Linda Douglas v. Dallas Performance, LLC ( 2022 )

Affirmed in part and Reversed and Remanded in part and Opinion Filed
April 26, 2022
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-00630-CV
LINDA DOUGLAS, Appellant
V.
DALLAS PERFORMANCE, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-03688-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Myers
Linda Douglas appeals the take nothing judgment based on the jury’s verdict
on her claims for conversion and “wrongful detention”1 of her vehicle by appellee
Dallas Performance, LLC, and her claim for attorney’s fees under section 70.008 of
the Property Code. Dallas Performance brings a cross-appeal of the trial court’s
take-nothing judgment on its claim for attorney’s fees. We reverse the trial court’s
judgment on Douglas’s claims for conversion, wrongful detention, and for attorney’s
1
By “wrongful detention,” Douglas appears to mean the tort of trespass to chattels.
fees under section 70.008. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Dallas
Performance take nothing on its claims for attorney’s fees. We remand the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Linda Douglas owns a 2004 Corvette. She decided she wanted the car to
sound bigger. In December 2013, she took the car to Dallas Performance, owned by
Taylor Sims, to have a new camshaft put in. The car also had low oil pressure and
made a ticking sound. Douglas told Dallas Performance she wanted the camshaft
changed. Dallas Performance was concerned about the other motor problems the
car was having and wanted to remove the engine, tear it down, and find what was
wrong with it. Douglas told Dallas Performance she could not afford that and just
to change the cam shaft. Douglas and Dallas Performance eventually agreed Dallas
Performance could also do some work on the pistons and rings but not tear down the
motor. Dallas Performance agreed to do the work but said it could not warranty the
work if it could not tear down the motor to find the problem. Douglas left the car
with Dallas Performance. The back of Dallas Performance’s invoices said Dallas
Performance would charge $40 per day for storage of vehicles left at Dallas
Performance more than three days after notification of job completion. Dallas
Performance did the agreed work to change the camshaft and work on the pistons
2
For further information on the case, see the opinion from the earlier appeal of this case, Douglas v.
Sims, No. 05-17-01187-CV, 2019 WL 926133 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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and rings, but it also, without notifying Douglas, tore down the motor, fixed it, and
put it back together.
In February 2014, Dallas Performance notified Douglas that the car was
repaired and told her the bill for the work on the camshaft, pistons, and rings, which
was the work Douglas had authorized, was $4,791.56. Dallas Performance agreed
Douglas could make unspecified monthly payments to pay for the repairs and that
storage charges would be $50 per week; Douglas said “No problem.” Douglas made
some payments but then got sick. When she asked Dallas Performance how much
she owed, Dallas Performance presented her with a bill for the unapproved motor
work, which was $7,077.64. On September 11, 2015, Douglas made a payment that
brought her total payments to $4,820, which was more than she owed for the repairs
she had authorized, but not enough to pay the storage fees to that point or pay for the
unauthorized repairs. Douglas demanded Dallas Performance return the car, but
Dallas Performance refused.
First Trial
Douglas sued Dallas Performance for various claims including conversion and
wrongful detention. Douglas sought the return of the car, damages for the loss of
use of the car between September 11, 2015 and the trial, and attorney’s fees. Dallas
Performance brought counterclaims, including a quantum meruit claim for the
unauthorized motor work, a breach-of-contract claim for Douglas’s failure to pay
for the unauthorized motor work and the storage fees, and a claim for attorney’s fees.
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As defenses to Douglas’s claims for conversion and wrongful detention, Dallas
Performance alleged Douglas’s claims violated the statute of limitations.
