Chadwick Smith v. State ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-17-00144-CR
____________________
CHADWICK SMITH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 356th District Court
Hardin County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23828
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Appellant Chadwick Smith for the offense of possession
of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or
more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West
2017).1 Smith filed a motion to suppress, and after a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion. Thereafter, Smith pleaded guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at
1
We cite to the current version of the statute as subsequent amendments do
not affect our disposition.
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eleven years’ confinement. In a single issue, Smith appeals the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Hearing on Motion to Suppress
In his motion to suppress, Smith alleged that the evidence was seized pursuant
to an “illegal stop, detention and/or arrest.” According to Smith, the stop was without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion and any evidence seized or statements made
should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful search and seizure.
At the suppression hearing, the State conceded that there was no warrant for
the search. Officer Justin Holt (the “Officer”) with the Silsbee Police Department
testified that he stopped a motorcycle on the evening of June 3, 2015, because he
could not see a legible license plate on the motorcycle. The Officer also explained
that the paper tags “were all crinkled up and folded and dirty[,]” and although the
motorcycle had a buyer’s tag, the tag was not legible due to its condition and how it
was fastened. Upon further investigation, after stopping the motorcycle the Officer
also noticed other violations. The Officer observed that the rear tire was extremely
underinflated and the tread was wearing through to the cords. At the hearing, the
Officer identified Smith as the person he stopped.
The Officer explained that, upon stopping Smith, he also noted that “[t]he
ignition wires appeared to have been cut, VIN numbers were ground down[]” and
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the seat and fuel tank were not bolted down, and that he investigated whether the
vehicle was stolen. Once he stopped the motorcycle, he could see that the front tire
was also severely worn and was very slick. According to the Officer, he had dealt
with Smith a couple of months earlier in a matter regarding methamphetamines and
he had “firsthand knowledge” that he had “arrested the subject before with narcotics
and with a weapon.” The Officer also explained that he communicated by radio with
a sergeant at the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office Narcotics Division, and he recalled
that the sergeant warned him of a possible weapon. According to the Officer, he also
observed a rag or paper towel shoved into the “ram air induction system[.]” The
Officer explained that nothing should have been in the air intake because that is
where the air would channel into the air filter. Based on his observations of the
vehicle, his knowledge of the suspect’s past history, plus his conversation with the
Narcotics Division, the Officer was looking at “possible concealment of narcotics[]”
and a “possible stolen vehicle.”
The Officer “ran” the tags for the motorcycle, and the vehicle appeared to
belong to Triangle Motors. The motorcycle plates were from Triangle Motors, and
at the time of the stop, the Officer had an open investigation into Triangle Motors
for illegal distribution of plates and narcotics. When he asked Smith where he got
the motorcycle, Smith told the Officer that the motorcycle was acquired “from a
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Harris County police auction.” And, Smith later told the Officer that his wife had a
receipt for the motorcycle.
The Officer testified that he asked Smith for consent to search the rear
compartment of the motorcycle, or the area under the seat, and Smith gave consent.
The Officer found a purple container that he felt may have been used to conceal
narcotics but that he did not find any narcotics inside the container. The Officer
explained that he then confronted Smith about what might be underneath the fuel
tank, and Smith did not give him a direct answer. According to the Officer, Smith
was very nervous and sweating profusely. Smith removed the rear seat, and the
Officer removed the fuel tank, after which the Officer located a “little side box . . .
inside the air box.” Inside the air box the Officer found approximately ten grams of
methamphetamine.
The Officer testified that he believed he had probable cause to search more
than the rear compartment of the motorcycle based on his prior knowledge of Smith
with drugs and guns, a radio communication from another officer to be on the
lookout for Smith with drugs, a “paper towel wadded up in the air box that [he could]
visually see[,]” his experience with motorcycles, the fact that Smith was sweating
profusely, and the fact that Smith was in an “excited state[]” when he responded to
the Officer’s questions. The Officer testified that he was personally familiar with the
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model of the motorcycle that Smith was riding, and he explained as follows: “I have
rebuilt them; repaired them; disassembled them down to motors, frames, swing arms,
subframes, forks, front ends, wheels, the entire -- there is not a screw that I haven’t
undone or put back together.” The State also offered into evidence a copy of the
video of the stop taken from the Officer’s patrol vehicle.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court did not enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellate record does not reflect that any were
requested. Smith pleaded guilty and filed a motion for new trial that was overruled
as a matter of law.
Issue
In a single issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to suppress. According to the Appellant, his detention was
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Texas
Constitution because the search was based on the detaining officer’s “inarticulate
hunches” that narcotics were being concealed on the motorcycle and, therefore, the
officer lacked probable cause to search the motorcycle.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-48 (Tex. Crim. App.
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2010). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but
review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Turrubiate v.
State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). At a suppression hearing, the
trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony, and a trial court may choose to believe or to
disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447;
Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting State v.
Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d
853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court does not engage in its
own factual review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts, “especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor.”
Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give the same
deference to the trial court’s conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and
fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). We review purely legal questions de novo as well as mixed
questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. State v.
Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48.
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We also review de novo “whether the totality of [the] circumstances is sufficient to
support an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Crain, 315 S.W.3d
at 48-49.
