TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. and Tewodros "Teddy" Sahilu v. Allco, Llc ( 2022 )


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  •                                  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    __________________
    NO. 09-21-00146-CV
    __________________
    TBS BUSINESS SOLUTIONS USA, INC.
    AND TEWODROS “TEDDY” SAHILU, Appellants
    V.
    ALLCO, LLC, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 58th District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. A-207,203
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The Texas long-arm statute authorizes a Texas court to exercise
    jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a lawsuit when the
    defendant does business in Texas. 1 The plaintiff sued the defendants, a
    California-based business and individual who were both residents of
    California, alleging they did business in Texas and the long-arm statute
    1Tex.   Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042.
    1
    authorized the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them in Texas. The
    defendants appeared through a special appearance, challenging the
    plaintiff’s claim that a Texas court could enter a judgment that would
    bind them because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over their persons.
    After hearing the defendants’ special appearance, the trial court
    found it had jurisdiction over the defendants and denied the defendants’
    special appearance. Later, at the plaintiff’s request, the trial court
    reduced its findings and conclusions supporting its ruling to writing. In
    its written findings, the trial court found that the defendants “routinely
    sell and distribute products” in Texas, and concluded the exercise of
    jurisdiction over them in the suit would not “offend traditional notions of
    fair play[.]”
    The defendants, TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. and Tewodros
    “Teddy” Sahilu, its Chief Executive Officer, filed a timely, joint notice of
    appeal after the trial court signed an order denying their special
    appearance. 2 On appeal, the appellants filed a brief raising four issues to
    support their arguments claiming the trial court’s order should be
    2Id. § 51.014(7) (authorizing the interlocutory appeal of a district
    court’s ruling that grants or denies a special appearance).
    2
    reversed. First, they argue that Allco failed to plead jurisdictional facts
    sufficient to show they are subject to the jurisdiction of courts in Texas.
    Second, they contend that because the litigation involves the plaintiff’s
    contract with a business located in Texas rather than a contract between
    the plaintiff and TBS, a company incorporated with its principal place of
    business in California, the pleadings and evidence reveal the claims the
    plaintiff brought against them are not substantially connected to the
    operative facts of the litigation. Third, they argue the trial court’s
    exercise of jurisdiction over them offends traditional notions of fair play
    and substantial justice. And fourth, they contend the trial court erred in
    concluding Sahilu’s unsworn declaration, which they used to verify their
    Special Appearance, was noncompliant with the requirement of Rule
    120a that special appearances be made by “sworn motion[.]” 3
    To resolve the appeal, we must decide whether the appellants, both
    of whom are residents of California, did business in Texas under the
    Texas long-arm statute, and if so whether the trial court’s exercise of
    jurisdiction over them complies with the requirements of due process. For
    3Tex.   R. Civ. P. 120a(1).
    3
    the reasons explained below, we conclude the trial court erred in denying
    the special appearance. We reverse the trial court’s order, render
    judgment granting the special appearance, and remand the case to the
    trial court with instructions to dismiss TBS and Sahilu from the suit.
    Background
    After the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic began, Allco, LLC
    ordered one million N95 masks manufactured by the 3M Company from
    a Texas-based business, Global Management Services, LLC, a medical
    supply business and authorized distributor of 3M masks. Allco ordered
    the masks from Global on March 31, 2020. To secure Global’s delivery of
    the masks, Allco sent Global a deposit of $870,000 toward the $2,900,000
    Global charged for the masks. Allco transferred $870,000 to Global’s bank
    account via a wire transfer.
    Global, which apparently didn’t have 3M masks in stock contacted
    TBS, another authorized 3M distributor in California, seeking a source
    of 3M, N95 face masks. On March 31, April 1, and April 6, 2020, Global
    sent TBS three purchase orders for 3M masks. These three orders (had
    the masks been delivered) would have allowed Global (had Global
    complied with its agreement with Allco) to fulfill its agreement with Allco
    4
    and supply Allco with one million 3M masks. When Global sent TBS
    these orders, TBS knew Global had agreed to sell Allco one million 3M
    masks; even so, TBS disputed that it was a party to the agreement
    between Global and Allco.
    In all, the three purchase orders Global sent TBS, discussed above,
    represent orders for 5.6 million N95 face masks manufactured by 3M.
