texas-commission-on-environmental-quality-guadalupe-blanco-river ( 2008 )


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  •                           NUMBER 13-06-00326-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    TEXAS COMMISSION ON
    ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
    GUADALUPE-BLANCO RIVER
    AUTHORITY, SAN ANTONIO RIVER
    AUTHORITY, AND SAN ANTONIO                                          Appellants/
    WATER SYSTEM,                                                  cross-appellees,
    v.
    SAN MARCOS RIVER FOUNDATION,                                          Appellee/
    cross-appellant.
    On appeal from the 261st District Court
    of Travis County, Texas.
    OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
    Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellants/cross-appellees, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (the
    “Commission”), San Antonio Water System, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, and San
    Antonio River Authority, appeal from a judgment wherein the trial court reversed the
    Commission’s denial of a water permit application that was filed by the San Marcos River
    Foundation (the “Foundation”), appellee/cross-appellant, and remanded the application to
    the Commission for a contested administrative hearing.1 By three issues, appellants/cross-
    appellees contend that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) the Commission had
    jurisdiction to entertain the Foundation’s application, (2) setting aside the Commission’s
    denial order, and (3) ordering that the Foundation had a right to a contested administrative
    hearing. The Foundation, by a single issue, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of its
    declaratory judgment action. We reverse and render a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On July 10, 2000, the Foundation filed a permit application with the Commission
    requesting an appropriation of approximately 1.3 million acre-feet of water in the
    Guadalupe River Basin for non-consumptive instream use and freshwater inflows into the
    Guadalupe/San Antonio bay and estuary system.                            The Foundation tendered the
    appropriate application fee, and on December 21, 2000, the executive director of the
    Commission declared the Foundation’s application administratively complete. On July 23,
    2001, notice of the Foundation’s application was issued to all parties within the Guadalupe
    River Basin so that they could provide comments to the Commission.
    In August 2001, San Antonio Water System, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, and
    San Antonio River Authority responded to the public notice by filing with the Commission
    motions for a contested-case hearing, wherein they sought the denial or dismissal of the
    Foundation’s application. Thereafter, the executive director conducted a technical review
    1
    This appeal involves five parties: (1) the Com m ission, a state agency that is responsible for
    im plem enting the constitution and laws of Texas relating to the conservation of natural resources and the
    protection of the environm ent, see T EX . W ATER C OD E A N N . § 5.012 (Vernon 2000); (2) the Foundation, a Texas
    non-profit corporation founded to protect the San Marcos River; (3) the San Antonio W ater System , a water,
    wastewater and wastewater reuse agency of the City of San Antonio, see San Antonio, Tex., Code of
    Ordinances, sec. 34-.01 (2008); (4) the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, a conservation and reclam ation
    district, see T EX . C ON ST . art. XVI, § 59; and (5) the San Antonio River Authority, a conservation and
    reclam ation district. See 
    Id. 2 of
    the application.
    On December 13, 2002, the executive director issued a draft permit and supporting
    technical data; the draft permit provided the Foundation with less water than it had
    requested. In January of the following year, the Commission issued formal public notice
    of the Foundation’s application and invited interested parties that had not filed hearing
    requests to brief two issues: (1) did the Commission have statutory authority to issue water
    rights permits of the type applied for by the Foundation; and (2) what was the appropriate
    action for the Commission to take with respect to the Foundation’s application?
