Stephen Davis v. State ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00109-CR
STEPHEN DAVIS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. F15-2152-16
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Stephen Davis appeals his conviction and his twenty-five-year
sentence for intoxication assault.2 We affirm.
A grand jury indicted Davis for intoxication assault. The indictment alleged
that while operating a car in a public place while intoxicated, he had crashed into
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07(a) (West 2011).
a woman’s car and had caused her serious bodily injury. For sentence-
enhancement purposes, the indictment also alleged that he had two prior felony
convictions.
At a jury trial, Davis pleaded not guilty. After considering the parties’
evidence and arguments, the jury found him guilty. The jury also found that he
had used a deadly weapon—the car—while committing the offense. After
hearing more evidence and arguments concerning Davis’s punishment, the jury
assessed twenty-five years’ confinement.3 The trial court sentenced him
accordingly, and he brought this appeal.
Davis’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a
brief under Anders v. California, representing that “any appeal . . . would be
wholly frivolous.” 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s
brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds
for relief. See id.; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App.
3
Davis pleaded true to the indictment’s sentence-enhancement allegations.
His pleas of true, standing alone, were sufficient to support the enhancement of
his sentencing range. See Wilson v. State, 671 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); see also Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(reciting the general rule “that a plea of true to an enhancement paragraph
relieves the State of its burden to prove a prior conviction alleged for
enhancement and forfeits the defendant’s right to appeal the insufficiency of
evidence to prove the prior conviction”). With Davis’s two prior felony
convictions, the minimum sentence in the enhanced range was twenty-five years,
which is the punishment that the jury assessed. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2017).
2
2008) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders). We gave Davis an
opportunity to file a pro se response to counsel’s brief, and he did so. The State
has not filed a brief.
Once an appellant's court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
must independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Davis’s pro se
response. We agree with counsel that this appeal is frivolous and without merit;
we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also
Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
WADE BIRDWELL
JUSTICE
PANEL: KERR, PITTMAN, and BIRDWELL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 12, 2018
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