    The purchase orders show that Global expected to pay $5,423,250 for the
    5.6 million masks. TBS accepted the three orders, and Global wired TBS
    $5,423,250 to pay for them. But after receiving Global’s money, TBS
    informed Global that it could not fill the orders through 3M. At Global’s
    request, TBS turned to Makrite Industries Inc., an alternate supplier of
    N95 masks, to supply Global with N95 masks manufactured by Makrite,
    not by 3M.
    To account for the change in manufacturers and the fact the
    Makrite masks were nearly three times more expensive, Global sent TBS
    a fourth purchase order, dated August 13, 2020. In that order, Global
    ordered 1,000,000 Makrite N95 masks for $2,850,000. On August 19,
    2019, Global’s president, Roger Morgan, signed TBS’s Purchase Order
    Acknowledgment/Acceptance form, which is the same form that Global
    5
    had signed when TBS acknowledged it accepted Global’s previous three
    orders. After TBS received the N95 masks from Makrite, pursuant to the
    terms of Global’s purchase order, TBS shipped the masks to Global by
    delivering them to a ground carrier so they could be delivered to Global
    in Texas. And since Global had previously sent TBS around $5.4 million
    to pay for orders TBS couldn’t fill with mask made by 3M, TBS applied
    approximately $2.8 million of the $5.4 million Global had deposited to the
    price    TBS charged Global for the Makrite masks, refunding
    approximately $2.6 million to Global.
    Turning to Allco’s petition, Allco alleged that Global never sent it
    any masks and that the defendants kept Allco’s $870,000 deposit even
    though Allco demanded a refund. When negotiations among the parties
    about refunding Allco’s $870,000 failed, Allco sued Global, Global’s
    president (Roger Morgan), TBS, and Sahilu on nine claims: common-law
    fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, conversion, statutory theft, breach of
    contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, vicarious liability, and
    civil conspiracy.
    After Allco sued, Morgan and Global failed to appear or to file
    answers to Allco’s suit. So Allco defaulted Global and Morgan. That said,
    6
    after they were served, TBS and Sahilu appeared, and they filed a
    combined Special Appearance and answer. The appellants supported
    their Special Appearance with an unsworn declaration, signed by Teddy
    Sahilu. In their Special Appearance, TBS and Sahilu (the appellants)
    alleged that they are not residents of Texas, that TBS is incorporated and
    has its principal place of business in California, and that TBS entered a
    contract to sell face masks to Global, not to TBS. In his unsworn
    declaration, Sahilu explained that TBS has no offices in Texas, that the
    communications with Global were by phone or by email from TBS’s office
    in California, and that he and TBS did not performed any of the work
    related to TBS’s transactions with Global in Texas.
    In TBS’s sworn motion, TBS alleged that when TBS determined it
    couldn’t fill Global’s orders with 3M masks, it partially filled Global’s
    request with N95 masks manufactured by Makrite Industries based on
    Global’s instructions to do so. To account for the change in Global’s order
    of masks, Global sent TBS a new purchase order and ordered one million
    Makrite Industries N95 masks for $2.85 million. Based on that order,
    TBS ordered the masks from Makrite Industries and charged Global for
    the masks, crediting the cost of the order for Makrite masks against the
    7
    deposit it received from Global for the 3M masks and refunding the
    balance due Global, around $2.6 million.
    In their special appearance, the appellants alleged they had not
    purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business
    in Texas, and they listed specific facts, which generally speaking explain
    why. Even though the trial court found Sahilu’s declaration defective, we
    note the appellants alleged in their Special Appearance that “[t]he
    incident on which the suit against TBS and Mr. Sahilu is based did not
    occur in Texas, and TBS and Mr. Sahilu have had no contacts with Texas
    in connection with this lawsuit, except to send the Makrite masks to
    Global via interstate commerce.”
    In response to the Special Appearance, Allco argued the trial court
    could exercise specific jurisdiction over its suit because the appellants, in
    selling the masks, “had actual knowledge that the Makrite masks . . .
    were shipped to Texas.” Second, Allco claimed that by contracting with
    Global—a Texas distributor—TBS should have reasonably expected the
    masks would enter Texas. Allco concluded the exercise of personal
    jurisdiction over TBS would not offend traditional notions of fair play
    8
    because contracts with Texas residents to supply face masks are of “great
    interest to the state of Texas.”
    When the trial court heard the special appearance, no one testified
    or asked the trial court to consider evidence not already attached to the
    pleadings on file. 4 Following the hearing, the trial court denied the
    Special Appearance in a written order. Based on Allco’s request, filed
    nearly a month after the hearing, the trial court issued Written Findings
    of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In its request for findings, Allco asked
    the trial court to find that Sahilu’s declaration was defective “because it
    did not state that the facts set out in the pleadings were true and correct.”
