidential information that she said that she was not supposed to share.”
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Specifically, on one occasion during a Crossmark shopper event “there was a
meeting that was being held in Dallas.” Ms. Villa, Mr. Gramling, and Mr. Stout
“were telling people that the meeting was to go with the client to audit [stores],” but
Ms. Williams “later found out that they were actually going to meet with Jim Rose
while they were in Dallas.” Ms. Williams stated, “It was later on down the road that
I found out that the plan was to not continue employment with Crossmark long-term
but to continue to explore opportunities outside of Crossmark with Jason and Jim
Rose.”
Ms. King testified that the only files she transferred from her Crossmark
computer to the thumb drive were personal files. She stated she did not take any
Crossmark data, did not give Product Connections any Crossmark confidential or
proprietary data, and did not intend to steal or misappropriate any Crossmark
confidential or trade secret data.
The trial court signed an October 23, 2020 order granting Crossmark a
temporary injunction against Product Connections, Mr. Stout, Ms. Villa, and Ms.
Palmer. The temporary injunction states appellants are “enjoined” from:
(a) offering for sale, marketing or selling any product or services
derived in whole or in part from CROSSMARK trade secret or
confidential information.
(b) using, disclosing or transferring, or assisting or encouraging others
to use, disclose or transfer, any trade secret, confidential, or proprietary
information, knowledge, know-how, reverse know-how, documents,
data, or other intellectual property of CROSSMARK, including, but not
limited to, any trade secret or confidential information, knowledge,
know-how, reverse know-how, documents, data or other intellectual
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property that any Former Employee received, maintained, developed or
had access to during or after the course of his or her employment at
CROSSMARK.
(c) interfering with any contracts or agreements CROSSMARK has
with any current or former employees, including, but not limited to,
knowingly hiring any CROSSMARK current or former employees to
cause them to breach any agreement with CROSSMARK or otherwise
encouraging such employees to breach any restrictive covenants owed
to CROSSMARK.
(d) (i) the Former Employees are prohibited from recruiting or
soliciting, or attempting to recruit or solicit, directly, indirectly or by
assisting or encouraging others, any persons formerly or currently
employed by or associated with CROSSMARK, or contacting or
communicating with or directing or assisting others in connecting or
communicating with, any such current or former employees for the
purpose of inducing such persons to terminate their employment with
CROSSMARK; and (ii) Product Connections will refrain from
recruiting or soliciting, or attempting to recruit or solicit, directly,
indirectly, or by assisting or encouraging others, any persons formerly
or currently employed by or associated with CROSSMARK, any such
current or former employees for the purpose of obtaining
CROSSMARK confidential and proprietary information or to induce
CROSSMARK’s clients and customers to divert, withdraw, curtail or
cancel any of their business with CROSSMARK; notwithstanding this
restriction, nothing prevents any CROSSMARK employees from
responding to a general solicitation not specifically targeted toward him
or her, or from initiating contact with Product Connections on their own
volition and initiative, and without any direct or indirect solicitation by
Product Connections.
(e) for a period of (6) months, Stout and Villa are prohibited from, on
behalf of a competitor, including Product Connections, (i) directly or
indirectly servicing, diverting, or taking away any Covered Clients and
Customers, (ii) directly or indirectly providing a service to Covered
Clients and Customers, or (iii) conducting any business on behalf of
Product Connections or any other business that offers events and retail
merchandising services that are substantially similar to the activities
Stout and Villa conducted on behalf of CROSSMARK.
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(f) interfering with any contracts or agreements CROSSMARK has
with [Client X and Client Y], or otherwise directly or indirectly, or by
assisting or encouraging others, taking any steps to cause any current
client or customer of CROSSMARK, including [Client X and Client
Y], to divert, withdraw, curtail or cancel any of their business with
CROSSMARK.
(g) the Former Employees are prohibited from soliciting or attempting
to solicit, directly or indirectly, or by assisting or encouraging others,
to call on or market services or products to CROSSMARK Covered
Customers and Clients.
(h) inducing or attempting to induce or soliciting or attempting to
solicit, in any manner, directly or indirectly, or by assisting or
encouraging others, or calling on, marketing products or services to, or
performing engagements for [Client X or Client Y]; notwithstanding
this prohibition, (i) Product Connections is not prohibited from
responding to an RFP from [Client X and Client Y] that either initiates
on its own volition, without direct or indirect solicitation by Product
Connections, or (ii) if CROSSMARK is terminated by [Client X or
Client Y] prior to the expiration of any current agreement’s term
without solicitation or interference by Product Connections, this
provision does not prohibit Product Connections from responding to a
request for proposal received from that client or customer.
