Sherese Oakland v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Certificate Trustee on Behalf of Bosco ( 2022 )

Opinion issued January 20, 2022
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-20-00083-CV
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SHERESE OAKLAND AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellant
V.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS CERTIFICATE
TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF BOSCO, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1146674
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a forcible entry and detainer suit. Appellee Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company, as Certificate Trustee on Behalf of Bosco Credit II
Trust Series 2010-1, (“Deutsche Bank”) purchased the residential property
previously owned by appellant Sherese Oakland at a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
After Oakland failed to vacate the premises, Deutsche Bank brought a forcible
entry and detainer action in justice court. The justice court entered judgment of
possession in favor of Deutsche Bank. Oakland appealed to the county court. The
county court entered a judgment of possession in favor of Deutsche Bank. Oakland
appealed. On appeal, Oakland contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
because the question of title was so integrally linked to the issue of possession that
possession could not be determined without first determining title. We affirm.
Background
In March 2005, Oakland executed a deed of trust to secure payment of a note
on the real property located at 7602 Timberway Lane, Houston, Texas. The deed of
trust was assigned to Deutsche Bank. The deed of trust provided that in the event
of a default, the lender could accelerate the note and require immediate payment of
all sums. It also provided that the property could be sold at a foreclosure sale, and
that if the loan were foreclose, the person in possession of the property, would
become a tenant at sufferance and could be removed by a writ of possession.
After default by Oakland, Deutsche Bank foreclosed the loan and purchased
the property on October 1, 2019. A trustee’s deed was recorded, and Deutsche
Bank mailed Oakland a notice to vacate. After Oakland failed to vacate the
property, Deutsche Bank instituted a forcible entry and detainer action against
Oakland in justice court. Oakland filed suit in the Harris County district court
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asking the court to set aside the foreclosure because the statute of limitations had
run.1 Oakland then filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the justice court, arguing that
the court did not have jurisdiction to determine immediate possession of the
property until the title was resolved in the district court. She stated that the title
issue involved her challenge to the validity of the foreclosure sale. Following a
hearing on the motion, the justice court ruled in Deutsche Bank’s favor. Oakland
filed an appeal de novo to County Court at Law No. 4. In January 2020, the county
court entered a judgment of possession in favor of Deutsche Bank. Prior to
execution of the writ of possession, Oakland appealed.
Oakland appeals the judgment granting immediate possession of the
property to Deutsche Bank, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
eviction suit because the statute of limitations claim in the district court title suit
had to be resolved as a prerequisite to the resolution of immediate possession. This
is the only issue on appeal. We hold that the county court at law had jurisdiction
and affirm the court’s judgment.
Standard of Review
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a
case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000).
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review
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In its brief, Deutsche Bank states that it removed the suit to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in December 2019.
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de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004).
Applicable Law
Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice
court of the precinct where the property is located, and on appeal, to the county
court for a trial de novo. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 27.031(a)(2); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). A trial de novo is a new trial in which
the entire case is presented as if there had been no previous trial. TEX. R. CIV. P.
510.10(c). A county court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not
title. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); see Black v. Washington Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d
414, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (“[T]he justice
court, and a county court on appeal, lack jurisdiction to resolve any questions of
title beyond the immediate right to possession.”).
A forcible detainer “action ‘is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property.’” Coinmach Corp.
v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex. 2013) (quoting
Marshall v. Hous. Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006)). The judgment in a
forcible detainer action is a final determination only of the right to immediate
possession. Id. Thus, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is not
required to prove title, but is only required to present sufficient evidence of
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ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Isaac v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 563 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet. denied). If, however, an issue of title is so intertwined with the issue of
possession that a court must resolve the title dispute before determining which
party has a superior right to immediate possession, then the justice court and the
county court lack jurisdiction to resolve the matter and must dismiss the case.
Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
“A forcible detainer action is cumulative, not exclusive, of other remedies
that a party may have, thus the parties may pursue both a forcible detainer action in
justice court and a suit to quiet title in district court.” Dormady v. Dinero Land &
Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d
w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g) (citing Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818–19 (Tex. 1936)).
“[N]ot only can the right to immediate possession be determined separately from
the right to title in most cases, but the Texas Legislature purposely established just
such a system.” Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558 (quoting Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d
705, 710 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)).
Analysis
Oakland contends that the question of title is intertwined with the question
of possession such that the county court did not have jurisdiction to determine
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possession. Oakland argues that Deutsche Bank is not entitled to possession
because it does not have proper title to the property. Deutsche Bank argues that the
trial court had jurisdiction to decide possession because Oakland’s challenge to the
validity of the foreclosure sale need not be resolved in order to decide possession.
We agree with Deutsche Bank.
“A landlord-tenant relationship provides ‘an independent basis on which the
trial court could determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the
issue of title to the property.’” Salazar v. HPA Tex. Sub 2016-1 LLC, No. 01-19-
00330-CV, 2020 WL 7702176, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29,
2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712). When “a landlord-
tenant relationship is established in the original deed of trust[,] [t]he landlord-
tenant relationship provides a basis for determining the right to immediate
possession without resolving the ultimate issue of title to the property.” Dormady,
61 S.W.3d at 559. Even when the validity of a deed is challenged, courts have held
that the issue of possession may be determined without addressing title when a
landlord-tenant relationship is established through a deed of trust. See Casalicchio
v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-19-00392, 2021 WL 921779, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Chevalier v.
Roberson, No. 01-15-00225-CV, 2016 WL 1590993, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—
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Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[Appellant] has the right
to sue in district court to determine whose deed is valid.”).
Here the deed of trust provided:
If the property is sold pursuant to this paragraph 16, Borrower
[Oakland] or any person holding possession of the Property through
Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to
the purchaser [Deutsche Bank] at the sale. If possession is not
surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance
and may be removed by writ of possession.
Oakland argues that because the statute of limitations had run, both the deed
of trust and the power of sale pursuant to it are void. She argues that if the deed of
trust is void, the tenancy-at-sufferance clause is also void, depriving the justice
court of its independent basis for jurisdiction. “A title dispute ‘based entirely on
[the] contention that the foreclosure was improper” is not intertwined with the right
of immediate possession.” Guillen v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 494 S.W.3d 861, 867 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc.
v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).
Oakland’s attack on the validity of the foreclosure sale is independent of the
question of possession in the forcible detainer action. Villalon v. Bank One, 176
S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding
appellant could sue in district court to determine whether appellee’s deed should be
cancelled because of wrongful foreclosure, but county court could determine
immediate possession in forcible detainer suit); Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558 (citing
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Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d at 818–19) (“[I]f the forcible detainer defendants desired to
attack the validity of the sale made under the deed of trust, they could proceed with
a suit in the district court.”).
We need not decide whether the statute of limitations actually expired and
whether, as a result, the deed of trust, with its tenancy-at-sufferance clause, was
invalid. The question of the foreclosure’s validity may be resolved independently
of the county court’s determination that Deutsche Bank is entitled to immediate
possession of the property. See Guillen, 494 S.W.3d at 868. Deutsche Bank
established the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship through the deed of trust.
Because there was a basis for determining possession without resolving the
ultimate issue of title, we hold the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to
decide the forcible detainer action. See Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557–59.
We overrule Oakland’s issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Peter Kelly
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly and Landau.
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