Lacey Noelle Tannehill v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00100-CR
___________________________
LACEY NOELLE TANNEHILL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 355th District Court
Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR14480
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We dismiss Appellant Lacey Noelle Tannehill’s appeal as moot. After
Tannehill had appealed and filed her brief, the trial court signed a judgment nunc pro
tunc correcting the clerical error about which she complained.
I. BACKGROUND
Tannehill pled guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain to theft under $2,500
with two prior convictions, and the trial court placed her on deferred adjudication
community supervision. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(D). About four
months later, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt and
alleged that Tannehill had violated the conditions of her probation in eighteen
paragraphs identified as (A) through (R). At the hearing on the State’s motion,
Tannehill pled true to paragraphs (F) through (R), and consistent with Tannehill’s
pleas, the trial court found paragraphs (F) through (R) true, adjudicated her guilty, and
sentenced her to imprisonment for two years in a state jail facility. The trial court’s
judgment, however, shows that Tannehill pled true and that the trial court found
paragraphs (A) through (R) true. Tannehill appealed.
II. TANNEHILL’S AND THE STATE’S CONTENTIONS
In her brief, Tannehill contends in one issue that the judgment does not
comport with the trial court’s oral pronouncement, that the oral pronouncement
controls, and that the judgment should be reformed to reflect that the trial court
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found only paragraphs (F) through (R) true. See Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328–29
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
In response, the State concedes that Tannehill is entitled to a judgment that
corresponds to the trial court’s oral pronouncement. But the State argues that
Tannehill’s complaint has become moot because the trial court signed a judgment
nunc pro tunc correcting this clerical error so that the judgment now properly reflects
its oral pronouncement. See Blanton v. State, 369 S.W.3d 894, 897–98 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Henkel v. State, No. 13-03-00112-CR, 2005 WL 5926929, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 14, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). A supplemental clerk’s record shows that a day after Tannehill filed her
brief, the trial court signed a judgment nunc pro tunc correcting the error about which
she complained and effecting the relief that she sought on appeal.
III. DISCUSSION AND RULING
An appeal becomes moot when an appellate court’s judgment can no longer
have an effect on an existing controversy or cannot affect the parties’ rights. Jack v.
State, 149 S.W.3d 119, 123 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hung Dasian Truong v. State,
580 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Appellate
courts normally cannot act on moot cases. Pharris v. State, 165 S.W.3d 681, 687–88
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting an exception—“when a claim is ‘capable of repetition,
yet evading review’”); Hung Dasian Truong, 580 S.W.3d at 207. Nor may they entertain
hypothetical claims or render advisory opinions. Carter v. State, No. 06-19-00172-CR,
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2020 WL 5223327, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 2, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Dix v. State, 289 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d). The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases with
actual controversies between parties. Hung Dasian Truong, 580 S.W.3d at 207; Ex parte
Flores, 130 S.W.3d 100, 104–05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. ref’d). “When there
has ceased to be a controversy between the litigating parties which is due to events
occurring after judgment has been rendered by the trial court, the decision of an
appellate court would be a mere academic exercise and the court may not decide the
appeal.” Flores, 130 S.W.3d at 105; see Nicolas v. State, Nos. 04-13-00834-CR, 04-13-
00835-CR, 2014 WL 1089791, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 19, 2014, no pet.)
(per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeals because
trial court granted appellant the relief he sought); Lamb v. State, No. 05-09-00836-CR,
2010 WL 2560548, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (dismissing appeal because judgment nunc pro tunc
mooted issue); cf. Guajardo v. State, Nos. 04-17-00421-CR, 04-17-00422-CR, 2018 WL
3129452, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (overruling first point on merits and dismissing second
point because judgments nunc pro tunc mooted it; affirming judgments nunc pro
tunc).
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Because the trial court’s judgment nunc pro tunc corrected the error about
which Tannehill’s brief complained, we dismiss her appeal as moot. See Hung Dasian
Truong, 580 S.W.3d at 211.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: June 3, 2021
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