Courtney Dobbins v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-20-00095-CR
________________________
COURTNEY DOBBINS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2019-416,791; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
June 18, 2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Courtney Dobbins, appeals from his conviction by jury of the second
degree felony offense of aggravated assault, 1 with a deadly weapon finding, enhanced
by a prior felony conviction, and the resulting sentence of imprisonment for a term of
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2020).
twenty-seven years and the imposition of a fine of $10,000. 2 Appellant challenges his
conviction and sentence through five issues alleging the trial court erred by (1) admitting
an exhibit that purported to show he sought to influence the testimony of the alleged
victim, (2) finding forfeiture by wrongdoing pursuant to article 38.49 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, (3) admitting lay testimony regarding whether the victim’s injuries
were self-inflicted, (4) admitting lay testimony regarding the distance between the shooter
and the victim, and (5) the cumulative effect of the errors complained of in issues 1
through 4 rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Based on the reasons set forth below,
we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to a disposition of
Appellant’s issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Appellant was charged via indictment with the aggravated assault of his girlfriend,
Alexa Hernandez. He pleaded “not guilty” and the matter was tried before a jury. Through
the testimony of several witnesses, the State introduced evidence that Appellant and
Alexa had an argument during which the two struggled over a gun. Alexa suffered a
gunshot wound to her neck and back 3 and went to a local hospital for treatment. She
also suffered other injuries that appeared to be related to a physical altercation.
2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b) (West 2020). When enhanced by a prior felony conviction, an
offense which is “punished as” a higher offense only raises the level of punishment and not the degree of
the offense. See Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 526-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
3 Testimony indicated the bullet entered Alexa’s shoulder line at the base of her neck and exited
out the middle of her back.
2
Several witnesses testified that Alexa told them Appellant had shot her. A
recording of a 911 call was also introduced during which Alexa is heard stating the same.
However, prior to trial, Alexa signed an affidavit of non-prosecution and during her trial
testimony, she stated she shot herself. Despite this testimony, at the close of the
evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged in the indictment and sentenced him
as noted after a punishment hearing.
ANALYSIS
ISSUE ONE—ADMISSION OF LETTER OVER APPELLANT’S RULE 404(B) OBJECTION
Through his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred when it admitted a
letter purportedly written by Appellant to Alexa. The letter was found among his
belongings in his jail cell and an employee of the jail testified the letter was never sent.
Alexa denied receiving such a letter. Consequently, Appellant argues, the trial court
should not have admitted it and in doing so, harmed him.
During Alexa’s trial testimony, the prosecutor asked her about a jail phone call with
Appellant during which he told Alexa she should not testify in court. The prosecutor later
asked Alexa, during cross-examination, about a letter from Appellant that said, “No
witness, no case.” It appeared to encourage her to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege.
Alexa said she did not receive a letter like this. She testified at length until, after being
confronted with the jail phone call, she decided to assert her privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A deputy at the detention center where Appellant was held testified she searched
Appellant’s cell on January 30, 2020. She said she found items in a manila envelope and
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authenticated the letter from Appellant. The State offered it as Exhibit S99. The trial court
admitted it over Appellant’s Rule 404(b) objection and others. The letter was published
and read to the jury by the deputy. The deputy also testified the letter was never sent.
During closing, the State referenced this letter when it said, “He was writing her in
January. ‘Deny I did anything to you. Plead the 5th.’ That’s what she did. She followed
instructions.” Appellant argues the admission of this letter was erroneous and harmed
him.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse
of discretion. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “As
long as the trial court’s ruling is within the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement,’ there is no
abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted). If the
trial court’s decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold
the decision. Id. at 344.
Rule 404(b) expressly provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of the defendant to show he acted in conformity
therewith. Rule 404(b) codifies the common law principle that a defendant should be tried
only for the offense for which he is charged and not for being a criminal generally. Rogers
v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 32 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). See Segundo v. State, 270
S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining that the defendant is generally to be
tried only for the offense charged, not for any other crimes).
