Juanita Matilde Martinez v. Haas-Anderson Construction, Ltd., HAC Equipment, Ltd., Haas-Anderson Management, L.C. and Eleno Cardona Jr. ( 2022 )

NUMBERS 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-00391-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JUANITA MATILDE MARTINEZ, Appellant,
v.
HAAS-ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION, LTD., Appellee.
On appeal from the 148th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
NUMBER 13-20-00567-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JUANITA MATILDE MARTINEZ, Appellant,
v.
HAAS-ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION, LTD.,
HAC EQUIPMENT, LTD., HAAS-ANDERSON
MANAGEMENT, L.C., AND ELENO CARDONA JR., Appellees.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING
Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Tijerina
Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing by Justice Longoria
On December 16, 2021, this Court affirmed the district and trial court’s orders. See
Martinez v. Haas-Anderson Constr., Ltd., No. 13-20-00567-CV, 2021 WL 5931031, at *1
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 16, 2021, no pet. h.). Appellant Juanita
2
Matilde Martinez has now filed an amended motion for rehearing. We deny the motion,
withdraw our prior opinion and judgment, and substitute this opinion and judgment in their
stead. 1
In appellate cause numbers 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-00391-CV, appellant
challenges the trial court’s orders: (1) denying her motion to strike factual allegations in
her petition; (2) denying her plea to the jurisdiction; and (3) granting appellee Haas-
Anderson Construction, Ltd.’s motion to declare appellant’s marriage to Juan Martinez2
valid. As a result of the declaration of validity of her marriage to Juan, Haas-Anderson
Construction, Ltd., along with appellees Haas-Anderson Management, L.C., HAC
Equipment, Ltd., and Eleno Cardona, Jr., filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging
appellant’s ability to bring a wrongful death cause of action against them. Appellees’ plea
to the jurisdiction was granted and appellant’s wrongful death cause of action was
dismissed. Appellant challenges that order in appellate cause number 13-20-00567-CV.
We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Isaac Garcia, Jr. was killed in a motor vehicle accident. His adult children brought
a wrongful death and survival suit against appellees in the Nueces County Court at Law
Number 1 (county court). Appellant intervened in the suit, claiming to be the deceased’s
common-law spouse. The same day she intervened in the wrongful death and survival
suit, appellant filed a separate suit in the 148th Judicial District Court of Nueces County
(district court) seeking to declare her previous marriage to Juan void. Haas-Anderson
1 Appellant also filed a motion for en banc reconsideration which we dismiss as moot.
2 Juan Martinez, a real party in interest, did not participate in this appeal.
3
Construction intervened in her separate suit, seeking declaratory judgment that
appellant’s marriage to Juan was valid.
A. Petition to Declare Marriage Void
In her petition to declare her previous marriage void, appellant alleged that she
was seventeen years old at the time of the marriage and thus underage. She further
alleged that there was no parental consent or court order granting permission for the
marriage of an underage person. She requested the district court declare the marriage
void pursuant to § 6.205 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.205 (“A
marriage is void if either party to the marriage is younger than 18 years of age, unless a
court order removing the disabilities of minority of the party for general purposes has been
obtained in this state or in another state.”).
Haas-Anderson Construction intervened, arguing that appellant’s marriage was
valid because she was relying on the wrong version of the Texas Family Code.
Specifically, Haas-Anderson Construction contended that the controlling version of the
family code was the version in effect at the time the marriage occurred, 1981, and that
version provided in part that
[t]he licensed or informal marriage of a person 14 years of age or older but
under 18 years of age, without parental consent as provided in Section 1.52
or 1.92 of this code or without a court order as provided by Section 1.53 of
this code, is voidable and subject to annulment on the petition of a next
friend for the benefit of the underage party, or on the petition of the parent
or the judicially designated managing conservator or guardian (whether an
individual, authorized agency or court) of the person of the underage party.
