Roderick D. Thomas v. State , 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 2989 ( 2013 )


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  • Opinion issued March 21, 2013.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-12-00487-CR
    ———————————
    RODERICK D. THOMAS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 230th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1315014
    OPINION
    A jury found Roderick D. Thomas guilty of aggravated robbery and assessed
    punishment at ten years’ confinement. The written judgment ordered that Thomas
    pay $274 in court costs. On appeal, Thomas contends that insufficient evidence
    supports the trial court’s assessment of court costs in the judgment absent a bill of
    costs. Thomas requested a bill of costs in his request for the clerk’s record, but
    none was produced. We ordered the trial court clerk to provide a bill of costs. The
    trial court clerk has supplemented the record with a bill of costs. We hold that
    sufficient evidence supports the costs recited in the original judgment and therefore
    affirm.
    Discussion
    I.      Supplementation of record with costs assessment
    Thomas contends that the $274 award of court costs in the written judgment
    is not supported by sufficient evidence. In particular, Thomas contends that he is
    unable to determine if attorney’s fees were incorrectly included as part of the $274
    award of costs in the trial court’s judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
    art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring courts to consider a defendant’s ability
    to pay before assessing “costs of the legal services provided” as court costs). The
    district clerk must keep a record of each fee or item of cost charged for a service
    rendered in a criminal action or proceeding. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    103.009(a)(1) (West 2006). If a criminal action is appealed, an officer of the court
    must certify and sign a bill of costs and send it to the court to which the action is
    appealed. 
    Id. art. 103.006.
    We may direct the trial court clerk to supplement the
    record with any relevant omitted item, including a bill of costs. TEX. R. APP. P.
    34.5(c); see Cardenas v. State, 01-11-01123-CR, 
    2013 WL 460437
    , at *4 (Tex.
    2
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2013, no pet. h.).
    Accordingly, we ordered the trial court “to prepare, certify, and file a
    supplemental record containing a bill of costs,” and if no bill of costs existed, we
    ordered “the trial court clerk or an officer of the court . . . to prepare a bill of costs
    for inclusion in the supplemental record.” In response, the trial court provided a
    supplemental record including a document entitled “Cost Bill Assessment,”
    itemizing costs imposed on Thomas. This assessment lists items of costs totaling
    $329. The supplemental record also contains a copy of the original judgment with
    the $274 assessment of court costs marked out and replaced with a $329
    assessment. Thomas filed a written objection to the supplemental record and
    objected to the supplemental record in a reply brief.
    First, Thomas objects that that the trial court could not modify the judgment
    as it purported to do in the supplemental record. The trial court may correct
    clerical, but not judicial, omissions or errors in a judgment after the trial court loses
    its plenary jurisdiction through a judgment nunc pro tunc. State v. Bates, 
    889 S.W.2d 306
    , 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). But a trial court lacks
    jurisdiction to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc after the appellate record for the case
    is filed. See Meineke v. State, 
    171 S.W.3d 551
    , 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
    judgment nunc pro tunc to correct its judgment after the appellate record in this
    3
    case was filed, we disregard the modified judgment contained in the supplemental
    clerk’s record.
    Court costs are not punitive, but merely a collateral consequence of the
    defendant’s conviction. Weir v. State, 
    278 S.W.3d 364
    , 366 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2009). They are generally mandated by statute, not charged at the discretion of the
    court. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.005(a) (West 2006) (“A
    defendant convicted of an offense . . . shall pay . . . .”); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. § 133.102(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) ( “A person convicted of an offense shall
    pay as a court cost . . . .”). Hence, court costs need not be incorporated into the
    judgment to be assessed, but may be assessed, and a bill of costs produced, after
    the judgment. See Armstrong v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 759
    , 766–67 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011) (holding court costs need not be incorporated into the judgment); Owen v.
    State, 
    352 S.W.3d 542
    , 547–48 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (reviewing a
    bill of costs created after the judgment); Cardenas, 
    2013 WL 460437
    at *4 (same);
    see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.006 (providing that a bill of costs
    be created when an action is appealed). Additionally, the trial court is not limited
    to the costs assessed in the judgment or the bill of costs provided on appeal, but
    may later issue an amended bill of costs. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    103.007 (providing for a procedure to assess additional costs, thus an amended bill
    of costs, even after convicted defendant has paid costs in previous bill of costs).
