Ramon Martinez v. Edgar Guajardo and Daniela C. Guajardo ( 2022 )

NUMBER 13-20-00165-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAMON MARTINEZ, Appellant,
v.
EDGAR GUAJARDO AND
DANIELA C. GUAJARDO, Appellees.
On appeal from the 206th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Hinojosa, Tijerina, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
Appellant Ramon Martinez appeals the trial court’s no-evidence and traditional
summary judgments in favor of appellees Edgar Guajardo and Daniela C. Guajardo. By
his first issue, Martinez argues the trial court erred in granting the no-evidence motion
because he “produced more than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue as to all the
elements contained in their motion.” By his second issue, Martinez argues that the trial
court erred in granting the traditional summary judgment motion because the Guajardos
failed to establish the statute of limitations affirmative defense as a matter of law. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties dispute title to real property. On October 8, 2004, Irma Chapa was
granted title to the property via warranty deed, which she recorded in the Hidalgo County
property records on November 19, 2004. Chapa sold the property to the Guajardos via
warranty deed on November 28, 2011, which was recorded on December 6, 2011.
Seven years later, on December 6, 2018, Martinez filed an original petition against
the Guajardos alleging fraud and trespass-to-try-title claims. Alternatively, Martinez
sought a partition of the property. In his petition, he alleged that he and Chapa purchased
the property to which he made large investments even though title to the property
appeared solely in Chapa’s name. According to Martinez, he was subsequently
imprisoned, and Chapa agreed she would transfer the property to Martinez upon his
release. However, upon his release from prison, Chapa sold the property to the Guajardos
instead.
The Guajardos filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting
Martinez’s trespass-to-try-title claim failed because he produced no evidence that he had
title to the property. The Guajardos also challenged his partition action because there was
no common interest in the property. Lastly, they asserted that Martinez did not offer any
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evidence as to any of the common-law fraud elements. They additionally stated that all of
Martinez’s claims relied on alleged verbal agreements for which there is no evidence.
In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the Guajardos claimed that the
statute of limitations barred Martinez’s suit because it commenced in 2011, yet Martinez
did not file suit until 2018—after the four-year limitation period expired. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004(a)(4) (providing a four-year period in which to bring
claims for “fraud”), 16.051 (providing that every action for which no express period applies
“must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues”).
Martinez responded to the no-evidence and traditional summary judgments.
Regarding the no-evidence summary judgment, Martinez asserted that the Guajardos did
not challenge each element as to Martinez’s suit for plea in partition. Martinez also stated
that he sought a judicial finding that he had ownership of the property, and if the trial court
agreed, then his trespass-to-try-title claim prevails. He further stated his attached affidavit
was evidence to support his cause of action for fraud. In response to the traditional
summary judgment, Martinez asserted that his cause of action for fraud was not barred
by the statute of limitations because the Guajardos did not submit conclusive proof that
Martinez was aware of the alleged fraud within the four years from the date the fraud
occurred. Martinez did not address the Guajardos’ statute of limitations arguments for his
claims for trespass-to-try-title claim and suit for plea in partition.
The trial court granted the Guajardos’ no-evidence and traditional motions for
summary judgment against Martinez. This appeal followed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Mann
Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In
reviewing a no-evidence judgment motion, we must take as true all evidence favorable to
the nonmovant and draw every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of
the nonmovant. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23–24
(Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a motion for a pretrial
directed verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310
(Tex. 2009). After an adequate time for discovery, a party without the burden of proof
may, without presenting evidence, seek summary judgment on the ground that there is
no evidence to support one or more essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim or
defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The nonmovant is required to present evidence raising
a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. Id.;
Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310. A genuine issue of material fact is raised if the non-
movant produces more than a scintilla of evidence regarding the challenged element.
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). When a party moves
for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence grounds, we first review the no-
evidence motion. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).
III. DISCUSSION
By his first issue, Martinez argues the trial court erred in granting the Guajardos’
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no-evidence motion for summary judgment “because the summary judgment evidence
raised a fact issue as to [his] title to the subject property.”
A. Trespass-To-Try-Title
The Guajardos moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the ground that
there was no evidence to support Martinez’s trespass-to-try-title cause of action. To
prevail on a trespass-to-try-title claim, a plaintiff must “(1) prove a regular chain of
conveyances from the sovereign, (2) establish superior title out of a common source,
(3) prove title by limitations, or (4) prove title by prior possession coupled with proof that
possession was not abandoned.” Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018)
(citing Plumb v. Stuessy, 617 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1981)). Trespass-to-try-title actions
“involve detailed pleading and proof requirements.” Id.Martinez responded to the no-evidence motion by attaching his affidavits wherein
he averred that he gave Chapa money to purchase the property “to launder money from
the sale of narcotics.” He further stated they had agreed to “improve the home with the
drug money and then she would sell the home and return the money to [him] as laundered
money.” According to Martinez’s affidavit, he invested over $500,000 for improvements
to the home as “laundered money to escape narcotic detection.” Martinez claimed that
upon release from prison, he contacted Chapa to sell the property and return his money
as per their oral agreement, but she refused.
