Arianna Lindsey v. State ( 2015 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 4, 2015
Court of Appeals
S In The
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00517-CR
ARIANNA LINDSEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1171158-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Evans, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
Lindsey hit her baby’s head on the kitchen counter to get him to stop crying and caused
the child permanent brain damage. She subsequently pled guilty to serious bodily injury to a
child with a deadly weapon pursuant to an agreement that punishment would be assessed
between eight and twenty-two years’ imprisonment. The trial court followed the agreement and
sentenced Lindsey to eighteen years’ imprisonment.1
In a single appellate issue, Lindsey argues the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting an audio tape of an “interrogation” because the “mid-stream” Miranda warnings did
not cure the taint of a prior unwarned interrogation.
1
Lindsey did not waive her right to appeal as part of the agreement.
Because we conclude there was no custodial interrogation, the trial court did not err in
overruling Lindsey’s objection that the audio tape was inadmissible because her statements were
involuntary. Moreover, the same evidence had already been admitted without objection. We
thus affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
During the hearing on punishment, Detective Glen Slade testified without objection. He
said that he received a call from Children’s Hospital about a child who suffered severe head
injuries. Lindsey, the mother, was already at the hospital when Slade arrived so he took her into
an interview room to talk to her. The interview was recorded by audio recorder.
Lindsey initially told him that she put the baby to bed in his crib at about nine o’clock the
night before and found him crying on the floor at about nine the next morning. The baby would
not stop crying, so she woke her mother up. They noticed that the baby had a knot on his head,
so they called an ambulance. At that point, Slade knew that the child was in ICU and had a
cracked skull and subdural hemorrhaging, so he did not think this version of the events explained
the child’s injuries.
Two doctors came into the room where Lindsey was being interviewed because they
were concerned that the child might have liver damage and had some questions. They described
the injuries to Lindsey and told her it was not possible for the child to have sustained these
injuries by falling out of a crib.
The doctors asked if she had squeezed the baby. Lindsey then said she was in the kitchen
making a bottle for the baby and he had squirmed around and she dropped him on the floor.
When the doctors told her it would take a lot more force than that to cause the injuries in
question, Lindsey then stated that she was holding the baby in the kitchen and hit the baby’s head
on the counter as she turned.
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One doctor explained to Lindsey how hard of an impact there would need to be to cause
the kind of damage the child had. Slade handed Lindsey a notebook and asked her to show them
what she did. Lindsey picked up the notebook and slammed it on the table, and then said she hit
the baby’s head on the counter because it wouldn’t stop crying.
The doctors left the room, came back in with a doll, and asked Lindsey to demonstrate
what she did. Lindsey stood and hit the doll’s head on the table. She said, “After I hit his head
on the counter, he didn’t stop crying, so I did it again and he didn’t stop crying.” The doctors
asked Lindsey about holding the baby tight, and she said yes, she held him really tight.
After Lindsey gave this version of events, Slade asked her to write a statement. She
agreed, and was informed of her rights before doing so. Lindsey’s statement was admitted into
evidence without objection.2
Lindsey’s statement says:
I was trying to get my baby to stop crying but he wouldn’t so I hit his head
on the counter about two times then after I did that I called 911.
On the same day he interviewed Lindsey, Slade visited the apartment where the crime
occurred. He took pictures of the apartment, and these pictures were admitted into evidence
without objection. The detective observed that there was no crib in the apartment as Lindsey had
initially claimed.
After the detective testified about his interview of Lindsey, the State moved to admit the
audio tape of the interview into evidence. Defense counsel objected based on “voluntariness,”
which the trial court overruled.
Slade said that he spent less than an hour interviewing Lindsey. Initially, when she told
him the child was in the room with two other people, they were the primary suspects, not her.
2
Defense counsel initially objected, but subsequently withdrew the objection.
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He just viewed Lindsey as a mother who was concerned about her child. Slade did not become
suspicious until the fourth version of the story—when Lindsey said she hit the baby’s head on
the counter. Detective Slade recalled that he had even asked her if she was trying to protect
someone. After Lindsey told him her final version of the story and he became suspicious, he
gave her the Miranda warnings.
