alliantgroup-lp-v-karim-solanji-zeeshan-makhani-saqib-dhanani ( 2014 )


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  • Opinion issued March 18, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-12-00798-CV
    ———————————
    ALLIANTGROUP, L.P., Appellant
    V.
    KARIM SOLANJI, ZEESHAN MAKHANI, SAQIB DHANANI,
    PARADIGM NATIONAL CONSULTANTS, L.P., PARADIGM SMD
    GROUP, L.L.C., AND PARADIGM PARTNERS, L.P., Appellees
    On Appeal from the 125th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 2009-62874
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Alliantgroup, L.P. (“Alliantgroup”), sued appellees, Karim
    Solanji, Zeeshan Makhani, Saqib Dhanani, Paradigm National Consultants, L.P.,
    Paradigm SMD Group, L.L.C., and Paradigm Partners, L.P. (collectively,
    “Paradigm”), asserting claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with
    contracts. Paradigm moved for no-evidence summary judgment, which the trial
    court granted. Alliantgroup appeals the trial court’s granting of Paradigm’s no-
    evidence motion for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court erred because
    the record contained more than a scintilla of evidence that (1) Paradigm breached
    the parties’ settlement agreement and (2) Paradigm tortiously interfered with
    Alliantgroup’s business relationships.
    We affirm.
    Background
    Alliantgroup conducts research and development tax credit studies (“R&D
    studies”) for businesses in Texas and other locations.     Solanji, Makhani, and
    Dhanani worked for Alliantgroup until 2006, when they left Alliantgroup and
    formed Paradigm National Consultants, L.P. d/b/a Paradigm Partners. In August
    2006, Alliantgroup sued Solanji, Makhani, and Dhanani, claiming that they used
    Alliantgroup’s trade secrets without permission for the purpose of unfair
    competition. On February 21, 2007, the parties entered into a written settlement
    agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) to resolve the August 2006 suit. In relevant
    part, the Settlement Agreement provided:
    Paradigm and the Individual Defendants [Solanji, Makhani, and
    Dhanani] shall not knowingly initiate contact with any individual or
    entity who was actually known by Paradigm and the Individual
    Defendants prior to the direct contact by Paradigm and Individual
    2
    Defendants to be a client of Alliantgroup. The parties agree that any
    violations of this provision will result in $50,000 in liquidated
    damages for each violation being owed by Paradigm and Individual
    Defendants, jointly, to Alliantgroup.
    In September 2009, Alliantgroup filed a second lawsuit against Paradigm,
    resulting in the litigation underlying this appeal.         Alliantgroup alleged that
    Paradigm had contacted two of Alliantgroup’s clients—MGS Manufacturing
    Group, Inc. (“MGS”) and Acutec Precision Machining, Inc. (“Acutec”).
    Alliantgroup asserted that Paradigm knew MGS and Acutec were its clients
    because Solanji and Makhani worked with MGS and Acutec when they were
    employed at Alliantgroup. Alliantgroup alleged causes of action for breach of the
    Settlement Agreement and for tortious interference with its on-going business
    relationships with MGS and Acutec.
    On July 7, 2010, all of the Paradigm parties except for Paradigm Partners,
    LP moved for no-evidence summary judgment “on all claims asserted against
    them” by Alliantgroup and for “partial” summary judgment “on the issue of
    whether the liquidated damages provision of the [S]ettlement [A]greement
    constitutes an unenforceable penalty provision.” 1
    1
    All of the Paradigm parties except for Paradigm Partners, L.P., moved for
    summary judgment on July 7, 2010. Paradigm Partners, L.P. originally filed an
    answer asserting that no such entity existed and also entering a general denial “in
    an abundance of caution.” The trial court granted the July 7 no-evidence summary
    judgment. On March 2, 2011, Paradigm Partners, L.P. moved for no-evidence and
    traditional summary judgment against Alliantgroup. It classified itself as a
    3
    Alliantgroup responded to Paradigm’s no-evidence motion for summary
    judgment. It argued that Acutec and MGS were both clients of Alliantgroup “at all
    times relevant to this case pursuant to a written contract.” Alliantgroup argued that
    the contracts with Acutec and MGS both provided for audit defense and refund
    obligations that “extend[ed] the contractual obligations between the parties for up
    to over 20 years.” Alliantgroup attached copies of the contracts it had entered into
    with both MGS and Acutec to perform R&D studies.                      Wes Bangerter,
    Alliantgroup’s corporate representative, provided an affidavit with the copies of
    the contracts between Alliantgroup and Acutec and MGS attached. The affidavit
    stated that “[e]ach of these contracts provides that Alliantgroup shall provide audit
    defense representation to each respective client for up to over 20 years”; that
    Acutec had been a client of Alliantgroup from February 2, 2006 until the time of
    his affidavit (March 18, 2011); that “contracts between Acutec and Alliantgroup
