Brian Steer v. State ( 2013 )

NUMBER 13-11-00758-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
BRIAN STEER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
A jury convicted appellant Brian Steer of one count of aggravated robbery and two
counts of burglary of a habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.03, 30.02 (West
2011). After Steer pleaded true to two prior felonies, the trial court assessed his
punishment at seventy-five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. By two issues, Steer complains that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his motions for mistrial.1 We affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for
mistrial and motion for new trial using an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling and uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court, but rather we decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion
for new trial [or a motion for mistrial] only when no reasonable view of the
record could support the trial court's ruling. Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d
204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in "extreme circumstances" for a
narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Hawkins v. State,
135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642,
648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A mistrial halts trial proceedings when error is
so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be
wasteful and futile. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Whether an error requires a mistrial must be determined by the
particular facts of the case. Id.
....
Because it is an extreme remedy, a mistrial should be granted "only
when residual prejudice remains" after less drastic alternatives are
explored. Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Less drastic alternatives include instructing the jury "to consider as
evidence only the testimony and exhibits admitted through witnesses on the
stand," and, questioning the jury "about the extent of any prejudice," if
1
Steer also filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled as a matter of law. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 21.8(c) (providing that a motion for new trial is deemed denied when it is not ruled on by written order
within seventy-five days of imposition of the sentence). In that motion, Steer identified the same issues he
raised in his motions for mistrial. However, Steer framed his appellate issues as challenges to the trial
court’s denial of his motions for mistrial, and we will address them as such. See Webb v. State, 232
S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (explaining that the denial of a motion for mistrial and a denial of a
motion for new trial are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard); Cueva v. State, 39 S.W.3d 839,
856 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011, pet. ref’d) (same).
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instructions alone do not sufficiently cure the problem. Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 521–22 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). Though
requesting lesser remedies is not a prerequisite to a motion for mistrial,
when the movant does not first request a lesser remedy, we will not reverse
the court's judgment if the problem could have been cured by the less
drastic alternative. Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004); see also Wood, 18 S.W.3d at 648 (concluding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for mistrial when
the appellant had not requested the less drastic remedy of a continuance).
Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884–85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Brewer v. State, 367
S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In other words, “[a]n appellant who moves for
a mistrial without first requesting a less drastic alternative forfeits appellate review of that
class of events that could have been cured by the lesser remedy.” Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at
886–87 (citing Barnett, 161 S.W.3d at 134; Young, 137 S.W.3d at 70).
II. DISCUSSION2
A. The State’s File
By his first issue, Steer complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor displayed his case file before the jury.
A red label with the words “REPEAT OFFENDER” appeared on the side of the file. Steer
argues that his substantial rights were affected by the denial and that the error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Steer asks
this Court, in the interest of justice, to grant a new trial, which should “proceed in
accordance with the suggested and necessary policy change within the Nueces County
District Attorney’s office that all repeat offender labels be removed from the prosecutor’s
file prior to any jury trial.”
2
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for
it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
3
Shortly before noon on the first day of trial, during the second witness’s testimony,
the following colloquy occurred outside the presence of the jury:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The prosecutor has a folder with my
client’s name on it. It’s a manila folder.
It’s legal size. And at the bottom of the
folder, there’s a red—a red stripe all the
way across it, probably about an inch and
a half high, and I would say in
three-quarter inch letters, it says,
“Repeat—“
THE COURT: Repeat offender.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: “Repeat offender,” in bold, black
lettering. The prosecutor in the
courtroom is sitting probably about two
feet from the last juror member.
THE COURT: I think it’s—I think the file is about three
or four, but nevertheless, relatively close.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And the jury, to get to the jury room, they
have to exit the seats that they’re in and
walk right past the prosecutor’s desk and
with that folder that says “Repeat
Offender” on it right next to them and
then into the room.
At this time, Your Honor, I would object
that that—when the jury is walking by, if
they’re looking at it, then it will introduce
into evidence character evidence; and at
this time, we would request a mistrial on
that.
THE COURT: Okay. . . .
THE STATE: Judge, the file in question, I would—I
haven’t measured in terms of the stripe
that [Defense Counsel] is referring to or
the lettering on it. Certainly, his client’s
name is handwritten in ink in a
smaller—smaller font on the file.
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The—the positioning of this particular
file, I think is undisputed was the lettering
on a—on a smaller part of the file that is
positioned away and to the side of the
jury, and I do not think—and also that file
was out for a very limited portion of this
morning’s testimony; but with that said, I
would agree that that file was out at some
point and it is now—the file is in my—my
briefcase, and the—and should it come
out again, the lettering has been taken
off of that file; and I do not think—I do not
think the jury saw that.