    4
    Thomas contends that permitting a bill of costs to be produced after the
    judgment denies him due process in that he may not object to any costs assessed in
    the bill of costs. However, Thomas has not been denied an opportunity to challenge
    the costs listed in the bill of costs. See Cardenas, 
    2013 WL 460437
    , at *4. A
    contemporaneous objection in the trial court is not required to contest costs on
    direct appeal. See Mayer v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 552
    , 555–56 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2010). Thomas therefore was not procedurally prejudiced by his alleged inability
    to raise his objections in the trial court.
    Despite the lack of a written bill of costs, completely apart from the
    availability of direct appeal, Thomas could also seek correction of an error in costs
    by moving to correct costs in the trial court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
    art. 103.008(a) (“On the filing of a motion by a defendant not later than one year
    after the date of the final disposition of a case in which costs were imposed, the
    court in which the case is pending or was last pending shall correct any error in the
    costs.”). Thomas notes in particular that he could not challenge the
    constitutionality of any particular statute authorizing an assessment of costs against
    him. In addition to the methods already mentioned, however, various other
    proceedings permit such a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Ex parte Carson, 
    159 S.W.2d 126
    , 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (permitting convicted defendant to
    challenge constitutionality of statute assessing court costs in his criminal case in
    5
    habeas corpus proceedings); Rylander v. Caldwell, 
    23 S.W.3d 132
    , 137 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that convicted defendant could challenge
    constitutionality of statute authorizing particular costs in criminal case in separate
    declaratory action). A civil post-judgment hearing to collect costs provides still
    another due process avenue to prevent erroneous deprivation via clerical or other
    errors. See Harrell v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 315
    , 320–21 (Tex. 2009).
    Thomas next argues that a bill of costs created after the trial court rendered
    judgment cannot be considered part of the record on appeal, because it was not
    properly before the court as evidence when the judgment was rendered, relying on
    a footnote in Johnson v. State, 
    389 S.W.3d 513
    , 513 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet. h.), which in turn relies upon Chambers v. State, 
    194 S.W.2d 774
    , 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946), and Lamb v. State, 
    931 S.W.2d 611
    , 613
    (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, pet. ref’d). Chambers and Lamb hold that evidence
    created after the judgment but included in the record may not be considered as
    evidence to support the judgment on appeal. See 
    Chambers, 194 S.W.2d at 775
    ;
    
    Lamb, 931 S.W.2d at 613
    . Unlike the evidence in Lamb and Chambers, a bill of
    costs is not itself factual evidence to support the assessment of costs in a factual
    sufficiency inquiry. Rather, costs assessed in a bill of costs, like those assessed in
    the judgment, must be supported by the record. See, e.g., 
    Owen, 352 S.W.3d at 547
    –48 (holding that factual predicate for the assessment of court costs included in
    6
    a bill of costs must be supported by the record).
    Finally, Thomas objects that the “Cost Bill Assessment” provided by the
    trial court in the supplemental record is not a valid bill of costs under Texas Code
    of Criminal Procedure article 103.001. Article 103.001 provides that costs are not
    “payable” until a bill of costs containing “the items of cost, signed by the officer
    who charged the cost” “is produced or is ready to be produced.” TEX. CODE. CRIM.
    PROC. ANN. art. 103.001. In other words, a judgment may assess costs, but
    ultimately, in any post-judgment civil proceeding to collect costs, a bill of costs
    meeting the requirements of article 103.001 is required. See 
    id. The case
    before us,
    however, is a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, not a proceeding to collect
    costs for which a bill of costs satisfying article 103.001 is required. Nonetheless,
    we note that the assessment in the supplemental record fulfills the bill of costs
    requirements under article 103.001. It contains an itemized list of court costs
    imposed on Thomas, and the last page contains a certification stamp, initialed by
    the clerk, followed by the signature of the trial court deputy clerk. For all of these
    reasons, we reject Thomas’s objections to the cost bill filed in the supplemental
    record. We turn to address the sufficiency of evidence supporting the costs
    assessed in the judgment.