    Yet before requesting findings, Allco had never before pointed to any
    defects in Sahilu’s declaration. After Allco requested and drafted
    proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court rubber
    stamped Allco’s proposed findings and conclusions. In finding the facts,
    the court found:
    4Other  than the pleadings on file when the hearing occurred, the
    documents before the trial court when the hearing occurred are attached
    either to Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
    to Special Appearance, and the combined Special Appearance and
    Answer.
    9
    1. TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. and Teddy Sahilu have
    sold and delivered medical supplies and equipment to Global
    Management Services, LLC, a Texas company located in
    Stafford, Texas that routinely sell and distribute products in
    the State of Texas. See Affidavit of Roger Morgan.
    2. Global Management Services, LLC ordered the 3M masks
    at issue in this case from TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc.,
    which some were destined for end use in the State of Texas.
    See Affidavit of Roger Morgan.
    3. Teddy Sahilu indicated to Roger Morgan that he knew that
    products sold to Global Management Services, LLC would be
    for end use in the State of Texas. See Affidavit of Roger
    Morgan.
    4. Roger Morgan has personal knowledge that TBS Business
    Solutions USA, Inc. had a reasonable expectation that
    products distributed to Global Management Services, LLC
    would enter the stream of commerce in the State of Texas. See
    Affidavit of Roger Morgan.
    5. TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. shipped Makrite masks
    directly to Houston, Texas as a part of this litigation. See
    Affidavit of Roger Morgan.
    6. Global Management Services, LLC and Roger Morgan have
    coordinated with Texas OrthoSolutions, LLC and end users in
    the State of Texas regarding purchasing equipment that is
    distributed by Global Management Services, LLC and these
    products enter into the stream of commerce in Texas. See
    Affidavit of Ryan Armstrong.
    7. TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. and Teddy Sahilu have
    done business with another (unnamed) Texas company in a
    June 2020 transaction in which they contracted to sell
    10
    thermometers and isolation gowns to a company in Irving,
    Texas. See Declaration of Tewodros “Teddy” Sahilu.
    Relying on the above, the trial court then reached these six
    conclusions.
    1. Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
    privilege of conducting activities within Texas and the
    claims against them in this litigation resulted from injuries
    arising from their contacts with Texas.
    2. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants do
    not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
    justice.
    3. Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas
    such that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
    4. Defendants also knew or reasonably anticipated that their
    activities in Texas would render it foreseeable that they
    may be “hailed into court” here.
    5. Defendants knew that some of their products were in or
    would wind up in Texas and intentionally acted to serve
    Texas with these products.
    6. The Declaration of Tewodros “Teddy” Sahilu, attached to
    Defendants’ Special Appearance, did not verify the special
    appearance as required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
    120(a), as it was defective because it did not state that the
    facts set out in the pleadings were true and correct.
    11
    Standard of Review
    A nonresident defendant may object to the court’s authority to
    exercise jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property by filing a
    special appearance meeting the requirements of Rule 120a. 5 Under Rule
    120a, the trial court must decide the special appearance on “the
    pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such
    affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of
    discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” 6 In deciding the motion, a
    trial court may consider evidence and resolve disputed issues of fact tied
    to resolving whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the
    nonresidents who have challenged the court’s jurisdiction over them by
    filing a special appearance. 7 When, as here, the trial court denies the
    defendants’ special appearance and issues findings of fact and
    conclusions of law to support its ruling, the findings may be challenged
    on appeal on legal or factual sufficiency grounds. 8 We review a trial
    5See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a; Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
    
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 240 (Tex. 2004).
    6Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3).
    7BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 
    83 S.W.3d 789
    , 794 (Tex.
    2002).
    8Id.
    12
    court’s conclusions of law as legal questions. 9 Even though a party may
    not challenge a trial court’s conclusions of law on grounds of factual
    insufficiency, they may challenge a conclusion of law as incorrect.10
    Should we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous but despite
    the error the trial court reached the correct ruling, the error—if the trial
    court reached the right ruling anyway—would not require a reversal. 11
    Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
    if the pleadings and evidence show the following:
    • the Texas long-arm statute applies and authorizes a Texas
    court to decide the case; and
    • the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
    defendant comports with the constitutional guarantees of due
    process. 12
    In its brief, Allco argues because the evidence before the trial court
    shows specific jurisdiction exists over the defendants for its claims, the
    trial court properly denied the special appearance. But the appellants
    question whether the trial court has the authority to bind them to a
    judgment, an issue that hinges on whether they have “the ‘minimum
    9Id.
