Danyett Danell Goodrum v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-21-00132-CR
    DANYETT DANELL GOODRUM,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 369th District Court
    Leon County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 20-0042CR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    After a jury trial, appellant, Danyett Danell Goodrum, was convicted of felony
    hindering apprehension or prosecution of a known felon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
    38.05(d). On appeal, Goodrum contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support
    the jury’s finding that she knew that Kevin Kahler was under arrest for or charged with
    a felony; and (2) the trial court assessed unlawful and premature court costs. Because we
    hold that the evidence is insufficient to support Goodrum’s conviction for felony
    hindering apprehension, but sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included
    offense of misdemeanor hindering apprehension, we reform the judgment to reflect a
    conviction for the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor hindering apprehension and
    remand to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a
    sufficiency issue as follows:
    When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
    whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
    the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319,
    
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979); Villa v. State, 
    514 S.W.3d 227
    , 232 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to
    the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
    testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
    basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    . We may not re-weigh
    the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams
    v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting
    a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy
    but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
    at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or
    evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the
    facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at
    trial. Cary v. State, 
    507 S.W.3d 750
    , 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson,
    
    443 U.S. at 319
    ); see also Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
    from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.
    Merritt v. State, 
    368 S.W.3d 516
    , 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because
    the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
    witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial
    Goodrum v. State                                                                            Page 2
    evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
    sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
    incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey
    v. State, 
    473 S.W.3d 805
    , 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 
    214 S.W.3d at 13
    .
    We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
    to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
    defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
    State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
    correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
    the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof
    or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately
    describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
    also Daugherty v. State, 
    387 S.W.3d 654
    , 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law
    as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
    offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
    S.W.3d at 665.
    Zuniga v. State, 
    551 S.W.3d 729
    , 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
    Here, Goodrum was convicted of felony hindering apprehension.1 See TEX. PENAL
    CODE ANN. § 38.05(d). To show that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to
    support a conviction for felony hindering apprehension, the State must prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that:          “(1) the defendant warned another person of impending
    discovery or apprehension, (2) the defendant had the intent to hinder that individual’s
    arrest, and (3) the defendant had knowledge that the individual was under arrest for,
    charged with, or convicted of a felony.” Nowlin v. State, 
    473 S.W.3d 312
    , 317 (Tex. Crim.
    1 Punishment was assessed at five years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice, which was probated for ten years. As conditions of her probation, the trial
    court ordered Goodrum to serve 180 days in the county jail, complete 500 hours of community service at
    sixteen hours per month, and pay a $5,000 fine.
    Goodrum v. State                                                                                    Page 
    3 App. 2015
    ) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05(a), (d)).        Only the last element,
    knowledge of the individual’s being charged with a felony, is being challenged in this
    case. As stated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Nowlin, “an individual acts
    with knowledge when [s]he is aware that the circumstances exist.” Id. at 318 (citing TEX.
    PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b)). Thus, the State had to prove that Goodrum was aware, at
    the time the offense of hindering apprehension was committed, that Kahler was under
    arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony.
    BACKGROUND
    The evidence showed that a warrant for Kahler’s arrest for burglary of a building
    was signed by a magistrate on September 17, 2019. Two days later, deputies with the
    Leon County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the trailer that Goodrum and Kahler rented from
    Timothy Rabon to execute the warrant for Kahler’s arrest. Neither Goodrum nor Kahler
    opened the door or responded when deputies arrived at the trailer and knocked on the
    door on September 19, 2019. Deputy Cody Wood of the Leon County Sheriff’s Office
    testified that deputies repeatedly yelled for Kahler to come out. Neither Goodrum nor
    Kahler responded. With the assistance of Rabon, deputies were eventually able to gain
    access to the trailer by prying the door open with a crowbar. When they entered the
    trailer, deputies noticed a dog barking and roaming free. Deputies yelled that someone
    needed to restrain the dog to prevent the dog from getting hurt. It was at this point that
    Goodrum entered the main living area and encountered the deputies. Goodrum stated
    Goodrum v. State                                                                    Page 4
    that she did not hear the deputies yelling and knocking on the door because she was
    sleeping. After telling Goodrum to move, deputies proceeded to search the trailer for
    Kahler. They eventually found Kahler hiding in a small compartment in Goodrum’s
    closet where the water heater was located. Deputies asserted that Goodrum helped
    Kahler hide inside the water-heater compartment by altering and placing a panel in front
    of the compartment. Kahler was placed under arrest for burglary of a building and was
    moved to a law-enforcement vehicle outside. Goodrum was later arrested for hindering
    the apprehension of Kahler.
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Goodrum’s sufficiency challenge focuses on the element of hindering
    apprehension that requires the State to prove that she knew Kahler was under arrest for,
    charged with, or convicted of a felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05(d). In response
    to Goodrum’s challenge, the State focuses on an interview of Goodrum that was
    conducted by Lieutenant Wayne Sallee of the Leon County Sheriff’s Office on September
    12, 2019.    In this interview, Lieutenant Sallee informed Goodrum that he was
    investigating an alleged burglary of a building that involved the theft of tools from
    Rabon’s shed. When asked about the incident, Goodrum acknowledged that Kahler told
    her some details about how he acquired certain tools that were later determined to have
    been stolen from Rabon’s shed. Specifically, Goodrum explained that Kahler told her he
    acquired the tools as payment for jobs or that he retrieved them from the dump.
    Goodrum v. State                                                                  Page 5
    Goodrum admitted to pawning several tools that law enforcement identified as property
    stolen by Kahler. And although it was repeatedly suggested during the interview that
    the tools were stolen, there was no indication that a felony had been committed or that
    an arrest warrant was forthcoming.