The jury found against Douglas on all her claims. On Dallas Performance’s
counterclaim for breach of contract for the storage fees, the jury found Douglas
agreed to pay storage fees, that she failed to comply with that agreement, and that
she failed to pay Dallas Performance $9,000 for the storage fees. The jury also found
Douglas did not agree to pay Dallas Performance for the additional motor work, but
the jury found the elements of quantum meruit and damages to Dallas Performance
of $3,200. The jury found Dallas Performance’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s
fees were $8,750. The trial court rendered judgment that Douglas take nothing and
that Dallas Performance recover damages of $3,200 for quantum meruit, $9,000 for
breach of contract, and $8,750 for attorney’s fees.
First Appeal
Douglas appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court. On Dallas
Performance’s quantum meruit claim, we determined there was no evidence to
support the jury’s verdict because there was no evidence of the element that Dallas
Performance reasonably notified Douglas that it was performing the motor repair
work or expected Douglas to pay for the work. Douglas, 2019 WL 926133, at *6.
We rendered judgment that Dallas Performance take nothing on its quantum meruit
claim. Id.–4–
On Douglas’s conversion and wrongful-detention claims, we determined
Douglas conclusively established she owned the car, that Dallas Performance had
possession of the car, and that she had demanded the return of the of the car. Id. We
said the jury’s finding that Dallas Performance had not converted the car meant:
the jury necessarily found Dallas Performance’s possession of the car
was not ‘unlawful,’ ‘without authorization,’ ‘inconsistent with
Douglas’s rights,’ or an ‘impairment or exclusion’ of Douglas’s right
to possess and control the car. Based on the pleadings and evidence at
trial, this finding could have been based only on Dallas Performance’s
contention it had the right to possess the car until Douglas paid for all
the work.
Id. at *7. We then said Dallas Performance’s failure to establish it was entitled to
recover for the unauthorized motor work “directly impacts Dallas Performance’s
assertion it had a valid lien on the car, an issue crucial to the jury’s determination of
whether Dallas Performance converted or wrongfully detained the car.” Id. at *8,
slip op. at 15. Douglas asked us to render judgment in her favor on her claims for
conversion and wrongful detention. We declined to do so because, as the jury charge
was structured, the jury’s “No” answer on conversion meant the jury did not answer
questions on Dallas Performance’s limitations defense, the value of the car on the
date of the conversion, whether the car should be returned to Douglas, and whether
Douglas was entitled to exemplary damages. Id. We reversed the take-nothing
judgment on conversion and wrongful detention and remanded the case for a new
trial in the interest of justice. Id. at *8.
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On Dallas Performance’s counterclaim for breach of contract for storage fees,
the jury found Douglas agreed to pay storage fees, did not comply with that
agreement, and that $9,000 was the amount she failed to pay under the agreement.
We held:
Douglas’s agreement to pay storage fees terminated when she made the
last payment for the camshaft work on September 11, 2015. . . . There
were eighty-one weeks and one day between February 20, 2014 [the
date storage fees began] and September 11, 2015. Accordingly,
Douglas owed storage fees of $4,057.14.
Id. at *10. We concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to support the award
of $9,000 for breach of contract, and we suggested a remittitur—which Dallas
Performance accepted—reducing Dallas Performance’s breach-of-contract damages
on the storage fees to $4,057.14. Id.; Douglas v. Sims, No. 05-17-01187-CV, 2019
WL 1198394 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2019) (mem. op.) (supplemental opinion
after Dallas Performance accepted suggestion of remittitur).
On Dallas Performance’s claim for attorney’s fees, we reversed the award of
attorney’s fees because we rendered take-nothing on Dallas Performance’s quantum
meruit claim and had reduced the damages on the breach of contract claim by more
than half. We ordered the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees.
Douglas, 2019 WL 926133 at *11.
Second Trial
Following remand of the case, the trial court presided over a second jury trial.