    10Id.
    11Id.
    12Searcy   v. Parex Res., Inc., 
    496 S.W.3d 58
    , 66 (Tex. 2016).
    13
    contacts’ necessary to create specific jurisdiction.” 13 The minimum
    contacts “necessary to create specific jurisdiction focuses on the
    relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 14 “For
    a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the
    defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection
    with the forum State.” 15
    Specific jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff’s claims arise from or
    relate to the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum where the
    plaintiff sued. 16 “A claim arises from or relates to a defendant’s forum
    contacts if there is a substantial connection between those contacts and
    the operative facts of the litigation.” 17 This standard “does not require
    proof that the plaintiff would have no claim but for the contacts, or that
    the contacts were a proximate cause of the liability.” 18 “Instead, we look
    at what the claim is principally concerned with, whether the contacts will
    13Walden    v. Fiore, 
    571 U.S. 277
    , 283 (2014).
    14Id. at 284 (cleaned up).
    15Id.
    16Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI,
    L.P., 
    493 S.W.3d 65
    , 73 (Tex. 2016); see also Moki Mac River Expeditions
    v. Drugg, 
    221 S.W.3d 569
    , 576 (Tex. 2007).
    17TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 
    490 S.W.3d 29
    , 52 (Tex. 2016) (cleaned up).
    18Id. at 52-53 (cleaned up).
    14
    be the focus of the trial and consume most if not all of the litigation’s
    attention, and whether the contacts are related to the operative facts of
    the claim.” 19
    The parties bear shifting burdens of proof in the hearing on the
    special appearance. 20 Under the burden-shifting standard, the plaintiff
    must plead sufficient facts to bring the nonresident defendant within the
    reach of the Texas long-arm statute. 21 If the plaintiff’s pleadings do not
    show the plaintiff’s claims fall under the long-arm statute, “the defendant
    need only prove that it does not live in Texas to negate jurisdiction.”22 On
    the other hand, should the plaintiff plead facts sufficient to show the
    defendant committed a tort or did business with the plaintiff and that
    the business conducted in the State satisfied the requirements of due
    process, the burden shifts to the defendant to negate the well-pled
    allegations. 23
    19Id.   at 53 (cleaned up).
    20Kelly    v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 
    301 S.W.3d 653
    , 658 (Tex.
    2010)
    21Id.
    22Id.658-59.
    23See id. at 659.
    15
    Since the petition defines the scope of the lawsuit, “the defendant’s
    corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in
    the plaintiff’s petition. 24 The defendant may “negate jurisdiction on
    either a factual or a legal basis.” 25 “Factually, the defendant can present
    evidence that it has no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the
    plaintiff’s allegations[,]” and on presenting evidence that it has no
    contacts the burden shifts to the plaintiff to respond with evidence
    “affirming its allegations” to avoid having the suit dismissed. 26 Or the
    defendant may present a legal defense by showing
    that even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the evidence
    is legally insufficient to establish jurisdiction; the defendant’s
    contacts with Texas fall short of purposeful availment; for
    specific jurisdiction, that the claims do not arise from the
    contacts; or that traditional notions of fair play and
    substantial justice are offended by the exercise of jurisdiction.
    One way the defendant may show the trial court cannot
    exercise jurisdiction over the defendant’s person is by showing
    that it has had no contacts with the forum. 27
    24Id.
    25Id.
    26Id.
    27Id.
    16
    Analysis
    The Unsworn Declaration
    Since deciding whether Sahilu’s Special Appearance met the
    requirements of Rule 120a is a threshold issue, we must determine
    whether the trial court erred in reaching that conclusion before we
    address the appellants’ remaining issues. 28 On appeal, relying on Casino
    Magic Corp. v. King, Allco argues the trial court could have denied the
    appellants’ special appearance because the appellants failed to verify the
    jurisdictional facts in their special appearance as true and correct, a
    requirement of Rule 120a. 29 But even were Allco correct that Sahilu’s
    declaration failed to verify the jurisdictional facts in the Special
    Appearance (and it isn’t, as we later explain), defects in forms used to
    support a special appearance may be cured if the opposing party objects.30
    But here, Allco didn’t object to any alleged defects in Sahilu’s declaration
    until after the hearing occurred; instead, it waited until nearly two weeks
    28See  Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(1).
    29Casino  Magic Corp. v. King, 
    43 S.W.3d 14
    , 18 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2001, pet. denied).
