in Re Commitment of Lonnie Kade Welsh ( 2021 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-21-00139-CV
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IN RE COMMITMENT OF LONNIE KADE WELSH
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On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 15-01-00659-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a post-judgment order in a civil commitment case,
which ended when this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in 2016. In its 2016
judgment, the trial court signed an order committing Lonnie Kade Welsh to
treatment after the jury found in a civil commitment proceeding that Welsh is a
sexually-violent predator. See In re Commitment of Welsh, No. 09-15-00498-CV,
2016 WL 4483165 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 25, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
This appeal arose from a post-judgment motion Welsh filed in his civil commitment
case in 2021. In the post-judgment motion, which Welsh filed in the trial court that
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signed the order committing him to treatment, he asked the judge presiding over the
trial court to recuse from all post-judgment proceedings, the proceeding that will
decide whether Welsh should be released from treatment. The post-judgment
proceedings are in the court where the Honorable Patty Maginnis is the presiding
judge. After Judge Maginnis decided she would not voluntarily recuse, she referred
Welsh’s post-judgment motion to the Honorable Olen Underwood, the presiding
judge of the second administrative judicial region. Judge Maginnis asked Judge
Underwood to resolve Welsh’s motion.
On April 5, 2021, after considering Welsh’s motion, Judge Underwood denied
it. In the order Judge Underwood signed denying the motion, he found Welsh failed
to show that Judge Maginnis is recused or disqualified from conducting the
proceedings in Welsh’s case. On May 10, 2012, Welsh appealed from Judge
Underwood’s order.
On May 18, 2021, this court advised the parties, by letter, that the order Welsh
appealed does not appear to be appealable. We asked the parties to respond to our
jurisdictional inquiry by providing us with any rule or statute they claimed applicable
to Welsh’s appeal and explain how those provisions, if any, gave this Court
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an interlocutory ruling on a post-judgment
motion to recuse.
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Ten days later, Welsh responded. In his response, Welsh argues that his
motion to recuse Judge Maginnis is “a phase of the post[-]trial commitment
proceeding in its own right[.]” Welsh also claims that post-judgment civil
commitment proceedings may lead to multiple judgments, each of which can be
appealed. Yet Welsh did not cite any rules or statutes relevant to our jurisdictional
inquiry. And he is not appealing from a judgment but instead from an interlocutory
order that denied his motion to recuse. When the State responded to our request, it
argued “[t]he SVP statute only grants the right to appeal the initial determination on
whether a person is a sexually violent predator.” The State concludes that neither the
SVP statute, nor the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (which authorizes the appeal
of some interlocutory orders), permits a party to appeal from an interlocutory ruling
on a motion to recuse.
Previously, this Court explained that, while the trial court retains jurisdiction
during the periods that a commitment judgment remains in effect, we lack appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders signed after the judgment in the civil-
commitment case becomes final. See In re Commitment of Bohannan, No. 09-20-
00260-CV, 2021 WL 1134307, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.
h.) (mem. op.). Simply put, nothing in the SVP statute or the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code (the statutes that give parties their rights of appeal) authorize a party
to appeal from a post-judgment order, signed after the judgment committing
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someone as a sexually-violent predator, became final. See id. Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 841.001-.153 (SVP Statute); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
51.014 (Appeal From Interlocutory Order).
We conclude the order from which Welsh appealed is not appealable. Since
we lack jurisdiction over Welsh’s appeal from an interlocutory order, post-judgment
order, we dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on June 23, 2021
Opinion Delivered June 24, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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