Douglas testified Dallas Performance still refused to release the car to her. Dallas
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Performance’s witnesses testified that it was entitled to continue holding the car
because Douglas had not paid the storage fees. Dallas Performance did not request
submission of any affirmative defenses to the conversion and wrongful-detention
claims. At the end of the trial, the jury found Dallas Performance did not convert or
wrongfully detain the car. The jury did not answer questions on conversion damages
concerning the value of the vehicle on September 11, 2015, loss of use of the vehicle
since September 11, 2015, malice, or exemplary damages. In Jury Question 5, the
jury was asked, “Is Dallas Performance wrongfully detaining the Car?” and the jury
answered “No.” The jury was asked about attorney’s fees for both Douglas and
Dallas Performance and answered “0” for all questions about attorney’s fees.
Douglas timely filed a motion for new trial arguing the evidence was “legally
and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding[s]” on her claims for
conversion and wrongful detention. Douglas asserted that the only issue was
whether Dallas Performance’s possession of her car was wrongful, and she asserted
the evidence conclusively established Dallas Performance’s possession was
wrongful. She argued that when she finished paying the amount of the authorized
repairs, Dallas Performance’s mechanic’s lien ended, and it no longer had a right to
possess her car. She also asserted she established the amount of her damages and
attorney’s fees. The motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c).
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Second Appeal
Both Douglas and Dallas Performance filed timely notices of appeal.
Douglas brings four issues contending the trial court erred by (1) not rendering
judgment for her on her claims for conversion and wrongful detention, (2) not
rendering judgment for her loss-of-use damages and attorney’s fees, (3) not granting
her the alternative relief of a new trial, and (4) submitting a question to the jury on
Dallas Performance’s attorney’s fees incurred in the second trial.
Dallas Performance brings one cross-issue contending the trial court should
have awarded it its attorney’s fees from the first and second trials.
CONVERSION AND WRONGFUL DETENTION
As we stated in the first appeal of this case, “Conversion is the unauthorized
and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal
property of another, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner’s rights.”
Douglas, 2019 WL 926133, at *6. Its elements are, “(1) the plaintiff owned or had
possession of the property or entitlement to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully
and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the
exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff’s rights as an owner; (3) the plaintiff
demanded return of the property; and (4) the defendant refused to return the
property.” Id.Douglas’s “wrongful detention” of personal property claim appears to be a
claim of trespass to chattels. “A trespass to chattels is a wrongful interference with
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or injury to property that causes actual damage to the property or deprives the owner
of its use for a substantial period of time.” Armstrong v. Benavides, 180 S.W.3d
359, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); see also Omnibus Int’l, Inc. v. AT&T,
Inc., 111 S.W.3d 818, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“To interfere
wrongfully with the use or possession of property is a trespass to chattels. For
liability to attach, causing actual damage to the property or depriving the owner of
its use for a substantial period must accompany the wrongful interference.” (citation
omitted)).
In this case, Douglas conclusively established that she met elements (1), (3),
and (4) of her conversion claim because proved she owned the car, she demanded
the return of the car, and Dallas Performance refused to return the car. See Douglas,
2019 WL 926133, at *6. On her wrongful-detention claim, Douglas conclusively
proved Dallas Performance interfered with her possession of the car and deprived
her of its use for a substantial period of time. The only question is whether Dallas
Performance’s interference and assuming and exercising of control over the car after
September 11, 2015 were wrongful, unlawful, and without authorization. The only
authorization Dallas Performance asserted it had for retaining possession of the car
after Douglas had paid for the authorized repairs was its mechanic’s lien.
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MECHANIC’S LIEN
Dallas Performance asserted it was entitled to keep possession of Douglas’s
car until she paid the storage fees pursuant to section 70.001(a) of the Property
Code:3
(a) A worker in this state who by labor repairs an article, including a
vehicle, . . . may retain possession of the article until:
(1) the amount due under the contract for the repairs is paid . . . .
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.001(a). The lien is released when the worker receives
payment for the amounts due under subsection (a) or when the worker releases
possession of the vehicle. Id. § 70.001(b-1).