    30See Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 
    968 S.W.2d 319
    , 322 (Tex. 1998)
    (noting that even the lack of a verification to support a special appearance
    is curable under Rule 120a).
    17
    after the trial court denied the appellants’ Special Appearance, pointing
    the alleged defect out for the first time when it asked the trial court to
    conclude that because Sahilu’s declaration was defective, the declaration
    failed to verify the Special Appearance.
    To be sure, Sahilu’s Declaration lacks a jurat. So even though Allco
    never complained the Declaration lacks a jurat, the Declaration Sahilu
    filed does not function as an affidavit. 31 But even had Sahilu intended to
    file an affidavit and left off the jurat, an affidavit filed without a jurat is
    a defect that is subject to the rule of waiver since Rule 120a allows special
    appearances to “be amended to cure defects.” 32 In other words, Allco
    waived any errors in Sahilu’s declaration by never objecting to it until
    after the trial court ruled on the appellants’ Special Appearance.
    And even if Sahilu intended to file an unsworn declaration, and in
    our view that’s what he intended, his unsworn declaration (absent a
    timely objection to its form) made the appellants’ Rule 120a Special
    Appearance a “sworn motion” under Texas law. Under section 132.001 of
    31SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.011(1);
    32Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(1); Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v.
    Montgomery Cty., 
    365 S.W.3d 314
    , 317 (Tex. 2012); Dawson-Austin, 968
    S.W.2d at 321-22.
    18
    the Civil Practices and Remedies Code, an unsworn declaration
    transforms a special appearance into a sworn motion. 33 With exceptions
    not applicable here, section 132.001(a) provides: “[A]n unsworn
    declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration,
    verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute or
    required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by law.” 34
    Given the above, the trial court’s conclusion that Sahilu’s
    declaration didn’t verify the Special Appearance because (in the trial
    court’s opinion) it was defective is legally incorrect and unsupported by
    the record. The record shows that Sahilu did verify the facts in the
    appellants’ Special Appearance. He declared:
    I am a Defendant in the above-referenced lawsuit. I am over
    18 years of age, of sound mind, and capable of making this
    affidavit. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my
    personal knowledge and are true and correct. I have also
    reviewed the Special Appearance filed by me and
    Defendant TBS Business Solutions USA Inc. (“TBS”) in
    the above-referenced lawsuit, and according to my
    personal knowledge, the facts stated therein are true
    and correct. (emphasis added).
    33Tex.  Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 132.001.
    34Id. § 132.001(a).
    19
    For all these reasons, we hold the trial court erred in concluding
    that Sahilu’s Declaration “did not verify the special appearance” as
    required by Rule 120a.
    Specific Jurisdiction
    In their first issue, the appellants argue that Allco failed to plead
    jurisdictional facts showing their connection with Texas. According to
    appellants, the “only jurisdictional allegations in [Allco’s] Original
    Petition are conclusory statements that ‘[t]he court has personal
    jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants engaged in business in
    Texas by contracting with a Texas resident’ and ‘Defendants committed
    torts, which are the subject of this suit, in whole or in part in Texas.’”
    Were those the only allegations relevant to the trial court’s jurisdictional
    inquiry, we would agree that alone they cannot support the trial court’s
    ruling. 35 But they don’t stand alone. When deciding a special appearance,
    35E.g.,Doe v. Univ. of N. Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., No. 02-19-00321-CV,
    
    2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2817
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2020,
    pet. denied) (“[A] plaintiff does not meet the burden to plead facts
    affirmatively demonstrating jurisdiction with conclusory allegations; as
    we have held, if conclusory allegations were sufficient, ‘the jurisdictional
    inquiry would become meaningless.’”) (quoting City of Forest Hill v.
    Cheesbro, No. 02-18-00289-CV, 
    2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1572
    , at *5 (Tex.
    20
    the court’s jurisdictional inquiry is not limited to one paragraph of the
    pleadings. Instead Rule 120a requires the jurisdictional inquiry to
    encompass the factual allegations in “the pleadings . . . and such
    affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of
    discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” 36 So even though the
    appellants focus on one paragraph of the Plaintiff’s Original Petition to
    argue Allco’s pleadings of jurisdictional facts were insufficient, the trial
    court was not free to ignore the remaining allegations of fact in Allco’s
    thirteen-page-long Original Petition or the factual allegations in Allco’s
    thirteen-long-page Response in Opposition to Special Appearance. When
    considering the matters encompassed by Rule 120a, we conclude the
    pleadings and evidence, if taken as true, are sufficient to show the trial
    court was authorized on the pleadings, had the pleadings been
    undisputed, to exercise specific jurisdiction over at least one of Allco’s
    nine claims.