    provide that Alliantgroup shall provide Acutec with tax consulting services during
    this entire period”; and that “[a]t no time did Acutec terminate its tax consultant
    “partnership that is no longer authorized to do business in Texas” and stated that
    its “domestic limited partnership status was cancelled in August 2008.” It further
    stated, “Paradigm Partners, L.P. maintains that it is not a proper party to this
    litigation and has filed a verified denial to that end.” Nevertheless, Paradigm
    Partners, L.P. argued that it was entitled to summary judgment, asserting
    essentially the same grounds for summary judgment that the other Paradigm
    parties had asserted in their motion and reply. The trial court eventually granted
    this no-evidence motion for summary judgment as well, finally disposing of all
    Alliantgroup’s claims against all parties. Paradigm does not contest the inclusion
    of Paradigm Partners, L.P. as a party to this appeal.
    4
    and client relationship with Alliangroup.” He made similar statements regarding
    MGS’s relationship with Alliantgroup.
    Included in the summary judgment evidence was a contract dated February
    2, 2006, and signed by Acutec’s president on February 6, 2006, in which
    Alliantgroup agreed to perform an R&D study for Acutec for the tax years 2002
    through 2005. In the agreement, Alliantgroup provided an estimated amount of
    available R&D tax credits for the 2002 through 2004 tax years, but provided that
    “the actual credits identified during the study may be more or less than the
    estimated amount. In addition, we can be engaged annually to capture the tax
    credit value of current and future R&D investments.” Under “Scope of Services,”
    the agreement outlined three separate phases of the R&D study to be performed for
    the 2002 through 2004 tax years: (1) assessment and feasibility, in which
    Alliantgroup would gather information about the company’s business and research
    and development activities; (2) design and implementation, in which Alliantgroup
    would “design a detailed work plan and execute the associated implementation
    strategy,” including “a full analysis of technical issues related to qualified R&D
    projects, detailed collection of eligible expenditures, and identification,
    documentation, and quantification of qualifying expenditures”; and (3) reporting,
    in which Alliantgroup would prepare and deliver the R&D study and provide the
    company’s CPA with the necessary forms and schedules to amend the tax returns.
    5
    The agreement also provided that Alliantgroup’s fees were “due upon delivery of
    study.”
    The February 2, 2006 agreement also provided for audit defense and a fee
    refund under certain circumstances:
    Our fee structure options include a refund provision for prior year
    credits. If it is ultimately determined, upon examinations and after
    you exhaust any and all legal alternatives that you deem appropriate,
    that the tax credits are unallowable, we will refund a pro-rata portion
    of the fee that resulted from the disallowed item or items. This
    provision is not applicable for a current year study. Furthermore,
    [A]lliantgroup will, at its own expense, represent you through the IRS
    Appellate Conference with respect to any challenge by the IRS of the
    benefits taken in relation to the R&D Study.
    The agreement included an “Exhibit 1” that provided additional terms
    relevant to the agreement. Under “Services,” it provided, “It is understood and
    agreed      that   [Alliantgroup]   services   frequently   include   advice    and
    recommendations, but all decisions in connection with the implementation of such
    advice and recommendations shall be the responsibility of Client.” It further
    provided that the client was required to file any amended tax returns with ten days
    of their delivery to the client and that Alliantgroup could deem the audit defense
    and refund provisions null and void in the event the client failed to adhere to this
    timeline.
    The February 2, 2006 Acutec agreement further stated, under “Term,”
    Unless terminated sooner in accordance with its terms, this
    engagement shall terminate on the completion of [A]lliantgroup’s
    6
    services hereunder. This engagement may be terminated by either
    party at any time by giving written notice to the other party not less
    than ten (10) business days before the effective date of termination.
    In the event of termination by Client, Client shall be responsible to
    pay [A]lliantgroup for time and materials based on the firm’s standard
    hourly rates for the services performed and expenses incurred through
    the effective date of termination. Furthermore, if Client terminates
    [A]lliantgroup’s services, Client shall pay to [A]lliantgroup the
    outstanding fees and expenses incurred within seven (7) days of the
    effective date of termination.
    (Emphasis added). The agreement provided that “‘delivery of study’ shall mean
    the date on which the client receives the written report for the research and
    development study. ‘Delivery of study’ does not include delivery of the amended
    tax returns.”
