Winnsboro Auto Ventures, LLC v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ( 2018 )

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 19, 2018.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00895-CV
WINNSBORO AUTO VENTURES, LLC, Appellant
V.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15149
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Myers, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Winnsboro Auto Ventures, LLC (Winnsboro) appeals the trial court’s order denying its
special appearance in a suit instituted by Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (Santander) in Dallas
County. In two issues, Winnsboro argues it has insufficient contacts with Texas to support
jurisdiction in this case. We conclude that Winnsboro has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas
to support specific jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction over Winnsboro does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
order denying Winnsboro’s special appearance and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because the dispositive issues in this case are settled in
law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute between Santander, an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business and headquarters in Dallas County, Texas, and automobile dealership
Winnsboro, a Louisiana corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana. Santander
is in the business of purchasing automobile retail installment sales contracts from dealers like
Winnsboro. On or about April 16, 2014, Winnsboro and Santander entered into a Non–Recourse
Master Dealer Agreement (Agreement) whereby Winnsboro was entitled, but not obligated, to sell
automobile retail installment sales contracts to Santander.
Under the Agreement, Winnsboro had the option of submitting a proposal, including terms
and conditions, under which it would consider selling and assigning an installment sales contract
to Santander. After reviewing Winnsboro’s proposed terms and conditions and the applicable loan
documentation, Santander could elect to purchase the installment sales contract. Winnsboro,
however, controlled final approval of the sale, and could refuse the transaction notwithstanding
Santander’s agreement to purchase the installment sales contract. The Agreement had no specified
term, and was to be governed by and construed in accordance with Texas law. Winnsboro agreed
to indemnify Santander in the event of claims arising out of Winnsboro’s breach of or conduct
under the Agreement or the installment sales contracts.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Winnsboro solicited and sold numerous installment sales
contracts to Santander. This lawsuit arises out of Winnsboro’s alleged breach of the Agreement
as it relates to one installment sales contract arising from a vehicle Winnsboro sold (and Santander
financed) with a value of $33,165.33 (the “Contract”). Specifically, Santander alleges Winnsboro
breached the Agreement by failing to repurchase the Contract after it misrepresented the condition
of the vehicle and the equipment options included therewith, which resulted in the purchaser
returning the vehicle and demanding a refund. Santander obtained a no-answer default judgment
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against Winnsboro. Thereafter, Winnsboro filed a special appearance and moved for a new trial
subject to its special appearance.
Winnsboro supported its special appearance with the affidavit of Brett Oubre, Winnsboro’s
president and manager, generally disavowing having done business in Texas, and detailing the
nature of Winnsboro’s business. Santander responded by presenting the affidavit of Benny Cherry,
the Vice President–Dealer Operations for Santander (the Cherry Affidavit). The Cherry Affidavit
states, in pertinent part, that Santander’s corporate headquarters is in Dallas, Texas, and describes
the formation of the Agreement, the parties’ relationship under the Agreement, the procedures for
executing the Agreement, and Winnsboro’s solicitation and sale to Santander of 736 separate retail
installment contracts, including the Contract. Attached to the Cherry Affidavit was a copy of the
fully executed Agreement and a copy of the retail installment sales contract at issue in this case.
The trial court denied Winnsboro’s special appearance and ordered a new trial. This interlocutory
appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2016).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question
of law. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 790-91 (Tex. 2005).
Consequently, we review a trial court’s determination of a special appearance de novo. Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). If, as is the case here,
the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance
ruling, we imply all findings of fact necessary to support its ruling that are supported by the
evidence. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); Lewis v.
Indian Springs Land Corp., 175 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). In this case,
the trial court impliedly found the Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over
Winnsboro, Winnsboro established purposeful “minimum contacts” with the forum state, and that
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the exercise of jurisdiction over Winnsboro comports with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”
DISCUSSION
I. Personal Jurisdiction
In its first issue, Winnsboro argues it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. Texas
courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “when the state’s long-arm
statute authorizes such jurisdiction and its exercise comports with due process.” Cornerstone
Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, L.P., 493 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. 2016). The
Texas long-arm statute allows jurisdiction over a nonresident that does business in Texas. TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 2015). Among other acts, the Texas long-arm
statute provides that contracting with a “Texas resident,” where either party is to perform the
contract in whole or in part in Texas, constitutes “doing business” in this state. Id. (emphasis
added); Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574.