Douglas argues the storage of the car was not part of the repairs, so the storage
fees are not secured by the mechanic’s lien. Dallas Performance argues that the
contract for the repairs provided for storage fees, so those fees are part of “the
amount due under the contract for repairs,” and Douglas had not paid “the amount
due under the contract for repairs” when she finished paying for the repairs on
September 11, 2015, but still owed over $4,000 for storage fees.
We did not in the first appeal—and the parties do not in this appeal—expressly
address this statutory construction matter. Our opinion from the first appeal stated,
“Douglas’s agreement to pay storage fees terminated when she made the last
3
There is a provision in the Property Code for a garageman’s lien, section 70.003(c), but Dallas
Performance did not assert in the trial court and does not argue on appeal that the statutory garageman’s
lien applies in this case.
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payment for the camshaft work on September 11, 2015.” Douglas, at *10, slip op.
at 19. But that statement goes to what the parties’ agreement was for allowing Dallas
Performance to charge storage fees; our opinion did not address whether the law
allows Dallas Performance to keep possession of the car until the post-repair storage
fees are paid.
The Eastland Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation in Allstar
Refinishing & Collision Center, Inc. v. Rosas, No. 11-07-00268-CV, 2009 WL
481885, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). In that case,
Rosas took her car to Allstar for repairs. Allstar rented Rosas a car while her car
was being repaired. Rosas transferred the insurance company’s payment to Allstar,
leaving a balance of $500 for the repairs to her car. The rental car was damaged
while in Rosas’s possession. When Rosas returned the rental car and gave Allstar a
check for $500 for the remaining balance due on her car, Allstar refused to return
her car to her because she owed money for the damaged rental car. Rosas sued for
conversion, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment on her
claim for conversion. On appeal, Allstar argued that section 70.001 permitted it to
retain Rosas’s vehicle until she paid both the repair bill for her vehicle and the
expenses assessed for the rental car in full. The court of appeals disagreed:
Subsection (a)(1) is the applicable provision of the statute because
Allstar specified the amount due for the repairs to be made to Rosas’s
vehicle. This provision states that the worker may retain possession of
the article “until the amount due under the contract for the repairs is
paid” (emphasis added). The expenses claimed by Allstar for the costs
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of the rental vehicle, including costs for damages allegedly occurring
to the rental vehicle, do not constitute costs “for the repairs” of the
vehicle that is the subject of the statutory lien. Accordingly, we
disagree with Allstar’s construction of the statute.
Id. at *2.
In this case, the invoice provide that storage fees would be charged beginning
three days after the customer was notified that the repairs were completed. Because
the fees were not incurred until after the repairs were completed, the storage fees
were not part of “the amount due under the contract for the repairs.” PROP. §
70.001(a)(1) (emphasis added); see Rosas, 2009 WL 481885, at *2. Therefore, the
post-repair storage fees were not secured by the mechanic’s lien.
The evidence conclusively established that Dallas Performance had no right
to maintain possession of Douglas’s vehicle after September 15, 2015, when she
finished paying for the authorized repairs. Dallas Performance’s refusal to return
Douglas’s vehicle to her after she demanded they do so constituted an unlawful and
unauthorized assumption and exercise of control over the vehicle to the exclusion of
Douglas’s rights as an owner. Thus, Douglas conclusively established Dallas
Performance committed the tort of conversion. Douglas also conclusively
established Dallas Performance wrongfully interfered with the car depriving
Douglas of the use of the car for a substantial period of time. Thus Douglas also
conclusively established trespass to chattels. See Armstrong, 180 S.W.3d at 363.
Next, we must determine the appropriate disposition of these causes of action.