A suit filed under this subsection by a next friend must be brought within 90
days after the date of the marriage, or it is barred. A suit by a parent,
managing conservator, or guardian of the person must be brought within 90
days after the date the petitioner knew or should have known of the
marriage, or it is barred. However, in no case may a suit by a parent,
managing conservator, or guardian of the person be brought under this
subsection after the underage person has reached 18 years of age.
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TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.41, Act of May 31, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 888, sec. 2.41,
1969 Tex. Gen. Law 2707, 2719 (amended 1997) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.102–.104). Accordingly, Haas-Anderson Construction argued that appellant could
not void her prior marriage thirty-eight years after it occurred on grounds that she was
underage. Haas-Anderson Construction filed a motion to declare appellant’s marriage to
Juan valid.
Appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that Haas-Anderson Construction
did not have standing to intervene in the dissolution of her marriage to Juan under either
the Texas Family Code or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). She also
moved to strike two paragraphs from her petition to declare the marriage void, specifically,
the paragraphs that contained her date of birth and the date of the marriage.
The district court entered an order granting Haas-Anderson Construction’s motion
and found appellant’s marriage to Juan to be valid. The district court denied appellant’s
plea to the jurisdiction and motion to strike factual allegations.
B. Wrongful Death and Survival Suit
During the pendency of appellant’s suit to declare her marriage void, appellees
filed a plea to the jurisdiction in response to appellant’s intervention in the wrongful death
and survival suit. The plea argued that appellant lacked standing to sue for wrongful death
or survival claims because she is not a legal heir of the deceased, nor was she the
spouse. The plea argued that appellant, having been married to Juan at the time of the
deceased’s death, could not have been a common-law spouse as she alleged in her
intervention. After the district court entered an order declaring appellant’s marriage to
Juan to be valid, appellees amended their plea in the county court to include the order,
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arguing it precluded appellant from denying her marriage to Juan in the wrongful death
and survival suit. Appellees reiterated their position on appellant’s lack of standing and
sought to have appellant’s claims dismissed. The county court granted appellees’ plea
and dismissed appellant’s claims.
These consolidated appeals followed.
II. VALIDITY OF THE 1981 MARRIAGE
Appellant contends the district court erred by: (1) denying her plea to the
jurisdiction because (a) Haas-Anderson Construction lacked standing to intervene in her
marital dispute, and (b) Haas-Anderson Construction’s claim was not valid under the
UDJA; (2) denying her motion to strike the requested factual allegations in her petition;
(3) granting Haas-Anderson Construction’s motion to declare the marriage valid because
“the validity of the purported marriage license constitutes a genuine issue of material fact”;
and (4) granting Haas-Anderson Construction’s motion to declare the marriage valid
pursuant to former § 2.41 of the Texas Family Code as it is unconstitutional as applied to
minors.
A. Plea to the Jurisdiction
“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a
cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question
of law. Id. at 226. Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling
on a plea to the jurisdiction. Id.
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Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction that courts review de novo.
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). A
plaintiff’s lack of standing may be challenged through a plea to the jurisdiction, as well as
other procedural devices. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554. “Standing is a
constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit in either federal or state court.” Williams v.
Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). “The issue of standing focuses on whether a
party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in
its outcome.” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). “The
general test for standing in Texas requires that there ‘(a) shall be a real controversy
between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration
sought.’” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (quoting Bd. of Water Eng’rs v. City of
San Antonio, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1955)); see also Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d
169, 179–80 (Tex. 2015).
Appellant contends that a suit to declare a marriage void may only be brought in
limited circumstances pursuant to § 6.307(a) of the family code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.307(a) (“Either party to a marriage made void by this chapter may sue to have the
marriage declared void, or the court may declare the marriage void in a collateral
proceeding.”). Accordingly, appellant argues that “the Legislature has conferred standing
to bring a suit to declare [a] marriage void on limited persons under the Texas Family
Code, the common law standing requirements do not apply, and a party must instead
establish its standing under the appropriate statutory provision.” Appellant also argues
that Haas-Anderson Construction does not have standing to intervene under the UDJA.
