Issac-John Collins v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

NUMBER 13-20-00144-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ISSAC-JOHN COLLINS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 117th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant Issac-John Collins was convicted of: (1) one count of aggravated
kidnapping, a first-degree felony; (2) sixty-six counts of sexual assault of a child, a
second-degree felony; (3) one count of attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault of a
child, a first-degree felony; (4) one count of indecency with a child, a third-degree felony;
and (5) one count of unlawful restraint of a child, a state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 20.02(c)(1), 20.04(A)(1)(1–6), 21.11(d), 22.011(a)(2), 22.021(a)(2)(B). Collins
was sentenced to a total of seventy years in prison.
In two issues, Collins appeals his conviction on the grounds that: (1) the trial court
should have not allowed him to waive his right to counsel, and (2) his sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the seriousness of the alleged offenses. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Collins was arrested on February 7, 2019 for the above-described charges. At his
arraignment hearing on April 22, 2019, Collins appeared with private counsel. The trial
court listed the charges Collins faced and confirmed with Collins that he had received and
reviewed a copy of the indictment. Collins’s first attorney withdrew from the case on May
24, 2019, and a competency evaluation was ordered that same day. On June 5, 2019,
Collins filed an affidavit of indigence and counsel was appointed to represent him. The
results of the competency evaluation were received by the court on September 10, 2019,
but were not included in the record on appeal.
On October 16, 2019, Collins filed a pro se, handwritten letter addressed to the
court in which he requested to represent himself. The letter stated, in part,
I have a court appointed [attorney] and getting her to do stuff on behalf of
my defense is almost impossible. Iv [sic] spoken with her and she has no
objection concerning me executing my legal rights in representing myself. I
represented myself in my last felony case in [P]ecos [C]ounty in 2018. . . . I
walked out with no time. At age 19[,] I took a disorderly conduct charge to
trial in [S]mith [C]ounty, picked out my jury and cross examined my accusers
and I hung the jury. I do know how to handel [sic] myself in court.
In the letter, Collins also objected to continuing his trial date, requested a pretrial hearing,
moved for the suppression of certain evidence, and asked that his appointed counsel
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relinquish to Collins the discovery in her possession.
On October 18, 2019, the trial court held a Faretta hearing. See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 833–36 (1975). The following exchange took place between the
court and Collins:
THE COURT: And I received the letter that you want to represent
yourself. Before I can allow that to happen, I have to,
in effect, counsel you that that is not a good idea.
[COLLINS]: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: In fact, there is an old saying that someone who
represent[s] themselves has a fool for a client, okay?
And the bottom line is you have not gone to law school.
[COLLINS]: Right.
THE COURT: It is—I have to hold you to the same Rules of
Procedure and the same Rules of Evidence. It’s just
that you don’t get to just talk. So when you want to
represent yourself, it is like you can handle the case
and I can’t give you any leeway or make it easier for
you, and I certainly can’t be your attorney.
[COLLINS]: I understand, Your Honor.
....
THE COURT: Now, you have the right to represent yourself, after I
had admonished you that it is not a good idea. I do not
recommend it at all because, again, in my opinion you’ll
be at a disadvantage because you are not trained as a
lawyer to know the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of
Procedure.
[COLLINS]: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay? So I need to know, after I have admonished you,
what is your decision?
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[COLLINS]: Your Honor, my decision to proceed as what it is. But I
was requesting, what’s it called? Because of the nature
of this case, these cases are considered biased, a lot
of people are biassed [sic] and pre-judge these cases
and—
THE COURT: You’re considering what?
[COLLINS]: These cases are like—these cases can easily be
biased on the, like they pre-judge these cases, looking
at the evidence and stuff.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[COLLINS]: And even—you’ve been a judge for decades, and you
handle these cases and—
....
[COLLINS]: —and you’ve been my judge most of my life.1
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[COLLINS]: And I’m requesting that you hear my case, so it will be
like—more like requesting a bench trial.
THE COURT: You are requesting a bench trial?
[COLLINS]: I won’t get a fair trial with a jury, like these cases are
easily pre-judged I’ve seen it can be done.
....
THE COURT: And you haven’t answered my question. Do you want
[appointed counsel] to be, in effect, the attorney that
represents [you] during the case, the bench trial, or are
you going to insist on representing yourself?
1 The record indicates that the presiding judge in the underlying case was also the presiding judge
for the following: (1) Collins’s guilty pleas to theft and failure to identify entered on April 22, 2011, see TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03, 38.02, and (2) a hearing to revoke Collins’s community supervision on March
7, 2012. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.754. The record also indicates the presiding judge in
the underlying case signed off on a judgment of conviction on November 18, 2014, for a count of theft
committed by Collins. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03.
