Timothy Lloyd Booth v. State ( 2019 )

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 14, 2019
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00679-CR
No. 05-18-00680-CR
TIMOTHY LLOYD BOOTH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 296-83462-2016 & 296-83459-2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Whitehill, and Justice Partida-Kipness
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
A jury convicted appellant Timothy Lloyd Booth of one count of theft of $300,000 or more
and one count of securities fraud involving $100,000 or more. The trial court assessed punishment
at sixty-eight years in prison on each count, concurrently. In two issues, Booth argues that (i) the
prosecution violated the Texas Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause and (ii) the trial court
erred by sustaining the State’s objections to certain evidence. We conclude that Booth’s issues
were not preserved in the trial court and accordingly affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we resolve this case based on appellant’s failure to preserve error, we abbreviate
our factual summary. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (a memorandum opinion should be “no longer than
necessary to advise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic reasons for it”).
According to appellant’s brief, he is a businessman who co-founded two companies,
TenList and StaMedia. While appellant was promoting StaMedia across the country, he “got ahead
of himself” and began spending “exorbitantly on himself and his family.” A government
investigation caused the enterprise to collapse, leaving a company “with millions of dollars of
investments, no source of revenue, and millions of dollars already paid out to its founders, some
of which was spent conspicuously on luxury goods.”
The indictments accused appellant of stealing and defrauding investors out of millions of
dollars. In closing arguments, the State characterized appellant’s conduct as a Ponzi scheme.
Appellant was convicted of theft and securities fraud, and he was sentenced to sixty-eight
years in prison on each count.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Issue One: Did the State violate the Texas Constitution’s Separation of Powers
Clause by allowing lawyers from the State Securities Board to “handle the entire
prosecution” of the State’s case?
Appellant’s first issue argues that the State violated the Separation of Powers Clause, TEX.
CONST. art. II, § 1, because lawyers from the State Securities Board—an executive agency—
controlled this prosecution instead of the Collin County District Attorney’s Office—part of the
judicial branch.
The State responds, among other things, that appellant failed to preserve his first issue in
the trial court. Appellant does not dispute that he did not raise a separation of powers argument in
the trial court.
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We conclude that appellant failed to preserve his first issue.
“Preservation of error is a systemic requirement on appeal.” Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d
530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (footnote omitted). “If an issue has not been preserved for appeal,
neither the court of appeals nor [the court of criminal appeals] should address the merits of that
issue.” Id. (footnote omitted). Typically, error must be preserved by a timely request, objection,
or motion in the trial court, followed by either a ruling or a refusal to rule by the trial court. See
TEX. R. EVID. 33.1(a). These requirements serve the important purposes of (i) giving the trial court
an opportunity to correct the problem and (ii) giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond,
if necessary. See Thomas v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 884 & n.36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Although some rights cannot be forfeited and others can be forfeited only by express
waiver, see Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), appellant does not
argue that the Separation of Powers Clause is unforfeitable or can be forfeited only by express
waiver. Indeed, he acknowledges that two appellate courts have held that a separation of powers
argument must be preserved by objection in the trial court. See Gamble v. State, No. 02-13-00573-
CR, 2015 WL 221108, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 15, 2015, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Boone v. State, 60 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d); cf. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(“[A]lmost all error—even constitutional error—may be forfeited if the appellant failed to object.”)
(footnote omitted). The Gamble court noted that there is an exception for facial challenges to a
penal statute, 2015 WL 221108, at *4, but appellant does not make such a challenge here. Instead,
appellant argues that he was excused from objecting because it was impossible for him to object
until the entire prosecution had concluded.
We disagree with appellant’s impossibility argument. He complains that the State
Securities Board lawyers involved in the case (i) signed “seemingly every document filed by the
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State” before trial and (ii) are the only lawyers shown in the reporter’s record as representing the
State at trial. Even if we assume that the separation of powers violation was not complete until
the trial ended (a question we do not decide), appellant does not explain why he could not have
raised his separation of powers argument in a motion for new trial. See Berryhill v. State, No. 05-
13-01605-CR, 2014 WL 5858602, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 12, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“Generally, when a defendant does not have an opportunity to
object, he must file a motion for new trial to preserve error for appellate review.”); Habib v. State,
431 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. ref’d) (observing that defendant could have
preserved complaint about denial of closing argument by new trial motion if he had no opportunity
to object during trial).
Moreover, an objection by a new trial motion or otherwise was essential to allow the State
to adduce evidence relevant to the separation of powers question, such as evidence about the
district attorney’s involvement in and ultimate control of the case. See Villarreal v. State, 504
S.W.3d 494, 505–07 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. ref’d) (undertaking close
factual review to determine whether district attorney maintained ultimate supervisory authority
over the prosecution), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 398 (2017). Because appellant did not raise the
separation of powers argument below, the record is undeveloped on the critical facts, and the State
cannot now develop them.