(i) prohibiting and restraining Palmer from working for Product
Connections or any other competitor’s events and retail merchandising
business in a capacity that would likely result in the Former Employees’
use or disclosure of CROSSMARK trade secrets or confidential or
proprietary information, including specifically trade secret, confidential
and proprietary information relating to digital transformation, virtual
engagement, and digital demo services.
(j) prohibiting Product Connections from including in its virtual
engagement experience or digital demo product any features, benefits
and functionality that is or derives from CROSSMARK’s trade secret,
confidential or proprietary information, including any innovation that
Palmer learned of while employed by CROSSMARK.
(k) altering, deleting, removing or writing over in any respect any
documents, computer files (including, but not limited to, e-mails, hard
drives, thumb drives, disc drives, zip drives), data, drafts or other
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materials obtained from or belonging to CROSSMARK or containing
or referring to CROSSMARK’s trade secrets or confidential or
proprietary information, including any such devices, servers or other
storage means, to which CROSSMARK documents or confidential
information have been copied.
(l) altering, deleting, removing or writing over in any respect any
documents, computer files (including, but not limited to, e-mails, hard
drives, thumb drives, disc drives, zip drives), data, communications,
drafts or other things relating in any way to (i) any business relationship
between the Former Employees and existing or prospective customers
or clients of CROSSMARK to whom the Former Employees provided
or plan to provide products and/or services since leaving
CROSSMARK, until such time as those materials may be turned over
in discovery or until further order of the Court; (ii) the Former
Employees’ actual or potential employment by Product Connections,
including any contact of the Former Employees by anyone at Product
Connections before they became employed by Product Connections;
(iii) the Former Employees’ solicitation or recruitment of persons
employed by CROSSMARK to join Product Connections until such
time as those materials may be turned over in discovery or until further
order of the Court; and (iv) the Former Employees’ direct or indirect
attempts to solicit from or perform for any Covered Client or Customer
any services which are similar to or the same as any services that
CROSSMARK performs or solicits.
Additionally, the temporary injunction contains a “Device Turnover Order”
(DTO) that states:
The Court further ORDERS that, in light of Defendants’ conduct to
date which reveals efforts of deception and concealment and actual
misappropriation of CROSSMARK Confidential Information by at
least one Former Employee, and in order to maintain the status quo,
Defendants must immediately produce to CROSSMARK’s outside
counsel for forensic inspection any company or personal laptops, hard
drives, thumb drives (including all thumb drives used by any Former
Employee while working for CROSSMARK) or other digital storage
devices (1) used by the Former Employees in their work for Product
Connections and which contain CROSSMARK information, (2) used
by the Former Employees while working for CROSSMARK, and (3) in
possession of Defendants on which may be maintained
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CROSSMARK’s Confidential Information and Trade Secrets.
CROSSMARK shall treat the production of these devices as
“Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” as defined in the Proposed Protective Order
filed conjunctively with this Petition, and shall only permit a forensic
expert to review these devices after signing the protective order on an
“Attorneys’ Eyes Only” basis.
Appellants filed a November 5, 2020 “Emergency Motion to Clarify Device
Turnover Order.” They contended, among other things, that (1) “there exists a
dispute between the Parties as to whether the three prongs in the Device Turnover
Order are intended to be conjunctive or disjunctive”; (2) the phrase “may be
maintained” and the term “CROSSMARK information” are excessively broad; and
(3) the DTO is improper because “Crossmark made no showing that it is unable to
acquire appropriate discovery through reasonable means, or that Defendants would
not comply with such requests.”2 The trial court held a November 17, 2020 hearing
at which it orally “clarified” that the order requires appellants to turn over any
devices that meet any one of the three prongs and that the third prong’s phrase “may
be maintained” means “is maintained.” After this appeal was filed, this Court granted
appellants’ request to stay the DTO pending this appeal’s resolution.
Analysis
2
On that same date, appellants also filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in which
they asked that the trial court (1) specify the causes of action as to which Crossmark “has shown itself
entitled to injunctive relief based on a probable right to relief” and (2) “issue findings of fact on the basis
of its ruling that Plaintiff has shown a “probable, irreparable, and imminent injury” in the event Defendants
are not prohibitively enjoined as set forth in the Order (items (a)–(l)), and mandatorily enjoined to
immediately produce their personal and work computers, hard drives, and other storage devices for forensic
examination, as ordered . . . .” The trial court did not file findings of fact or conclusions of law.