Winnsboro urges that because Santander is an Illinois Corporation it is not a Texas resident
entitled to utilize the long-arm statute to sue Winnsboro in Texas. While the long-arm statute gives
examples of actions that constitute doing business in the state, including contracting with a “Texas
resident” under stated circumstances, the statute does not define the term “Texas resident.”
Winnsboro does not cite any language in the statute or case law holding a corporation based in
Texas but incorporated under another state’s laws, such as Santander, cannot be a resident of
Texas. Rather, Winnsboro seizes on the long-arm statute’s definition of “nonresident,” for
purposes of describing defendant’s within its reach, as including a foreign corporation, which it
would then apply to the statute’s reference to the act of contracting with a Texas resident. It also
points us to the Texas Business Organizations Code and its definition of “foreign entity” as “an
organization formed under, and the internal affairs of which are governed by, the laws of a
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jurisdiction other than this state.” Borrowing from that definition, Winnsboro urges that Santander
is not a “Texas resident” and, thus, cannot rely on the long-arm statute to establish jurisdiction in
this case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041(2); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §
1.002(28) (West Supp. 2017). We disagree with Winnsboro.
The long-arm statute’s definition of “nonresident” is addressed to the power of Texas
courts to effect service of process, not who may sue. Its reference to nonresident defendants within
its reach is a truistic necessity to reflect the reality that long-arm service is not needed to obtain
service over a defendant who is physically present in the state. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 619 (1990). In defining the term “doing business” in Texas to include a nonresident
corporation, the statute permits jurisdiction over corporate defendants who are neither incorporated
nor based in this state, as one would expect. It is silent as to who may file suit and invoke the
court’s long-arm power. No language in the statute, and no logical rationale, would support the
conclusion that the legislature meant to exclude corporations maintaining their principal place of
business here, despite being incorporated under a different law, from invoking the court’s long-
arm power.1 The Texas legislature was presumably aware of the treatment of corporate residents
and citizens in the federal laws when it enacted the long-arm statute and intended that the term
“resident” include corporations based or incorporated here and that they be within its reach.2
For the foregoing reasons, Winnsboro’s attempt to utilize the long-arm’s definition of
“nonresident” to limit who is a “Texas resident” for purposes of invoking—rather than resisting—
the court’s power, is unavailing and would have the practical effect of precluding all businesses
1
Winnsboro’s interpretation of the long-arm statute would preclude third-party practice and the efficiencies afforded thereby in many cases.
For example, under Winnsboro’s construction a dispute among three corporations that are parties to a single transaction that are located in Texas
but are incorporated in states outside of Texas would have to resolve their dispute elsewhere and possibly in several cases. Winnsboro’s “Texas
resident” argument misses the mark and the focus of a court’s jurisdictional inquiry.
2
When construing a statute, courts presume that the legislature was aware of the background law and acted with reference to it. Jasek v.
Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Serv., 348 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2011).
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who are located in this state, but incorporated elsewhere, from having access to Texas courts, and
would obviate access to relief otherwise afforded to individuals giving rise to a host of avoidable
constitutional concerns.3 HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288, 290 n.4 (Tex. 1994) (corporation
is an individual entitled to constitutional protection). In addition, the definitions in section 1.002
of the business organizations code, including the definition of “foreign entity” upon which
Winnsboro relies, are expressly limited in their application to that code, and, thus, do not inform
our analysis here. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002. Applying the proper standard, we
conclude jurisdiction is invoked in this case under the long-arm statute because the parties’
Agreement is to be performed, at least in part, in Texas by Winnsboro submitting sales proposals
and documentation to Santander and Santander reviewing same in Texas. Having determined a
basis for jurisdiction over Winnsboro exists, we now consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over Winnsboro is consistent with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process.
Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990).