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Haas-Anderson Construction responds that § 6.307, titled “Jurisdiction to Declare
Marriage Void,” does not confer standing but rather sets forth the circumstances in which
a court may declare a marriage void. Haas-Anderson Construction also contends that
even if the section limited standing, the section is inapplicable in this case as the marriage
at issue here was voidable not void. Lastly, Haas-Anderson Construction argues that it
properly intervened under the UDJA.
1. Section 6.307
Section 6.307 of the family code states:
(a) Either party to a marriage made void by this chapter may sue to have
the marriage declared void, or the court may declare the marriage void
in a collateral proceeding.
(b) The court may declare a marriage void only if:
(1) the purported marriage was contracted in this state; or
(2) either party is domiciled in this state.
(c) A suit to have a marriage declared void is a suit in rem, affecting the
status of the parties to the purported marriage.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.307. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we will interpret
the statute according to its plain meaning. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d
314, 318 (Tex. 2002). No argument is made regarding ambiguity, and a plain reading of
§ 6.307 indicates no attempt to limit or confer standing, as suggested by appellant. Aside
from the assertion that § 6.307(a) “confer[s] standing to bring a suit to declare marriage
void on limited persons under the Texas Family Code,” appellant offers no explanation
for how or why, nor does she address intervening in a suit brought by the parties to the
marriage. Appellant provides no authority, other than a citation to § 6.307, to support her
position that only the parties to the marriage may be involved in a suit to declare it void.
8
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s argument that Haas-
Anderson Construction did not have standing to intervene under § 6.307.
2. UDJA
Appellant argues that the UDJA does not confer standing on Haas-Anderson
Construction to intervene in her petition to declare her 1981 marriage void. Specifically,
she argues that § 37.004(a) “address[es] who has standing to seek a declaration with
respect to certain written instruments” and in this case there is no deed, will, ordinance,
or franchise at issue.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a). However,
appellant’s standing argument fails as it is clearly explained in § 37.003(c) that
The enumerations in [§§] 37.004 and 37.005 do not limit or restrict the
exercise of the general powers conferred in this section in any proceeding
in which declaratory relief is sought and a judgment or decree will terminate
the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
Id. § 37.003(c). As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, “[a] declaratory judgment is
appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties
and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought.” Bonham State Bank v.
Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (citing Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446).
And in order “[t]o constitute a justiciable controversy, there must exist a real and
substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a
theoretical dispute.” Id. (citations omitted); see Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d
678, 685 (Tex. 2020).
Here, Haas-Anderson Construction argues that a justiciable controversy existed
regarding the outcome of the district court’s determination of the validity of the 1981
marriage. Specifically, appellant was pursuing a separate cause of action against Haas-
Anderson Construction, and others, that would hinge upon the validity of appellant’s 1981
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marriage. Because Haas-Anderson Construction was involved in litigation that could be
resolved by the declaration it sought in intervening in appellant’s suit, it argues it
effectively had standing to intervene. We agree.
In its petition in intervention, Haas-Anderson Construction stated
[Haas-Anderson Construction] would show this Court that there is a
justiciable controversy in this suit. [Appellant] and [Haas-Anderson
Construction] sharply dispute whether [appellant’s] marriage to Juan
Martinez is in full force and effect, voidable or void under the applicable
Texas statutes. The resolution of this controversy will determine whether
[appellant] has legal standing to file suit and assert wrongful death and
survival claims against [Haas-Anderson Construction] arising out of the
death of Isaac Garcia. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.004 and
§ 71.021(b); Villegas v. Griffin Industries, 975 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998, pet. denied).
Haas-Anderson Construction sought a declaration that the 1981 marriage was
valid and could not be voided. If its request for relief was granted by the district court,
appellant would be unable to pursue a wrongful death or survival action against it, thus,
meeting the general test set forth for standing. See Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at
446.