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The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
subject matter of a suit pending a trial on the merits. Wimbrey v. WorldVentures
Mktg., LLC, No. 05-19-01520-CV, 2020 WL 7396007, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d
198, 204 (Tex. 2002)). The extraordinary equitable remedy of an injunction must be
carefully regulated and confined to proper cases. El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc.,
356 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
There are two general types of temporary injunctions: prohibitive and
mandatory. Health Care Servs. Corp. v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr., 495 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.). A prohibitive injunction forbids conduct, and a
mandatory injunction requires it. Id.To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three
elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief
sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru,
84 S.W.3d at 204. The probable right to relief element does not require the applicant
to show that it will prevail at trial, nor does it require the trial court to evaluate the
probability that the applicant will prevail at trial. Young Gi Kim v. Ick Soo Oh, No.
05-19-00947-CV, 2020 WL 2315854, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, it requires the applicant to present enough evidence to raise
a bona fide issue as to its right to ultimate relief. Id. This requires the applicant to
produce some evidence supporting every element of at least one valid legal theory.
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Id.; see also Dallas Anesthesiology Assocs., P.A. v. Tex. Anesthesia Grp., P.A., 190
S.W.3d 891, 896–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“To establish a probable
right to the relief sought, an applicant is required to allege a cause of action and offer
evidence that tends to support the right to recover on the merits.”). A party proves
irreparable injury for injunction purposes by proving damages would not adequately
compensate the injured party or cannot be measured by any certain proper pecuniary
standard. Young Gi Kim, 2020 WL 2315854, at *5. A preliminary mandatory
injunction is proper only if a mandatory order is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury or extreme hardship. Health Care Servs., 495 S.W.3d at 238 (citing Iranian
Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex.1981)).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires every order granting a temporary
injunction to state the reasons for its issuance, be specific in terms, and describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act
or acts sought to be restrained. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The purpose of the rule is to
ensure that parties are adequately informed of the acts they are enjoined from doing
and why they are enjoined from doing them. El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 744. Thus,
the order must be specific and legally sufficient on its face and not merely
conclusory, and it must be definite, clear and precise as possible. See id. The trial
court must set out in the temporary injunction order the reasons the court deems it
proper to issue the injunction, including the reasons why the applicant will suffer
injury if the injunctive relief is not ordered. Id. (citing State v. Cook United, Inc., 464
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S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971)); see Freedom LHV, LLC v. IFC White Rock, Inc., No.
05-15-01528-CV, 2016 WL 3548012, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2016, pet.
dism’d) (mem. op.) (“[C]onclusory recitals of the elements of a temporary injunction
without explanation, including about how [applicant] would suffer probable,
imminent, and irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, are insufficient.”). The
requirements of rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed, even if a
sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere in the record. El Tacaso, 356
S.W.3d at 745.
The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. E.g., Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993);
Health Care Servs., 495 S.W.3d at 338. A reviewing court should reverse an order
granting injunctive relief only if the trial court abused its discretion. Butnaru, 84
S.W.3d at 204; see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,
241 (Tex. 1985) (trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or without
reference to any guiding rules or principles). Our abuse-of-discretion review requires
that we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order,
indulging every reasonable inference in its favor,” and defer to the trial court’s
resolution of conflicting evidence. Amend v. Watson, 333 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance LLC,
No. 05-19-01261-CV, 2020 WL 4581649, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2020,
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no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court has broad discretion in determining whether
pleadings and evidence support temporary injunction).
Challenge to temporary injunction elements
We begin with appellants’ second issue, in which they contend the trial court
abused its discretion by granting injunctive relief because Crossmark did not satisfy
the second and third temporary injunction elements—a probable right to relief and a
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.3
Probable right to relief
We disagree with appellants’ position that no probable right to relief was
shown. Crossmark asserted a TUTSA claim against all defendants. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 134A.001–.008. The elements of a TUTSA claim are:
(1) ownership of a trade secret; (2) misappropriation of the trade secret; and (3) an
injury, if the plaintiff is seeking damages. E.g., EJ Madison, LLC v. Pro-Tech Diesel,
Inc., 594 S.W.3d 632, 643–44 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (citing TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 134A.002(1), (3), (6), 134A.004(a)). TUTSA defines “trade
secret” as any type of information that the owner has taken reasonable measures to
keep secret and which derives economic value, potential or actual, from not being
generally known to others who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or
3
We address this issue first because its resolution would accord appellants the greatest relief in that
sustaining the argument would undermine the entire basis of Crossmark’s right to an injunction. See
Hernandez v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-20-00225-CV, 2021 WL 520456, at *1, 6 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Feb. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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use. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.002(6). “Misappropriation” includes
“(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (B) disclosure or use
of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who:
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; [or] (ii) at the time
of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the person’s knowledge of the
trade secret was: (a) derived from or through a person who used improper means to
acquire the trade secret; (b) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain the secrecy of or limit the use of the trade secret; or (c) derived from or
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the
secrecy of or limit the use of the trade secret.” Id. § 134A.002(3). “Improper means”
includes “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a
duty to maintain secrecy, to limit use, or to prohibit discovery of a trade secret, or
espionage through electronic or other means.” Id. § 134A.002(2).