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[COLLINS]: I will insist on representing myself.
The court granted Collins’s request to represent himself and his request for a
bench trial, and his appointed counsel was ordered to serve as standby counsel
throughout the remainder of the proceedings. See Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83,
92–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that although a defendant does not have an
absolute right to hybrid representation, a trial court may permit it in its discretion).
On November 7, 2019, the trial court held a status conference during which it
revisited its ruling on Collins’s waiver of his right to counsel based on reports from the jail
concerning Collins’s mental health. According to Edra Bocanegra, the mental health
coordinator and licensed professional counselor employed at the jail, Collins had been
placed on suicide watch several times following the October 18 hearing. Bocanegra
testified that Collins would ask to be removed from his unit based on his fears of the other
inmates. When Collins’s request to be removed was denied, he would then report having
suicidal ideations. Bocanegra stated that “[Collins] didn’t need to be on suicide watch
because of the risk factors. He has no history of suicide attempts, no history of mental
health [issues], and so we would take him off suicide watch.”
The following colloquy then took place between the court, Collins, and standby
counsel:
THE COURT: Okay. Let me explain to you. I—I think you’re
being well taken care of in the jail. Hold on. My
concern is . . . whether you can represent
yourself in a serious case.
[COLLINS]: Oh, I can represent myself. . . .
I don’t have no mental illnesses. I don’t have no–
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I don’t have no suicidal behaviors. I only come
down because people in there start messing
with me because of my case . . . .
THE COURT: Again, you’re not listening to what I have to say
and that is I understand what has been
happening in the jail.
[COLLINS]: Yeah.
THE COURT: The reason is I heard about what’s been
happening in the jail and it began to concern me
with regards to the decision that I have to make
and that is whether or not you are capable of in
effect representing yourself after you have
expressed the desire to represent yourself and
after I have admonished you about the negative
aspects of representing yourself.
[COLLINS]: I’m pretty confident in my representation of
myself. I think a medical examiner—a medical
by—a doctor examined me and said I was good.
I was seen to be fit.
THE COURT: Okay. [Standby counsel], he’s your client and
I’ve appointed you as of October to in effect to
assist him with regards to his self-
representation. Have you had any meetings with
him that would shed some light on to whether or
not I need to conduct another hearing and make
a determination as to whether I should allow him
to represent himself even though it is his desire?
[STANDBY COUNSEL]: Judge, I feel like—even if he had a court-
appointed lawyer representing him he would
be—he would be running the show. He is
determined to represent himself. I will tell the
Court he’s come up with some things that I think
are good decisions—
THE COURT: Okay.
[STANDBY COUNSEL]: —and so I—I don’t think there is going to be any
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lawyer who can represent him. He—he is
determined to represent himself and I think he
would agree with that.
[COLLINS]: I do want to say I thank this Court, you know, for
giving me the opportunity to, you know, be able
to represent myself. I’m sorry that I have a
housing issue that—
THE COURT: Okay.
[COLLINS]: —I’m not able to control and it’s in the way—
THE COURT: He—he definitely sounds like he’s got a grasp of
the circumstances involved. Okay. So I was just
concerned as to what I heard was happening in
the jail and I needed to revisit my ruling on
October 18th. So my ruling on October 18th
based upon what I’ve heard in this courtroom,
your—your statement and [standby counsel]’s
statement, that ruling will stand . . . .
On March 2, 2020, Collins’s trial began. Prior to opening statements, the court
found that:
[E]arly, early on, this Court entertained and sent Mr. Collins for a
competency evaluation where he was determined, without a question, to be
competent, and that Mr. Collins has indicated to the Court and requested
from the Court, on a number of occasions, that he be allowed to represent
himself. This Court did conduct a competency [evaluation] as to whether he
could or he could not represent himself. . . . I made the determination after
I admonished him and argued against him representing himself that he
could represent himself, and he has been doing that ever since.
At the conclusion of trial, the judge found Collins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of all seventy counts and sentenced him to a total of seventy years in prison. This appeal
followed.