But, extraneous offense evidence may be admissible for other purposes such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). The list of examples in Rule 404(b) is non-
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exhaustive. Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court’s
Rule 404(b) ruling admitting evidence is generally within the zone of reasonable
disagreement “if there is evidence supporting that an extraneous transaction is relevant
to a material, non-propensity issue.” Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). Texas courts utilize a two-step analysis for determining the admissibility of
extraneous offenses or uncharged acts. Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 32-33. Courts determine
first whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue in the case and second whether
the relevant evidence should be admitted as an exception to Rule 404(b). Id.Appellant argues that because the letter found in his cell was never sent, he has
not committed any kind of completed extraneous bad act or crime to which Rule 404(b)
would apply. Rather, he asserts, this matter is analogous to the circumstances in Castillo
v. State, 59 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. ref’d), wherein the court stated
that statements concerning a defendant’s thoughts of wrongdoing are “merely inchoate
thoughts” and, therefore do not implicate Rule 404(b). Appellant points out that the Court
of Criminal Appeals made a similar finding in Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 463 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993).
Appellant complains on appeal only of the trial court’s ruling on the basis of Rule
404(b). The State contends that, if the letter did not constitute a bad act because it was
unsent, it is thus not excludable under Rule 404(b). And, as also noted by both the State
and Appellant, the cases relied on by Appellant conclude that thoughts or statements are
not conduct and therefore, do not implicate Rule 404(b). See Moreno, 858 S.W.2d at
453; Castillo, 59 S.W.3d at 361. Therefore, because Rule 404(b) would be inapplicable
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to Appellant’s written statements reflecting only his thoughts, the trial court did not err in
overruling his objection on that ground.
Even if Appellant’s written statements were subject to a Rule 404(b) objection,
such evidence would still be admissible for purposes of showing Appellant’s motive,
intent, preparation, or plan to tamper with the testimony of the key witness against him.
Moreover, even if we were to construe Appellant’s objection as a more general Rule 403
objection, we would still find the letter was both relevant and admissible as a written
statement by a party opponent. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2). Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s first issue.
ISSUE TWO—ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS BY ALEXA FOLLOWING A
FINDING OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 38.49
Through his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it made a
finding of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” under article 38.49 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, thereby allowing into evidence several harmful inculpatory testimonial
statements by Alexa.
Article 38.49 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) A party to a criminal case who wrongfully procures the unavailability of
a witness or prospective witness:
(1) may not benefit from the wrongdoing by depriving the trier
of fact of relevant evidence and testimony; and
(2) forfeits the party’s right to object to the admissibility of
evidence or statements based on the unavailability of the
witness as provided by this article through forfeiture by
wrongdoing.
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(b) Evidence and statements related to a party that has engaged or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of a witness or prospective witness are admissible and
may be used by the offering party to make a showing of forfeiture by
wrongdoing under this article, subject to Subsection (c).
(c) In determining the admissibility of the evidence or statements described
by Subsection (b), the court shall determine, out of the presence of the
jury, whether forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred by a preponderance of
the evidence. If practicable, the court shall make the determination
under this subsection before trial using the procedures under Article
28.01 of this code and Rule 104, Texas Rules of Evidence.
(d) The party offering the evidence or statements described by Subsection
(b) is not required to show that:
(1) the actor’s sole intent was to wrongfully cause the
witness’s or prospective witness’s unavailability;
(2) the actions of the actor constituted a criminal offense; or
(3) any statements offered are reliable.
(e) A conviction for an offense under Section 36.05 or 36.06(a), Penal Code,
creates a presumption of forfeiture by wrongdoing under this article.
(f) Rule 403, Texas Rules of Evidence, applies to this article. This article
does not permit the presentation of character evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence or other
applicable law.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.49 (West 2015).
