in the Interest of N.R., a Child ( 2022 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-22-00115-CV
    ___________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF N.R., A CHILD
    On Appeal from the 360th District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 360-699434-21
    Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Appellant G.R. (Mother) appeals a judgment terminating her parent–child
    relationship with her daughter, N.R.1 The trial court found that the Department of
    Family and Protective Services had proved four conduct-based grounds for
    termination and that termination was in N.R.’s best interest. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), (2). The trial court awarded permanent managing
    conservatorship of N.R. to the Department. Mother timely appealed.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief asserting that no “legally
    non-frivolous grounds for appeal” exist and that Mother’s appeal is therefore
    frivolous. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744–45, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 1400 (1967);
    see also In re K.M., 
    98 S.W.3d 774
    , 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
    (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). Counsel’s
    brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the
    record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
    We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record
    and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so. The Department has agreed that
    1
    N.R.’s parent–child relationship with her unknown father was also terminated,
    but no appeal was filed on his behalf.
    2
    no meritorious grounds for appeal exist and thus has declined to file a responsive
    brief.
    III. DISCUSSION
    When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate
    record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-
    00219-CV, 
    2018 WL 4496240
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)
    (mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also
    consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-
    18-00073-CV, 
    2018 WL 3288591
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.
    denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
    (orig. proceeding).
    As part of our independent review of the record, we noted that no Native
    American tribe is listed or identified anywhere in the appellate record filed with this
    court. However, we questioned whether the trial court had made an express finding
    on the record that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to this
    proceeding and whether the entire appellate record had been filed. 
    25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901
    –63. In response to our order, the trial judge signed findings indicating that
    (a) the appellate record filed in this court is complete and (b) although the trial judge
    did not make an express finding on the record, the evidence in the appellate record
    supports an implied finding that ICWA does not apply to these proceedings.
    3
    We have carefully reviewed not only these written findings, but also appointed
    appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the appellate record. Having found no reversible
    error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State,
    
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 
    279 S.W.3d 849
    , 850 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
    terminating the parent–child relationship between Mother and N.R.
    Counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme
    court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance with
    Family Code Section 107.016. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016
    ; In re P.M.,
    
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Dana Womack
    Dana Womack
    Justice
    Delivered: September 16, 2022
    4