I mean, if that was to be developed, I
suppose we could find that out, but I do
not believe that to be the case. I do not
believe that they did see a red stripe that
they would know what that means. I do
not believe they were in a position from
where they were seated to—I believe
they weren’t in a position from where
they were seated to see what the
lettering contained.
....
THE COURT: All right, [the motion for mistrial] is denied
at this time.
Evidence referring to or implying extraneous offenses committed by the defendant
may be rendered harmless by an instruction to disregard. Coe v. State, 683 S.W.2d 431,
436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Steer did not request a curative instruction before moving
for a mistrial. This decision forfeited his appellate relief because any error could have
been cured by an instruction. See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885; see also Brewer, 367
S.W.3d at 253. Less drastic alternatives were available, either by instructing the jury to
consider as evidence only the testimony and exhibits admitted through witnesses on the
stand or by questioning the jury about the extent of any prejudice, if instructions alone do
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not sufficiently cure the problem. See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885. We will not reverse
the trial court’s ruling on the motion for mistrial because a less drastic remedy could have
cured the problem. See id. We, thus, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying this motion for mistrial. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112. We
overrule Steer’s first issue.
B. Steer’s Post-Arrest Silence
By his second issue, Steer asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for mistrial after a State’s witness, Detective Victor Trujillo, allegedly commented on his
post-arrest silence in violation of the court’s pre-trial order and Steer’s Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. Steer contends that the State attempted to elicit inadmissible
testimony by calling an investigator for the mere purpose of showing the jury that the
defendant had refused to give a statement, in violation of the court’s pre-trial order.
Detective Trujillo testified that he was assigned to investigate this case. His first
step would have been to “review the report, the elements of the crime, determine who [he
needed] to speak to first, or what [he needed] to do.” Detective Trujillo explained that “in
this case after reviewing the facts and speaking to the witnesses[, he] contacted [Steer].”
Following this testimony and outside the presence of the jury, Steer’s counsel
informed the trial court that he anticipated that the evidence was going to show that this
detective talked to Steer in jail and that Steer invoked his Fifth Amendment right at that
time. The trial court commented, “Well, he hasn’t gotten that far yet.” Steer’s counsel
urged that “[e]ven calling someone to say that they went to speak to someone” violated
that person’s “right to remain silent” and even “[i]f [the detective] doesn’t say what
happened next, the next logical inference is that Mr. Steer didn’t talk to him.” The trial
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court replied, “You’re going to have to show me some case law on that . . . .” Steer’s
counsel requested an instruction “[t]o disregard the last statement of the detective,” and
the trial court instructed the jury to “disregard that last answer from the detective.”
Steer’s counsel also moved for a mistrial. However, the trial court did not rule on this
motion. Instead, it said,
Well, I’ll carry it but you got to show me that you’re entitled to it. . . . I don’t
think that you’re entitled to it at this point but you might be able to find a case
that says otherwise. . . . I mean, you can have time to research that
tonight. I don’t have to make a decision right this minute but we got a jury
in the box, we got a witness sitting here . . . .
Although the trial court provided Steer’s counsel with an opportunity to research the
matter, Steer did not reurge this motion.
After both sides rested and closed, Steer’s counsel did move for a mistrial, but this
time the motion was based on the “cumulative error” of the presence of the prosecutor’s
file and the detective’s testimony. The trial court denied this motion.
On appeal, Steer suggests that the trial court overruled his motion for mistrial that
challenged Detective Trujillo’s testimony. We disagree. It is clear from the record that
the trial court did not rule on Steer’s motion for mistrial based only on the detective’s
testimony.
“To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must make a
timely, specific request that the trial court refuses.” Brewer, 367 S.W.3d at 253; see TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. The error alleged on appeal must comport with the complaint submitted
to the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537
(Tex. Crim. App.) (“The legal basis of a complaint raised on appeal cannot vary from that
raised at trial.”). Steer did not preserve error because the trial court did not rule on his
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request for a mistrial following the detective’s challenged testimony. See Brewer, 367
S.W.3d at 253. And Steer’s “cumulative-error” motion at the conclusion of the evidence
was not a timely request and did not comport with the issue before us. See id.
Even assuming that the trial court denied this motion for mistrial and Steer
preserved error, we presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction to disregard
the challenged testimony. See Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) ("When objectionable testimony is elicited,
inadvertently or deliberately, an appellate court presumes the jury will follow instructions
to disregard the evidence.") (quoting Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 696 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (en banc)). On this basis, then, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying this motion for mistrial. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112.
We overrule Steer’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
16th day of May, 2013.
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