in Re Tad Mayfield ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-21-00115-CV
IN RE TAD MAYFIELD
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter,* JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens
_______________
*Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Father to J.M., B.M., and M.M.,1 has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
asking this Court to direct the 71st Judicial District Court of Harrison County, Texas, to vacate a
temporary order appointing the children’s foster parents as their joint managing conservators
with the right to designate their primary residence, dismiss the foster parents’ original petition
seeking conservatorship of the children, and return the children to Relator. Father argues (1) that
the appointment of nonparents as joint managing conservators was made in the absence of
sufficient evidence to show that Father was an unfit parent and (2) that the trial court should have
recused before the entry of the temporary order at issue. Because we conclude that (1) the trial
court’s factual determination that Father is unfit cannot be disturbed by mandamus and (2) Father
waived his recusal complaint, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
I. Standard of Review
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and to be entitled to such relief, a petitioner must
show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the petitioner has no adequate
remedy by appeal.” In re Ater, No. 06-21-00095-CV, 2021 WL 5263693, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Nov. 12, 2021, orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding)); see In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458(Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Father has no adequate appellate remedy because temporary
orders in a suit affecting the parent/child relationship are not appealable. TEX. FAM. CODE
1
To protect the confidentiality of the children, we refer to them by initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
ANN. § 105.001(e); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Supp.). Even so, Father must
show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
“A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision that is so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to constitute a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to correctly
analyze or apply the law.” In re Ater, 2021 WL 5263693, at *1 (citing In re Cerberus Capital
Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Walker v.
Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). “It is [Relator’s] burden to show
entitlement to the requested relief.” Id. (quoting In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d at 435). Father must
also show that he seeks “to compel a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial
decision.” Id. (quoting In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d at 435) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 187 S.W.3d 197, 198–99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, orig.
proceeding)).
II. Factual and Procedural Background
The evidence established that the children had been removed from Father in prior cases
involving the Department of Family and Protective Services (Department). In the Department’s
first case, Father took a drug test on November 18, 2019. Before the results were returned, the
trial court entered a final order, on November 21, 2019, removing the Department as a
conservator and appointing Father permanent managing conservator of the children. Due to that
order, the trial court dismissed the Department’s first petition.
A few days after the November 21 order, Father’s November 18 drug test results were
returned and were positive for methamphetamine. As a result, on November 27, 2019, the
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Department filed a second petition seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights, alleging
aggravating circumstances. On December 3, 2019, after an adversary hearing, the trial court
found that there was a substantial risk of danger to the children if they remained in Father’s
home, appointed the Department temporary managing conservator of the children, and appointed
Father temporary possessory conservator of the children. However, because of the Department’s
petition alleging aggravated circumstances, the trial court denied Father visitation based on his
use of drugs “that influenced his ability to determine reality.” Even so, the Department’s second
petition was dismissed on July 13, 2021, after the statutory deadline to decide the case had
passed. The Department chose not to refile its petition.
Instead, on July 23, 2021, the children’s foster parents filed a petition seeking sole
managing conservatorship based on an allegation that Father and the children’s mother engaged
“in a history or pattern of child neglect.” 2 The foster parents also requested that the trial court
enter temporary orders appointing them temporary sole managing conservators. The affidavit in
support of the foster parents’ petition was similar to the one first attached to the Department’s
dismissed petition.
On August 10, 2021, the trial court held a hearing to consider temporary orders. The
children’s foster parent testified that the children had lived with the foster parents for
2
Father argues that the foster parents relied on much of the evidence used by the Department in its prior cases and
that the Legislature could not have intended to allow foster parents to “essentially seek to extend” the Department’s
dismissed cases. Yet, the Texas Family Code grants standing to file an original suit affecting the parent child
relationship to “a person who is the foster parent of a child placed by the Department of Family and Protective
Services in the person’s home for at least 12 months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of
the petition,” and Father has cited to no cases barring foster parents from asserting claims similar to those raised by
the Department in prior cases to which the foster parents were not a party. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 102.003(a)(12) (Supp.).
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approximately twenty months, that Father had only made telephone visits with the children, and
that Father had not provided financial support for them. According to the foster parent, this was
Father’s third Child Protective Services case. Although the Department’s petition had been
dismissed, the foster parent testified that it was not in the children’s best interests to remove
them from the foster home. During cross-examination, the foster parent admitted that there were
no orders requiring Father to provide financial support or work family-based services and that
Father was not to have any contact with the children.
Father testified that he was employed with a railroad company full time and had worked
there for the past twenty-seven years. After the railroad company had transferred him to
Nebraska, Father purchased a two-story, single-family home in Omaha in October 2020 in his
name and lived there with his fiancée. Pictures of the home, Father’s vehicles, and the children’s
rooms, with appropriate furniture and toys, were admitted into evidence.