    On March 20, 2003, the Commission denied the Foundation’s application. In its
    order, the Commission made the following determinations:
    Whereas, certain Texas Water Code statutes enacted by the Texas
    Legislature reflect this state interest [in protecting instream uses of Texas
    surface waterbodies] by requiring consideration of instream flows and bay
    and estuary system maintenance in the granting of state water rights (e.g.,
    Texas Water Code §§ 11.042(b); 11.046(b); 11.134(b)(D); 11.147; 11.1491;
    16.058; and 16.059);
    Whereas, the Commission has included provisions relative to these
    important considerations in various reservoir permits issued since enactment
    of these statutes and in numerous instream flow requirements on permits
    issued by the Commission;
    Whereas, the Texas Legislature has also created the Texas Water
    Trust to hold water rights dedicated to environmental needs, including
    instream flows and bays and estuaries, and also provided that in certain
    circumstances five percent of the firm yield of any reservoir constructed with
    state funds be given to the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department to be used
    for instream flows and bays and estuaries (e.g. §§ 15.7031, 15.3041, and
    16.1331);
    Whereas, these forgoing statutes embody the method by which the
    Texas Legislature intended for the Commission to protect these important
    resources in considering and granting water right permits;
    Whereas, the Commission has also considered its rules regarding
    substantive and procedural water rights to reach its decision in this matter;
    and
    3
    Whereas, while the Commission has approved applications to add
    instream use designations to four specific water right permits previously
    issued for other beneficial purposes, the Commission has not heretofore
    issued a new permit for instream use only, as contemplated by this
    application.
    The order denied the application under section 11.131 of the water code. See TEX . W ATER
    CODE ANN . § 11.131 (Vernon 2000).2 The Foundation filed a motion for rehearing with the
    Commission, which was denied on June 2, 2003.
    The Foundation sought judicial review in a Travis County District Court by bringing
    a suit against the Commission under the water code, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
    Act, and the Administrative Procedures Acts.3 See 
    id. § 5.351
    (Vernon 2000); TEX . CIV.
    PRAC . & REM . CODE ANN . § 37.004(a) (Vernon 1997); TEX . GOV’T CODE ANN . § 2001.038
    (Vernon 2000).
    The Foundation asserted that the Commission had jurisdiction over its application,
    see TEX . W ATER CODE ANN . § 5.013(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (providing that the
    Commission has general jurisdiction over water and water rights including the issuance of
    water rights permits), and that the Commission had statutory authority to appropriate water
    for beneficial uses, which according to the Foundation includes non-consumptive instream
    uses and freshwater inflows into an estuary system. See 
    id. §§11.002(4), 11.023(b)
    2
    Section 11.131(a) of the water code provides:
    The com m ission shall m ake a prelim inary exam ination of the application, and if it appears
    that there is no unappropriated water in the source of supply or that the proposed
    appropriation should not be allowed for other reasons, the com m ission m ay deny the
    application.
    T EX . W ATER C OD E A N N . § 11.131(a) (Vernon 2000).
    3
    T he Foundation brought two suits against the Com m ission which, by an agreed order, were
    consolidated at the trial level.
    4
    (Vernon Supp. 2007). The Foundation argued that the Commission erred in summarily
    denying its application because the Commission improperly deprived it of a contested
    hearing and misconstrued the water code’s statutory framework by concluding that it could
    not grant environmental-only permits. The Foundation also sought a judgment declaring
    its existing rights and interests in the water that was subject to the application.
    The Commission responded to the Foundation’s petition with a general denial. San
    Antonio Water System, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, and San Antonio River
    Authority intervened in the suit and prayed that the Foundation’s claims be denied and that
    costs be assessed against the Foundation.
    The Foundation moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds.                 The
    Commission responded to the Foundation’s motion, and it also sought summary judgment
    and prayed that its decision to summarily deny the Foundation a permit without a
    contested-case hearing be affirmed. On February 7, 2006, the trial court granted the
    Foundation summary judgment, and it found that the Commission had jurisdiction to hear
    the Foundation’s application and that the Foundation had a right to a contested-case
    hearing.
    Over the following few months, the trial court evaluated the Foundation’s request
    for declaratory relief. The Commission responded to the declaratory judgment action by
    filing a plea to the jurisdiction. In its plea, the Commission argued that the February 7
    summary judgment granted the Foundation all the relief that its declaratory judgment action
    sought and that “there [was] nothing left to adjudicate.” The Foundation rejoined by
    arguing that it sought a declaratory judgment to force the Commission to follow statutes
    5
    and administrative rules that it had not previously followed.