    MGS entered into an essentially identical agreement with Alliantgroup,
    dated February 21, 2005, and signed on March 4, 2005. MGS signed a second,
    slightly amended agreement with Alliantgroup on August 8, 2005, but the material
    provisions were still identical to the Acutec agreement. Alliantgroup performed
    R&D studies for MGS for the 2001 through 2003 tax years. These agreements
    were also included in Alliantgroup’s summary judgment exhibits.
    Exhibits attached to Alliantgroup’s response to Paradigm’s no-evidence
    motion for summary judgment in this 2009 litigation for breach of the 2007
    Settlement Agreement also included the deposition testimony of Wes Bangarter.
    Bangarter stated that MGS and Acutec were current clients of Alliantgroup at the
    time they were allegedly contacted by Paradigm based on the 2005 and 2006
    7
    contracts.        Specifically, Bangerter testified that Acutec and other companies
    remained “a continuing client as long as the statute runs on any open return and as
    long as there are carry-forwards of any credits.”         However, when asked if
    Alliantgroup was representing Acutec in any continuing returns, Bangerter
    answered, “Not to my knowledge. I don’t represent—me, personally—clients.”
    Bangerter also testified by deposition that a client for which Alliantgroup
    had completed a R&D study “would be a client of Alliantgroup until they notified
    us differently.”       He stated that, to his knowledge, Acutec had not notified
    Alliantgroup that it wanted to disengage. When asked about the alleged contact
    between Paradigm and MGS, Bangerter answered:
    Mr. Dunst [at MGS] actually contacted our managing director of our
    TCS [Tax Controversy Services] group to let us know that someone
    from Paradigm—and I’m not sure who that person is—contacted him
    regarding R&D studies.
    Bangerter further stated that Jeremy Fingeret was the managing director of the
    TCS group. Bangerter did not know what Dunst had told Fingeret about the
    contact from Paradigm because he “wasn’t on that phone call.” Bangerter affirmed
    that his “knowledge as Alliantgroup’s rep is that there was a single phone call
    where Tom Dunst of MGS Manufacturing Group contacted Jeremy Fingeret and
    told him that somebody from Paradigm had contacted MGS regarding R&D
    studies. . . .”
    8
    Alliantgroup also relied on a series of e-mails it attached to its response to
    the motion for summary judgment, which included: a series of e-mails between
    Makhani and Acutec personnel related to the 2006 R&D study Makhani completed
    for Acutec while he was employed at Alliantgroup; e-mails between Mike Grenier,
    the regional director of Paradigm Partners, and Sandy Bates, Acutec’s treasurer, in
    which Grenier discussed the services Paradigm could provide to Acutec and in
    which Bates expressed a lack of interest in further R&D studies; and a series of e-
    mails from 2005 and 2006 between Solanji, personnel at MGS, and other
    Alliantgroup personnel relating to the tax study Solanji helped prepare while he
    was working for Alliantgroup. Alliantgroup argued in its response that Bates had
    told Paradigm that Acutec was a client of Alliantgroup. However, neither the e-
    mails nor any other evidence in the summary judgment record supports this
    assertion.
    Alliantgroup also attached to its response to Paradigm’s no-evidence motion
    for summary judgment the deposition testimony of Lauren Meagher—the
    Paradigm employee who allegedly initiated the contact with Acutec. Meagher
    testified that she did not recognize the name Acutec and did not recall contacting
    Sandy Bates or anyone else at Acutec.
    Paradigm replied to Alliantgroup’s response to its no-evidence motion for
    summary judgment, arguing that Alliantgroup did not provide “[a]dmissible
    9
    evidence that anyone at Paradigm in fact contacted someone from MGS.”
    Paradigm also argued that the evidence presented by Alliantgroup did not provide
    evidence of “existing contracts with Acutec and MGS,” as both of the contracts
    presented with Alliantgroup’s response to the motion for no-evidence summary
    judgment had “long expired by their own terms.” Thus, Paradigm argued that it
    was entitled to no-evidence summary judgment on Alliantgroup’s breach of
    contract claims. Regarding Alliantgroup’s tortious interference claim, Paradigm
    argued that Alliantgroup did not present any evidence of existing contracts with
    MGS and Acutec, of Paradigm’s willful and intentional interference with any
    contracts, or of any injury to Alliantgroup resulting from the alleged interference.
    The trial court granted no-evidence summary judgment in favor of
    Paradigm, ordering that Alliantgroup take nothing by its breach of contract and
    tortious interference claims. This appeal followed.
    Standard of Review
    We review de novo the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Provident
    Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 
    128 S.W.3d 211
    , 215 (Tex. 2003). We must
    make inferences, resolve doubts, and view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the non-movant. Rhône–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 
