Ralph Woodward v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00519-CR
RALPH WOODWARD APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1218737D
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
----------
Appellant Ralph Woodward appeals the revocation of his deferred
adjudication community supervision for burglary of a habitation, his conviction,
and his twenty-five-year sentence as a habitual offender. 2 Appellant concedes
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2014), § 30.02(a)(1),
(3), (c)(2) (West 2011).
that he violated a condition of community supervision but argues that, although a
trial court may grant a petition to adjudicate, adjudicate guilt, revoke community
supervision, and sentence a person to confinement, the trial court should not
have done so in this case because options were available that better fit the
preferred goal of a continuum of sanctions. We affirm.
We review an order revoking deferred adjudication community supervision
and adjudicating guilt under an abuse of discretion standard. 3 In a revocation
proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision. 4 Proof by
a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged violations of the
conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order. 5
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community supervision and adjudicating his
guilt. Appellant initially entered a plea of true to the allegation that he violated the
terms and conditions of community supervision by failing to complete the
Substance Abuse Felony Punishment (SAFP) program but then withdrew the
3
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2014); Rickels
v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665
S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Cantu v. State, 339 S.W.3d 688, 691
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.).
4
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
5
Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980);
Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
2
plea and entered a plea of not true. Appellant took the stand, however, and
admitted to the violation alleged. His testimony, along with the testimony of the
State’s witness, provided proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the
violation. 6 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
Appellant’s community supervision and proceeding to adjudication of guilt.
Appellant forfeited his sentencing complaint by not raising it on allocution
or in his motion for new trial. 7 But as the State points out, the sentence that the
trial court imposed—twenty-five years’ confinement—is the minimum sentence
permitted by law for burglary of a habitation with two prior sequential felony
convictions. 8
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
6
Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871.
7
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07 (West 2006); Hicks v. State,
415 S.W.3d 587, 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, no pet.).
8
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(d), 30.02(a)(1), (3), (c)(2).
3
/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 20, 2014
4