John David Martinez v. State ( 2011 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-09-00204-CR & No. 04-09-00205-CR
John David MARTINEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law, Val Verde County, Texas
Trial Court No. 07-570-CR
Honorable Sergio J. Gonzalez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 23, 2011
REVERSED AND REMANDED
After the trial court denied John David Martinez’s motion to suppress, he pled guilty to
the offenses of driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. On appeal, this court
affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in denying Martinez’s motion to suppress. Martinez
v. State, 318 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009), reversed, Nos. PD-1238-10 & PD-
1239-10, 2011 WL 2555712 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2011). On discretionary review, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held the investigatory detention of Martinez was not supported by
04-09-00204-CR & 04-09-00205-CR
reasonable suspicion. Martinez, 2011 WL 2555712, at *4. The court reversed our judgments
and remanded the causes to this court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id.
Because there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the original stop, the trial court
should have granted Martinez’s motion to suppress and ruled that any evidence resulting from
the stop is inadmissible at trial. See Martinez, 2011 WL 255712 at *4; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005). To decide if the error requires reversal, we must identify the
“fruits” of the illegal detention and search and determine whether the fruits have “somehow been
used” by the State. See Gonzales v. State, 966 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Martinez sought to suppress the marijuana found on his person after his arrest, his oral and
written statements, evidence of his actions at the time of the stop and thereafter, the results of
any breath test, and evidence of his refusal to take any breath test. The record reflects the
following evidence was obtained after the stop: 1) Martinez performed and failed field sobriety
tests; 2) Martinez provided a breath sample measured by a portable breath test device, which
indicated his alcohol concentration was “0.151”; 3) Martinez refused to submit another breath
sample for the intoxilyzer; and 4) marijuana was found in a white envelope removed from his
person at the police department. This evidence was all included in the arresting officer’s report,
which the State introduced in support of Martinez’s pleas of guilty. The State thus clearly used
the fruits of the unlawful detention in obtaining the judgments of guilt.
In its brief on original submission to this court, the State argued the evidence was
admissible even if the arresting officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment because
Martinez failed to demonstrate the officer engaged in “culpable misconduct or egregious
behavior.” The State contends that absent such showing, the exclusionary rule is not “triggered.”
We interpret the State’s argument to suggest that a “good-faith” exception should apply under
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04-09-00204-CR & 04-09-00205-CR
the facts of this case. Texas has a statutory “good-faith” exception to its exclusionary rule. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b) (West 2005). However, that section applies only in cases
involving warrants issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause. Id. This case
involves a warrantless search and arrest, conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
the statutory good-faith exception has no application. See id. The evidence obtained in violation
of Martinez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution shall not be
admitted in evidence against him in any criminal trial. See id. art. 38.23(a).
We reverse the judgments of conviction and remand these causes to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Do not publish
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