Michael Atkinson v. TDCJ Parole Division ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Vacated and Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 24, 2021.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-20-00002-CV
    MICHAEL ATKINSON, Appellant
    V.
    TDCJ PAROLE DIVISION, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 333rd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2019-85829
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The threshold question in this appeal is whether the pro se plaintiff, Michael
    Atkinson, chose the correct court and legal vehicle for challenging a condition of his
    mandatory supervision. Concluding that he did not, we vacate the civil district
    court’s order denying habeas and injunctive relief, and we dismiss the case for want
    of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    Atkinson pleaded guilty in the 458th Judicial District Court of Fort Bend
    County to a single count of possession of child pornography. In exchange for that
    guilty plea, he received a negotiated sentence of four years’ imprisonment.
    Less than one year into his term of imprisonment, Atkinson was released on
    mandatory supervision. As part of his release, Atkinson agreed to abide by certain
    conditions imposed by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and one of those
    conditions was that he would participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program.
    Under that program, Atkinson faced the potential of submitting to a polygraph
    examination.
    During the period of his mandatory supervision, Atkinson filed a pro se civil
    case in the 333rd Judicial District Court of Harris County. His sole pleading in that
    civil case was styled “Emergency Writ of Habeas Corpus for Injunction,” and it
    sought to enjoin the Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    (the “State”) from administering an “instant offense” polygraph. Atkinson alleged
    that this sort of polygraph violated his constitutional rights, that it served no
    rehabilitative purpose, and that the State should only be allowed to administer a
    “maintenance” polygraph to verify that he was adhering to his parole guidelines. In
    addition to seeking habeas and injunctive relief, Atkinson also requested a temporary
    restraining order, which an ancillary judge granted ex parte.
    The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction. The State argued that
    Atkinson was challenging his confinement, and that the proper vehicle for such a
    challenge was an application for writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Because that article requires the application to
    be assigned to the convicting court and made returnable to the Texas Court of
    2
    Criminal Appeals, the State further argued that the civil district court had no
    jurisdiction to rule on Atkinson’s requested relief.
    The civil district court conducted a live hearing, where both parties were
    present. The hearing was not transcribed, and afterwards, the civil district court
    signed a written order denying the State’s plea, vacating the temporary restraining
    order, and denying all of Atkinson’s requested relief. Atkinson now appeals from
    this written order.
    ANALYSIS
    Atkinson has filed a pro se brief, complaining of the civil district court’s ruling
    on the merits. The State has also filed a brief, arguing that the civil district court
    erred by denying the plea to the jurisdiction, or alternatively, that it made the correct
    ruling on the merits. Because we are duty-bound to determine questions of
    jurisdiction, we begin by addressing the State’s argument that the civil district court
    should have dismissed the case from the outset. See In re City of Dallas, 
    501 S.W.3d 71
    , 73 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
    In its written order, the civil district court gave the following explanation for
    denying the State’s plea: “Because [Atkinson] does not challenge his conviction or
    the constitutionality of a criminal statute, jurisdiction of this matter is not controlled
    by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.07, and does not lie exclusively in criminal court.
    See Passel v. Fort Worth I.S.D., 
    440 S.W.2d 61
     (Tex. 1969).” This explanation is
    incorrect.
    Passel recognizes that a civil court may enjoin an unconstitutional criminal
    statute if no prosecution has been threatened yet and the plaintiff has no other way
    to challenge the statute except by an administrative or civil action. 
    Id. at 64
    . That
    rule does not apply here because Atkinson has already been prosecuted. See also
    3
    Reese v. City of Hunter’s Creek Village, 
    95 S.W.3d 389
    , 391–92 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (noting that Passel has been limited by
    subsequent decisions). Furthermore, Atkinson is not challenging a criminal statute,
    but rather a condition of his mandatory supervision, and Article 11.07 provides a
    vehicle for that challenge.
    Under Article 11.07, a person may obtain habeas relief from a final felony
    conviction by challenging either the fact or length of his confinement. See Ex parte
    Harrington, 
    310 S.W.3d 452
    , 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Confinement means
    confinement for any offense or any collateral consequence resulting from the
    conviction that is the basis of the instant habeas corpus.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
    11.07, § 3(c).
    Though Atkinson has been released from imprisonment, he is still “confined”
    by the conditions of his mandatory supervision and by the collateral consequences
    of his final conviction. See Ex parte Fulce, 
    993 S.W.2d 660
    , 661 n.1 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1999); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.147(b) (“An inmate released to
    mandatory supervision is considered to be released on parole.”); Bd. of Pardons &
    Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 
    910 S.W.2d 481
    , 483
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Parole is a form of restraint
    which allows an applicant to pursue the remedies afforded under Article 11.07,
    V.A.C.C.P.”). Atkinson has also challenged that confinement by arguing that the
    administration of an “instant offense” polygraph would amount to a violation of his
    constitutional rights.
    The exclusive vehicle for raising this challenge is an application for writ of
    habeas corpus under Article 11.07. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 5 (“After
    conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other
    proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.”).
    4
    And as the State argued in its plea to the jurisdiction, that application must have been
    assigned to the convicting criminal court and made returnable to the Texas Court of
    Criminal Appeals. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(a)–(b). Because
    Atkinson filed his case in the civil district court instead, we conclude that the civil
    district court had no jurisdiction and that it should have granted the State’s plea to
    the jurisdiction. See Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 
    802 S.W.2d 241
    , 243 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the court of appeals had no
    jurisdiction to rule on an original mandamus petition when an adequate remedy was
    available through Article 11.07).
    In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the merits of Atkinson’s appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    The civil district court’s order denying habeas and injunctive relief is vacated,
    and the case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
    /s/       Tracy Christopher
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.
    5