Appellants contend (1) “Crossmark admits that the Digital Demo Product and
its components are readily observable and thus not ‘secret’”; (2) “Crossmark
presented no actual evidence that any Appellant acquired Crossmark’s alleged trade
secrets by improper means”; and (3) Crossmark cannot satisfy its burden “without
some evidence of use or injury.”
As to the existence of a trade secret, Mr. Lynch testified (1) Crossmark
possesses information it considers confidential, including playbooks and digital
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transformation strategies, that would give a competitor “insight into what we’re
working on” and an opportunity “to cut corners and create a shortcut to allow them
to be able to compete effectively and potentially even, you know, take it further faster
than we are”; (2) Crossmark takes multiple steps to protect that information,
including limiting access and requiring employees to sign confidentiality
agreements; and (3) the digital demo display customers see in stores is “just the tip
of the iceberg” and does not constitute the entirety of Crossmark’s strategy.
The evidence also showed (1) Mr. Stout, Ms. Villa, Ms. Palmer, and Ms. King
worked on the same Client X events team at Crossmark; (2) Mr. Stout and Ms. Villa
concealed their intentions to join Product Connections; (3) Ms. Palmer joined
Product Connections in February 2020, just as Mr. Stout’s and Ms. Villa’s non-
compete agreements were expiring; (4) a few months later, just as Crossmark was
launching its digital demo product for which it was planning additional
enhancements, Product Connections announced its “eerily similar execution” that
was “a very strong replica” of Crossmark’s and was described as “patent pending”;
(5) both Ms. Villa and Ms. Palmer appeared in Product Connections’ related social
media video, which “mirrored almost identically what [Crossmark] had done” in the
Client X digital demo presentation; (6) Ms. King left Crossmark for Product
Connections shortly thereafter with a thumb drive containing files downloaded from
her Crossmark computer with names pertaining to Crossmark client services; and
(7) those files were accessed on a different computer after she left Crossmark.
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Though appellants argue “Crossmark’s allegations about King simply do not
support relief against Appellants,” her actions, along with the other evidence, support
an inference of appellants’ participation in concerted acts to improperly acquire and
use Crossmark’s trade secrets. On this record, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by determining Crossmark presented enough evidence to raise a
bona fide issue as to its right to ultimate relief on its TUTSA claim. See Young Gi
Kim, 2020 WL 2315854, at *2; see also Hernandez v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No.
02-20-00225-CV, 2021 WL 520456, at *17–18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting no-probable-right-to-relief attacks to temporary
injunction that were based on disagreement with trial court’s inferences regarding
obtaining and use of confidential information).
Probable, imminent, and irreparable injury
As to a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim, appellants
assert Crossmark “presented nothing more than speculation and conjecture regarding
Appellants’ actions and Crossmark’s feared injuries” and failed to show it could not
be adequately compensated in damages. We disagree.
We have already addressed and rejected appellants’ challenge to the proof of
their actions in taking and using Crossmark’s confidential information regarding a
“multigenerational” digital demo product for which multiple enhancements are
planned. See Hernandez, 2021 WL 520456, at *18 (noting that same already-
challenged inferences supporting proof of alleged use of confidential information
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supported imminent injury element). Additionally, Mr. Lynch testified Crossmark’s
confidential digital transformation strategy information would give a competitor
“insight into what we’re working on” and an opportunity “to cut corners and create
a shortcut to allow them to be able to compete effectively and potentially even, you
know, take it further faster than we are.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by determining Crossmark satisfied its burden as to probable, imminent
harm. See IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (concluding imminent injury element was
established where evidence showed defendants had possession of plaintiff’s data
entitled to trade secret protection and were actively using that information to
compete with plaintiff).