As noted in our analysis of Appellant’s first issue, we review a trial court’s decision
to admit or exclude evidence based on an abuse of discretion standard. Osbourn v. State,
92 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We utilize the same standard in the forfeiture
by wrongdoing context. Shepherd v. State, 489 S.W.3d 559, 573 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2016, pet. ref’d). Article 38.49 requires the trial court to make a determination, outside
the presence of the jury “whether forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred by a preponderance
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of the evidence.” Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.49(c)). The statute also
provides that the evidence to be considered by the trial court in its determination of
forfeiture by wrongdoing is “[e]vidence and statements related to a party that has engaged
or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of
a witness or prospective witness.” Shepherd, 489 S.W.3d at 573-74 (citing TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.49(b) (emphasis in original)). In addition, article 38.49 provides
that the party offering the evidence is not required to show that the wrongdoer’s “sole
intent was to wrongfully cause the witness’s or prospective witness’s unavailability.”
Shepherd, 489 S.W.3d at 574 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.49(d)(1)).
During the presentation of its case-in-chief, the State called Detective Brandon
Smith to provide testimony regarding statements made to him by Alexa. The court held
a hearing outside the presence of the jury prior to allowing the statements into evidence.
During that hearing, the prosecutor told the court that the combination of admitted jail
phone calls, the letters from Appellant encouraging Alexa to “plead the Fifth,” including
the unsent letter, and Alexa’s behavior in the courtroom indicated “forfeiture by
wrongdoing” because it showed Appellant wrongfully procured Alexa’s testimony or
threatened her availability to testify. Accordingly, the State argued, it was permitted to
elicit testimony from Detective Smith regarding Alexa’s statements to him. The court
made the requested finding and permitted the testimony.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that because the State knew Alexa intended to
assert her Fifth Amendment rights, a hearing should have been held prior to her
presentation as a witness. The defense also objected on the basis of article 38.49(f),
arguing that Texas Rule of Evidence 403 applies to article 38.49 and that the provision
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does not permit the presentation of character evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. The court overruled the objections except as
it pertained to character evidence.
Detective Smith testified that Alexa told him that Appellant shot her. She said they
argued, and Appellant hit her in the face. She ran to the bedroom and he followed. He
tried to hit her, but she dodged and he pulled out a gun. He then put it down and got on
the bed to attempt to hit or kick her. He picked up the gun again, ejected the magazine,
and pointed the gun at her. She “flinched” and turned away. Appellant pulled the trigger
and Alexa realized she had been shot. She, her children, and Appellant walked to her
mother’s house. Alexa went to the hospital for treatment, but Appellant left. On appeal,
Appellant points out that Alexa’s statements to Detective Smith contradicted Alexa’s own
trial testimony during which she said she and Appellant argued but that she shot herself.
Appellant asserts that article 38.49 limits the conditions under which a trial court
may make a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing to situations in which a party actually
wrongfully procures the unavailability of a witness. Here, Appellant argues, Alexa testified
at length. Indeed, her testimony spanned some fifty-three pages of the reporter’s record.
While the State argued that Appellant tried to make Alexa unavailable as a witness by
telling her in a jail call, “Like in the letter I told you. No witness, no case” and in
encouraging her to “plead the Fifth,” and that Alexa seemed amenable to the idea and
did eventually assert that right, Alexa testified at trial that Appellant told her to come to
trial. She also denied getting a letter that said “No witness, no case.” Also, a jail employee
testified the letter recovered from Appellant’s cell was never sent. Further, Appellant
argues the court’s own comment to Alexa the day after she testified that “You sure like to
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lie a lot,” while off the record and outside the presence of the jury, likely led her to assert
her Fifth Amendment rights. As such, Appellant asserts, the trial court should not have
made a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing and should not have permitted Detective
Smith’s testimony about Alexa’s statements to him. Rather, Alexa’s statements should
only have been admitted under Rule 613 as impeachment evidence and not as
substantive evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 613.
We disagree. A witness may be made “unavailable” under many circumstances4
and the mere fact that Alexa offered some testimony does not render the trial court’s
finding under article 38.49 erroneous. The record shows, and the State points out, that
Alexa was a hostile witness from the outset of her testimony and clearly did not wish to
testify. She had signed an affidavit of non-prosecution prior to trial and appeared to resent
being called into court to testify against Appellant. During her testimony on direct
examination, she often said she could not remember even basic facts. She claimed she
managed to shoot herself in the back of her neck and claimed she lied to her mother,
medical personnel, and police officers when she told them Appellant shot her simply
because she was mad at him.
