david-l-smith-v-bill-belton-jack-allen-individually-and-in-his-official ( 2009 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 2-08-258-CV
    DAVID L. SMITH                                     APPELLANT
    V.
    BILL BELTON, JACK ALLEN,                           APPELLEES
    INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    CONSTABLE OF PRECINCT
    FOUR OF TARRANT COUNTY,
    TEXAS; CAMP BOWIE
    PARTNERS, L.P., A TEXAS
    LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND
    CAMP BOWIE CAPITAL CORP.,
    A TEXAS CORPORATION
    ------------
    FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
    ------------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ------------
    1
     See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    The issue in this appeal is whether an order entered by the justice court
    granting a new trial on a petition for bill of review is a final, appealable order
    that may be appealed to a county court at law. Because we hold that it is not,
    we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    I.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On September 20, 2002, appellant David L. Smith filed suit against
    appellee Bill Belton in Tarrant County Justice of the Peace Court Precinct Four,
    styled Smith v. Belton, Cause No. C00004616. Smith sought the return of his
    apartment lease security deposit and other damages from Belton, whom he
    alleged was the apartment owner. On October 28, 2002, Smith took a default
    judgment against Belton, and the justice court awarded Smith $5,000.00 in
    damages.
    On January 27, 2003, Belton filed a petition for bill of review in the same
    justice court, styled Belton v. Smith, Cause No. C00004724, seeking to vacate
    the default judgment entered against him in Smith v. Belton. Smith answered
    and brought crossclaims and third-party claims against appellees Jack Allen,
    individually and in his official capacity as Constable of Precinct Four of Tarrant
    County, Texas, Camp Bowie Partners, L.P., a Texas Limited Partnership, and
    Camp Bowie Capital Corp., a Texas Corporation.
    2
    On June 20, 2003, the justice court entered an order setting aside the
    judgment and granting a new trial in Smith v. Belton.         The justice court
    specifically ordered as follows:
    IT IS, THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
    the Petition for Bill of Review is [in] all things GRANTED; the
    Judgment dated October 28, 2002[,] in Cause No. C00004616 is
    SET ASIDE in all respects, including all post judgment writs,
    motions, and any other matters filed therein; and IT IS ORDERED
    that Cause No. C00004616 is now a pending case and should be
    set, upon notice to all parties[,] for a new trial (emphasis added).
    Smith appealed the justice court’s judgment to Tarrant County Court at Law
    No. 3.
    Nearly two years later, in March 2005, the county court at law conducted
    a de novo hearing on Belton’s petition for bill of review and determined that
    Belton established a meritorious defense to Smith’s claims. The following year,
    on July 27, 2006, the county court at law, on its own motion, entered an order
    dismissing Smith’s counterclaims and third-party claims for want of jurisdiction,
    based on its finding that Smith pleaded his claims outside of the jurisdictional
    limits of the justice court. 2
    2
     When this case was filed, amounts in controversy of more than
    $5,000, exclusive of interest, were outside the justice courts’ jurisdictional
    limits. See Act of May 22, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 776, § 2, sec.
    27.031(a)(1), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2767, 2767 (amended 2007) (current
    version at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (raising
    jurisdictional limit to $10,000 for cases filed on or after Sept. 1, 2007)).
    3
    In August 2006, Smith appealed the county court at law’s July 27, 2006
    order to this court. We stayed that appeal upon notification that Smith had
    filed a petition for bankruptcy.
    No further activity occurred in the case pending before the county court
    at law until April 15, 2008, when the county court at law was informed that
    the bankruptcy court had dismissed Smith’s petition for bankruptcy. The next
    day, the county court at law entered a notice of dismissal for want of
    prosecution. No party seeking affirmative relief responded to the court’s notice
    and, in an order signed May 21, 2008, the county court at law dismissed all
    remaining claims pending before it for want of prosecution.
    On June 19, 2008, Smith filed his notice of appeal in this court,
    attempting to appeal the county court at law’s May 21, 2008 order, “including
    all orders, rulings, findings and conclusions merged therein.”
    II.   LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
    On October 28, 2009, we sent Smith a letter expressing our concern that
    the justice court’s June 20, 2003 judgment does not appear to be an
    appealable, interlocutory order, and we directed the parties to file any response
    showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Smith responded that the June 20,
    2003 judgment is final and appealable because appellees waived any objection
    4
    to appellate jurisdiction in the county court at law and because the justice court
    lacked jurisdiction.
    A bill of review is an independent action brought to set aside a judgment
    that is no longer appealable or subject to challenge by a motion for new trial. 3
    When the trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a judgment in a prior
    case, the subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case occurs in the same
    proceeding as the trial on the bill of review. 4 A bill of review that sets aside a
    prior judgment but does not dispose of the case on the merits is interlocutory
    and not appealable. 5
    The justice court’s June 20, 2003 judgment granting bill of review states
    that the prior case, Cause No. C00004616, “is now a pending case and should
    be set . . . for a new trial.” The judgment does not dispose of the prior case
    on the merits. Therefore, the June 20, 2003 judgment of the justice court was
    interlocutory and not appealable, and the county court at law had no jurisdiction
    3
     Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 
    11 S.W.3d 924
    , 926–27 (Tex. 1999);
    State v.1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, VIN: 1GCEK14HLFS165672, 
    778 S.W.2d 463
    , 464–65 (Tex. 1989) (op. on reh’g).
    4
     1985 Chevrolet Pickup 
    Truck, 778 S.W.2d at 465
    ; Hartford
    Underwriters Ins. v. Mills, 
    110 S.W.3d 588
    , 590 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
    no pet.).
    5
     Jordan v. Jordan, 
    907 S.W.2d 471
    , 472 (Tex. 1995); Hartford
    
    Underwriters, 110 S.W.3d at 591
    ; Mills v. Corvettes of Houston, Inc., 
    44 S.W.3d 197
    , 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
    5
    to entertain Smith’s appeal of the petition for review proceeding. Because the
    county court at law had no jurisdiction over the petition for review proceeding,
    it had no jurisdiction to enter the May 21, 2008 order from which this appeal
    has been taken. Therefore, we only have jurisdiction to vacate the May 21,
    2008 order and dismiss this appeal. 6
    Accordingly, we vacate the county court at law’s May 21, 2008 order
    and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    PER CURIAM
    PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and MCCOY, JJ.
    DELIVERED: November 25, 2009
    6
     See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(e); In re Gibbs, 
    253 S.W.3d 866
    ,
    877 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d) (op. on reh’g) (vacating order
    in case over which trial court had no jurisdiction and dismissing appeal).
    6