Ralph Dewayne Watkins v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-16-00377-CR
    RALPH DEWAYNE WATKINS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 13th District Court
    Navarro County, Texas
    Trial Court No. D36507
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Ralph Watkins appeals from a conviction for the offense of possession of a
    controlled substance of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. TEX. HEALTH &
    SAFETY CODE §481.115(d). On original submission, this Court affirmed the judgment after
    deleting an improper award of restitution and attorney's fees, but the Court of Criminal
    Appeals reversed our judgment and remanded the proceeding for this Court to conduct
    a harm analysis in regard to the erroneous admission of evidence not disclosed in
    discovery. See Watkins v. State, 
    554 S.W.3d 819
     (Tex. App.—Waco 2018), reversed by
    Watkins v. State, 
    619 S.W.3d 265
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). On remand, Watkins argues that
    the trial court's erroneous admission of evidence was harmful and that this Court should
    employ a constitutional harm analysis pursuant to Rule 44.2(a) of the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure. Watkins alternatively argues that, if we determine that the proper standard is
    nonconstitutional error, the error was also harmful under that standard. Because we find
    that the error was harmless pursuant to Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    we affirm the judgment of conviction as previously modified.
    In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that documentary
    evidence was erroneously admitted during the punishment phase of his trial. The
    evidence consisted of 34 exhibits that were admitted into evidence during the
    punishment phase of trial. The exhibits included jail book-in sheets, pen packets, and
    judgments of conviction for six felony and six misdemeanor convictions. The evidence
    had not been produced by the State pursuant to article 39.14(a) of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the documents should have been
    produced to Watkins pursuant to his discovery request because they were "material"
    pursuant to Article 39.14(a). See Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 290. Based on its holding, the
    Court of Criminal Appeals remanded this proceeding to this Court for this Court to
    conduct a harm analysis. Id. at 291.
    Watkins argues that the error in the admission of the exhibits that were not
    produced should be analyzed pursuant to the standard for constitutional error pursuant
    Watkins v. State                                                                   Page 2
    to Rule 44.2(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, the error in question is a
    function of statutory error, that being a violation of the discovery production rules in
    article 39.14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and we will address it as such. This is
    because generally, the right to discovery in criminal cases is not constitutional but
    statutory in nature, with limited exceptions not at issue in this proceeding. See Weatherford
    v. Bursey, 
    429 U.S. 545
    , 559, 
    97 S. Ct. 837
    , 
    51 L. Ed. 2d 30
     (1977) ("There is no general
    constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady [v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963)] did not create one."); see also Pena v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 797
    , 809 n.10 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011); see also United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 675, 
    105 S. Ct. 3375
    , 3379-80, 
    87 L. Ed. 2d 481
     (1985) (Prosecutor required pursuant to the Constitution "only to disclose
    evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a
    fair trial.").
    Pursuant to Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for nonconstitutional
    error, "[a]ny other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial
    rights must be disregarded." See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In determining whether harm has
    resulted from the erroneous admission of evidence, a trial court's erroneous admission of
    evidence will not require reversal when the same evidence was received without
    objection elsewhere. Leday v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 713
    , 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also
    Anderson v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 622
    , 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("Inadmissible evidence can
    Watkins v. State                                                                         Page 3
    be rendered harmless if other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it proves
    the same fact that the inadmissible evidence sought to prove.").
    In the punishment phase of this trial, testimony regarding several of the
    extraneous offenses and conduct was presented without objection that went well beyond
    the scope of the exhibits in question. Watkins pled true to two enhancement paragraphs
    to which some of the exhibits related. The pre-sentence investigation report (PSI)
    generally contained the same information in the exhibits and the trial court took judicial
    notice of its contents without objection by Watkins. 1
    In his brief to this Court on remand, Watkins argues that it was improper for the
    trial court to take judicial notice of the factual assertions contained within the PSI.
    However, he did not object to the contents of the PSI at the time the trial court took
    judicial notice of it, although he had a statutory right to do so. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 42.12, § 9(e); repealed by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 770 (H.B. 2299) § 3.01, effective
    January 1, 2017; recodified as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.255(b), Acts 2015, 84th
    Leg., Ch. 770 (H.B. 2299), § 1.01, effective January 1, 2017 (defendant may comment on
    report and request approval to introduce testimony or other information alleging a
    factual inaccuracy). "Because a PSI report is intended to acquaint the sentencing trial
    1 The State did timely disclose its intent to introduce evidence of the extraneous offenses and bad acts prior
    to trial. However, the general disclosure of the intent to use these extraneous offenses and bad acts differed
    substantially from the scope of information in the exhibits in question. Thus, in this proceeding the prior
    disclosure provides little, if any, assistance to the State in evaluating the harm resulting from the failure to
    timely produce the exhibits prior to trial as part of the discovery process.
    Watkins v. State                                                                                        Page 4
    judge with the defendant's criminal history, and the defendant has a full opportunity to
    object to the accuracy of the PSI report, a trial court may consider unobjected-to [facts]
    listed in the PSI report when assessing an appropriate sentence." Jackson v. State, 
    474 S.W.3d 755
    , 757-58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). Because Watkins
    did not object to the PSI, he cannot complain of the trial court's consideration of the facts
    contained within it for the first time on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Jackson, 474
    S.W.3d at 757-58.
    We find that because the same or similar evidence to the exhibits at issue was
    admitted into evidence during the punishment phase of the trial without objection, the
    admission of the exhibits was harmless. Because we have found the admission of the
    exhibits to be harmless, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as previously modified.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Johnson, and
    Justice Smith
    Affirmed as modified
    Opinion delivered and filed January 12, 2022
    [CRPM]
    Watkins v. State                                                                       Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-16-00377-CR

Filed Date: 1/12/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/14/2022