A. Due-Process Guarantees
Constitutional due-process guarantees are satisfied when (1) the nonresident defendant has
established “minimum contacts” with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added). Minimum contacts are established when
a defendant “purposefully avails” itself of the privilege of conducting activity in the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474–76 (1985) (emphasis added). There are three aspects of purposeful availment applicable
to the minimum contacts analysis. First, it is only the defendant’s contacts with the forum that
3
Depriving only corporations of the right to make full use of our courts would be problematic on multiple state and federal constitutional
grounds. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)) (constitutional avoidance); Nat’l Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1972, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
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count. Id. at 475. Second, the acts relied on must be “purposeful” rather than fortuitous. Id.
Third, a defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by “availing” itself of the
jurisdiction. Id.
First, in determining whether Winnsboro purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business in the state of Texas, we consider only Winnsboro’s contacts with the state.
Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. The evidence shows Winnsboro repeatedly solicited Santander to
purchase automobile retail installment sales contracts, including the Contract at issue in this
lawsuit, in Texas over a period of years, and that the individual transactions were primarily in
Winnsboro’s control because it established the terms and conditions of sale, and retained the right
of final approval. Indeed, by its terms, the Agreement requires that the sale of each installment
sales contract begins and ends with Winnsboro. As required, for each individual contract,
Winnsboro forwarded its proposed terms and conditions and all contractually required
information, including customer credit-related information, to Santander’s offices in Texas. Thus,
the transactions under the Agreement were not the result of Santander’s unilateral acts.
Second, we consider whether Winnsboro’s contacts with Texas were purposeful rather than
fortuitous. Winnsboro relies on the supreme court’s decision in Searcy to argue its contacts with
Texas were not purposeful, but were merely fortuitous. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58
(Tex. 2016). Winnsboro’s reliance on Searcy is misplaced. In that case, a Bermudian company,
located in Houston, Texas, as the sole shareholder of another Bermudian company that owned
Columbian oil and gas operations, initially entered into a share purchase agreement with a Texas
entity. That deal fell apart, and the Bermudian company solicited other purchasers. A Canadian
company pursued the shares and the Texas entity sued both the Bermudian company and the
Canadian company for tortious interference with the contract it entered into with the Bermudian
company. In that case, the supreme court concluded Texas courts lacked specific jurisdiction over
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the Canadian company, but could validly exercise jurisdiction over the Bermudian company. In
doing so, the court noted the Canadian Company’s communications with the Bermudian
company’s representatives, who were located in Texas, was fortuitous, rather than purposeful. In
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized the Canadian company did not specifically seek out
a Texas seller or Texas assets, let alone attempt to meddle with a contract governed by Texas law
or develop a Texas business. Id. at 73. It was, instead, on the hunt for Colombian assets, and the
Bermudian company happened to own some. Here, Santander’s business and assets were located
in Texas and Winnsboro contracted to obtain the benefits of same and Texas law. Thus, Searcy is
distinguishable from this case and does not guide us in determining whether Winnsboro’s contacts
with Texas were purposeful.
The supreme court has stated that the contacts of “[s]ellers who ‘reach out beyond one state
and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state’ ” are purposeful
rather than fortuitous. Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Winnsboro voluntarily entered into the Agreement with Santander
whereby it created a continuing relationship and obligations with a resident of Texas. Pursuant to
that Agreement, Winnsboro had the option to solicit Santander for the purpose of selling its retail
installment agreements. Under these circumstances, we conclude Winnsboro’s contacts with the
state were purposeful rather than fortuitous. See DJRD, LLC v. SKOPOS Financial, LLC, No. 05-
16-00072-CV, 2016 WL 3912769, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas, July 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Colmen LLC v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., No. 05-17-00101-CV, 2017 WL 5022700, at *8
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Finally, we consider whether Winnsboro sought and obtained some benefit or profit from
conducting business with a Texas resident. The stream of commerce Winnsboro tapped into was
significant. As noted, Winnsboro sold and assigned 736 retail installment sales contracts valued
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in excess of $19 million to Santander. In addition, pursuant to the parties’ Agreement, the
relationship was to be governed by Texas law. By entering into an open-ended Agreement that
expressly provides that Texas law governs its relationship with Santander, had Santander reneged
on any of its agreements to pay Winnsboro for an installment contract, Winnsboro had the
contractually assured right to invoke Texas law and a Texas remedy. For the foregoing reasons,
we conclude that Winnsboro sought and obtained benefits from doing business in Texas.
