Calvin Jerome Massengale v. State ( 2012 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-11-00474-CR
Calvin Jerome MASSENGALE,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009CR12809B
Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 6, 2012
AFFIRMED
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Calvin
Jerome Massengale’s motion to suppress because statements were obtained from him after his
request for an attorney was not honored by the investigating officer. Because we hold
Massengale’s statement referring to an attorney was not a clear and unequivocal request for an
attorney, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-11-00474-CR
BACKGROUND
During the course of a custodial interrogation involving a capital murder, the following
exchange occurred between Massengale and the investigating officer:
Massengale: I need to find out what y’all are sayin’ and ch… that I’ve done and
how I did it and all this. So, if we’re goin’ — we might as well
just go to the next step. You know what I’m sayin’. ‘Cause that’s,
hat’s, that’s what I want to do.
Officer: And you understand that going to that next step means that you
don’t have the opportunity to talk. Because what we’re gonna do
Massengale: No, I’m sayin’. Okay, what are y’all gonna do?
Officer: — what we’re gonna do is um — when it comes time — ‘cause the
next step is basically trial, alright? That’s kind of what we’re
talking about. So the next step that …
Massengale: So, yeah, I already been charged? Is that what you’re saying?
Officer: Yeah, yeah, you’ve been charged.
Massengale: Yeah. So then, I’m just going to wait and talk to my lawyer then.
Officer: Ok. The problem with that is it — when it comes time for trial,
we’re going to testify that we gave you the opportunity to tell us
what happened because inevitably —
Massengale: I mean can I get my lawyer to talk to y’all?
Officer: Yeah. You can. It’s possible.
Massengale: I mean, so what’d be the difference?
Officer: Well, he won’t talk to us.
Massengale: Yeah.
Officer: What he’ll do is he’ll go —I mean he’s going to wait and he’s
going to talk to the judge and he’s going to talk to the jury. And at
that time your lawyer’s probably gonna tell you something like you
know what we’re gonna say that this happened or this happened.
We’re gonna say it was self-defense. We’re gonna say that – you
know – you were crazy. Whatever the case may be. The problem
is, we’re gonna get up and say we talked to him the day after, the
next day, and he didn’t tell us it was self-defense, he didn’t tell us
he went crazy, he didn’t tell us he was high….
Massengale filed a motion to suppress, asserting that his reference to a lawyer was a
request for an attorney and that the officer violated his constitutional right to counsel by
continuing to question him. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the investigating officer
acknowledged that he and Massengale engaged in a conversation regarding a lawyer. When the
officer was asked his reason for continuing to interrogate Massengale after that conversation, the
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officer responded that whether a defendant has clearly invoked a right to counsel is a legal
determination that he leaves up to the courts. 1 The officer later explained that if he believes a
defendant has clearly invoked his right to counsel, he will cease the interrogation. 2 The trial
court denied the motion to suppress, stating his reasoning on the record as follows:
But as to the rest, and I do think that when one looks at the context and
then really at the case law, that kind of explains what constitutes an unambiguous
and unequivocal request. One of them is kind of close, I think, to the facts on
[sic] this case because it seems like more of a discussion about whether it’s a
good idea to talk now, whether it’s a better idea to wait and go to the next step.
And so because there’s all that discussion about timing and when would be a good
time, and maybe I’ll just talk to my lawyer then.
And so I think the facts and what — you know, whatever the Defendant
was saying in this case, if you look at it — and I did — closely to what he actually
said, and in the context of the discussion prior to what he said, there was really
more of a discussion about timing and how the system works, and whether it
would be better to talk now or wait until later and talk to a lawyer when we take it
to the next step. And that, coupled with the testimony, which I find credible from
[the investigating officer] who just testified that, hey, if it had been unequivocal in
his opinion, he would have stopped. He didn’t perceive it to be a certain and
unambiguous request for an attorney at that time, but it was more ambiguous than
that. So I’m going to rule that those statements made by Calvin Massengale are
— that part of the video is admissible.
Massengale appeals the trial court’s order.
DISCUSSION
If a suspect requests an attorney at any time during a custodial interrogation, the
interrogation must cease and he is not subject to further questioning until an attorney is made
available to him or the suspect himself reinitiates further communication with the police. Davis
1
The officer stated, “In the short amount of time I was over there, I learned that it was better to continue speaking to
an individual and allow the courts to determine whether or not the statement would be admissible or not, especially
in cases where there could be other individuals involved. He may be able to give information on someone else other
than himself, which may be admissible, even though something might — he might say against himself would be
inadmissible. Instead of trying to deal with all those issues there in the room, continue talking, and then let it be
decided among people that do this on a regular basis.”
2
The officer explained, “If he were to have said, I do not want to talk to you anymore until I speak to my attorney,
which I’ve had that happen to me in interrogation rooms, when they make a clear invocation, I have ceased speaking
to them. … A clear indication. It doesn’t have to be verbatim but something that tells me then and there that they
want an attorney, they don’t want to go another step, and I need to stop talking to them, or if they ask me to stop
talking to them.”
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v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994); Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 122 (2011). “To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide
guidance to officer conducting interrogations,” whether the suspect has actually invoked his right
to counsel is an “objective inquiry.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 458-59; see also Davis
v. State, 313 S.W.3d at 339. Invocation of the right to counsel “‘requires, at a minimum, some
statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney.’” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
178 (1991)). “But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in
that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of
questioning.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Rather the suspect must unambiguously request
counsel.” Id. A suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly
that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a
request for an attorney.” Id. “If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity,” the law
“does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect.” Id.
The rule as stated “provides a bright line rule that can be applied by officers in the real
world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the gathering of
information.” Id. at 461. “But if we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a
statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be
lost.” Id. “Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the
suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if
they guess wrong.” Id. Accordingly, “law enforcement officers may continue questioning until
and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that a suspect’s statement “Maybe I should
talk to a lawyer” was not a request for an attorney. Id. at 462. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has held that a suspect’s statement “I should have an attorney” was not in the form of a
request or an express statement that the suspect wanted a lawyer. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d at
341. Similarly, given the context in which Massengale made references to a lawyer in this case,
we hold that “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would [not] understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 459; see also
Jernigan v. State, No. 06-10-00221-CR, 2011 WL 4954168, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct.
19, 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding suspect’s questions “Do I need to get a lawyer?” and “Can I talk to
one first?” did not clearly request an attorney).
CONCLUSION
Because Massengale did not clearly request an attorney, the questioning was permitted to
continue, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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