In the absence of any findings of fact, either because none were requested or
none were spontaneously made by the trial court, an appellate court must presume
that the trial court implicitly resolved all issues of historical fact and witness
credibility in the light most favorable to its ultimate ruling. State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d
667, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856); see also Aguirre
v. State, 402 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“in
the absence of specific findings, an appellate court’s hands are tied, giving it little
choice but to ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling
and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling
as long as those findings are supported by the record[]’”) (quoting Ross, 32 S.W.3d
at 855). We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran,
396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling
if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law
applicable to the case. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014);
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Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ross, 32
S.W.3d at 855.
Applicable Law
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the requirement for a warrant.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The “automobile exception” allows for the warrantless
search of a vehicle “if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that
it contains contraband.” See Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (police may search a vehicle if they
have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime). The Officer testified
that he observed Smith’s motorcycle in motion, and the State offered video evidence
of the motorcycle in motion. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985)
(explaining that the “automobile exception” to the requirement of a warrant applies
when a vehicle is being used on the highways). The Appellant does not challenge
the fact that his vehicle was “readily mobile.” Rather, he contends that the trial court
erred because the search was based on the detaining officer’s “inarticulate hunches”
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that narcotics were being concealed on the motorcycle and, therefore, the officer
lacked probable cause to search the motorcycle.
Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the arresting officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information would warrant a reasonable and prudent man in believing that a
particular person has committed or is committing a crime.” Brown v. State, 481
S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see also Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407,
413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “Probable cause requires an evaluation of probabilities,
and probabilities ‘are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Wiede, 214 S.W.3d
at 24 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). If the totality
of the circumstances demonstrate a “fair probability” of finding evidence at the
location being searched, then the probable cause standard is met. Dixon v. State, 206
S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A court may consider “the training,
knowledge, and experience of law enforcement officials” involved in the warrantless
search. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. Only a “minimal level of objective
justification” on the part of the officer is required, and our “determination of
reasonable suspicion must be based upon commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior.” See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); United
9
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Dalgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
Analysis
In this case, the Officer testified that he made the initial stop based on his
visual observation that the motorcycle lacked legible tags and that he also visually
determined that the motorcycle had seriously worn tires. Once he stopped Smith, the
Officer testified that he observed that the motorcycle’s VIN numbers had been
ground down, and that he suspected the vehicle might be stolen. Furthermore, the
Officer explained that he personally knew Smith to have a history of involvement
with methamphetamines, and that Smith was very nervous, sweating profusely, and
in an excited state. The Officer testified that he observed something stuffed into the
air intake of the motorcycle, that the seat of the motorcycle and fuel tank were not
bolted down, and that based on his knowledge of motorcycles, he knew that nothing
should be stuffed into the intake area. He also testified that he had been working an
open investigation with Triangle Motors for distribution of illegal narcotics and that
the temporary plate on the motorcycle indicated the motorcycle came from Triangle
Motors.
In Marcopoulous, the Court determined that a suspect’s furtive gestures,
including his visits to a bar known for involvement with narcotics sales, were
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insufficient to establish probable cause to search the suspect’s vehicle under the
“automobile exception.” See 538 S.W.3d at 603-04. The Court explained that an
officer’s observations about the suspect may have provided reasonable suspicion to
justify a temporary investigative detention, but that additional “indicators of drug
activity” were necessary to tip the scale in favor of finding probable cause to search
the vehicle. Id. at 604. By contrast, the record in this case includes evidence of
numerous additional facts that provided additional indicators of drug activity beyond
the arresting officer’s initial basis for stopping Smith. Among other things, the
Officer was very familiar with motorcycles, including the particular model Smith
was driving, and the Officer had observed several indicators from the motorcycle
and the suspect. For example, the Officer noticed something unusual stuffed into the
air intake of the motorcycle. The Officer also observed that the motorcycle showed
that it was registered to Triangle Motors, an entity the Officer personally knew to be
associated with an open narcotics sales investigation, the Officer had specific
knowledge that the suspect had previously been linked to narcotics, the suspect was
nervous and sweating, and failed to give direct answers to certain questions, and the
motorcycle’s seat and gas tank appeared to be inadequately secured indicating to the
Officer that contraband could be hidden in the motorcycle. Such “additional
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indicators” of drug activity factually distinguish this case from Marcopoulous and
would tip the scale in favor of finding probable cause. See id.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
Officer and of which the Officer had reasonably trustworthy information would
warrant a reasonable and prudent man in believing that Smith had committed or was
committing a crime or that the motorcycle contained contraband. See Keehn, 279
S.W.3d at 335; Brown, 481 S.W.2d at 110. The trial court could have reasonably
concluded based upon the record that the Officer’s warrantless search of the
motorcycle was justified under the “automobile exception.” See Ross, 456 U.S. at
825; Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the
State met its burden to demonstrate at least a minimal level of objective justification
to justify the search of Smith’s motorcycle. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Keehn, 279
S.W.3d at 336. Accordingly, we overrule the Appellant’s issue and affirm the trial
court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
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Submitted on March 30, 2018
Opinion Delivered June 13, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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