    App.—Fort Worth Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)); McLane v. Thomas,
    No. 03-18-00439-CV, 
    2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1964
    , at *20 (Tex. App.—
    Austin Mar. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (“[C]onclusory allegations are not
    sufficient to overcome sovereign immunity.”).
    36Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3).
    21
    In issue two, the appellants contend their contacts with Texas are
    insufficient under the pleadings and evidence before the trial court to
    establish that the trial court could exercise specific jurisdiction over them
    in the suit. As to Allco’s claims, the parties do not dispute that on March
    31, 2020, Global agreed to sell Allco one million N95 face masks
    manufactured by 3M for $2,900,000. To secure the sale, Allco sent Global
    $870,000 in advance as a deposit toward its purchase of the masks.
    Global, an authorized distributor of 3M masks, contacted TBS, a business
    incorporated in California with its principal place of business there, to
    fill orders Global was receiving from its customers, customers that
    included Allco, for N95 face masks manufactured by 3M.
    The evidence shows that between March 31, 2020, and August 13,
    2020, Global sent four Purchase Orders to Allco for face masks. The first
    three of these orders were for 3M masks, but the last order on August 13,
    2020, was for N95 masks made by Makrite Industries, which Global told
    TBS to order after learning that TBS couldn’t fill Global’s first three
    purchase orders for 3M masks even though Global had already paid TBS
    in advance for those orders and before TBS delivered the 3M masks that
    were ordered.
    22
    In its petition, Allco alleged the “Defendants represented to [Allco]
    that they were ready, willing, and able to provide the N95 masks upon
    receipt of payment[.]” But there were no facts alleged about where TBS
    or Sahilu allegedly made those representations to Allco. Simply put, Allco
    alleged no facts claiming that Sahilu or any employees of TBS were in
    Texas when these representations were made. And the facts Sahilu swore
    to in his special appearance—that its business with Global was all by
    phone or email from California—was undisputed. More than a decade
    ago, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the “directed a tort” approach and
    the “effects test,” the very tests Allco asked the trial court to apply (and
    the court appears to have applied based on its findings of fact) in ruling
    on the defendants’ special appearance. 37
    Next, we turn to the jurisdictional evidence attached to Allco’s
    pleadings. It shows that Global’s relationship concerning both the 3M
    masks, which weren’t delivered, and the Makrite face masks, which were
    delivered, were with TBS and its managing director, Sahilu. In other
    37See Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 
    549 S.W.3d 550
    , 564-
    565 (Tex. 2018); Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 
    168 S.W.3d 777
    , 790-792 (Tex. 2005).
    23
    words, TBS’s and Sahilu’s relationships on these transactions were not
    with Allco, and Allco’s evidence does not show otherwise. For instance,
    every time TBS accepted Global’s purchase orders for 3M face masks,
    TBS sent Global a “Purchase Order Acknowledgement/Acceptance” form,
    which Global’s president, Roger Morgan, signed. Allco is not a party to
    these agreements. The record contains no contract between TBS and
    Allco obligating TBS to sell Allco any product, including 3M or Makrite
    face masks.
    Add to that, the following condition is in each of the Acceptance
    forms that Morgan signed when purchasing 3M masks from TBS:
    As the cases of COVID-19 accelerate across the United States
    and Canada, 3M is receiving an increasing number of requests
    for large-volume supply to support the healthcare industry
    and national preparedness efforts. As a result, order status
    and shipping dates could fluctuate based on supply. We value
    your business and patience during this time. This is an
    evolving situation and we are supplying the best manner
    possible. We are dedicated to fulfilling all orders in a timely
    manner.
    So the written terms of Global’s and TBS’s agreements informed Global
    that TBS’s ability to supply 3M masks could fluctuate based on supply
    and that it would “supply in the best manner possible.” That statement
    reflects TBS would supply customers like Global 3M masks given the
    24
    demands for them in the “best manner possible,” basically a best-efforts
    term in filling Global’s orders. It doesn’t show that TBS represented to
    Global that it had over 5 million N95 masks manufactured by 3M on hand
    when Global issued the purchase orders in March and April 2020. And
    while Allco attached an affidavit signed by Global’s president, Roger
    Morgan, to its reply, Morgan never claimed that TBS ever told him that
    it had millions of N95 face masks manufactured by 3M on hand when he
    spoke to Sahilu or anyone at TBS. So despite Allco’s conclusory allegation
    claiming “Defendants” represented “they” were ready, willing, and able
    to supply 3M masks, allegations that are devoid of specifics are
    insufficient to affirmatively demonstrate how TBS or Sahilu did business
    or committed a tort in Texas. 38
    We further conclude that the purchase orders attached to Allco’s
    pleadings show that Global, a Texas business, reached into California by
    ordering face masks under an order requiring TBS to ship the masks to
    it by a common ground carrier so that Global could then use the masks
    Doe, 
    2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2817
    , at *8; Cheesbro, 2019 Tex.