When Alexa was confronted during trial with a jail phone call between herself and
Appellant after she had testified he had not told her to refuse to testify, she asserted her
Fifth Amendment rights. Alexa refused to testify further. During a hearing outside the
presence of the jury, the State urged the court to make a finding of forfeiture by
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. It asked the court to consider the
4 See TEX. R. EVID. 804 (setting forth criteria under which a witness may be considered unavailable).
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evidence it had heard, including the jail phone calls urging Alexa not to come to court, the
unsent letter from Appellant to Alexa saying, “[n]o witness, no case” and telling her to
plead the Fifth, and Alexa’s behavior in the courtroom. The State told the court it wanted
to further examine Alexa and to discuss her statements as substantive evidence. The
court ruled, stating “[b]ased on what the Court has previously heard, the Court makes
such a finding.”
The record shows the trial court had before it evidence from which it could have
concluded Appellant procured Alexa’s unavailability as a witness. Alexa was confronted
with Appellant’s instruction that she not testify and that she plead the Fifth. Once she
was confronted with that evidence, she refused to testify further and the State was unable
to examine her regarding the statements she made identifying Appellant as the person
who shot her and describing what occurred. Appellant cannot benefit from the success
of his attempts to keep Alexa from fully testifying, particularly since the testimony she
refused to give went directly to the offense for which he was charged.
Further, even if the trial court erred in making its ruling on this point, any error was
harmless. Improper admission of evidence is non-constitutional error that we disregard
unless the error affects an appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Garcia
v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Under Rule 44.2(b), “an appellate
court may not reverse for non-constitutional error if the court, after examining the record
as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Garcia, 126 S.W.3d at 927. It is well-settled
that “[a]n error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence
comes in elsewhere without objection.” Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim.
11
App. 2004) (quoting Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). See
Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“In addition, a party must
object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection.”).
Here, the record shows other witnesses testified that Alexa told them Appellant shot her.
One of those witnesses included Detective Smith whom Alexa spoke with a day or two
after the shooting. He told the jury Alexa told him details of the struggle and argument
between Appellant and Alexa and that he shot her. Alexa made similar admissible
statements to another officer and to medical personnel. We thus find any error in the trial
court’s finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing harmless. Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 193. We
overrule Appellant’s second issue.
ISSUE THREE—ADMISSION OF OFFICER’S TESTIMONY CONCERNING WHETHER WOUND
WAS SELF-INFLICTED
In his third issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred by admitting, over his
objection, the lay testimony of a police officer regarding whether Alexa’s wound was self-
inflicted because that testimony was properly a subject for an expert witness, not lay
testimony.
At trial, Officer Kenny Rodriguez testified that while he was not a gunshot wound
expert, he had seen self-inflicted wounds, and in his opinion, Alexa’s gunshot wound did
not appear to be self-inflicted. He reached this conclusion because he did not see powder
burns on her wound. During cross-examination, Rodriguez admitted he took only a short
look at the wound and did not test for any type of residue.
The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex.
12
Crim. App. 2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without
reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Witnesses who are not experts may testify about opinions or inferences, but only
when those opinions or inferences are rationally based on the perception of the witness
and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID. 701. An expert witness may offer an opinion if he is qualified
by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to do so and if scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence or to determining a fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. Although police officers
have training and experience, they are not precluded from offering lay testimony
regarding events which they have personally observed. Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 536
(citing Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
pet.) (police officer testified that, in his opinion, based on his experience, the actions he
observed were consistent with someone selling drugs); State v. Welton, 774 S.W.2d 341,
343 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, pet. ref’d) (police officer permitted to testify as non-expert
opinion witness regarding intoxication based in part on smelling the odor of alcohol)).
Here, the officer testified the wound he observed was not consistent with a self-
inflicted gunshot wound. The officer testified only to his own observation of Alexa’s
gunshot wound and his observation was something that would help the jury determine
whether Alexa’s wound was from her shooting herself or from Appellant shooting her.
