Kristen Eileen Brown v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-19-00385-CR
KRISTEN EILEEN BROWN,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 19th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-937-C1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kristen Eileen Brown was charged with, and convicted of, compelling the
prostitution of her own child. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.05(a)(2). In one issue, Brown
asserts the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the introduction of extraneous
offense evidence without the State having provided notice to Brown as required by article
38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
During trial, the State moved to offer the medical report of the medical advisor at
the Advocacy Center for Crime Victims and Children who had conducted a medical
examination of Brown’s child. Brown objected to the third paragraph on the first page of
the report and its reference to an incident that happened in the State of Wisconsin. Brown
objected on the basis that the incident was an extraneous offense which may be
admissible under article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but that the required
notice was not given by the State. The objection was overruled. Brown argues on appeal
that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling this objection.
We review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, even extraneous
offense evidence, for an abuse of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82-83 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial
court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83.
The State argues, as it did in the trial court, that because the Wisconsin incident
was not committed by Brown, but by another individual, the evidence is not governed
by article 38.37 and no notice was required.
Article 38.37 provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by
the defendant against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted
for its bearing on relevant matters, including the state of mind of the defendant and the
child; and the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, sec. 1, (b). Notice of the State’s intent to introduce such
evidence in its case in chief is required. Id. sec. 3.
The operative phrase in this statute which is at issue in this appeal is, “by the
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defendant.” Other crimes or wrongs or acts committed by the defendant against the child
requires notice. In this case, the crime, wrong, or act against the child in Wisconsin was
not committed by Brown—it was committed by another individual. Thus, it is not
governed by article 38.37 and its notice requirement. Brown has not provided us with
any authority that notice is required under article 38.37 when the crime, wrong, or act is
committed by someone other than the defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence over Brown’s article 38.37 notice objection,
and Brown’s sole issue is overruled.
Because we have overruled Brown’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 9, 2022
Do not publish
[CRPM]
Brown v. State Page 3