in the Interest of L.G.J. ( 2022 )


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  •        TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-20-00180-CV
    In the Interest of L.G.J.
    FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY
    NO. CV39274, THE HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas (OAG) seeks to appeal
    from the judgment in this cause. We will dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the
    orders in this case did not dispose of all parties and issues raised by the application for
    protective order. 1
    We must review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdiction.            See Hamilton
    v. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins.., 
    328 S.W.3d 664
    , 666 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); see
    also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 
    139 S.W.3d 671
    , 673 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). Generally,
    appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals from only final judgments and certain
    interlocutory orders as permitted by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    ,
    195 (Tex. 2001); see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a). A judgment following a
    1  Normally, an involuntary dismissal for want of jurisdiction requires ten days’ notice to
    the parties. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3. Appellees’ motion to dismiss put the parties on notice that
    jurisdiction was at issue, albeit on other grounds. To the extent that notice was otherwise
    required, we suspend that rule to expedite the decision in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 2.
    conventional trial on the merits creates a presumption that the judgment is final for purposes of
    appeal. See Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 
    400 S.W.2d 893
    , 897-98 (Tex. 1966). The
    judgment in a case must conform to the pleadings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. A protective order
    rendered pursuant to the family code is a final, appealable order provided it disposes of all
    parties and all issues except in circumstances not applicable to this cause. See Tex. Fam. Code
    § 81.009; Roper v. Jolliffe, 
    493 S.W.3d 624
    , 633 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied). A
    written judgment or order controls over a trial court’s oral pronouncements. In re K.M.B.,
    
    148 S.W.3d 618
    , 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
    The Protective Order is not final and appealable. The live pleading seeking relief
    in this case is the Application for Protective Order brought by E.S.A. on behalf of herself and her
    minor children, G.Z.J. and L.G.J. She requested a protective order prohibiting R.C.J. from
    committing violence against, communicating with, or going anywhere near her or the children.
    The trial court issued a temporary ex parte protective order shielding E.S.A. and the children
    from R.C.J. and extended it twice. At the final hearing on protective order, the trial court orally
    stated what it termed “a limited protective order” stating that R.C.J. have no contact with E.S.A.
    and clarified that the protective order would not extend to the children. The trial court signed a
    Protective Order that restricted R.C.J.’s conduct toward and communications with E.S.A.
    through February 7, 2021. The written Protective Order did not mention the children except in
    the style of the case, did not address the requests for their protection as had previous temporary
    orders, and did not contain any language of finality, such as stating that it “finally disposes of all
    parties and all claims and is appealable.” See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205-06. The Protective
    Order is not a final, appealable order.
    2
    None of the other orders in the appellate record—the Agreed Order of Rescission
    of Acknowledgment of Paternity, the Order on Motion for New Trial, or the Order Granting
    Respondent’s Motion to Strike Order for New Trial—disposes of the application for protection
    of the children, carries a presumption of finality, or contains the language of finality. None of
    the orders in this cause is among the appealable interlocutory orders. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
    Rem. Code § 51.014.
    Because there is not a final, appealable order in this record, we have no
    jurisdiction over this appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    Without regard to the merits of the issues raised by the parties’ briefs, we dismiss
    this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    __________________________________________
    Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Smith
    Concurring Opinion by Justice Baker
    Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
    Filed: February 24, 2022
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-20-00180-CV

Filed Date: 2/24/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2022