Guillermo Rodriguez v. State ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-18-00159-CR
NO. 02-18-00160-CR
GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1457745D, 1457902D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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A jury convicted Guillermo Rodriguez of evading arrest and possessing 4
grams or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine. The trial court
found the indictments’ habitual-offender notice to be true and sentenced
Appellant to thirty years’ confinement for each offense. In three related points,
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence seized
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
from his vehicle because police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of a traffic offense to justify the traffic stop that resulted in the evidence’s seizure.
We affirm.
Background
Fort Worth Police Officer Harlow Jorgensen testified that on the night of
May 26, 2016, while he was on normal patrol, he observed a vehicle driving in
traffic without an illuminated license plate. See Tex. Transp. Code. Ann.
§ 547.322(f) (West 2011). He then saw the vehicle make a right turn at an
intersection, but the vehicle did not turn into the first available lane. See id.
§ 545.101(a) (West 2011).
Officer Mark Muse was riding with Officer Jorgensen during the pursuit,
and his testimony was consistent with that of Officer Jorgensen. Officer Muse
testified that the suspect vehicle did not have an “effective” license plate light,
and he also testified that the vehicle failed to turn into the first available lane
when it executed a right turn at an intersection.
According to Officer Jorgensen, he initiated a traffic stop by activating his
patrol car’s red and blue flashing lights and siren, but the vehicle failed to pull
over. Instead, it accelerated and entered a freeway. The vehicle eventually
exited the freeway, then sped up and attempted to outrun the patrol car, running
three stop signs and driving at high speeds down residential streets. The pursuit
continued until the vehicle failed to negotiate a turn, struck a curb, and broke its
axle.
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The officers arrested Appellant, who was the vehicle’s driver and sole
occupant, and then searched the vehicle. The search revealed a brick of
marijuana weighing fourteen ounces, a container holding thirteen grams of
methamphetamine (including adulterants and dilutants), and a pistol.
The trial court admitted into evidence the dashboard camera video from
Officer Jorgensen’s patrol car. In the video, Appellant’s vehicle’s rear license
plate was visible, but it was not clear whether the plate was illuminated by a bulb
on the vehicle or whether it merely reflected light from the patrol car’s headlamps
and spotlight. Officer Jorgensen testified that license plates are reflective and
that the video did not accurately depict how the suspect vehicle’s license plate
appeared on the night in question. The video also depicted Appellant’s vehicle
making a right-hand turn onto a three-lane freeway access road by driving across
the right-hand and center lanes of the access road and continuing in the left-hand
lane.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his vehicle. The
court carried the motion with the trial and heard arguments on the motion after
Officers Jorgensen and Muse testified. Appellant argued that Officers Jorgensen
and Muse lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic
stop because it appeared from the dashcam video that Appellant’s license plate
was illuminated and that Appellant turned into the right-hand lane before moving
left to the center and left-hand lanes of the freeway access road. Appellant
argued that the officers’ testimony about Appellant failing to turn into the first
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available lane was a pretext for the stop invented after the officers realized the
video showed that Appellant’s license plate was illuminated.
After hearing argument, the trial court made the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the record:
[T]he Court makes the following conclusion regarding the credibility
of the officers. The Court concludes that Officers Jorgensen and
Muse are highly credible. And based upon the testimony and the
evidence, the Court concludes [the] officers possessed a reasonable
articulable suspicion that involved -- and probable cause when they
observed the sedan, operated by the Defendant, be operated
without and not in conformity with Texas Traffic Code --
Transportation Code, Section 547.322(f)(1)(2), which would be for
failing to operate a vehicle with a tail lamp or separate lamp be
constructed emit -- and emit a white light that illuminates the rear
license plate and, (2), makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of
50 feet from the rear.
Now, the Court makes its conclusion based upon the
testimony -- testimony -- based upon the testimony of the officer and
the exhibit that was displayed in State’s Exhibit 10.
Furthermore, a second violation occurred under Texas
Transportation Code, Section 545.101(a), for failure to make a right
turn at an intersection. An operator shall make both the approach
and turn as closely as [practicable] to the right-hand curb or edge of
the roadway.
Thereby, the traffic violations gave the officers the reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop. It later evolved into evading arrest and
detention, which is the subject of the criminal case now pending
before the Court.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion should be and is hereby
denied.
The trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress forms the basis of
Appellant’s points on appeal.
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Discussion
In three points, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress because the search and seizure of evidence from Appellant
and his vehicle violated Appellant’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution; article I, section 9 of the Texas
constitution; and article 38.23 of the code of criminal procedure. See U.S. Const.
amends. IV, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23
(West 2018).
1. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual
review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.
State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000),
modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on
(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts
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was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-
of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). We review a trial court’s determination of historical facts based on a video
recording under the same deferential standard. Montanez, 195 S.W.3d at 109.
But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and
demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions
de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
2. Relevant substantive law
Article 38.23 of the code of criminal procedure provides that “[n]o evidence
obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the
United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on
the trial of any criminal case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a).
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1628 (1963); Villareal v. State, 935
S.W.2d 134, 136 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Article I, section 9 of the Texas
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constitution provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches.” Tex.
Const. art. I, § 9.
A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a “seizure” of the vehicle’s
occupants and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 9 of the Texas constitution. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); State v. Torrez, 490 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d); see Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. Law enforcement
personnel have probable cause to initiate a traffic stop when they see a person
commit a traffic violation. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005). Because reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable
cause, an officer who has probable cause to detain a suspect necessarily has
reasonable suspicion to do so. Rubeck v. State, 61 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).
The transportation code requires that all motor vehicles be equipped with a
lamp “constructed and mounted to emit a white light that: (1) illuminates the rear
license plate; and (2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from
the rear.” Tex. Transp. Code. Ann. § 547.322(f). The transportation code also
requires a driver making a right turn at an intersection to “make both the
approach and the turn as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of
the roadway.” Id. § 545.101(a).
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3. Analysis of trial court’s ruling
After hearing the testimony of Officers Jorgensen and Muse and viewing
the dashcam video, the trial court determined that the officers were “highly
credible.” The court determined that the officers observed Appellant commit two
traffic violations—operating his vehicle without an illuminated license plate and
failing to make a right turn as close as possible to the right-hand edge of the
roadway. Giving these findings of historical fact almost total deference, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
officers witnessed Appellant commit two traffic violations. See Amador, 221
S.W.3d at 673. Applying the law to the facts found by the trial court, the officers
had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop after they observed Appellant commit
the traffic violations. See Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469–70; see also Hughes v.
State, 334 S.W.3d 379, 385 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (“Since we find
there is evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding of a violation of a
traffic law, a wide right turn, there are specific articulable facts upon which to
base a temporary detention of appellant.”); Montanez v. State, 211 S.W.3d 412,
415 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) (holding officer’s testimony that defendant’s
vehicle was operating without an illuminated license plate created lawful basis for
stop; parties disputed whether dashcam video showed a properly illuminated
plate or whether the plate was reflecting the officer’s headlamps).
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We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress. See Gray, 211 S.W.3d at 469–70. We overrule
all three of Appellant’s points.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Appellant’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
BONNIE SUDDERTH
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; MEIER and KERR, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 28, 2018
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