Further, the use of confidential information in cases such as this has been
described as “the epitome of irreparable injury.” Hernandez, 2021 WL 520456, at
*21 (citing Thomas v. A*Med Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-19-00564-CV, 2020 WL 5269412,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (listing
cases holding that damages for loss of customer goodwill and use of confidential
information by a former employee may be difficult to quantify and constitute an
irreparable injury)). Because the evidence showed a probable, imminent injury that
cannot be measured by any certain proper pecuniary standard, the irreparable injury
element was satisfied. See Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 281
S.W.3d 215, 228 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (“[A]ssigning a dollar
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amount to such intangibles as a company’s loss of clientele, goodwill, marketing
techniques, and office stability, among others, is not easy.”)); Mabrey v. Sandstream,
Inc., 124 S.W.3d 302, 319 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“Irreparable harm
may be established by evidence that disclosure of confidential information could
enable competitors to mimic the marketing plans and strategies of the applicant and
avoid the less successful strategies . . . .”); see also Sandberg v. STMicroelectronics,
Inc., 600 S.W.3d 511, 537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. filed) (“Because the
evidence showed Sandberg likely retained ST’s confidential information and had
used or disclosed it, the trial court could find that ST was facing imminent harm, had
suffered an irreparable injury, and had no adequate remedy at law.”).
Compliance with rule 683 requirements
Next, we turn to appellants’ first issue, in which they contend the temporary
injunction should be “dissolved” because it does not comply with rule 683’s
requirements.
Reasons why irreparable injury will result
According to appellants, the temporary injunction fails to comply with rule
683 because it “does not state or explain the reasons why irreparable injury will
result absent an injunction.” See El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 744. Appellants also assert
that the DTO, as a mandatory injunction, is subject to the “more rigorous standard”
of “necessary to prevent irreparable injury or extreme hardship,” which the order
does not address.
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The temporary injunction order states:
If Defendants are not enjoined as requested herein,
CROSSMARK’s Confidential Information and Trade Secrets that
CROSSMARK has spent significant time, talent, and effort cultivating,
are threatened, thereby causing irreparable harm to CROSSMARK’s
trade secrets, client relationships, goodwill and good reputation,
because once CROSSMARK trade secrets are improperly used and
disclosed, they are forever lost and such loss is cannot be calculated in
money damages. Further, CROSSMARK’s customer and client
goodwill, which has been developed over many years, will be harmed
and such harm cannot be quantified in money damages.
The damage that will be caused to CROSSMARK by the Former
Employees’ probable and actual breach of the Confidentiality
Agreements, the Former Employees’ use and disclosure of
CROSSMARK Confidential Information and Trade Secrets, and
Product Connections and Rose’s tortious interference and Product
Connections’ misappropriation and probable disclosure of
CROSSMARK Confidential Information and Trade Secrets, cannot be
adequately compensated by money damages, leaving CROSSMARK
with no adequate legal remedy. In addition, the only way to remedy the
Former Employees’ breaches of their non-compete and non-solicitation
obligations is through this equitable relief. Unless Defendants and all
others through or with whom Defendants are acting are enjoined as
requested herein, CROSSMARK will suffer irreparable injury and
harm for which it lacks an adequate remedy of law.
The Court further finds that CROSSMARK will suffer imminent
and irreparable harm unless Defendants are immediately restrained and
enjoined as set forth below.
Consequently, the Court finds that a temporary injunction is
necessary because it appears to the Court that the Former Employees
are presently engaged in, or will engage in, the use and disclosure of
CROSSMARK Confidential Information and Trade Secrets, and
Product Connections are presently engaged in, or will engage in,
tortiously interfering with agreements CROSSMARK has with its
employees and clients and customers and misappropriation of
CROSSMARK’s trade secrets, such that immediate relief is necessary
to protect CROSSMARK’s contractual rights pending a trial on the
merits. Further, the harm is irreparable because of the lack of any
remedy at law to adequately compensate CROSSMARK for the
damage which may be done to CROSSMARK’s trade secrets.
Defendants’ use and disclosure of CROSSMARK’s trade secrets and
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other confidential information, and/or probable misappropriation of
CROSSMARK’s trade secrets will also irreparably harm
CROSSMARK.
Though much of this provision is conclusory, two portions address “reasons
why” Crossmark will suffer irreparable injury: “because once CROSSMARK trade
secrets are improperly used and disclosed, they are forever lost and such loss is
cannot be calculated in money damages” and “CROSSMARK’s customer and client
goodwill, which has been developed over many years, will be harmed and such harm
cannot be quantified in money damages.” These portions specifically pertain to the
use and disclosure of Crossmark’s trade secrets, which are the focus of the temporary
injunction’s twelve prohibitive provisions. Thus, we conclude the temporary
injunction adequately explains the reasons why irreparable injury will result absent
the relief in those twelve provisions.
