in Re J.E., Relator ( 2019 )


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  •                                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-18-00447-CV
    IN RE J.E., RELATOR
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    January 24, 2019
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL, and PARKER, JJ.
    “Oh, the movie never ends. It goes on and on and on and on . . . .”1
    This movie began in 2013, as explained by one of our initial opinions in the dispute.
    See In re Epps, No. 07-14-00420-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13951 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    Dec. 31, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (discussing the history of the dispute
    involving J.E., M.J., Adoption Covenant, and the biological child of J.E and M.J.). Scenes
    have been added to it through the ensuing years. See In re Epps, No. 07-14-00344-CV,
    2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11317 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 14, 2014, orig. proceeding)
    (mem. op.) (rejecting the claim that M.J. lacked standing to seek the modification of
    conservatorship because her rights had been terminated); In re B.B.J., No. 07-15-00291-
    1   “Don’t Stop Believin”, Journey.
    CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8804 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 20, 2015, order) (per curiam)
    (order abating for findings of facts and conclusions of law); In re B.B.J., No. 07-15-00291-
    CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 4018 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 15, 2016, pet. denied) (mem.
    op.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction and holding that J.E. had standing to
    challenge the reinstatement of M.J.’s parental rights).
    The new scene before us also concerns a petition for writ of mandamus. J.E.
    petitioned this Court for such a writ directing the Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, presiding
    judge of the 140th District Court, to vacate the November 16, 2018 order disqualifying
    William McNamara from representing J.E. We conditionally grant the writ.
    According to the record, the parties were conducting voir dire of potential jurors
    when Adoption Covenant, a party to the proceeding from its inception, moved for
    McNamara’s disqualification. It argued that the attorney had represented another party
    in the cause, namely M.J., gave her advice, and, therefore, became a fact witness subject
    to disqualification. The trial court granted the motion because it believed that “since the
    very first hearing in this matter [in 2014] that Mr. McNamara should have recused from
    representation of either party.” That decision resulted in the petition currently before us.
    M.J. filed a response to the petition and represented therein that “she does not
    assert McNamara represented her.” She also supported this representation through
    citation to an excerpt of a hearing conducted in September of 2017. Adoption Covenant
    appeared at and participated in that hearing. The excerpt to which we allude consisted
    of M.J. being asked the following: “Ma’am, when you testified on September the 14th of
    2014, you testified you did not think Bill McNamara was your lawyer, correct?” (Emphasis
    added). She responded, “Correct.” That was followed by the query: “That’s still true
    today, correct?” She answered, “Yes.”
    2
    In that September 2014 hearing, questions arose concerning McNamara’s
    potential disqualification or recusal due to his supposed representation of M.J. At that
    time, the trial court asked the litigants whether “we have a problem.” Upon hearing no
    complaint from M.J., it then said, “Well, we’ll go forward at this point in time.” Now, on the
    precipice of a trial seemingly to finalize whether M.J. should regain her parental rights to
    her biological child, B.B.J., Adoption Covenant resurrected the topic of disqualification.
    Mandamus lies to correct a clear abuse of discretion where an adequate legal
    remedy does not exist. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 
    290 S.W.3d 204
    , 207 (Tex. 2009); In
    re Grubbs, No. 07-18-00217-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4454, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    June 19, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). That it is available to correct an improperly
    issued order of disqualification is beyond doubt. See In re Sanders, 
    153 S.W.3d 54
    , 56
    (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that “[m]andamus is appropriate to correct an erroneous
    order disqualifying counsel because there is no adequate remedy by appeal”). So, the
    second element of the requisite test is satisfied here.
    Regarding the existence of a clear abuse of discretion, we again turn to Supreme
    Court precedent and see where we have been told that a lawyer serving as both advocate
    and witness does not in itself compel disqualification. 
    Id. at 57.
    Like precedent also told
    us that disqualification can be waived. That is, a litigant seeking to disqualify opposing
    counsel must do so in a timely manner; should he not, then the delay results in the
    question’s waiver. In re George, 
    28 S.W.3d 511
    , 513 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Vaughan v.
    Walther, 
    875 S.W.2d 690
    (Tex. 1994) (per curiam)). As for what constitutes untimeliness,
    a delay of seven months was enough to effectuate waiver, according to our Supreme
    Court. See, e.g., Buck v. Palmer, 
    381 S.W.3d 525
    , 528 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (wherein
    the movant waited seven months and the reviewing court held not only that the trial court
    3
    correctly denied the motion due to the delay but also that a delay of less time has also
    resulted in waiver).
    Whether McNamara should recuse himself or be disqualified from representing
    J.E. due to some purported representation of M.J. is not a new topic. It reared its head
    over four years ago and died because the party having the greatest interest in objecting,
    i.e, M.J., did not complain. No one can deny that, since at least September of 2017,
    Adoption Covenant has known of the allegations about McNamara’s supposed
    representation of M.J. Yet, it waited for over a year and until the middle of selecting jurors
    to attempt to resuscitate the corpse of disqualification and did so on the very basis raised
    back in 2014. Delaying for such an amount of time effectuated a waiver of its complaint.
    Consequently, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in disqualifying McNamara at
    this late date.
    The movie may go on and on, but we do not stop believing that the litigants will get
    their final day in court. We do not stop believing that the child in question soon will find
    one measure of stability through the adjudication of who his lawful parents are. The
    prongs underlying the issuance of mandamus having been established, we conditionally
    grant the petition.    Should the trial court not vacate its November 16, 2018 order
    disqualifying William McNamara as counsel for J.E. within thirty (30) days, we will issue
    a writ of mandamus directing that he do so.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
    4