The usual measure of damages for conversion is the fair market value of the property
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at the time and place of conversion. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A. v. RPK Capital
XVI, L.L.C., 360 S.W.3d 691, 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Alternatively,
the plaintiff can seek the return of the property and damages for its loss of use during
the time of its detention. Id. Damages are limited to the amount necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for the actual losses or injuries sustained as a natural and
proximate result of the defendant's conversion. Id. Loss-of-use damages “are
typically measured by the reasonable cost to rent a replacement, although actual
rental of such replacement is not necessary.” Wolf v. Starr, 617 S.W.3d 898, 907
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). The plaintiff must elect to recover the property
itself or the fair market value in damages. R.J. Suarez Enters. Inc. v. PNYX L.P.,
380 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). The plaintiff may not
change its election of damages for conversion after the case has been submitted to
the fact-finder. Id. Further, this election is subservient to the doctrine that the object
is to compensate for the injury, and the trial court must be given the discretion
required to fashion an equitable remedy. Id. If allowing the plaintiff to elect to
recover the converted property itself will over-compensate him for his injury, then
the trial court should take the election away from the plaintiff and limit the recovery
to the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the conversion. Id.Trespass to chattels differs from conversion in the measure of damages
recoverable. “On a trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff can recover only the
diminished value of his property and the damage to his interest in its possession or
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use.” Simmonds v. TDCJ, No. 10-07-00361-CV, 2010 WL 654498, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Waco Feb. 24, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In this case, Douglas did not make, nor was she asked to make, an election as
to damages. Douglas testified she wanted the car returned to her. She also presented
two measures of damages, the value of the vehicle, which she testified she learned
from Kelley’s Blue Book was $16,500, and loss of use, $15,860. Concerning
damages for loss of use, Douglas, as of the day of trial, had been wrongfully deprived
of the use of her car for 1,586 days. Douglas did not testify to any out-of-pocket
expenses she incurred from the loss of use of the car for over four years. During that
time, she “had to rely on other people or take the bus or just not have transportation.”
She computed the loss-of-use damages by determining that it cost a minimum of $27
to $30 per day to rent a car, and she testified, “I thought $10 a day would be a
fair . . . estimate. I took that, multiplied that by the days that I was without the car,
and came up with that figure.” Thus, $15,860 represents loss-of-use damages of ten
dollars per day for her being wrongfully deprived of her car for 1,586 days.
Douglas requests that we (1) render judgment ordering Dallas Performance to
deliver possession of the car to her or to pay her the value of the car, $16,500, (2)
render judgment awarding Douglas damages of $15,860 for loss of use of the car,
and (3) render judgment awarding Douglas her attorney’s fees of $15,000 through
trial and $25,000 for attorney’s fees on appeal. In the alternative, Douglas requests
that we grant her a new trial. In this case, we conclude that a new trial, rather than
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rendition of judgment is appropriate. In the first appeal of this case, we concluded
rendition was not appropriate because the jury charge instructed the jurors not to
answer questions concerning Douglas’s actual damages, Dallas Performance’s
malice, and exemplary damages if the jury found that Dallas Performance did not
convert or wrongfully detain Douglas’s car. We stated:
Douglas requests that we render judgment in her favor on her
conversion and wrongful detention claims and order that Dallas
Performance return the car or, alternatively, pay damages for the lost
value of the car. However, the jury was instructed that if it found Dallas
Performance neither converted nor wrongfully detained the car, it
should not answer questions about the defenses asserted by Dallas
Performance to those claims, the value of the car on the date of any
conversion, whether the car should be returned to Douglas, and whether
Douglas was entitled to exemplary damages. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that rendition is the appropriate remedy in this case.
Douglas, 2019 WL 926133, at *8. Following retrial, a jury again found Dallas
Performance did not convert or wrongfully detain the car. Again, the jury charge
instructed the jurors not to answer questions about the value of the car, damages for
loss of use, malice, or exemplary damages. As in the first appeal, we conclude
remand, rather than rendition is appropriate. See Hebert Acquisitions, LLC v.
Tremur Consulting Contractors, Inc., No. 03-09-00385-CV, 2011 WL 350466, at
*5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 4, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The mere fact that
evidence is uncontroverted, however, does not make it conclusive.”); see also TEX.
R. APP. P. 44.1(b) (“The trial court may not order a separate trial solely on
unliquidated damages if liability is contested.”).