We conclude Winnsboro has sufficient purposeful contact with Texas to satisfy the first
prong of jurisdictional due process.
B. Specific or General Jurisdiction
In order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, its contacts with a forum
must give rise to either specific or general jurisdiction. Retamco Operating v. Republic Drilling
Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009). On appeal, the parties restrict their arguments to the
existence of specific jurisdiction. When specific jurisdiction is alleged, we focus the minimum-
contacts analysis on the “relationship among the defendant, the forum[,] and the litigation.”
Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.
1991) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). In order
for a nonresident defendant’s forum contacts to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction, there
must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.
See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585 (citing Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 229–33. We find this
Court’s decisions in SKOPOS and Colmen to be instructive in this case. See SKOPOS, 2016 WL
3912769; Colmen, 2017 WL 5022700.
The SKOPOS case involved an agreement between DJRD, d/b/a Darcars, and SKOPOS
Financial, whereby Darcars solicited SKOPOS’s purchase of retail installment sales contracts. The
agreement specifically provided that, if Darcars failed to collect the down payment in full prior to
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SKOPOS’s purchase of the contract, the contract would be subject to immediate repurchase.
SKOPOS alleged Darcars failed to collect the down payment from the purchaser of a 2014 Toyota
Camry and refused to repurchase the contract. By its lawsuit, SKOPOS sought to recover the
damages it suffered due to Darcars’s alleged failure to repurchase the installment sales contract as
promised. We concluded in SKOPOS, that there was a connection between SKOPOS’s breach of
contract claim and Darcars’s contacts with Texas. SKOPOS, 2016 WL 3912769, at *4.
The Colmen case involved an agreement between Colman and Santander, whereby
Colman solicited Santander’s purchase of retail installment sales contracts. Pursuant to the
agreement, Colmen represented and warranted that, for each contract sold and assigned to
Santander, the customer identity, employment, income and other credit information provided to
Santander is true and accurate. Santander maintained that Colmen breached the agreement by
misrepresenting retail customers’ income, employment, and credit or identifying information
relating to installment sales contracts it sold to Santander, thereby obligating Colmen to repurchase
those contracts. We concluded in Colmen, that there was a substantial connection between
Santander’s breach of contract claim and Colmen’s contacts with Texas. Colmen, 2017 WL
5022700, at *9.
Here, Winnsboro solicited Santander’s purchase of the Contract. Pursuant to the
Agreement, Winnsboro represented that there were no defenses available to the purchaser that
would impair the validity, enforceability, collectability, value, or marketability of the Contract and
that the vehicle and all of the options thereto were accurately described in the Contract. Santander
alleges Winnsboro misrepresented the condition of the vehicle that is the subject of the Contract
by failing to disclose significant structural damage and by representing the vehicle had equipment
options it did not contain. Santander contends that due to the breach of Winnsboro’s warranties
as described above, Winnsboro is required by the terms of the Agreement to repurchase the
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Contract and/or to pay Santander the current payoff amount of the Contract, and refuses to do so.
By its lawsuit, Santander seeks to recover the damages it suffered due to Winnsboro’s alleged
breach of the Agreement. Under these circumstances, we conclude there is a connection between
Santander’s breach of contract claim and Winnsboro’s contacts with Texas.
Winnsboro’s contacts with Texas support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we overrule Winnsboro’s first issue.
C. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
In its second issue, Winnsboro argues the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Fair play and substantial justice
should be considered in relation to (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the interests of the forum
state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social
policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. “When a nonresident defendant has purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum state, it will be only a rare case when the exercise
of jurisdiction does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Lombardo v. Bhattacharyya, 437 S.W.3d 658, 675 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). In a
special appearance, a defendant bears the burden of presenting “a compelling case that the presence
of some consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
Despite this burden, Winnsboro presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that
the exercise of jurisdiction over it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Winnsboro urges (1) the burden on Winnsboro to defend this case in Texas is substantially
high because all of the evidence, including witnesses, are located in Louisiana, (2) Texas’s interest
in the dispute is relatively low based on Winnsboro’s contention that Santander is not a Texas
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resident, and (3) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies would best be served in Louisiana because Santander, if successful, will have to
domesticate a judgment there.