Appellant also contends that Haas-Anderson Construction was “attempting to
misuse the UDJA to obtain a declaration of its non-liability to [a]ppellant in the separate
tort action.” Relying on three cases from the Texas Supreme Court, Abor v. Black, 695
S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985), BHP Petroleum Co. Inc. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1990),
and In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138, 140 (Tex. 2019), appellant argues
that Haas-Anderson Construction intervened in her suit to declare her marriage void with
the sole intent to determine whether Haas-Anderson Construction owed her any tort
liability in a separate action. In Abor, the Texas Supreme Court stated that: “the question
presented is whether a potential defendant in a negligence action can choose the time
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and forum for trial by beating the potential plaintiff to the courthouse and filing suit seeking
a declaration of non-liability” under the UDJA. See Abor, 695 S.W.2d at 565. The Court
held that a plaintiff should be given the “traditional right to choose the time and place of
suit” and allowing a defendant to file an action under the UDJA to declare non-liability,
and essentially beat the plaintiff to the courthouse, does not give the plaintiff that right. Id.
at 566. In BHP Petroleum and Houston Specialty, the Texas Supreme Court renewed its
holding explaining that it had “eschewed use of a declaratory judgment action to ‘deprive
the real plaintiff of the traditional right to [choose] the time and place of suit.’” 800
S.W.2d at 841 (quoting Abor, 695 S.W.2d at 566); 569 S.W.3d at 140 (“In the years since
[Abnor], we have never recognized any exception or nuance to the rule that a potential
tort defendant may not seek a declaration of nonliability in tort.”).
The case before this Court varies from those cited by appellant, namely because
here, Haas-Anderson Construction did not deprive appellant of her right to choose the
time and place of suit, nor did it ask the district court to affirmatively rule on any of its
defenses to liability in appellant’s wrongful death action against it, instead, Haas-
Anderson Construction argues it intervened in appellant’s marriage validity suit “to ensure
the proper law was applied in determining the status of [appellant’s] marriage, which
consequently affects her ability to carry her burden to establish her own standing to bring
her wrongful-death claims.” The validity of the marriage was brought to the district court
by appellant, not Haas-Anderson Construction. Because Haas-Anderson Construction
neither deprived appellant of her right to choose the time and place of suit, nor sought
declaration of non-liablity in a tort action already pending before another court, we find
that this case is distinguishable from those relied upon by appellant. See Abnor, 695
11
S.W.2d at 565; BHP Petroleum, 800 S.W.2d at 841; Houston Specialty, 569 S.W.3d at
140.
Accordingly, because Haas-Anderson Construction had standing to intervene and
did not “misuse” the UDJA, the district court did not err in denying appellant’s plea to the
jurisdiction. We overrule appellant’s first issue in appellate cause numbers 13-20-00390-
CV and 13-20-00391-CV.
B. Motion to Strike
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to strike certain
factual allegations from her petition to declare her 1981 marriage void. She contends that
§ 6.402(c) of the Texas Family Code “requires factual allegations to be struck from
pleadings in marriage dissolution cases” upon the party’s own motion to do so. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.402(c) (“The court shall strike an allegation of evidentiary fact from
the pleadings on the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion.”).
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. Sw.
Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 727 (Tex. 2016); Brenham Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 472 S.W.3d 744, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Without commenting on the merits of appellant’s argument that
the district court erred in denying her motion to strike, we note that even if the district court
erred, appellant cannot show that any error probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment or prevented her from properly presenting the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1.
Here, appellant sought to strike two facts from her pleadings that were relevant to her
allegations: her date of birth and the date of her marriage to Juan. However, her date of
birth and the date of her marriage were contained elsewhere in the district court’s record,
12
including within appellant’s proposed final order and decree declaring her marriage to
Juan void. Appellant was claiming she was underage at the time of her marriage to Juan;
both her date of birth and the date of the marriage, found within the record, are necessary
to determine her age at the time she was married. Appellant, therefore, has not shown
how the district court’s failure to strike these allegations would have probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment or prevented her from presenting the case on appeal.