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Douglas claimed attorney’s fees pursuant to Property Code section 70.008,
and she contends the trial court erred by not rendering judgment for her attorney’s
fees. Section 70.008 provides, “The court in a suit concerning possession of a motor
vehicle . . . and a debt due on it may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party.” PROP. § 70.008. Douglas’s claim for attorney’s fees is based on
her prevailing on her claims for conversion and trespass to chattels. Because we are
remanding Douglas’s claims “concerning possession of a motor vehicle,” we also
remand her claim for attorney’s under section 70.008.
We overrule Douglas’s first and second issues, but we sustain Douglas’s third
issue asserting the trial court erred in failing to grant Douglas’s request for a new
trial.
DALLAS PERFORMANCE’S ATTORNEY’S FEES
In her fourth issue, Douglas contends the trial court erred in submitting Dallas
Performance’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in the second trial. Douglas
presented neither argument nor authority in support of this issue. Her brief says the
issue is “unbriefed.” Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires an appellant’s
brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Because Douglas did not present argument in support of the issue, it is waived. See
In re S.L., No. 05-21-00874-CV, 2022 WL 896874, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.
28, 2022, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“When a party fails to adequately brief
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a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal.”); Hogan v. Aspire Fin., Inc., No. 05-
19-00385-CV, 2021 WL 2176929, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2021, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (“Because Hogan's issues are bare assertions of error, without
supporting argument or authority, we conclude she has waived our review of her
complaints.”); see also Murray v. Devco, Ltd., 731 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1987)
(“[T]he burden is on a party appealing from a trial court judgment to show that the
judgment is erroneous in order to obtain a reversal.”).
Even if any error were not waived, it would not be reversible. Neither the jury
nor the trial court awarded Dallas Performance any attorney’s fees for the second
trial. Therefore, any error by the trial court in submitting the question to the jury
probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment and is not reversible.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 441(a). We overrule Douglas’s fourth issue.
Dallas Performance’s fourth “issue” in its brief is a cross-issue contending the
question of its attorney’s fees for both trials should be remanded to the trial court.
The jury awarded Dallas Performance “$0” for Dallas Performance’s attorney’s fees,
and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Douglas
asserts Dallas Performance did not preserve this issue for appellate review; we agree
with Douglas.
Dallas Performance argues the jury had to award it at least some attorney’s
fees. This argument challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. To preserve a legal sufficiency challenge for appeal after
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a jury trial, the party must raise the specific complaint in the trial court by: (1) a
motion for directed verdict; (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
(3) an objection to the submission of the jury question; (4) a motion to disregard the
jury’s finding on a vital fact issue; or (5) a motion for new trial. THB Constr., LLC
v. Holt Tex., Ltd., No. 05-20-00020-CV, 2022 WL 123105, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). A party must preserve an issue of factual
insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding by filing a motion for new
trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1991).
Dallas Performance did not file a motion for directed verdict, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion to disregard the jury’s findings on attorney’s
fees. Nor did Dallas Performance file a motion for new trial. Therefore, Dallas
Performance has not preserved its challenge to the legal or factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We overrule Dallas Performance’s fourth
issue.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment as to Douglas’s claims for conversion,
wrongful detention, and attorney’s fees under section 70.008 of the Property Code,
and we otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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We remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
/Lana Myers//
200630f.p05 LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
LINDA DOUGLAS, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at
Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-20-00630-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-03688-
E.
DALLAS PERFORMANCE, LLC, Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Appellee Justices Molberg and Garcia
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion
of the trial court's judgment that appellant LINDA DOUGLAS take nothing on her
claims for conversion, wrongful detention, and for attorney’s fees under Texas
Property Code section 70.008. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that appellant LINDA DOUGLAS recover her costs of this
appeal from appellee DALLAS PERFORMANCE, LLC.
Judgment entered this 26th day of April, 2022.
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