    997 S.W.2d 217
    , 223 (Tex.
    1999). A no-evidence summary judgment motion asserts that no evidence exists as
    to at least one essential element of the non-movant’s claims on which the non-
    10
    movant would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Bendigo v.
    City of Houston, 
    178 S.W.3d 112
    , 114 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
    pet.) (citing Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 
    979 S.W.2d 68
    , 70–71 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 1998, no pet.)). The trial court must grant the motion unless the non-
    movant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of
    material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 
    73 S.W.3d 211
    , 215 (Tex. 2002).
    Breach of Contract
    To prevail on its breach of contract claim against Paradigm, Alliantgroup
    must prove (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or
    tender of performance; (3) the defendant’s breach of contract; (4) the plaintiff’s
    damages as a result of the breach. Prime Prods., Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 
    97 S.W.3d 631
    , 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).              The
    interpretation or construction of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law to be
    determined by the court. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 
    124 S.W.3d 154
    ,
    157 (Tex. 2003). “An unambiguous contract will be enforced as written, and parol
    evidence will not be received for the purpose of creating an ambiguity or to give
    the contract a meaning different from that which its language imports.” David J.
    Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 
    266 S.W.3d 447
    , 450 (Tex. 2008). Whether a contract is
    ambiguous is a question of law. 
    Id. at 451.
    We may not use extrinsic evidence to
    11
    contradict or vary the meaning of the explicit language of a written contract. Nat’l
    Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 
    907 S.W.2d 517
    , 521 (Tex. 1995).
    Paradigm primarily argued in its no-evidence motion that Alliantgroup had
    presented no evidence that Paradigm had breached the Settlement Agreement
    because it had not shown that Acutec and MGS were current clients at the time of
    the alleged contacts. Paradigm argues that the only evidence that Alliantgroup
    presented demonstrates that Acutec and MGS were former clients.
    Specifically, Paradigm argued that Alliantgroup failed to provide evidence
    necessary to support Alliantgroup’s breach of contract claim, including evidence of
    “[e]xisting contracts with Acutec and MGS. The contracts that Alliantgroup
    provided for both Acutec and MGS have long expired by their own terms.”
    Paradigm argued in the trial court,
    [T]he [S]ettlement [A]greement requires that Paradigm have
    knowledge that Acutec was a client of Alliantgroup and requires that
    Acutec in fact be a client of Alliantgroup. Alliantgroup has not
    presented any evidence that Paradigm knew that Acutec was a then
    existing client of Alliantgroup and the documents included with its
    response in fact demonstrate that Acutec was not an Alliantgroup
    client in July 2009 when there was limited contact with Acutec.
    Regarding the meaning of the Settlement Agreement, Paradigm argued in
    the trial court that the “language of the [S]ettlement [A]greement must be applied
    as written” and that the Settlement Agreement “clearly calls for contact with a
    company known ‘to be a client of Alliantgroup.’ It does not reference companies
    12
    who were once clients of Alliantgroup.”      Paradigm challenged Alliantgroup’s
    interpretation of the Settlement Agreement that would “expand the meaning of the
    [S]ettlement [A]greement to include any company that it may have had a
    contractual relationship with at some point in the past” because “[t]hat is not how
    the [S]ettlement [A]greement was written.” Paradigm made similar arguments
    concerning Alliantgroup’s breach of contract claim as it related to MGS.
    In order to determine whether Alliantgroup provided more than a scintilla of
    evidence that Paradigm breached the Settlement Agreement, we must analyze the
    Settlement Agreement and reach a conclusion regarding what action would
    constitute a breach under its terms. The Settlement Agreement unambiguously
    provided that Paradigm “shall not knowingly initiate contact with any individual or
    entity who was actually known by Paradigm and the Individual Defendants prior to
    the direct contact by Paradigm and Individual Defendants to be a client of
    Alliantgroup.”   (Emphasis added).    Thus, the Settlement Agreement uses the
    present tense in describing clients, indicating that Paradigm agreed not to contact
    entities that were clients of Alliantgroup at the time of the contact. The plain
    language of the Settlement Agreement does not contemplate a restriction against
    contacting any corporation or entity that had been a former client or potential
    client of Alliantgroup. See Dynegy Midstream Servs., Ltd. P’ship v. Apache Corp.,
    