As stated above, trespass-to-try-title actions “involve detailed pleading and proof
requirements.” Id. Here, the evidence shows that Martinez does not own, nor has he ever
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owned, the property in question. Conversely, the evidence established that solely Chapa
owned the property and subsequently sold the property to the Guajardos. Thus, Martinez
put forth no evidence that established: (1) a chain of conveyances from the sovereign; (2)
superior title out of a common source; (3) title by limitations; or (4) title by prior
possessions with proof that possession was not abandoned. See id. At most, Martinez
offered a conclusory allegation in his affidavit without further proof, but broad conclusory
statements are not valid summary judgment evidence. See Doherty v. Old Place, Inc.,
316 S.W.3d 840, 843–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). To the extent
that Martinez asserts equitable title based on an alleged oral agreement with Chapa, we
reject this argument as Martinez unequivocally stated his alleged agreement was to
launder drug money. See Komet v. Graves, 40 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2001, no pet.) (“[C]ourts will not enforce an illegal contract, even if the parties don’t object.
Enforcement of an illegal contract violates public policy.”) (internal citations omitted).
Based on the record, we conclude that Martinez does not raise a scintilla of evidence to
prevail on a trespass-to-try-title action. See King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751.
On appeal, Martinez additionally argues that the statements in his affidavit
establish “the creation of a purchase money resulting trust for [his] benefit.” However,
Martinez raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Because Martinez did not raise
this argument to the trial court in his response to the Guajardos’ no-evidence summary
judgment motion, we do not consider it on appeal. See McConnell v. Southside Indep.
Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993) (providing that a nonmovant’s issue to avoid
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a movant’s summary judgment motion must be expressly presented to the trial court by
written answer); Stewart v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 975 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998, no pet.) (“An appellate court cannot reverse a summary
judgment based on an issue not presented to the trial court.”). Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not err in granting the Guajardos’ no-evidence motion for summary
judgment on Martinez’s trespass-to-try-title claim.
B. Suit for Plea in Partition
In their no-evidence summary judgment motion, the Guajardos asserted that
Martinez produced no evidence of a common interest in land; therefore, his suit for plea
in partition must fail. Only a joint owner or claimant of real property or an interest in real
property may compel a partition of the interest or the property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 23.001. As previously stated, Martinez did not present more than a scintilla of evidence
that he had any legal interest in the property to be partitioned. As a result, his contingent
partition request must fail. See id.; see also Aguilar v. Lozano, No. 13-16-00568-CV, 2018
WL 655540, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(providing that “[t]he prerequisites of maintaining a suit for partition of land are (1) a
common interest in the land, and (2) the equal right to present possession”). Therefore,
the trial court did not err in granting the Guajardos’ no-evidence summary judgment on
this basis. See King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751.
C. Fraud
In the trial court, the Guajardos attacked all the elements of Martinez’s fraud claim,
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asserting that Martinez produced no evidence of the common law elements of fraud,
which are:
(1) that a material representation was made; (2) the representation was
false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false
or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive
assertion; (4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that the
other party should act upon it; (5) the party acted in reliance on the
representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury.
Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)
(quoting In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001)). In his response to
the Guajardos’ no-evidence summary judgment motion, Martinez’s entire argument is as
follows: “It is not necessary to prove a verbal conveyance, but only that a promise was
made, it was material, it was breached, and said breach resulted in damages to Plaintiff.
See Plaintiff’s affidavit . . . which sets forth the misrepresentations and damages to
Plaintiff.” However, this inadequate response does not reference evidence that raises a
fact issue on any of the challenged elements of fraud. To succeed on a challenge to a no-
evidence summary judgment motion, “the nonmovant must file a written response that
points out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.” Holloway v. Tex.
Elec. Util. Const., Ltd., 282 S.W.3d 207, 213 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.). If the
nonmovant “produces no summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact on [each of the challenged] elements[,]” the trial court must grant the no-evidence
motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see TEX. R. CIV.
P. 166a(i). As such, we conclude that Martinez’s response is inadequate for its failure to
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raise a fact issue on any of the challenged elements of fraud. We overrule his first issue.1
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of February, 2022.
1 Because the trial court did not err in granting the Guajardos’ no-evidence summary judgment, we
need not address Martinez’s remaining issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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