    38See
    App. LEXIS 1572, at *5; McLane, 
    2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1964
    , at *20.
    25
    in its business to fulfill its own agreements with its customers. 39 In other
    words, TBS would have discharged its obligations under the purchase
    orders for the 3M masks (had it obtained and delivered the masks) on
    handing the masks to a common carrier in California, regardless of
    whether California or Texas law were to apply to these three unfilled
    purchase orders. 40 Our conclusion that TBS’s obligations would have
    been discharged upon delivering the masks in California is reinforced by
    the fact that Global left the box labeled “F.O.B. POINT” in the purchase-
    orders blank. The term F.O.B. is a commercial term, which is defined by
    California and Texas law as “free on board.” 41 Thus, under Global’s
    purchase orders, the parties to the contract anticipated that the risk of
    loss of the goods involved in the transaction passed to Global when TBS
    delivered the masks to a common carrier in California, meaning the
    39Cal.  Com. Code § 2509(1)(a) (Deering, Lexis Advance through
    Chapter 138 of the 2022 Regular Session); 
    Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2.509
    (a)(1).
    40Id.
    41Cal. Com. Code § 2319(1) (Deering, Lexis Advance through
    Chapter 175 of the 2022 Regular Session); 
    Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 2.319
    26
    purchase orders did not require TBS to perform any part of the work
    under the purchase orders in Texas. 42
    Given the evidence about the nature of the relationship (or lack
    thereof) between Allco and TBS as it relates to the purchase orders that
    lie at the heart of the controversy, the question boils down to whether
    Allco’s claims arise from or relate to TBS’s purposeful contacts with the
    forum where Allco filed suit. 43 The answer is clearly no. Even though the
    trial court improperly relied on the directed tort and effects test, both of
    which tests have been rejected by the Texas Supreme Court, Allco led the
    court into the error. Just because TBS knew the masks would end up in
    Texas is insufficient without more than is shown in this record to support
    the trial court’s conclusion that it had specific jurisdiction over TBS or
    Sahilu because a product TBS sold ended up in Texas. 44
    To support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the
    jurisdictional evidence or allegations in the pleadings must establish the
    42Id.
    43Cornerstone Healthcare   Grp. Holding, Inc., 493 S.W.3d at 73; see
    also Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 576.
    44See Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 
    310 S.W.3d 868
    , 873 (Tex. 2010); see
    also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 
    480 U.S. 102
    ,
    107 (1987) (plurality opinion).
    27
    nonresident defendant engaged in conduct sufficient to demonstrate the
    nonresident defendant reached beyond its own state, created a
    continuing relationship with the resident of the other state, and the suit
    is related to the nonresident’s activities. 45 Examples of conduct that show
    a nonresident purposefully availed itself of a benefit or advantage in the
    forum where the suit was filed include: (1) designing the product for the
    market in the forum; (2) advertising for business in the forum; (3)
    establishing channels for providing its customers with regular advice in
    the forum; and (4) marketing products through a distributor who serves
    as the nonresident’s sales agent in the forum. 46 Allco’s pleadings do not
    allege that TBS designed any product, advertised in Texas, or that Global
    was TBS’s sales agent in Texas. And even though the trial court found
    that TBS and Sahilu “routinely sell and distribute products” in Texas,
    the trial court based that finding on Roger Morgan’s affidavit. But all he
    said in his affidavit was that “I have ordered medical supplies and
    equipment from [TBS] in the past, namely 3M respirator masks.” While
    Morgan’s affidavit does mention routine sales, he mentions routine sales
    45Asahi,   
    480 U.S. at 112
    ; Spir Star AG, 310 S.W.3d at 873.
    46Id.