As to the additional injunctive relief in the DTO—the turnover of appellants’
digital storage devices for examination—the temporary injunction order does not
address or explain why this mandatory relief is “necessary” to prevent irreparable
injury or extreme hardship, or why legal remedies regarding discovery of electronic
storage devices are inadequate. See Health Care Servs., 495 S.W.3d at 238; see also
In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 320–22 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)
(explaining discovery rules’ procedures and requirements for examining opponent’s
electronic storage devices). Thus, the mandatory injunction portion of the temporary
injunction order is improper. See Health Care Servs., 495 S.W.3d at 238; see also El
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Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 747 (concluding temporary injunction order’s “conclusory
statement” that applicant “has shown that it will suffer an irreparable injury for
which it has no other adequate legal remedy” did not satisfy rule 683’s requirement
to “specify the reasons why the applicant will suffer irreparable harm for which there
is no adequate remedy at law”).
Specific and definite terms
Additionally, appellants complain rule 683’s requirements are not met because
the temporary injunction’s “undefined, vague, and inconsistent terms” force
appellants “to speculate regarding whether their lawful conduct might violate the
Injunction.” According to appellants, the temporary injunction (1) “does not define
Crossmark’s trade secrets, confidential information, and proprietary information in
any meaningful way, and instead inconsistently uses those terms to improperly
enjoin lawful conduct that has no connection to this dispute,” and (2) “prohibits
conduct with respect to wide swath of unidentified current, former, even potential
‘customers and clients’ of Crossmark—regardless of whether Appellants secured
that relationship independent of or after any connection to Crossmark.”
The temporary injunction order states:
The Court finds CROSSMARK possesses trade secrets,
confidential information, and other proprietary information relating to
its “playbook,” digital transformation strategy, including its “Digital
Demo Product” (collectively the “Digital Transformation Strategies”),
its analytics and insight tools (the “Analytics Tools”), its customer and
client contact lists (the “Contact Lists”), confidential pricing and
costing strategy and analysis pertaining to its customers and clients (the
“Customer Financial Strategy”), which were created through its
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substantial expenditure of labor, skill and money. The “playbook”
referenced above includes confidential information such as best
practices, protocols, operating procedures, manuals, training guides,
and other documents that enable CROSSMARK to adequately run its
programs, including events, samplings, retail, alcohol beverage (“AB”),
and juicing programs (collectively, the “Playbook”). Collectively for
purposes of this Temporary Injunction, the Digital Transformation
Strategies, the Analytics Tools, Contact Lists, Customer Financial
Strategy and Playbook are referred to herein as the “CROSSMARK
Confidential Information and Trade Secrets.”
According to appellants, (1) “none of the subcategories used to define
[CROSSMARK Confidential Information and Trade Secrets] are described with
sufficient particularity” and (2) the order’s definitions regarding those subcategories
“are too vague to instruct Appellants regarding what they are required to do.” We are
not persuaded by appellants’ argument that the order’s use of “generic words” to
define key terms precludes understanding—particularly when the individual
appellants are all former Crossmark employees. The order specifically describes
each component of Crossmark’s “Confidential Information and Trade Secrets” and
clearly defines that term. To the extent the order uses that term, there is no lack of
specificity.
But the order also states, “The Court further finds that the CROSSMARK
Confidential Information and Trade Secrets and other confidential and proprietary
business information of CROSSMARK and business relationships of
CROSSMARK are assets belonging solely to CROSSMARK.” The terms
“confidential,” “proprietary,” and “business information” are not defined or
explained anywhere in the order, nor does the order’s context clarify them in any
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discernable way. These undefined terms are used in provisions (b), (d)(ii), (i), (j) and
(k).4 These terms are vague and fail to provide adequate notice to appellants of the
acts they are restrained from doing in terms not subject to reasonable disagreement.
See Ramirez v. Ignite Holdings, Ltd., No. 05-12-01024-CV, 2013 WL 4568365, at *4
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding temporary
injunction violated rule 683 because it failed to define “Proprietary
Information/Trade Secrets” with “enough specificity to give appellants notice of the
acts they are restrained from doing”); see also Cooper Valves, LLC v.
ValvTechnologies, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 254, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, no pet.). Thus, provisions (b), (d)(ii), (i), (j), and (k) violate rule 683’s
specificity requirement.5 See Ramirez, 2013 WL 4568365, at *4.
Additionally, the temporary injunction order states:
For purposes of this Temporary Injunction, “Covered Clients and
Customers” means those persons or entities that CROSSMARK
provided services to and that the Former Employees either had contact
with, supervised employees who had contact with, or received
proprietary information about within the last twenty-four (24) months
period that they were employed by CROSSMARK.
4
We note that the language of provisions (i) and (j) inexplicably enjoins “prohibiting” and “restraining”
appellants from certain acts. We address those provisions here to the extent the trial court’s intent was to
enjoin the acts themselves.
