noorddin-poonjani-showket-panjwani-and-1st-nations-fastop-marketing-inc ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00337-CV
NOORDDIN POONJANI, SHOWKET APPELLANTS
PANJWANI, AND 1ST NATIONS
FASTOP MARKETING, INC.
V.
ZAINAB KAMALUDDIN, AS THE APPELLEE
TRUSTEE OF THE
ABDULHAMEED AND ZAINAB
KAMALUDDIN FAMILY TRUST
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FROM THE 211TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-30033-211
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellants Noorddin Poonjani, Showket Panjwani, and 1st Nations Fastop
Marketing, Inc. attempt to appeal the trial court’s September 18, 2014 order
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
granting Appellee Zainab Kamaluddin, as the Trustee of the Abdulhameed and
Zainab Kamaluddin Family Trust’s motion to compel Appellants to answer
interrogatories in aid of judgment and Poonjani and Panjwani to appear for
postjudgment depositions.2 On October 23, 2014, we notified Appellants of our
concern that this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the order does
not appear to be an appealable order. We also stated that the appeal would be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction unless Appellants or any party desiring to
continue the appeal filed with the court on or before November 3, 2014, a
response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.
42.3(a), 44.3.
Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or order.
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment or
order is final if it disposes of every pending claim and party. Id. at 205. Trial
court orders granting or denying postjudgment discovery requests are not
appealable until a final judgment is rendered that disposes of all issues between
the parties. Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 500 n.5 (Tex. 1982) (orig.
proceeding); Rudder v. Israel, No. 02-10-00037-CV, 2010 WL 1633376, at *1
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Fisher v. P.M.
Clinton Int’l Investigations, 81 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, no pet.) (reasoning that a rule 621a order is not a final and appealable
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Poonjani and Panjwani were also ordered to pay $3,000 in attorney’s fees
and expenses incurred in connection with the motion to compel to Kamaluddin.
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order); Arbor Holding Co., Inc. v. The Cadle Co., No. 01-01-00755-CV, 2002 WL
1480907, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (same).
Here, Appellee filed his motion to compel responses to interrogatories in
aid of judgment and appearances at postjudgment depositions sought pursuant
to rule 621a. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 621a (permitting discovery for purposes of
obtaining information to aid in the enforcement of judgments). In their response,
Appellants cite Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992), for the
propositions that discovery orders can be appealed after final judgment and that
mandamus relief is rarely available for orders relating to discovery disputes. The
discovery orders at issue in Walker, however, were pretrial discovery orders.
See id. at 835–37. Walker does not address the appealability of postjudgment
discovery orders. Moreover, other matters are still pending in the trial court.
Appellee filed a motion in the trial court seeking sanctions for Appellants’ failure
to comply with trial court’s September 18, 2014 order, and the trial court has not
ruled on the motion.
Therefore, the order that Appellants attempt to appeal is not a final,
appealable order. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195; Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 500
n.5; Rudder, 2010 WL 1633376, at *1; Fisher, 81 S.W.3d at 486. Accordingly,
we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),
43.2(f).
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PER CURIAM
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: December 4, 2014
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