Damien Earl Crayton v. State ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00601-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DAMIEN EARL CRAYTON, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Damien Earl Crayton appeals from a judgment revoking his community
supervision and sentencing him to five-years’ confinement for the offense of assault
causing bodily injury to a family member, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.01(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). In one issue, Crayton
contends that he is entitled to a new hearing because the trial court was biased against
him. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2016, Crayton pled guilty to an alleged offense of assault causing
bodily injury to a family member. See id. The trial court adjudicated Crayton guilty,
assessed a $1,000 fine, sentenced him to five-years’ confinement, suspended the
sentence, and placed Crayton on community supervision for three years. The
community supervision order included several terms and conditions, including that
Crayton not commit any offense against the laws of Texas.
On September 21, 2017, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision,
alleging that Crayton had violated the aforementioned condition by committing the offense
of indecency with a child. See id. § 21.11(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
M.P., who was the mother of the child against whom Crayton had allegedly
committed the indecent act, testified at the revocation hearing. 1 M.P. testified that she
and Crayton were in a romantic relationship for the preceding two years. On direct-
examination by the State, M.P. recalled asking her daughter if Crayton touched her
sexually, to which M.P.’s daughter answered, “Yes.” On cross-examination by Crayton’s
counsel, she testified that she did not end her relationship with Crayton after hearing her
daughter’s accusation and that she still loved him. Crayton’s counsel then asked M.P.
whether she had sexual relations with Crayton after the incident. The court interrupted
1 In our discretion, we will use an alias in lieu of the mother’s name. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt.
(providing that the rule governing protection of a minor’s identity in parental-rights termination and juvenile
court cases does not limit an appellate court’s authority to disguise parties’ identities in appropriate
circumstances in other cases).
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that line of questioning by stating, “It’s irrelevant. Next question.” Crayton did not
complain of the court’s ruling and began a different line of inquiry. On appeal, Crayton
argues that the question exposed that M.P. did not believe her daughter’s accusation.
The trial court found true all allegations in the State’s motion to revoke Crayton’s
community supervision, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to
five-years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
II. JUDICIAL BIAS
Crayton contends that the trial judge violated his minimum rights to due process
by making an objection for the State. 2 Specifically, he challenges the court raising an
objection to his counsel’s question regarding his sexual relationship with M.P. Crayton
argues that by raising this objection sua sponte, rather than requiring the State to make
its own objection, the trial court violated his rights to a detached and impartial hearing
body as required under due process.
A. Applicable Law
The Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant a fair trial in a fair tribunal before
a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his
particular case. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997). The Due Process
Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual
bias. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009). In pursuit of this
end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the
2 Crayton did not object to the trial court’s alleged partiality below. However, a complaint of a
partial trial judge is “structural error” which may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Johnson v.
State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–
469 (1997)).
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probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). A judge is
constitutionally unacceptable when: (1) the judge has a direct personal, substantial, and
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case; (2) the judge has been the target of
personal abuse or criticism from the party before him; or (3) the judge has the dual role
of investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints. Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7,
21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011), aff’d, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Texas Rule of Evidence 611 allows a court to exercise reasonable control over the
examination of witnesses to prevent wasting time and to protect the witness from
harassment and undue embarrassment. TEX. R. EVID. 611(a)(2)–(3). A defendant’s
right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable
restrictions. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). As a result, state and
federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding
evidence from criminal trials. Id. Such rules do not abridge an accused’s right to
present a defense so long as they are not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.” Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1988)). Rule
611 is designed to give courts authority to exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of examining witnesses so as to avoid wasting time and to protect the witness from
harassment or undue embarrassment. Trial courts may place reasonable limits on
cross-examination based on such concerns as harassment, prejudice, the witness’s
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Matchett v. State,
941 S.W.2d 922, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
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B. Discussion
We note that Crayton has not alleged that the trial court judge was constitutionally
unacceptable because the judge had: (1) a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the case; (2) been the target of personal abuse or criticism from
the party before him; or (3) the dual role of investigating and adjudicating disputes and
complaints. Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 21. Thus, his complaints do not raise the kind of
fundamental procedural unfairness that the Supreme Court has held to be an
unconstitutional violation of due process rights. 3
Crayton instead bases his argument solely on the allegation that the court’s
interruption of his cross-examination of M.P. indicates that the judge was not “neutral and
detached.” This complaint implicates matters within the trial court’s discretion afforded
to it by rule 611, i.e., the regulation of testimony, processing of evidence, and general
conduct of trial. See Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).
We have reviewed the entire record. Throughout the revocation hearing, the trial
court exercised the kind of control contemplated by rule 611. In this case, Crayton had
already established that M.P. was still in love with him and maintained a romantic
relationship with him even after he had inappropriately touched her daughter. Further
evidence that M.P. continued to have sexual relations with Crayton would not materially
3 Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 816–18, 822, (1986) (pecuniary interest); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, (1927) (same); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955) (acting as
prosecutor); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (personal embroilment with defendant or
counsel); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262–63 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism’d)
(prejudging case); Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 206–09 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet.
ref’d) (favoring prosecution).
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further Crayton’s defense and could have resulted in harassment or undue
embarrassment of the witness. Therefore, the trial court’s sua sponte objection fell within
the purview of rule 611, and the court’s action did not violate Crayton’s due process
protections.
Finally, we note that most matters related to judicial conduct within the broad
confines of discretion traditionally afforded to a trial court do not usually implicate
constitutional due process protections. See Avilez, 333 S.W.3d at 675 (citing Bracy, 520
U.S. at 904). Indeed, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion,” and a trial court’s opinion would not constitute bias unless it
derives from “an extrajudicial source [or] reveal[s] such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555–56 (1994).
We conclude that the record does not demonstrate bias or a violation of Crayton’s
due process rights. We overrule Crayton’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
21st day of June, 2018.
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