    28
    only in the context of Global’s business, not that of TBS: He swore: “My
    company [Global] has routinely sold and distributed products in the state
    of Texas for end use in the State of Texas, and thus, said products have
    entered the stream of commerce in the State of Texas.” Even though
    Morgan may have ordered medical supplies and equipment from TBS and
    Sahilu in the past, his affidavit fails to show how Allco’s claims “arise out
    of or relate to” TBS’s contacts in Texas on a case involving Global’s
    alleged failure to return Allco’s deposit of $870,000 and where the
    relationship between TBS and Global as to the 3M masks Global ordered
    is a relationship that is centered in California, not Texas. 47
    Here, it appears the trial court focused on the unilateral activity of
    Global rather than the nonresident’s relationship with the forum in
    ruling on the Special Appearance. But the jurisdictional analysis
    requires courts to focus on the nonresident’s relationship to the forum,
    not the unilateral activity of a third party. 48 And even when the
    47See  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
    471 U.S. 462
    , 427 (1985);
    Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 
    278 S.W.3d 333
    , 338
    (Tex. 2009).
    48Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 
    625 S.W.3d 1
    , 9 (Tex.
    2021).
    29
    nonresident literally has a flood of contacts with the forum, “the exercise
    of specific jurisdiction is prohibited if the suit does not arise out of or
    relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” 49 This concept—that
    specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudicating issues deriving from or
    connected with the controversy involved in the lawsuit—which courts
    refer to as the relatedness inquiry, applies to all of Allco’s claims. 50
    The heart of the dispute in the trial court was Global’s failure to
    return Allco’s deposit of $870,000. In a sworn motion, the appellants
    alleged that TBS was not “privy to any of Global’s clients’ purchase orders
    or delivery information,” an allegation sufficient to shift the burden to
    Allco to prove Allco was a party to the agreement between TBS and
    49Id.at 14 (cleaned up).
    50Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
    471 U.S. 462
    , 478 (1985) (“[A]n
    individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone [cannot]
    automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s
    home forum[.]”); Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14 (noting that a flood of
    purposeful contacts is insufficient for a court to exercise specific
    jurisdiction unless there is a nexus between the defendant, the litigation,
    and the forum); TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 46 (comparing the stream-of-
    commerce cases with the directing-a-tort cases); Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d
    at 152 (“Texas’s interest in protecting its citizens against torts is
    insufficient to automatically exercise personal jurisdiction upon an
    allegation that a nonresident directed a tort from outside the forum
    against a resident.” ).
    30
    Global involving Global’s purchase of 3M face masks. 51 But the
    documents Allco attached to its pleadings do not show that Allco was a
    party to the TBS/Global contract or that TBS was a party to the
    Allco/Global contract. 52 And during the hearing on the appellants’ Special
    Appearance, in response to a question from the court, Allco’s attorney
    agreed that TBS had returned the money owed to Global after accounting
    for Global’s obligation to pay TBS for delivering to Global one million
    Makrite N95 masks.
    To sum up: The evidence before the trial court shows that TBS and
    Global conducted their business in California, not in Texas. Allco failed
    to allege and prove the appellants’ contacts with Texas related to and
    were connected in a substantial way to the facts of the litigation involving
    the agreement between Global and Allco.
    51See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658 (noting the caselaw governing special
    appearances “dictates that the plaintiff and the defendant bear shifting
    burdens of proof); First Bank v. Brumitt, 
    519 S.W.3d 95
    , 102 (Tex. 2017)
    (“As a general rule, the benefits and burdens of a contract belong solely
    to the contracting parties, and no person can sue upon a contract except
    he be a party to or in privity with it.”) (cleaned up).
    52See Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d at 102 (placing the burden of proof on the
    party who seeks to prove it is a third-party beneficiary to another’s
    contract).
    31
    For the reasons explained above, we conclude TBS was not doing
    business in Texas under the purchase orders Global issued to TBS. We
    sustain the appellants’ second issue. Because resolving the appellants’
    third issue would not provide appellants more relief, we need not address
    that issue. 53
    Conclusion
    We overrule the appellants’ first issue, sustain issues two and four,
    and conclude we need not reach issue three. We reverse the trial court’s
    order denying the special appearance. We remand the case to the trial
    court, with instructions that the trial court dismiss and then sever the
    claims against the appellants, TBS Business Solutions USA, Inc. and
    Tewodros “Teddy” Sahilu, from the claims against any other parties to
    the suit.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    _________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on November 4, 2021
    Opinion Delivered September 15, 2022
    Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    53Tex. R.App. P. 47.1. (requiring opinions to address each issue that
    is necessary to resolving the appeal).
    32
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-21-00146-CV

Filed Date: 9/15/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2022