Thus, the trial court could have determined it was proper lay testimony under Rule 701.
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Furthermore, even in the event the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, any such
error was harmless because other witnesses testified similarly. Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 193.
One of those witnesses, a physician, testified that in her twenty-eight years of experience,
she had not seen a self-inflicted gunshot at the trajectory with which Alexa presented.
She said self-inflicted gunshot wounds are “typically in the arms and legs, occasionally in
the abdomen.” She opined that Alexa’s wound was “in keeping with what [Alexa] told us
when she arrived, which was that her boyfriend beat and shot her.” We note also the
admission without objection of Appellant’s own interview with Detective Smith during
which he admitted his hand was on the gun when Alexa was shot. And, medical
documentation admitted into evidence included statements from Alexa saying Appellant
shot her. Consequently, we resolve Appellant’s third issue against him.
ISSUE FOUR—ADMISSION OF EMS TECHNICIAN’S TESTIMONY REGARDING DISTANCE
BETWEEN SHOOTER AND VICTIM
Via his fourth issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by admitting the lay
testimony of an EMS technician regarding the distance from which Alexa was shot
because that testimony was a subject requiring expert testimony, not lay testimony.
Micah Stone, an EMS technician treated Alexa the night she was shot. He testified
he looked at the wound and did not see any powder burns on her injury. The prosecutor
asked him, “[i]n your training and experience, do you have a rough idea of how far away
a firearm needs to be in order for there to not leave a powder burn?” Over Appellant’s
objection, Stone answered, “It would depend on the type of firearm it is, a small caliber
handgun would have to be at least within three feet.”
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As we noted in our analysis of Appellant’s third issue, the admissibility of evidence
is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. Powell, 63 S.W.3d at 438. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380.
Similar to our discussion in the analysis of Appellant’s third issue regarding the
police officer’s testimony based on his observations, Stone’s testimony was also based
on his own personal observation of Alexa’s gunshot wound and was also admitted to
assist the jury in determining whether Alexa could have shot herself or whether Appellant
was the person who shot her. Thus, the trial court could have determined this testimony
was also proper lay testimony.
Additionally, as was also the case with the police officer’s testimony, any error here
was harmless in light of the significant evidence presented showing Alexa’s gunshot
would was not self-inflicted. The physician, police officer, and detective all testified that
Alexa’s gunshot wound did not appear to be self-inflicted because of either the trajectory
and location of the wound or the lack of powder burns on her. And, as previously
discussed, during his interview with Detective Smith, Appellant admitted he had the gun
in his hand. Further, many witnesses testified to Alexa’s statements after the shooting
that Appellant was the one who shot her. Medical documentation supported those
statements. As such, any error in admitting Stone’s testimony on this issue was harmless.
We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
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ISSUE FIVE—CUMULATIVE ERROR
In Appellant’s fifth and last issue, he contends the “collective effect of these four
errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” As such, he argues, reversal and remand
is required.
“The doctrine of cumulative error provides that the cumulative effect of several
errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible error, even though no single instance
of error would” standing alone amount to reversible error. Stokes v. State, No. 05-18-
00571-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5236, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 24, 2019, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Holloway v. State, No. 05-14-
01244-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5546 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999) (“It is conceivable that a number of errors may be found harmful in their
cumulative effect.”)). In a cumulative error analysis, we consider only those errors that
were preserved for appeal. Stokes, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5236, at *3 (citation omitted).
The cumulative-error doctrine does not apply unless the complained-of errors have been
preserved for appeal and are actually errors. Id. (citing Chamberlain, 998 S.W.2d at 238(“[W]e are aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their cumulative effect
cause error.”). There is no cumulative harm when an appellant fails to prove any error as
to his complaints separately. Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(citing Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Because we have found no error under each of Appellant’s preceding four issues,
having considered their cumulative effect on the overall outcome of Appellant’s trial, we
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decline to find cumulative error or harm therefrom in this case. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s fifth issue.
CONCLUSION
Having resolved each of Appellant’s issues against him, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
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