See id. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue in cause numbers 13-20-
00390-CV and 13-20-00391-CV.
C. Genuine Issue of Material Fact
Appellant next argues that the district court erred in granting Haas-Anderson
Construction’s motion to declare the 1981 marriage valid because “the validity of the
purported marriage license constitutes a genuine issue of material fact.” Appellant argues
that the marriage license, which she claims Haas-Anderson Construction used along with
her original petition to support its claim of a valid marriage, fails to comply with the
formalities under the family code and is therefore invalid. She states that neither her
original petition nor the marriage license “conclusively establish the validity of [her]
purported prior marriage . . .” and that because Juan admitted appellant was underage
when they married without parental consent or court order, a question of fact arose as to
the validity of the purported prior marriage. We disagree.
A court having jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment has power to
determine issues of fact, issues of state law, and issues of federal law if such questions
be involved in the particular case. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. 1965); see Chapman v. Marathon Mfg. Co., 590 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Civ.
13
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) Here, it is undisputed that appellant was
underage at the time she married Juan in 1981; however, at the center of the dispute is
whether the marriage was invalid because of appellant’s age, or whether appellant waived
her right to annul the marriage almost forty years later. While appellant challenges the
validity of the marriage certificate itself to argue that her marriage to Juan was invalid,
she and Juan, through his answer to her petition, do not dispute that they were married,
they only seek to declare said marriage void. Accordingly, we do not agree with appellant
that the validity of the marriage certificate is a question of fact, but rather, as the
underlying facts are undisputed, we find the validity of the marriage to be a question of
law that the district court was within its discretion to determine. See id. We overrule
appellant’s third issue in cause numbers 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-00391-CV.
D. Section 2.41
By her fourth and final issue in cause numbers 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-00391-
CV, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the 1981 marriage to be valid
under § 2.41 of the Texas Family Code as enacted in 1981 because the section is
“unconstitutional as applied to minors.” She argues, in part, that § 2.41 violates the “open
courts” provision as applied to minors because it “abrogates a minor’s right to have
declared void an underage marriage that occurred without parental consent or court
order.” Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution states: “All courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision prohibits the legislature from
abrogating or unreasonably restricting a litigant’s right to seek redress by way of a well-
established common law cause of action. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841,
14
843 (Tex. 1990); Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994,
writ denied).
The “open courts” provision, however, does not apply to suits for divorce
because they are not common law causes of action, but rather statutorily
created and regulated proceedings. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d at 545–46
(holding “[b]ecause suits for divorce . . . are not common law causes of
action, but are statutorily created and regulated proceedings designed to
meet the changing desires and needs of the people in a dynamic society,
the ‘open courts’ provision has no application”); see Gowin v. Gowin, 292
S.W. 211, 214 (Tex. 1927) (holding that the grounds for divorce are
dependent upon the sovereign will, and the state may at any time take away
that right entirely or change the conditions of its existence).
Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 222–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied). Because appellant’s petition to void her 1981 marriage is a statutorily created
proceeding, we overrule appellant’s “open courts” challenge to § 2.41 of the Texas Family
Code in cause numbers 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-00391-CV.
III. WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL SUIT
In cause number 13-20-00567-CV, appellant challenges the trial court’s granting
of appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction, ultimately dismissing her wrongful death and survival
suit against appellees. By three issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred by
granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction because: (1) appellees’ plea failed to comply
with Rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) appellees failed to meet their
burden to prove the validity of the 1981 marriage; and (3) the former Texas Family Code
§ 2.41 is unconstitutional as applied to spouses married as minors.
As we have already determined that the district court did not err in granting Haas-
Anderson Construction’s motion to declare the 1981 marriage valid, and we have
overruled appellant’s “open courts” challenge to § 2.41 of the Texas Family Code, we
decline to address those issues further herein. Accordingly, appellant’s second and third
15
issues in cause number 13-20-00567-CV are overruled. We turn now to appellant’s
remaining issue.
A. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93
Rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: “a pleading setting up
any of the following matters, unless the truth of such matters appear of record, shall be
verified by affidavit.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 93. She specifically alleges that appellees
attacked her legal capacity to sue, which is governed by rule 93. See id. Without
addressing whether appellees were challenging standing as they argue or capacity as
argued by appellant, we find appellant’s argument unpersuasive. Rule 93 only requires
verification “unless the truth of such matters appear of record,” which appellant argues it
does not. Appellant’s argument as it relates to the truth of such matters is that appellees
attached the marriage license to their plea to the jurisdiction, and because she alleges
this document was in dispute, her capacity was not apparent from an “uncontroverted and
unambiguous record.” However, even if that were true, appellees also included as
evidence the district court’s order granting Haas-Anderson Construction’s motion and
finding that appellant’s 1981 marriage to Juan was valid. The district court’s order inserts
the truth of the validity of the marriage into the record. Relying on the doctrine of res
judicata, appellees argued that the district court’s order precluded appellant from “denying
the validity of her marriage to [Juan] in the wrongful death suit.”
1. Res Judicata
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims that have been
finally adjudicated or arise out of the same subject matter and that could have been
litigated in the prior action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.
16
1996). For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) a prior final
judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the same parties or those
in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or
could have been raised in the first action. Id.Appellant challenges the first and second elements of res judicata. However, we
have already found there to be a prior final judgment validating appellant’s marriage to
Juan, and therefore, we find that the first element is met. As to privity, appellant argues
that appellees HAC Equipment, Haas-Anderson Management, and Cardona lack privity
with appellee Haas-Anderson Construction. An analysis to determine whether a person
is in privity with a party to a prior judgment begins by examining the interests the parties
shared. Id. at 653. Privity exists if the parties share an identity of interests in the basic
legal right that is the subject of litigation. Id. “Privity is not established by the mere fact
that persons may happen to be interested in the same question or in proving the same
state of facts.” Gaughan v. Spires Council of Co–Owners, 870 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).To determine whether a prior and later lawsuit
involve the same basic subject matter, we focus on the factual basis of the complaint.
Barr v. Resol. Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1992).
Under the foregoing standards, we consider whether appellees HAC Equipment,
Haas-Anderson Management, and Cardona were in privity with appellee Haas-Anderson
Construction, such that res judicata bars appellant’s wrongful death and survival suit.
Appellant argues that there is no privity because HAC Equipment and Haas-Anderson
Management have both alleged they are improper parties to the wrongful death and
survival action and have denied existence of a joint venture with Haas-Anderson
17
Construction. However, we fail to see how this affects the basis of appellant’s suit against
these appellees. Appellant is suing all appellees under a claim of wrongful death and
survival, alleging that she is the common-law spouse of the deceased. Her suit fails
against all appellees because the district court’s order validating her marriage to Juan
precludes her from alleging a common-law marriage in the wrongful death and survival
suit. Because the very basis of appellant’s suit against all appellees, not just Haas-
Anderson Construction, involves the same underlying issue as previously determined in
the district court, we conclude appellees HAC Equipment, Haas-Anderson Management,
and Cardona are in privity with the original parties. See Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 652;
Njuku v. Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
Because we have determined that res judicata barred appellant from claiming to
be the deceased’s common-law spouse and thus bringing a wrongful death or survival
suit against appellees on behalf of the deceased, we overrule her third and final issue in
cause number 13-20-00567-CV.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s orders in cause numbers 13-20-00390-CV and 13-20-
00391-CV denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction, denying appellant’s motion to strike
factual allegations, and granting Haas-Anderson Construction’s motion to declare the
marriage valid. We also affirm the trial court’s order in cause number 13-20-00567-CV
granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
24th day of February, 2022.
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