5
Appellants assert that because provision (a) uses the term “confidential,” that provision also lacks the
required specificity. We disagree. That provision’s language indicates the term “confidential” was meant to
be used in the context of the properly defined term “Crossmark Confidential Information and Trade
Secrets.” See HMS Holdings Corp. v. Public Consulting Grp., No. 05-15-00925-CV, 2016 WL 1179436, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The terms and paragraphs being
challenged . . . must be read in the context of the injunction order as a whole.”).
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Appellants contend this “broad and nebulous definition” does not satisfy rule
683 because “[i]t is impossible for Appellants to know with certainty all of the
‘Covered Clients and Customers’ that they or someone they supervised may have
serviced or for which they may have once received a spreadsheet containing
information about.” We agree with appellants that this definition does not meet rule
683’s specificity requirement. The meaning of “had contact with” is not clear, nor
does the definition address how appellants would know whom their supervised
employees “had contact with.” See Computek Comput. & Office Supplies, Inc. v.
Walton, 156 S.W.3d 217, 220–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“An injunction
must be as definite, clear, and precise as possible and when practicable it should
inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing, without calling on him
for inferences or conclusions about which persons might well differ and without
leaving anything for further hearing.”). The term “Covered Clients and Customers”
is used in provisions (e), (g), and (l)(iv). Thus, those provisions lack rule 683’s
required specificity.6
Appellants also complain provisions (c), (d)(i), (f), (h), and (l)(i) are invalid
due to other non-specific terms. According to appellants, provision (c) is “overly
broad” and “facially impermissible” because its language would prohibit interfering
6
Provision (e) is limited to “a period of (6) months.” Thus, any complaint regarding that provision
became moot on April 21, 2021. Because appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies,
see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999), our conclusions herein pertain
only to the temporary injunction’s non-moot portions.
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with an “at-will employment relationship.” We disagree that the term “contracts and
agreements” in provision (c) is overly broad or encompasses every type of
relationship. Rather, provision (c) adequately specifies and reasonably details the
conduct prohibited. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.
As to provision (d)(i), appellants complain of the language enjoining the
former-employee appellants from recruiting “any persons formerly or currently
employed by or associated with Crossmark.” Appellants contend this provision is
“so facially broad” that it “impermissibly enjoin[s] lawful conduct,” as “there is no
legal basis to enjoin Appellants from recruiting individuals who have left
Crosmmark’s employment or who are not employed but merely ‘affiliated’ with
Crossmark.” We agree. The term “associated with” is undefined and lacks
specificity. Further, “[w]here . . . some acts are permissible and some are not, an
injunction should not issue to restrain actions that are legal or about which there is
no asserted complaint.” Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 384
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). We conclude provision (d)(i) is invalid.
Regarding provision (f), appellants complain of the language enjoining them
from “directly or indirectly . . . taking any steps to cause any current client or
customer of CROSSMARK, including [Client X and Client Y], to divert, withdraw,
curtail or cancel any of their business with CROSSMARK.” We agree with
appellants that this provision lacks specificity not only as to the undefined term
“current client or customer,” but also as to “indirectly . . . taking any steps” to cause
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diversion of business from Crossmark. See Computek, 156 S.W.3d at 220–21. Thus,
provision (f) does not meet rule 683’s specificity requirement.
Appellants contend that though provision (h) “may seem more tailored”
because it prohibits them from soliciting only two specific clients, this provision is
actually “incredibly broad” because it “prohibit[s] Appellants from reaching out not
only to retailers where Crossmark’s product demonstrations occur . . . but to the
companies who make the products being displayed or demonstrated.” But
appellants’ argument in support of that position addresses provisions (g) and (h)
together and focuses on the term “Crossmark covered Customers and Clients” in
provision (g), which we rejected above as lacking specificity. Appellants do not
explain, and the record does not show, how provision (h) itself extends beyond Client
X and Client Y. We cannot agree with appellants that provision (h) lacks specificity
or is overbroad. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; see also HMS Holdings Corp. v. Public
Consulting Grp., No. 05-15-00925-CV, 2016 WL 1179436, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Mar. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“So long as the injunction is narrowly tailored,
the fact that it may have the effect of restraining some competition does not render
it an abuse of discretion.”).
As to provision (l)(i), appellants complain that the scope of its restriction
pertaining to “existing or prospective customers or clients of CROSSMARK” is
“undefined and overbroad” because “it would prohibit Appellants from deleting
anything ‘relating in any way’ to potential customers of Crossmark.” They argue
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provision (l)(i) impermissibly enjoins them from “deleting data that is wholly
unrelated to the subject matter of the lawsuit.” We agree that the term “existing or
prospective customers or clients of CROSSMARK” lacks the specificity rule 683
requires.7 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.