1. Undue burden on nonresident defendant
Winnsboro argues it is unduly burdensome for it to defend this suit in Texas because all of
the potential witnesses related to the case are located in Louisiana, including the company that sold
the vehicle at issue to Winnsboro. While subjecting Winnsboro to suit in Texas certainly imposes
a burden on it, the same can be said of all litigants, resident and nonresident alike. Indeed, it is
inevitable that someone will have to travel to resolve contract disputes between citizens of different
states whenever they contract. See MedCost L.L.C. v. Loiseau, 166 S.W.3d 421, 442 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, no pet.) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (“Travel required by a corporate defendant and its
employee witnesses to the forum does not constitute a substantial burden or undue hardship as to
violate the Due Process Clause if the defendant has purposefully availed itself of that forum.”).
Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in impliedly finding this consideration weighs in
favor of jurisdiction in this case.
2. Interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute
The dispute in this case concerns Winnsboro’s sale of the Contract to Santander and the
Agreement between the parties. Because, contrary to Winnsboro’s assertion, this dispute involves
a Texas resident, Texas courts have a substantial interest in adjudicating the claims. Lewis v.
Indian Springs Land Corp., 175 S.W.3d 906, 919 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, no pet.). Moreover,
Texas has a manifest interest in ensuring “a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by
out-of-state actors.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473. Furthermore, Texas has an interest in
adjudicating the dispute because the laws of Texas will apply to the contract’s interpretation.
Billingsley Parts & Equip., Inc. v. Vose, 881 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
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1994, writ denied). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in impliedly finding this
consideration weighs in favor of jurisdiction in this case.
3. Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief
As a Texas resident, Santander’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief weigh
in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. Royal American Const. Co. v. Comerica Bank, 164 S.W.3d
466, 470 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). As to Winnsboro’s assertion that Santander will have
to domesticate a judgment in Louisiana to collect thereon, Winnsboro has presented no evidence
establishing it has no assets in Texas, and domesticating a judgment is generally not a complicated
process. Moreover, the convenience of obtaining a judgment in Texas in this case outweighs any
concern over enforcement in another state. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in
impliedly finding this consideration weighs in favor of jurisdiction in this case.
4. The interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies
In order to overcome the interstate interest in litigating in Texas, Winnsboro must make a
compelling case as to why jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. at 477. Santander will have
witnesses located in Texas and Winnsboro will have witnesses in Louisiana. Winnsboro’s claim
that it has witnesses in Louisiana is not compelling enough to create the possibility of more
efficient resolution. The inconvenience to the parties and to the non-party witnesses is minimal
because the parties can depose the non-party witnesses and those witnesses cannot be compelled
to appear for deposition more than 150 miles from the county in which they reside. TEX. R. CIV.
P. 176.3. Moreover, because the parties chose Texas law to govern their agreement, other states,
including Louisiana, would be burdened with the obligation to learn and apply Texas law to resolve
this case. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in impliedly finding this consideration
weighs in favor of jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated above, Winnsboro has failed to present a compelling case as to why
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jurisdiction in Texas does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
We overrule Winnsboro’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Because the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over Winnsboro, because Winnsboro’s
contacts with Texas were direct and purposeful, because Santander’s claim arises out of
Winnsboro’s contacts with Texas, and because jurisdiction over Winnsboro comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the trial court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over Winnsboro. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Winnsboro’s
special appearance and remand this case to the trial court for further proceeding consistent with
this opinion.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE
170895F.P05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
WINNSBORO AUTO VENTURES, LLC, On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District
Appellant Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-15149.
No. 05-17-00895-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck.
Justices Bridges and Myers participating.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,
Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order denying
WINNSBORO AUTO VENTURES, LLC’S special appearance is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. recover its costs
of this appeal from appellant WINNSBORO AUTO VENTURES, LLC.
Judgment entered this 19th day of April, 2018.
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