    294 S.W.3d 164
    , 168 (Tex. 2009) (holding that courts construing contracts must
    13
    give terms their plain and ordinary meaning unless contract indicates that parties
    intended different meaning, and “[a] contract is not ambiguous simply because the
    parties disagree over its meaning”); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 
    167 S.W.3d 840
    ,
    841 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that intent manifested in contract’s language
    “is not changed simply because the circumstances do not precisely match the
    scenarios anticipated” when contract was formed and that “a court interprets a
    contract by ascertaining the true objective intentions of the parties, based on the
    contract language”).
    Considering the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, we conclude
    that Alliantgroup had to present some evidence that Acutec and MGS were its
    clients at the time of Paradigm’s alleged contacts in 2009. But Alliantgroup
    produced no evidence that anyone allegedly contacted by Paradigm was a client of
    Alliantgroup at the time of the alleged contacts. Evidence that Acutec and MGS
    were former clients, without more, is insufficient to establish that Paradigm
    breached the Settlement Agreement when it allegedly contacted MGS and Acutec
    in 2009. We conclude that Alliantgroup failed to present any evidence that it had a
    current client relationship with either Acutec or MGS in 2009, which was an
    essential element of its claim. 2 See Prime Prods., 
    Inc., 97 S.W.3d at 636
    (setting
    2
    Moreover, in construing the meaning of the Settlement Agreement, as we must do
    to resolve the issues presented by the parties in their motions and briefing, we
    must be cognizant of the fact that this clause in the Settlement Agreement is
    14
    out elements of breach of contract claim); see also 
    Haden, 266 S.W.3d at 450
    (holding that unambiguous contract will be enforced as written).
    Alliantgroup argues that Acutec and MGS were its clients at the time of the
    alleged contacts in 2009 based solely on the 2006 contracts for R&D studies.
    Bangerter’s affidavit and deposition stated that Acutec and MGS were its clients in
    2009 because of the terms of these 2006 agreements, which obligated Alliantgroup
    to provide audit defense, and because neither company had stated that it wished to
    end its engagement with Alliantgroup.
    essentially a covenant not to compete between Alliantgroup and its former
    employees, and thus is subject to the requirements of the Covenants Not to
    Compete Act. See Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 
    354 S.W.3d 764
    , 768 (Tex. 2011)
    (“Covenants that place limits on former employees’ professional mobility or
    restrict their solicitation of the former employers’ customers and employees are
    restraints on trade and are governed by [the Covenants Not to Compete Act found
    in Business and Commerce Code Chapter 15].”). Although the parties do not
    make any arguments or provide any briefing on this law, in construing a contract,
    we must bear in mind the particular business activity to be served, and when
    possible and proper to do so, avoid a construction that is unreasonable,
    inequitable, and oppressive. See Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 
    165 S.W.3d 310
    , 312 (Tex. 2005) (per curaim); U.S. Denro Steels, Inc. v. Lieck, 
    342 S.W.3d 677
    , 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Texas law
    requires that covenants not to compete must contain “limitations as to time,
    geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do
    not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other
    business interest of the promisee.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a)
    (Vernon 2011); 
    Cook, 354 S.W.3d at 777
    . Accordingly, in construing and
    enforcing the Settlement Agreement, we must not reach an interpretation of that
    agreement that imposes a greater restraint than necessary to protect Alliantgroup’s
    business interests. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a); 
    Cook, 354 S.W.3d at 777
    .
    15
    However, the terms of the agreements themselves did not, as Alliantgroup
    argues, contemplate the existence of an ongoing client relationship. Rather, they
    provided that Alliantgroup would provide a limited service—the three-part R&D
    tax study—in exchange for payment of fees upon delivery of the studies. The
    agreement explicitly stated, “Unless terminated sooner in accordance with its
    terms, this engagement shall terminate on the completion of [A]lliantgroup’s
    services hereunder.” (Emphasis added). Although the agreement did not define
    the completion of its services as the delivery of the R&D study, it did state that
    delivery of the study triggered the client’s obligation to pay Alliantgroup’s fees.
    Likewise, the agreement did not define “the effective date of termination.”
    However, the other provisions under the “Term” section of the agreement indicate
    that the parties intended for the termination of the agreement to occur before the
    payment of Alliantgroup’s fees:
    This engagement may be terminated by either party at any time by
    giving written notice to the other party not less than ten (10) business
    days before the effective date of termination. In the event of
    termination by Client, Client shall be responsible to pay
    [A]lliantgroup for time and materials based on the firm’s standard
    hourly rates for the services performed and expenses incurred through
    the effective date of termination. Furthermore, if Client terminates
    [A]lliantgroup’s services, Client shall pay to [A]lliantgroup the
    outstanding fees and expenses incurred within seven (7) days of the
    effective date of termination.
    Furthermore, the terms of the agreement indicated that the audit-defense and
    fee-refund provisions were not the result of an ongoing business relationship;
    16
    rather, they were provisions that were triggered by “any challenge by the IRS of