II. Analysis
1. Standard of Review
The trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of
witnesses in determining the voluntariness of a confession. See Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235,
238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An appellate court affords great deference to a trial court’s ruling
and will overturn the decision “only where a flagrant abuse of discretion” is shown. Id. The
determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be made by examining the totality of the
circumstances. Id.; see also Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 732(Tex. App.—Texarkana
2010, pet. ref’d).
2. Custodial Interrogation
The State may not use a defendant’s statements stemming from a custodial interrogation
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Article 38.22 of the code of
criminal procedure also precludes the use of statements that result from a custodial interrogation
without compliance with its procedural safeguards. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22
(West Supp. 2014). Before an investigation reaches the accusatorial or custodial stage, however,
a person’s Fifth Amendment rights have not come into play, and the voluntariness in waiving
those rights is not implicated. Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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Custodial interrogation is questioning by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444; Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To determine
whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A
person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, an objectively reasonable person would
believe that his or her freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a
formal arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
There are at least four general situations where a suspect’s detention may constitute
custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he or she cannot leave, (3) when
law enforcement creates a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his or her
freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to
arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he or she is free to leave. Id. at
255; McCulley v. State, 352 S.W.3d 107, 115–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). In
the first three situations, the restriction on freedom of movement must amount to a degree
associated with arrest rather than investigative detention. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255;
McCulley, 352 S.W.3d at 116. The defendant bears the initial burden of proving that a statement
was the product of “custodial interrogation.” Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526.
Thus, the State has no burden at all unless “the record as a whole clearly establishe[s]”
that the defendant’s statement was the product of custodial interrogation by an agent for law
enforcement. Id.
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3. Were the Unwarned Statements a Product of Custodial Interrogation?
Lindsey contends that she made a trial objection that she “was subjected to custodial
interrogation prior to being read [her] rights.” The record, however, shows no such objection.
Instead, Lindsey objected to the admission of the audio tape “based on the voluntariness” of it.
Although Lindsey asserts that the questions posed by the detective “were clearly designed to
elicit a confession,” she fails to identify any specific facts to support her claim. She also does
not explain why the interview constituted custodial interrogation such that a mid-stream Miranda
warning was ineffective. But the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that Lindsey’s
interview before the Miranda warnings was a custodial interrogation; thus, the voluntariness of
her pre-warning statements does not come into play.
The interview lasted less than an hour and was conducted in the hospital. Lindsey was
not taken there to be interviewed, she was there when the detective arrived. There were doctors
present and participating in the discourse at various times, and the fact that these individuals
came in and out of the room suggests an informal setting. The record is silent as to whether the
room had windows or more than one door. There is no evidence that the door was locked, or that
Lindsey was informed that she couldn’t leave.
Lindsey was not under arrest, and there is nothing to suggest that her freedom of
movement was restricted in any way or that she was not free to terminate the interview and leave
the room at any time. Detective Slade testified that when he began the interview, Lindsey was
only a witness—a mother who was concerned about the welfare of her child. Even when
Lindsey gave conflicting versions of events, the detective said he did not suspect Lindsey.
Instead, he thought she might be covering up for someone. The interview was conversational
and non-confrontational, and there is no evidence that Lindsey was denied food, water, or use of
the facilities.
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It was not until Lindsey gave her final version of events and said that she hit the baby’s
head on the counter because he wouldn’t stop crying that she became a suspect. She was
Mirandized immediately thereafter. Because the record does not support a conclusion that
Lindsey was subjected to custodial interrogation, the voluntariness of her statements before
receiving her Miranda warnings is not implicated. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the audio tape of the interview.
Moreover, even had the admission of the audio tape been error, Lindsey was not harmed
because substantially the same evidence was admitted without objection. See Hicks v. State, 860
S.W.2d 419, 430-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998). In his testimony, Detective Slade was permitted to summarize the interview
with Lindsey without objection. Lindsey’s statement was then admitted without objection.
Therefore, even if the audio tape was improperly admitted, there is no reversible error. Id.
Lindsey’s issue is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
140517F.U05 /Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ARIANNA LINDSEY, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-00517-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1171158-J.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang and Evans participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered November 4, 2015.
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