Finally, appellants contend the DTO lacks the specificity rule 683 requires
because it contains similarly deficient undefined terms, including “CROSSMARK
information” and “other digital storage devices.” We agree with appellants that those
terms are too vague to inform them what is required of them without calling for
inferences or conclusions about which persons might well differ. See Computek, 156
S.W.3d at 220–21. Thus, in addition to its irreparable-injury deficiency already
described above, the DTO is improper due to lack of specificity of those terms.
Propriety of mandatory injunctive relief regarding electronic devices
In their third issue, appellants assert this Court should vacate the DTO “for
the additional reason that a trial court cannot circumvent Texas rules and procedures
governing the permissible scope and proper conduct of electronic discovery by
compelling pretrial electronic discovery under the guise of a mandatory injunction.”
Appellants cite the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery, which,
among other things, specifically address “electronic or magnetic data” and establish
a procedure for seeking the court’s protection from improper requests. See TEX. R.
7
Appellants’ rule 683 complaints on appeal do not specifically address provisions (l)(ii) or (l)(iii), nor
do those provisions contain any of the deficient terms described above.
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CIV. P. 192–96. Appellants argue there is no “other statutory mechanism for pursuing
pretrial electronic discovery by mandatory injunction” and “the trial court abused its
discretion by compelling pretrial ‘production’ and ‘inspection’ of Appellants’
computers and other devices through the Device Turnover Order instead of the rules
governing and limiting the scope of that discovery.”
Appellants also contend the DTO “grants Crossmark’s attorneys direct,
immediate, and unfettered access to Appellants’ devices without the procedural
protections required by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes.” See
Weekley, 295 S.W.3d at 311, 322 (summarizing “proper procedure” for electronic
discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 and concluding trial court
abused its discretion by ordering defendant’s employees to turn over computer hard
drives to plaintiff’s forensic experts for searching where plaintiff failed to
demonstrate “the particular characteristics of the electronic storage devices involved,
the familiarity of its experts with those characteristics, or a reasonable likelihood
that the proposed search methodology would yield the information sought”).
According to appellants, “The fact that the trial court granted this relief under the
guise of a mandatory inunction—with the threat of contempt—does not change the
order’s nature as one compelling pretrial electronic discovery. Thus, In re Weekley
Homes applies.”
Weekley involved rule 196.4 discovery rather than a temporary injunction and
was not a trade secrets case. Appellants cite no authority mandating Weekley’s
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application here and we have found none. Further, the law governing mandatory
injunctive relief is consistent with Weekley’s requirement that “trial courts should be
mindful of protecting sensitive information and utilize the least intrusive means
necessary to facilitate discovery of electronic information.” Id. at 321. As described
above, rule 683 requires an injunction order to be specific and detailed and to “set
forth the reasons for its issuance.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; see El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at
747 (temporary injunction order must “specify the reasons why the applicant will
suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law”). And a
preliminary mandatory injunction is proper only if a mandatory order is “necessary”
to prevent irreparable injury or extreme hardship. See Health Care Servs., 495
S.W.3d at 238. Though the DTO in this case is deficient for the reasons described in
our analysis above, we cannot conclude Texas law entirely precludes mandatory
injunctions requiring production of digital storage devices when the applicable
standards—including rule 683’s specificity and irreparable injury requirements—are
met.
Conclusion
We reverse the DTO and the temporary injunction order’s provisions (b),
(d)(i), (d)(ii), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (k), (l)(i), and (l)(iv) for defects of form. We
otherwise affirm the trial court’s order.
Additionally, we must determine whether we can reform the trial court’s order
or whether it is necessary to remand for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P.
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43.3(a). Appellants contend the temporary injunction order “is not capable of being
sufficiently reformed” by this Court because it requires substantial modifications
more appropriate for the trial court’s consideration. We agree. Following our
approach in similar cases, we remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of protections for
Crossmark’s confidential information that comply with rule 683. See Ramirez, 2013
WL 4568365, at *4; Computek, 156 S.W.3d at 224; see also Cooper Valves, 531
S.W.3d at 267.
/Cory L. Carlyle//
200937f.p05 CORY L. CARLYLE
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RETAIL SERVICES WIS CORPORATION On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District
D/B/A PRODUCT CONNECTIONS, Court, Collin County, Texas
NATHAN STOUT, AMANDA VILLA, AND Trial Court Cause No. 429-05122-2020.
KATHERINE PALMER, Appellants Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices
Schenck and Reichek participating.
No. 05-20-00937-CV V.
CROSSMARK, INC., Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED in part
and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE the “Device Turnover Order” portion of the trial court’s order
and provisions (b), (d)(i), (d)(ii), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (k), (l)(i), and (l)(iv). In all other
respects, the trial court's order is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 4th day of May, 2021.
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