    In her testimony at trial, Goodrum stated that she had been a jailer for Leon
    County for a little over four years, but she no longer worked as one around the time of
    the offense. Lieutenant Sallee emphasized in his testimony that because Goodrum
    previously worked as a jailer, she likely reviewed many probable-cause affidavits and
    warrants and understood what offenses are felonies. He also believed that: (1) Goodrum
    would have known that when police enter a home and demand that someone comes out,
    it is based on a warrant; and (2) after the September 12, 2019 interview, “[t]here’s no doubt
    in my mind she knew something was fixing to happen.” Additionally, the record
    includes the testimony of Rabon, who was present when deputies entered the trailer on
    September 19, 2019, and recalled that law enforcement yelled that there was a warrant
    for Kahler’s arrest.
    The record also reflects that Deputy Wood spoke with Goodrum at her trailer on
    two prior occasions—September 6, 2019, and September 12, 2019.               On those two
    occasions, Deputy Wood informed Goodrum that there were “possibly some stolen items
    in the house, and I asked her if she would mind for me and an investigator to walk
    through the residence, and she did not mind.”
    Goodrum v. State                                                                       Page 6
    The evidence supports an inference that Goodrum was aware of the stolen items
    and Kahler’s possible connection to the items. Goodrum’s knowledge about the stolen
    items is further evidenced by a stray comment she made in the body cam videos that
    were admitted into evidence. Specifically, in State’s Exhibit 4, Goodrum told police,
    while she was being arrested, that she had told Kahler to call the police about the incident.
    However, despite the foregoing, we cannot say that the evidence mentioned above
    establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Goodrum knew, when she was helping
    Kahler conceal himself, that Kahler was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a
    felony.2 See Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 317 (“A strong suspicion or mere probability of guilt
    are insufficient.    In examining the evidence, factfinders are not permitted to make
    conclusions based on unsupported inferences or to guess at the possible meaning of a
    piece of evidence. While such a guess may be a reasonable one, it is not sufficient to
    support a finding of an element beyond a reasonable doubt because it is not based on
    facts.” (internal citations omitted)). Indeed, Deputy Wood admitted that when deputies
    called for Kahler to come out of hiding on September 19, 2019, they did not mention the
    word “warrant.” They merely yelled for Kahler to come out of hiding. Thus, the evidence
    2At the time of the offense, Goodrum could not have been aware that Kahler was charged with or
    convicted of a felony because the State did not indict Kahler for the burglary-of-a-building offense that
    served as the basis for the arrest warrant until January 2020, or approximately four months after the
    September 19, 2019 encounter.
    Goodrum v. State                                                                                  Page 7
    does not establish whether deputies had a felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant, a search
    warrant, or simply wanted to interview Kahler when they arrived at the trailer.
    And although Rabon recalled hearing law enforcement stating that they were
    present at the residence with a warrant for Kahler’s arrest, the body cam videos show
    that it was not until Kahler had been extracted from his hiding place and handcuffs were
    placed on him that law enforcement stated that a warrant for Kahler’s arrest had issued
    for felony burglary of a building.
    Therefore, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
    cannot say that the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to have
    found beyond a reasonable doubt that Goodrum knew Kahler was under arrest for a
    felony offense when she encountered the deputies at the trailer on September 19, 2019.
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05(d); see also Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 317-18. Therefore, we
    cannot uphold her conviction for felony hindering apprehension.
    However, as Goodrum asserts, the trial court necessarily found each element of
    the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor hindering apprehension, and the evidence is
    sufficient to support a conviction for that offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05(a)
    (providing that a person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder arrest . . . for an
    offense . . . [s]he: (1) harbors or conceals the other; (2) provides or aids in providing the
    other with any means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape; or (3) warns the other of
    impending discovery or apprehension.”), (c) (“Except as provided by Subsection (d), an
    Goodrum v. State                                                                       Page 8
    offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.”). Thus, rather than acquitting
    Goodrum, we reform her conviction to misdemeanor hindering apprehension and
    remand the case for a new punishment hearing. Accordingly, we sustain Goodrum’s first
    issue on appeal.
    Court Costs
    In her second issue, Goodrum challenges several court costs that were assessed.
    We conclude that it is unnecessary to address this issue, as a new certified bill of costs
    will be produced after the trial court conducts a new punishment hearing in this case. See
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.15(a) (“When the defendant is fined, the judgment
    shall be that the defendant pay the amount of the fine and all costs to the state.”), 42.16
    (“If the punishment is any other than a fine, the judgment shall specify it, and order it
    enforced by the proper process. It shall also adjudge the costs against the defendant, and
    order the collection thereof as in other cases.”); Johnson v. State, 
    423 S.W.3d 385
    , 390 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2014) (noting that the imposition of court costs upon a criminal defendant is
    a nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with
    the trial of the case). Accordingly, we overrule Goodrum’s second issue.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we reform Goodrum’s conviction for felony hindering
    apprehension to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor
    hindering apprehension and remand to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. See
    Goodrum v. State                                                                        Page 9
    Lee v. State, 
    537 S.W.3d 924
    , 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“When an appellate court finds
    the evidence insufficient to establish an element of the charged offense, but the jury
    necessarily found the defendant guilty of a lesser offense for which the evidence is
    sufficient, the appellate court must reform the judgment to reflect the lesser-included
    offense and remand for a new punishment hearing.”); see also Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 319.
    STEVE SMITH
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Johnson, and
    Justice Smith
    Reformed and remanded
    Opinion delivered and filed February 2, 2022
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Goodrum v. State                                                                 Page 10