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II. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In his first issue, Collins contends that his decision to waive his right to counsel
was not made competently nor was it made knowingly and intelligently.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right of an accused in a
criminal proceeding to effective assistance of counsel. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335, 342–44 (1963); U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. The right to effective assistance of
counsel may be waived by a defendant who wishes to conduct his own defense. Faretta,
442 U.S. at 836. “To be constitutionally effective, the waiver of counsel must be made (1)
competently, (2) knowingly and intelligently, and (3) voluntarily.” Fletcher v. State, 474
S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Collier v. State,
959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
B. Analysis
1. Collins’s Waiver Was Made Competently
The competency that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to
counsel is the competency to waive the right, not the competency to represent himself.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993). Thus, the standard for waiving the right to
counsel, generally, is no higher than the standard for competency to stand trial. Chadwick
v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399).
A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial unless a preponderance of the evidence
proves otherwise. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b).
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However, a trial court is permitted to insist upon counsel for a defendant who is
competent to stand trial, but who nonetheless suffers from severe mental illness. Indiana
v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 174 (2008). “[O]nce a defendant is deemed competent to stand
trial, the relevant inquiry in determining whether a court may insist on counsel is whether
the defendant can ‘carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without
the help of counsel.’” Fletcher, 474 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–
76). The court is authorized to take a realistic account of the defendant’s mental capacities
in determining whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is
mentally competent to do so. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177–78. The trial court is in a far
superior position than the reviewing court to assess the competency of a defendant to
proceed pro se. Id. at 177. A trial court’s determination that a defendant is competent to
waive his right to counsel is therefore reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Chadwick, 309
S.W.3d at 561. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. Id.Here, the trial court found that, after his competency evaluation, Collins “was
determined, without a question, to be competent.” Neither party objected to this finding.
In support of his assertion that his waiver was not competently made, Collins included an
excerpt from his trial transcript where he cross-examined a witness in a manner that he
asserts on appeal was “incompetent, damaging, and hostile.” But Collins’s waiver of
counsel was entered over four months prior to the questioning of this witness. The trial
court did not have the benefit of hindsight at the time it accepted Collins’s waiver of
counsel. See Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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Nevertheless, Collins argues it was the trial court’s duty to sua sponte declare a mistrial
and appoint counsel once it observed Collins’s performance at trial.
The record demonstrates that Collins asked many cogent questions during his
cross-examination of this particular witness. Other portions of the record from both his
trial and the preliminary proceedings indicate that he was, for the most part, respectful to
the trial court, the prosecutor, his standby counsel, and most of the witnesses. He filed
several motions, provided a coherent opening statement, was able to admit items of
evidence, and lodged many objections that were sustained. Therefore, the record
affirmatively demonstrates that Collins was able to “carry out the basic tasks needed to
present his own defense without the help of counsel.” See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76;
Chadwick, 309 S.W.3d at 563.
Further, the record does not indicate Collins suffers from any severe mental illness,
which is the “threshold requirement for mandating that a defendant accept the
representation of counsel.” See Fletcher, 474 S.W.3d at 401.
We therefore conclude the trial court’s finding that Collins’s waiver was
competently made was not an abuse of discretion.
2. Collins’s Waiver Was Made Knowingly And Intelligently
Because a defendant who conducts his own defense “relinquishes . . . many of the
traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” he must knowingly and
intelligently choose to forgo those benefits in order to represent himself. Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 835. A waiver is made knowingly and intelligently if the accused is “made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that
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‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. (quoting Adams
v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). The trial court must admonish the defendant
about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, that there are technical rules
of evidence and procedure, and that the defendant will not be granted special
consideration solely based on his decision to proceed pro se. Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at
279.
There is no formulaic line of questioning or script a trial court must follow in
evaluating whether a defendant appreciates the decision he is making. Id. at 278. If such
factors are not apparent from the record, a trial court’s inquiry regarding a defendant’s
waiver of counsel should center around his “‘age, education, background, or previous
mental health history.’” Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982)). In assessing whether a waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, courts look
to “the totality of circumstances.” Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Whether the totality of circumstances evinces an effective waiver will depend on
“the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Collins argues that, although the trial court admonished him at length on the perils
of representing himself, the waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly and
intelligently made because the trial court did not conduct an in-depth inquiry into Collins’s
“age, experience with the legal system, knowledge of the rules of evidence and procedure
for the State of Texas, or his overall maturity to conduct his own defense.” See Johnson
v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The record indicates Collins was
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thirty-two years old on the day of the Faretta hearing. Collins’s handwritten letter filed on
October 16, 2019, demonstrates that he (1) is literate; (2) has experience successfully
representing himself in at least two prior criminal cases; and (3) has a marked
understanding of criminal procedure. The trial judge also had some personal familiarity
with Collins’s experience with the legal system, as she had accepted pleas from him for
various offenses on at least three occasions prior to the underlying case. The court
conducted an inquiry into Collins’s mental health when it appointed an expert to
investigate his competency to stand trial.