    the benefits taken in relation to the R&D Study.” Alliantgroup presented no
    evidence that such a challenge had occurred, and Bangerter specifically testified
    that he was not aware of any continuing work that Alliantgroup had performed for
    either Acutec or MGS pursuant to the R&D studies it completed and delivered in
    2006. The agreements also stated that Alliantgroup could “be engaged annually to
    capture the tax credit value of current and future R&D investments,” but there was
    no evidence that either Acutec or MGS engaged Alliantgroup to complete any
    additional work following the completion of the 2006 R&D studies. In fact,
    Alliantgroup failed to present any testimony or other evidence that any of its
    employees had had any contact with Acutec or MGS since the completion of the
    R&D tax studies.
    We conclude that, by their own terms, the client agreements between
    Alliantgroup and Acutec and MGS do not provide for an ongoing relationship.
    Thus, the agreements do not support Alliantgroup’s allegation that Acutec and
    MGS were its clients in 2009, approximately three years after Alliantgroup’s
    delivery of the contracted-for R&D studies.       The only other evidence that
    Alliantgroup presented that Acutec and MGS were its clients in 2009 was the
    affidavit and deposition testimony of Wes Bangerter.       However, Bangerter’s
    testimony stated that the client relationship was created by the 2006 agreements.
    17
    To the extent that Bangerter made conclusory statements in his affidavit that
    Actuec and MGS were clients of Alliantgroup in 2009, when the alleged contact by
    Paradigm took place, those statements are not competent summary judgment
    evidence.   See Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 
    951 S.W.2d 464
    , 466 (Tex. 1997)
    (holding that conclusory statement in affidavit, unsupported by facts, is insufficient
    to support or defeat summary judgment). And Bangerter averred that he had not
    done any work for Acutec or MGS following the delivery of the R&D studies in
    2006, nor was he aware of any work done by anyone at Alliantgroup or any further
    contacts with those firms.
    We conclude that, as a matter of law, the contracts relied upon by
    Alliantgroup did not establish that Acutec and MGS were clients of Alliantgroup at
    the time of the alleged contacts in 2009. We further conclude that Bangerter’s
    testimony on the legal question of the term or effect of the client agreements is not
    evidence that can alter or vary the intent of the parties as expressed in those
    agreements. See 
    Haden, 266 S.W.3d at 450
    (“[P]arol evidence will not be received
    for the purpose of creating an ambiguity or to give the contract a meaning different
    from that which its language imports.”). Alliantgroup does not point to any other
    evidence establishing that Acutec and MGS were its clients in 2009 at the time of
    Paradigm’s alleged contacts.
    18
    Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Paradigm’s no-
    evidence summary judgment motion on Alliantgroup’s breach of contract claims.
    See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); 
    Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 215
    .
    Tortious Interference
    The elements of a tortious interference claim are (1) an existing contract
    subject to interference; (2) a willful and intentional act of interference with the
    contract; (3) that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) caused actual
    damages or loss. Funes v. Villatoro, 
    352 S.W.3d 200
    , 213 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Texas also recognizes a cause of action for tortious
    interference with a prospective contract. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 
    52 S.W.3d 711
    , 726 (Tex. 2001) (“We therefore hold that to recover for tortious
    interference with a prospective business relation a plaintiff must prove that the
    defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or wrongful.”). “To prevail on a
    tortious interference claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant
    interfered with a specific contract.” 
    Funes, 352 S.W.3d at 213
    (citing Finlan v.
    Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    90 S.W.3d 395
    , 412 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, pet.
    denied)).
    We have already concluded that Alliantgroup did not provide any evidence
    of an ongoing contract with either Acutec or MGS. Indeed, the summary judgment
    evidence indicated that the 2006 contracts were fully performed—i.e., Alliantgroup
    19
    delivered the R&D studies and the clients paid the fees—years prior to the alleged
    contact by Paradigm. Alliantgroup does not point to any specific contract or
    potential contract with either Acutec or MGS that Paradigm’s alleged contacts
    negatively affected. See 
    Funes, 352 S.W.3d at 213
    .
    Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Paradigm’s no-
    evidence summary judgment motion on Alliantgroup’s tortious interference
    claims. 3 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); 
    Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 215
    .
    3
    Because we hold that the trial court did not err in granting no-evidence summary
    judgment on the ground that Alliantgroup failed to present evidence that Acutec
    and MGS were “clients” under the Settlement Agreement at the time Paradigm
    allegedly contacted them, we do not address the remaining arguments on these
    issues. Furthermore, we need not address Alliantgroup’s arguments regarding the
    liquidated damages provision in the Settlement Agreement. Alliantgroup also
    argues that Solanji and Dhanani violated various Disciplinary Rules of
    Professional Conduct. However, Texas courts have consistently held that the
    Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct do not define standards for civil
    liability and do not give rise to private claims. See, e.g., Blankinship v. Brown,
    
