David Guerrero Aguilar v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                                   NO. 07-09-0294-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    APRIL 22, 2010
    ______________________________
    DAVID GUERRERO AGUILAR,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _______________________________
    FROM THE 242nd DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
    NO. B18054-0905; HON. ED SELF, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    Appellant David Guerrero Aguilar appeals from his conviction for indecency with
    a child by contact. Via a single issue, he contends the evidence is factually insufficient
    to show that he was the person who committed the offense and that he had the
    requisite mental state due to his intoxication. We affirm.
    Background
    While emptying the trash at 9 p.m., the victim, who was eight at the time,
    encountered a man in her backyard.          The man approached her, placed his hand
    underneath her clothing and touched her buttocks and vagina. The girl then began
    knocking on the back door of her house to gain entry. Apparently, her father had just
    locked it while not knowing she was outside.            Upon his opening the door, he
    encountered a distraught daughter and appellant next to her. No one else was seen.
    The child ran inside and told her mother what had occurred. Upon hearing this,
    the child’s father struck appellant and held him until the police arrived.     When asked,
    the father testified that appellant appeared intoxicated.
    Issue – Factual Insufficiency
    According to appellant the evidence is factually, not legally, insufficient to identify
    him as the assailant since no one directly testified that he was the person who touched
    the child. Rather, the evidence simply placed him in the backyard, next to the girl when
    her father opened the door. So too does he question the factual sufficiency of the
    evidence illustrating that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the offense since he
    was drunk. We overrule each contention.
    The standard of review for factual sufficiency issues is well established. We refer
    the parties to Watson v. State, 
    204 S.W.3d 404
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) for its
    explanation.
    As charged by the indictment, appellant could be found guilty of the offense if the
    State established, beyond reasonable doubt, that he engaged in sexual contact with the
    child. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §21.11 (Vernon Supp. 2009). Furthermore, sexual contact
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    consists of touching "any part of the genitals of a child" with "intent to arouse or gratify
    the sexual desire of any person." 
    Id. §21.11(c). As
    for the dispute regarding appellant’s identity as the assailant, the record
    illustrates that the offense occurred after dark as the child was returning from emptying
    the household trash. The dumpster wherein the trash was placed was located in the
    alley behind her house. After being touched, the child grew scared and attempted to
    enter her house. When her father responded to her knocking, appellant was the only
    one he saw in the yard, other than his daughter. Moreover, appellant was standing
    adjacent to the girl. It is beyond doubt that one can be convicted on the basis of
    circumstantial evidence that proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed
    that with which he was accused. Laster v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 512
    , 520-21(Tex. Crim.
    App. 2009). So direct evidence of appellant being the assailant was unnecessary if
    circumstantial evidence nonetheless existed establishing him as same.             And, such
    circumstantial evidence existed here, given the aforementioned evidence. The latter is
    not weak. Nor does the entire evidentiary record render the verdict manifestly wrong or
    unjust.
    Regarding the matter of appellant’s mens rea, evidence of his intoxication did not
    ipso facto render factually insufficient the jury’s finding that he touched the child with the
    intent to arouse or gratify someone’s sexual desire. Indeed, the court in Smock v.
    State, No. 11-03-00376, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 3612 (Tex. App.–Eastland May 12, 2005,
    no pet.) (not designated for publication) (wherein appellant contended that the evidence
    was factually insufficient to prove he had the intent to commit burglary by committing or
    attempting to commit indecency with a child due to his intoxication), found the evidence
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    factually sufficient to support conviction even though appellant was drunk. 
    Id. at *10.
    And, because one’s intent may be inferred from his conduct and words, Shamm v.
    State, 
    280 S.W.3d 271
    , 277 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (involving whether the
    State sufficiently proved that appellant exposed himself with the intent to arouse or
    gratify the sexual desire of any person); accord, Esquivel v. State, No. 04-06-0695-CR,
    2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8640 (Tex. App.–San Antonio October 31, 2007, pet. dism’d) (not
    designated for publication) (stating that the specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
    desire of any person can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, remarks and the
    surrounding circumstances), the jury was entitled to conclude that appellant had the
    requisite specific intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire from the evidence that he
    approached the child in her backyard at night, slipped his hands under her clothes and
    touched both her genitalia and buttocks. Such a conclusion is not supported by weak
    evidence. Nor is it manifestly unjust simply because appellant also may have been
    drunk.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 07-09-00294-CR

Filed Date: 4/22/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015