We conclude that appellant forfeited his first issue by failing to preserve it in the trial court.
B. Issue Two: Did the trial court err by sustaining the State’s objection to appellant’s
testimony that he acted on the advice of his civil attorneys?
Appellant’s second issue complains about the exclusion of his own testimony offered in
response to the State’s questions during cross-examination. The State responds, among other
things, that appellant failed to preserve error. We agree with the State’s failure to preserve
argument.
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1. Pertinent Facts
The relevant parts of appellant’s cross-examination testimony follow:
Q. And what do you think you did with these investors’ money?
A. We took advances, Mr. Barron, that our attorneys said were—
The State: Objection, nonresponsive.
The Court: Sustained.
....
Q. Again, let me ask you this. What made you think that you could take these
investors’ funds and use it for your own personal benefit? And I am not
asking what your attorneys told you or anyone else. I am asking why you
thought so.
Appellant: I’m sorry, Your Honor, the answer is the same.
The Court: Okay. Go ahead.
A. That we checked with our attorneys—
The State: Objection, nonresponsive.
The Court: Overruled. Go ahead.
A. Our attorneys said that we could and memorialize the loans or advances
later.
The State: Objection. He is trying to establish a mistake of law, a mistake of
fact defense; and he can’t do that.
The Court: Sustained to that.
....
Q. Let me ask you this. How do you justify taking Ms. Ortiz’ money and the
other investors whose money wound up in your own personal bank account?
How do you justify that?
Appellant: Your Honor—
The Court: What?
Appellant: It is the same answer. We had direction.
The Court: Answer the question. The lawyers will take care of the rest.
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A. Mr. Balestri at Bell Nunnally—
The State: Objection, we are going to get off into another mistake of fact
defense here. I am going to object to it, Judge.
The Court: Okay, I understand.
Q. The bottom line is, Mr. Booth, you really can’t justify any of this, can you?
A. Yes, I can, by the reasons I gave you. Except for spending too early,
absolutely.
2. Applicable Law
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires the appellant to have presented his
complaint to the trial court in a timely request, objection, or motion that “stated the grounds for
the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make
the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.”
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
The court of criminal appeals has further explained what the proponent of excluded
evidence must to do to preserve error under Rule 33.1(a)(1)(A). “[I]t is not enough to tell the judge
that evidence is admissible. The proponent, if he is the losing party on appeal, must have told the
judge why the evidence was admissible.” Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). The party must do everything necessary “to bring to the judge’s attention the evidence rule
or statute in question and its precise and proper application to the evidence in question.” Id.
(internal quotations and footnote omitted). The court further held that Reyna’s vague arguments
for admissibility in the trial court did not preserve an argument that the Confrontation Clause
entitled him to have the evidence admitted. Id. at 179–80.
The court reiterated the Reyna rule last year in Golliday v. State: “As was the case in
Reyna, Appellant was responsible for preserving the error he sought to raise on appeal by
specifically articulating the legal basis for his proffer at trial.” 560 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018) (footnote omitted).
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Thus, to preserve error, appellant had to inform the trial court specifically why his advice
of counsel testimony was admissible.
3. Applying the Law to the Facts
On appeal, appellant argues that his testimony about the advice of counsel was admissible
because it was relevant to whether appellant (i) intended to deprive the investors of their
investments and (ii) intentionally failed to disclose material facts. He also suggests that he was
entitled to present “all the relevant surrounding facts and circumstances of the charged offense[s].”
But the reporter’s record shows that appellant’s counsel did not respond to the State’s
objections and, thus, did not proffer any legal reason his advice of counsel testimony was
admissible over the State’s objections. Under Reyna and Golliday, therefore, appellant failed to
preserve error.
Citing Texas Rule of Evidence 103, appellant argues that he did not forfeit error because
the excluded testimony’s substance was apparent from the context. But Rule 103’s offer of proof
requirement is independent of Rule 33.1’s requirement that complaining party must inform the
trial court of the basis for admissibility. Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 668–69.
Appellant did not present the trial court with any legal basis that made his testimony about
counsel’s advice admissible. Accordingly, we conclude that he failed to preserve his second issue
in the trial court. See Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 532 (appellate courts should not address unpreserved
issues).
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III. CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
180679F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
TIMOTHY LLOYD BOOTH, Appellant On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-18-00679-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 296-83462-2016.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Chief Justice Burns and Justice Partida-
Kipness participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered June 14, 2019
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
TIMOTHY LLOYD BOOTH, Appellant On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-18-00680-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 296-83459-2016.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Chief Justice Burns and Justice Partida-
Kipness participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered June 14, 2019
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