Shannon Lee Abeyta v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                                          NO. 07-09-0121-CR
    NO. 07-09-0122-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    MARCH 23, 2010
    SHANNON LEE ABEYTA,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _____________________________
    FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
    NO. 41,915-C; 43,143-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, PRESIDING
    Memorandum Opinion
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    Shannon Lee Abeyta appeals pro se from an order denying his motion for post-
    conviction forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure.1 He pled guilty based on a plea bargain to two charges of aggravated
    sexual assault in 2003 and filed a motion in 2009 for DNA testing of evidence containing
    “biological material.” The State responded that it “never obtained from the child victim
    1
    Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel for him. However,
    we previously abated this appeal for the appointment of counsel.
    any evidence which contained biological material.”2 The State also alleged that identity
    was not an issue in the case and that appellant attached an unsworn affidavit to his
    motion. The trial court denied appellant’s motion without stating the basis for its ruling.
    A trial court may order forensic DNA testing only if it finds, among other things,
    that such evidence still exists and that identity was or is an issue in the case. TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(i) & (B) (Vernon Supp. 2009); see also Bell v.
    State, 
    90 S.W.3d 301
    , 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that the trial court must order
    testing only if the statutory preconditions are met). In our review of the trial court’s
    ruling, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of issues of
    historical fact and application of law-to-fact questions that turn on credibility and
    demeanor and review other issues de novo. Rivera v. State, 
    89 S.W.3d 55
    , 59 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2002). As such, we defer to the trial court’s finding whether the claimed
    DNA evidence exists. Caddie v. State, 
    176 S.W.3d 286
    , 289 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, the trial court may make its determination based
    upon the State’s response to the motion, 
    id. at 289;
    Mearis v. State, 
    120 S.W.3d 20
    , 24
    (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, pet. ref’d), which response need not be accompanied by
    affidavits. Whitaker v. State, 
    160 S.W.3d 5
    , 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cravin v. State,
    
    95 S.W.3d 506
    , 509 (Tex. App. –Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet ref’d).
    A court may order testing only of evidence that was secured in relation to the
    offense that is the basis of the challenged conviction and was in the possession of the
    State during the trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
    2
    The State is required to either deliver the evidence to the court along with a description of the
    condition of the evidence or explain in writing why the evidence cannot be delivered. TEX. CODE CRIM.
    PROC. ANN. art. 64.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
    2
    Appellant’s motion seeks testing of “any and all evidence containing biological material
    that was secured.” He fails to identify what specific evidence he seeks to have tested or
    whether such evidence even exists. See Atkins v. State, 
    262 S.W.3d 413
    , 417 (Tex.
    App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that the record contained no indication
    that such evidence was taken from the crime scene or from appellant or the victim);
    James v. State, 
    196 S.W.3d 847
    , 850 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (finding the
    motion defective when there was no suggestion in it that any biological material actually
    exists).
    In response, the State has alleged that it never obtained any evidence upon
    which DNA testing could be conducted. It further went on to explain that the sexual
    assault nurse examiner did not perform any laboratory tests to obtain biological material
    due to the length of time between the assaults and the examination and the fact the
    child gave no indication that appellant had ejaculated into her mouth or sexual organ.
    Given the vagueness of appellant’s motion and the response of the State, the record
    does not establish the existence of any evidence subject to testing. See Lopez v. State,
    
    114 S.W.3d 711
    , 716-17 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). That being so, the
    trial court did not err in denying the motion. 
    Id. at 717
    (finding no error given the State’s
    response that there was no evidence available to test).3
    Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
    Per Curiam
    3
    We do not address whether appellant’s judicial admission to the commission of the underlying
    offenses negated any potential for his identity being in dispute.
    3