in Re Paul Ludie Moore ( 2012 )


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  •     Opinion issued June 21, 2012.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    NO. 01-12-00038-CR
    ____________
    CHRISTOPHER JEROME HEALY, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1303212
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Christopher Jerome Healy, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of
    assault against a family member,1 pursuant to an agreement with the State that
    adjudication of guilt be deferred. The trial court deferred adjudication, and, in
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West 2011).
    accordance with the terms of appellant’s plea bargain agreement with the State,
    placed appellant on three years of community supervision and assessed a $200 fine.
    The trial court certified that this is a plea-bargain case and that appellant has no
    right of appeal.
    Subsequently, the State moved to revoke appellant’s supervision and for
    adjudication of guilt. Appellant pleaded true to the State’s allegations and executed
    a waiver of his right to appeal, in exchange for the State’s recommendation that
    punishment be assessed at confinement for five years. The trial court adjudicated
    appellant guilty, and, in accordance with the recommendation of the State, assessed
    punishment at confinement for five years. The trial court certified that appellant
    had waived the right of appeal. Nevertheless, appellant filed a pro se notice of
    appeal. We dismiss the appeal.
    An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant has
    the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d);
    Dears v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court’s
    certification, which is included in the record on appeal, states that appellant waived
    the right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a). A valid waiver of appeal prevents
    a defendant from appealing without the trial court’s consent. Monreal v. State, 
    99 S.W.3d 615
    , 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
    2
    The record reflects that appellant swore to a stipulation of evidence and
    judicial confession, pleading “true” to the allegations in the State’s motion to
    adjudicate appellant’s guilt. The document contains an agreement that the State
    would recommend punishment of confinement for five years and a $200 fine. The
    document also includes a “Waiver of Appeal,” stating that, “As part of my
    agreement with the prosecutor to plead true, I agree to waive any right to appeal I
    may have concerning any issue or claim in this case, including my plea or [sic] true
    or admission of guilt.” Appellant separately initialed the waiver of appeal. The
    trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty of the underlying
    offense, and assessed punishment in accordance with the recommendation.
    When a defendant waives his right of appeal in exchange for consideration
    from the State, his waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and he
    may not appeal any matters unless the trial court first grants permission. See Ex
    parte Broadway, 
    301 S.W.3d 694
    , 697–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that
    defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive appeal without sentencing
    agreement when consideration is given by State for waiver); Blanco v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 218
    , 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that waiver of appeal rights
    in exchange for recommendation from state was binding). The record shows that
    appellant waived his right to appeal as partial consideration, along with his plea of
    3
    true, for the State’s recommendation on punishment, and that the trial court did not
    give its permission to appeal.
    Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss this appeal. See
    Menefee v. State, 
    287 S.W.3d 9
    , 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); 
    Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613
    .
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending
    motions are dismissed as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Keyes.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    4