Father testified that he had not made face-to-face contact with the children because of the
trial court’s orders in the Department’s second case3 but that he had visited with them twenty
times via telephone and FaceTime in the past two years, believed he had a good relationship with
his children, and loved them very much. Father admitted that he had been involved in three CPS
cases involving drugs, and he also admitted that he had tested positive for methamphetamine in
November and December 2019. Even so, Father testified that he had not been drug tested since
July 2020, when he tested negative in both hair follicle and urinalysis tests, was subjected to
3
Father believed that his appointment as sole managing conservator in the Department’s first case entitled him to
possession of the children and testified that he would have had the children in his possession if he had timely learned
of the trial court’s orders in both of the Department’s cases.
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random drug testing at work, had never failed a drug test at work, and had “done everything [he
could] to prove sobriety and maintain sobriety.” Father asked the trial court to return the
children to him.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On
August 16, 2021, the foster parents filed a pleading arguing that Father was an unfit parent. On
August 18, 2021, the trial court held a hearing to announce its ruling regarding the foster parents’
request for temporary orders.
During the August 18 hearing, the trial court found Father to be an unfit parent. The trial
court then commented about his belief that Father’s parental rights would have been terminated
in the Department’s second case had it not been dismissed due to the statutory deadline and that
Father “wouldn’t have gotten the[] children back anyway based on . . . the constant instability
and drug use and problems that . . . the parents had.” The trial court then engaged in the
following exchange, which relates to Father’s recusal complaint:
[BY THE COURT:] It’s hard for me not to take into consideration
everything that I know about the case because when [Father] testified, a lot of the
things that he testified to the other day were contrary to testimony that he had
provided in the past, particularly the employment.
He hadn’t paid child support because he was always working odd jobs.
He was out of a job at this time. You know, he was doing some construction
work building or remodeling houses, and his employer actually said he did a good
job at that.
So I find it hard to believe that through all that I’ve dealt with him he’s
been employed by the railroad for 27 years because I know they pay well, and he
was always -- there were -- there were issues with that.
That’s just one of the things that he testified to that is contrary to things
that he had testified to in the past. I will -- he hasn’t had visitation. I’m going to
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let him have visitation at Getting Together Safely. I’ll let him set that up once a
month if he wants to do that, and he needs to start paying support. . . .
The next thing is based on the history that I have, I don’t know that I can
-- well, I know that I can’t move forward as the judge in this case because of his
conduct in the past, and so, [Father’s attorney], I’m going to give you two options,
and you get to decide this. [Father] filed a motion to transfer. If you want me to
grant that . . . then I will do that, and I won’t be the judge in the case. If you want
it to remain in Harrison County, . . . I will recuse myself, and I will request that
the -- that [the presiding judge of that administrative judicial region] appoint
someone else to hear the case.
And so I’m going to leave you with that option as to which you would
prefer.
At that point, Father’s counsel selected the option to have the case transferred. The
hearing continued, as follows:
THE COURT: [Father’s counsel] said she wants the case transferred. . .
So that’s what I will do. If you’ll get me an order on the transfer, I’ll do that.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: Okay. . .
THE COURT: Oh, [foster parents] will be appointed as the temporary
managing conservators. [Father] will be the -- a temporary possessory
conservator. . . . No, no, I’m going to make -- they’re going to be joint managing
-- I’m sorry. They’ll be joint managing with [foster parents] determining the
primary residence.
When asked who would draft the temporary order, Father’s attorney said, “I’ll be glad to work
on that.” On November 30, 2021, the trial court entered written temporary orders giving Father
and the foster parents joint managing conservatorship of the children and granting Father
supervised visitation.4
4
The written order did not find that Father was an unfit parent.
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III. We Will Not Disturb the Trial Court’s Factual Finding that Father Is Unfit on
Mandamus Review
“The child’s best interest is always a trial court’s primary consideration in determining
conservatorship issues.” Madore v. Strader, No. 14-20-00147-CV, 2021 WL 4617936, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 2021, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.002). “The Family Code presumes that appointment of both parents as joint
managing conservators or a parent as sole managing conservator is in a child’s best interest, and
it imposes a heavy burden on a nonparent to rebut that presumption.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.131;5 In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000) (explaining that natural
parent “has the benefit of the parental presumption . . . and the nonparent seeking
conservatorship has a higher burden”)). This is because “the fit-parent presumption is ‘deeply
embedded in Texas law’ as part of the determination of a child’s best interest.” In re C.J.C., 603
S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. 2020). “[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of
the family.” Id. at 814 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (plurality
opinion)). As a result, mandamus relief must be granted “to require a trial court to vacate orders
erroneously permitting nonparents access to a child over a fit parent’s objection.” Id. at 811.