During the Faretta hearing, the trial court recommended against Collins’s self-
representation “because [he was] not trained as a lawyer to know the Rules of Evidence
and the Rules of Procedure.” See Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at 279 (requiring that defendant
be made aware “that there are technical rules of evidence and procedure”). The trial court
also admonished Collins that he would not be granted any leeway and would be held to
the same standard as an attorney. See id. (requiring that defendant be made aware “he
will not be granted any special consideration solely because he asserted his pro se
rights”). While it is true that the trial court did not determine Collins’s level of familiarity
with the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, “technical legal knowledge . . . [is] not relevant
to an assessment of [a defendant’s] knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836; see also Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 584 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984) (holding that appellant’s failure of “trial court’s impromptu evidentiary and
procedural ‘pop quiz’” was an improper ground for denial of appellant’s right to self-
representation). In addition to admonishing Collins, the trial court ordered defense
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counsel to remain as standby counsel.
The court also revisited the decision to accept Collins’s waiver of counsel, as it
was permitted to do, when concerns about Collins’s mental health arose. See Edwards,
554 U.S. at 177–78. At that hearing, the trial court impressed upon Collins the seriousness
of the charges he was facing. It also heard from standby counsel that Collins had come
up with some good legal decisions and that he was determined to represent himself. It
heard from both the mental health coordinator at the jail and from Collins that he was not
suffering from severe mental health issues.
The record before us is bereft of any inquiry into Collins’s level of education. A
careful trial court should inquire into a defendant’s age, background, education,
experience, and any other necessary information prior to permitting the wavier of counsel.
See Williams v. State, 774 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet ref’d). “But a
trial judge has no duty to inquire into an accused’s age, education, background[,] or
previous mental health history in every instance where an accused expresses a desire to
represent himself.” Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 356 (quotation omitted). Because the record
affirmatively shows that Collins was “literate, competent, and understanding, and that he
was voluntarily exercising his informed free will,” we conclude the trial court did not err in
implicitly finding that Collins’s waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly and
intelligently. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–36.
We overrule Collins’s first issue.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE
In his second issue, Collins contends that the punishment assessed by the trial
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court was disproportionate to the seriousness of the alleged offenses in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amends. VIII, XIV. The State contends Collins has failed to preserve the issue for review.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”
Id. amend VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s protections are extended to punishments
imposed by state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. amend. XIV. To preserve for appellate review a complaint that the sentence imposed
is grossly disproportionate, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request,
objection or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought. TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a); Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“As a general
rule, an appellant may not assert error pertaining to his sentence or punishment where
he failed to object or otherwise raise such error in the trial court.”). “A defendant is required
to ‘present’ a motion to the trial court within ten days of filing it, unless the court, in its
discretion, extends that time period.” Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6). “Merely filing the motion is not sufficient alone to
show presentment.” Id. The defendant must give actual notice to the trial court of the
timely filed motion for new trial and actual notice of the desire to have a hearing. Rozell
v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Collins’s sentence was imposed on March 9, 2020. After the punishment phase of
his trial, Collins did not object to the length of his sentence. Collins was appointed counsel
on March 10, 2020. In an inmate communication form filed with the court on March 12,
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2020, Collins wrote, “IV [sic] been given a[n] [e]xtraordinar[ily] cruel and unusual
punishment.” Collins also attached a motion for sentence reconsideration to the inmate
communication form. Neither the inmate communication form nor the motion for sentence
reconsideration requested a hearing on the motion for sentence reconsideration. See id.The record does not indicate that the trial court ever ruled on the motion. Moreover, the
trial court was not required to consider this motion, as Collins was represented by counsel
at the time it was filed. See Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (“[A] trial court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a defendant
who is represented by counsel.”); Hazelwood v. State, 838 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, no pet.). A trial court’s decision not to rule on a pro se
motion in this context is not subject to review. See Robinson, 240 S.W.3d at 922. The
issue of disproportionate sentencing was not raised in the motion for new trial that counsel
for Collins filed on March 27, 2020. See id. at 921.
We conclude that Collins’s complaint that his sentence was grossly
disproportionate has not been preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1);
Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005,
pet. ref’d). Moreover, even if this argument had been properly raised below, a comparison
of “the gravity of the offense [to] the severity of the sentence” in this case does not lead
to a threshold inference of gross disproportionality considering the evidence presented
as to the offenses. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d
at 927–28.
We overrule Collins’s second issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of February, 2022.
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