    399 S.W.3d 303
    , 311 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (citing Texas
    Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct preamble, which states that
    Disciplinary Rules do not define standards of civil liability and that violation of
    rule does not give rise to private cause of action); Garcia v. Garza, 
    311 S.W.3d 28
    , 43–44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied); Dardas v. Fleming,
    Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 
    194 S.W.3d 603
    , 613 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also Wright v. Sydow, 
    173 S.W.3d 534
    , 549 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that alleged violation of
    Disciplinary Rules does not necessarily establish cause of action and does not void
    otherwise valid contract outside of attorney-client relationship). Thus, we do not
    address these arguments.
    20
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Evelyn V. Keyes
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Massengale.
    Justice Massengale, dissenting.
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-12-00798-CV

Filed Date: 3/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2016

Authorities (21)

Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Knott , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 174 ( 2003 )

U.S. Denro Steels, Inc. v. Lieck , 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2470 ( 2011 )

Wadewitz v. Montgomery , 951 S.W.2d 464 ( 1997 )

Prime Products, Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc. , 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 9311 ( 2002 )

SAS Institute, Inc. v. Breitenfeld , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 949 ( 2005 )

Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook , 2011 Tex. LEXIS 930 ( 2011 )

Funes v. VILLATORO , 352 S.W.3d 200 ( 2011 )

Dynegy Midstream Services, Ltd. Partnership v. Apache Corp. , 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1176 ( 2009 )

Bendigo v. City of Houston , 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4807 ( 2005 )

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges , 52 S.W.3d 711 ( 2001 )

Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C. , 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3668 ( 2006 )

Garcia v. Garza , 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 727 ( 2010 )

Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc. , 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6728 ( 1998 )

Finlan v. Dallas Independent School District , 90 S.W.3d 395 ( 2002 )

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schaefer , 124 S.W.3d 154 ( 2003 )

Frost National Bank v. L & F Distributors, Ltd. , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 803 ( 2005 )

Wright v. Sydow , 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10541 ( 2004 )

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 927 ( 1999 )

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI ... , 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 7 ( 1995 )

David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden , 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1445 ( 2008 )

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