    7
    II.      Sufficiency of the evidence
    Sufficient evidence must support an assessment of costs in a bill of costs or
    in a judgment. See 
    Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 554
    –56; 
    Owen, 352 S.W.3d at 548
    (holding assessment of costs is supported by sufficient evidence when authorized
    by statute and supported by record). We review the record in the light most
    favorable to the award in measuring the sufficiency of the evidence to support an
    assessment of costs. See 
    Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557
    .
    The record demonstrations that a jury convicted Thomas of a felony in
    district court, supporting each of the following costs listed in the costs assessment:
    “Clerks Fee” of $40;1 “Jury Fee” of $20; 2 “Security Fee” of $5; 3 “Consolidated
    Court Costs” of $133; 4 “Jury Reimbursement Fee” of $4; 5 “DC Records
    1
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.005(a) (“A defendant convicted of an
    offense in . . . a district court shall pay for the services of the clerk of the court a
    fee of $40.”).
    2
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.004(a) (“A defendant convicted by a
    jury in . . . a district court shall pay a jury fee of $20.”).
    3
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.017(a) (“A defendant convicted of a
    felony offense in a district court shall pay a $5 security fee as a cost of court.”).
    4
    See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.102(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (entitled
    “Consolidated Fees on Conviction,” which provides: “A person convicted of an
    offense shall pay as a court cost, in addition to all other costs . . . $133 on
    conviction of a felony . . .).
    5
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.0045(a) (“A person convicted of any
    offense, other than an offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor
    8
    Preservation” fee of $25; 6 “Support of Indigent Defense” fee of $2; 7 “Support of
    Judiciary Fee” of $6; 8 and a “Court Technology Fee” of $4. 9 The cost assessment
    also lists a Sheriff’s Fee of $90, of which $70 is clearly supported in the record:
    $50 for “Serving Capias,”10 $5 for “Commitment,” 11 $5 for “Release,”12 $5 for
    vehicle, shall pay as a court cost, in addition to all other costs, a fee of $4 to be
    used to reimburse counties for the cost of juror services as provided by Section
    61.0015, Government Code.”).
    6
    See 
    id. art. 102.005(f)
    (“A defendant convicted of an offense in a . . . district court
    shall pay a fee of $25 for records management and preservation services performed
    by the county as required by Chapter 203, Local Government Code.”).
    7
    See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.107(a) (“A person convicted of any
    offense, other than an offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor
    vehicle, shall pay as a court cost, in addition to other costs, a fee of $2 to be used to
    fund indigent defense representation through the fair defense account established
    under Section 71.058, Government Code.”).
    8
    See 
    id. § 133.105(a)
    (“A person convicted of any offense, other than an offense
    relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle, shall pay as a court cost,
    in addition to all other costs, a fee of $6 to be used for court-related purposes for
    the support of the judiciary.”).
    9
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.0169(a) (“A defendant convicted of a
    criminal offense in a . . . district court shall pay a $4 . . . district court technology
    fee.”).
    10
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(2) (“A defendant convicted of
    a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following fees for services performed in
    the case by a peace officer . . . $50 for executing or processing an issued arrest
    warrant, capias, or capias pro fine . . . .”).
    11
    See 
    id. art. 102.011(a)(6)
    (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor
    shall pay the following fees for services performed in the case by a peace
    officer . . . $5 for commitment or release . . . .”).
    9
    “Summoning a Witness,”13 and $5 for Summoning a Jury. 14
    The costs assessment reflects that four other witnesses were summoned, but
    without a request for witness summons, we cannot confirm whether the fees for the
    other four witness summons is supported by the record. Still, the sum of the costs
    supported by the record before us is $309. No sum of money was included to pay
    for attorney’s fees. The record generated in the trial court through the entry of
    judgment demonstrates facts and circumstances sufficient to justify at least $274 of
    costs as directed by the statutes and rules referenced above. Accordingly, sufficient
    evidence supports the judgment awarding costs.
    12
    See 
    id. art. 102.011(a)(6)
    (“A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor
    shall pay the following fees for services performed in the case by a peace
    officer . . . $5 for commitment or release . . . .”).
    13
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.102.011(a)(3) (“A defendant convicted of a
    felony or a misdemeanor shall pay . . . $5 for summoning a witness.”).
    14
    See 
    id. art.102.011(a)(7) (“A
    defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall
    pay . . . $5 for summoning a jury . . . .”).
    10
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Jane Bland
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.
    Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    11