5
As applicable, Section 153.131 states,
(a) . . . [U]nless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the
best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s
physical health or emotional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing
conservator or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the
child.
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“However, the fit-parent presumption is not absolute, and may be rebutted.” In re B.B.,
632 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, orig. proceeding); see TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.131(b). “While the United States Constitution protects a parent, who is not a
‘model’ parent but who can adequately care for their child from state interference in child-
rearing decisions, an unfit parent (i.e. a parent who cannot adequately care for his children) is not
entitled to such deference.” Id. at 139 (citing In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 817). Also, “[a]
nonparent . . . appointed as a joint managing conservator may serve in that capacity with either
another nonparent or with a parent of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.372(a) (Supp.).
Here, the trial court expressed its awareness of the fit-parent presumption when it found
Father to be unfit based on, among other things, his drug history, admission that he was a party
to three prior CPS cases involving drugs, and the procedural history of cases filed by the
Department, which had removed the children from Father’s care for twenty months. Citing to
facts in his favor, Father’s mandamus petition argues that the foster parents failed to rebut the fit-
parent presumption, but we find that the trial court made a factual determination of Father’s
unfitness based on the totality of the record before it.
“[T]he law does not provide a basis for mandamus relief based on the trial court’s factual
determination and application of the law to that determination.” In re C.D.C., No. 05-20-00983-
CV, 2021 WL 346428, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2021, orig. proceeding) (citing In re
C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 808, 815–16). In other words, “[i]f the subject of the mandamus petition
(b) It is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint
managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131.
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involves a factual dispute, mandamus relief is precluded.” In re Ater, 2021 WL 5263693, at *1
(citing In re City of Galveston, 622 S.W.3d 851, 858 (Tex. 2021) (citing West v. Solito, 563
S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding) (“[A]n appellate court may not deal with
disputed areas of fact in a mandamus proceeding.”)); In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex.
2006) (orig. proceeding) (same)).
Because Father seeks to overturn a factual finding determined by the trial court where
some evidence supported the trial court’s decision, we conclude that Father’s complaint does not
seek to compel a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. As a result,
we overrule Father’s first complaint since mandamus relief in a case like this one is
inappropriate. See In re C.D.C., 2021 WL 346428, at *3 (declining to grant mandamus relief in
a similar case involving the fit-parent presumption where there was some evidence to support a
finding of unfitness because “the law does not provide a basis for mandamus relief based on the
trial court’s factual determination and application of the law to that determination.”).
IV. Father Waived His Recusal Complaint
In his last point of error, Father cites to the record of the August 18 hearing and argues
that “[i]f the trial judge was unable to make a ruling in the case without letting his prior history
with [Father] bias his determination of whether [Father] is now a ‘fit’ parent, the proper
procedure was to recuse prior to making findings and rulings, not after.” We find this complaint
waived.
Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the recusal of judges. That Rule
requires a party seeking to recuse a trial judge to file a verified motion, which was not done in
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this case. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(a). A trial court may also raise the issue of recusal on its own
motion. Blackwell v. Humble, 241 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.); see TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.002 (Supp.).
Here, all parties were aware that the trial judge was the same judge that had presided over
the Department’s two prior cases, but no party questioned the trial court’s impartiality. While
the trial judge’s comments acknowledged that he was “aware of a lot of history with” Father, the
trial judge did not recuse himself, and Father did not move for recusal. Instead, the trial judge
announced his ruling that Father was unfit, which meant that the foster parents would have
temporary conservatorship over the children, provided Father with visitation, ordered child
support, and then said that he would no longer preside over the case—“I don’t know that I can—
well, I know that I can’t move forward as the judge in this case.”
Even so, rather than recuse, the trial court gave Father the option of either asking the
judge to transfer the case or having the judge recuse if Father wished the case to remain in
Harrison County. Father affirmatively selected the option to have the trial judge remain on the
case so that he could grant Father’s motion to transfer. Father also volunteered to draft the
temporary orders he now complains of, after the trial court announced that Father and foster
parents would be appointed temporary joint managing conservators of the children.
“The parties to a proceeding may waive any ground for recusal after it is fully disclosed
on the record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(e); see Blackwell, 241 S.W.3d at 712. We find that the trial
court did not determine that recusal was necessary before entering temporary orders, that Father
never requested the trial court to recuse, and that Father instead volunteered to draft the
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temporary orders without voicing any objection to the trial court’s comments. As a result, we
find that Father waived the recusal complaint first argued in his petition for a writ of mandamus.
V. Conclusion
We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice
Date Submitted: February 7, 2022
Date Decided: February 8, 2022
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