    On May 11, 2006, the trial court granted the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction
    and dismissed the Foundation’s declaratory judgment action. Also on May 11, the trial
    court signed a final judgment that incorporated its February 6 summary judgment by
    reversing the Commission’s denial order and remanding the application back to the
    Commission for further proceedings. The Commission, San Antonio Water System,
    Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, and San Antonio River Authority appealed the trial
    court’s decision to reverse and remand the denial order, and the Foundation appealed the
    trial court’s dismissal of its declaratory judgment action.4
    II. DISCUSSION
    Before we address the merits, we note that the Commission has filed a motion to
    dismiss this appeal as moot. In its motion, the Commission argues that even if the
    Foundation’s application were remanded to the State Office of Administrative Hearings, it
    cannot, under the current statutory framework, grant the Foundation’s application. Section
    11.0237 of the water code provides that:
    The commission may not issue a new permit for instream flows dedicated to
    environmental needs or bay and estuary inflows. The commission may
    approve an application to amend an existing permit or certificate of
    adjudication to change the use to or add a use for instream flows dedicated
    to environmental needs or bay and estuary inflows.
    TEX . W ATER CODE ANN . § 11.0237(a) (emphasis added). We are, therefore, confronted
    with a mootness issue that must be analyzed at the outset.
    4
    This case was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals under
    a docket equalization order issued by the Suprem e Court of Texas. See T EX . G O V ’T C OD E A N N . § 73.001
    (Vernon 1998).
    6
    A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any
    stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 
    159 S.W.3d 640
    , 642 (Tex. 2005); Bd. of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende, 
    92 S.W.3d 424
    ,
    427 (Tex. 2002); Williams v. Lara, 
    52 S.W.3d 171
    , 184 (Tex. 2001). Under the mootness
    doctrine, a controversy must involve a dispute of something more than a hypothetical or
    abstract character. Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 
    106 S.W.3d 803
    , 809 (Tex.
    App.–Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (citing Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos County, 
    869 S.W.2d 478
    , 487 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)). A case becomes
    moot when (1) there is no real controversy, or (2) when a party seeks judgment which,
    when rendered, cannot have any practical legal effect. 
    Id. (citing Scholl
    v. Firemen's &
    Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
    520 S.W.2d 470
    , 471 (Tex. Civ. App.–Corpus Christi
    1975, no writ)).
    In section 11.0237 of the water code, the legislature used the phrase “may not” in
    directing the Commission not to issue new water permits for instream flows dedicated to
    environmental needs or bay and estuary inflows.           See TEX . W ATER CODE ANN . §
    11.0237(a). Under section 311.016 of the Code Construction Act, the term “‘may not’
    imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with ‘shall not,’” “unless the context in which the
    word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different
    construction is expressly provided by statute.” See TEX . GOV’T CODE ANN . § 311.016
    (Vernon 2005). The Commission, therefore, cannot grant the Foundation the water permit
    that it applied for, regardless of the trial court’s actions in setting aside the Commission’s
    denial order and remanding the application back to the Commission for further
    7
    proceedings. See, e.g., Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group, Inc., No. 04-0931, 2008 Tex.
    LEXIS 422, at *7 (Tex. 2008) (providing that the legislature establishes the jurisdiction of
    administrative agencies).
    In essence, the trial court’s judgment would have no legal effect given the statutory
    parameters that the legislature has enacted.                     The Foundation’s challenge to the
    Commission’s actions are therefore moot. See In re Gruebel, 
    153 S.W.3d 686
    , 690 (Tex.
    App.–Tyler 2005, orig. proceeding) (concluding that a petitioner’s application for writ of
    mandamus became moot when an amendment to the city ordinance that he was
    challenging became effective). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
    reversing the Commission’s order because the trial court’s judgment would have no legal
    effect. Appellants/cross-appellees’s first issue is sustained,5 and Foundation’s sole issue
    is overruled.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we render a dismissal of the
    Foundation’s trial court action. Furthermore, the trial court’s denial of the Foundation’s
    declaratory judgment action is affirmed.6
    ________________________
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Opinion delivered and filed
    this the 31st day of July, 2008.
    5
    This relieves us from having to address appellants/cross appellees’ second and third issues, for their
    resolution would not further affect the outcom e of this appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.1.
    6
    All pending m otions are herein denied as m oot.
    8