anambra-state-community-in-houston-inc-anasco-inc-v-christian ( 2013 )


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  • Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Opinion filed
    September 19, 2013.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-12-00107-CV
    ANAMBRA STATE COMMUNITY IN HOUSTON, INC. (ANASCO, INC.),
    Appellant
    V.
    CHRISTIAN CHINWUBA ULASI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
    FORMER PRESIDENT OF ANASCO, AND VINCENT N. NWEKE D/B/A
    ANAMBRA STATE COMMUNITY HOUSTON, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 80th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2010-68898
    OPINION
    On its own motion the trial court signed an order in which the court stated
    that it appeared this case presents no justiciable controversy within the court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction and that, to the extent there is such a controversy, the
    court declined to exercise jurisdiction over these claims because they deal with the
    internal affairs of a non-profit organization.        The trial court dismissed the
    plaintiff’s claims. Except as to one claim, we conclude there is a justiciable
    controversy within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.           We further
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
    jurisdiction as to one issue, but that the trial court abused its discretion by declining
    to exercise jurisdiction over the other claims and issues. Accordingly, we affirm in
    part and reverse and remand in part.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Appellant/plaintiff Anambra State Community in Houston, Inc. (ANASCO,
    Inc.) (hereinafter “the Corporation”), is a Texas non-profit corporation that filed
    this lawsuit against appellees/defendants “Christian Chinwuba Ulasi, Individually
    and as the former president of ANASCO,” and “Vincent N. Nweke d/b/a Anambra
    State    Community,     Houston,    (‘ANASCO’)”       (hereinafter,   collectively the
    “Individuals”). In its live petition, the Corporation made the following allegations:
    Anambra is a state in the southeastern part of Nigeria. To be a
    member of the Corporation, an individual must be originally from
    Anambra.
    The Corporation was formed as an avenue for the citizens of Anambra
    to promote family values, to uphold truth and integrity among
    members in Houston, Texas, and to promote unity and peace among
    its members.
    The Corporation has a constitution that sets out the form, manner, or
    procedure in which the organization should be run. The constitution
    has been in effect since October, 2002.
    Appellee Christian Chinwuba Ulasi was the president of the
    Corporation before he was removed from office in 2010.
    During a July 2010 meeting of the Board of Directors of the
    Corporation, the members of the Board instructed Ulasi to incorporate
    2
    the association as required by the Corporation’s constitution.
    When Ulasi failed to do so, the members of the Board of Directors
    instructed Sylvester Arubaleze, the Chairman of the Board, “to
    incorporate the Association” and file an assumed name certificate
    under the name “Anambra State Community in Houston” and the
    acronym “ANASCO.”
    On October 1, 2010, Arubaleze filed a certificate of incorporation for
    the Corporation with the Texas Secretary of State. On October 15,
    2010, Arubaleze filed an assumed name certificate with the Harris
    County Clerk.
    On October 15, 2010, the members of the Corporation decided
    unanimously to “dissolve the executive,” apparently meaning that
    President Ulasi was removed from office. Ulasi was not at the
    meeting; Vice-President John Okafor presided over the meeting.
    At the October 15, 2010 meeting, the members of the Corporation
    found that (1) the Corporation had no operating bank account, and that
    funds were being deposited by the executives into “an unknown
    account called Anambra State Citizens of Houston, Inc., with Bank of
    America”; (2) the executive failed to incorporate the entity “Anambra
    State Community in Houston, Inc.” in Texas as required by the
    constitution; (3) the Corporation did not have a tax identification
    number, never filed a tax return, and was never registered as a tax-
    exempt association under section 501(c) with the Internal Revenue
    Service; (4) the executives failed to submit the accounts of the
    association for audit when the request was made; and (5) the
    executives scheduled meetings irregularly, without considering that
    the official meeting dates must be on the third Friday of every month.
    On October 19, 2010, appellee Vincent N. Nweke filed and received
    an assumed name certificate from the Harris County Clerk under the
    name “Anambra State Community, Houston,” a name similar to the
    Corporation’s name. When he filed this certificate, Nweke “was
    aware that the same name was incorporated with the Secretary of
    State of Texas.” Nweke sought this name from the Texas Secretary of
    State and was informed that the name was unavailable. Alternatively,
    the Corporation alleges that Nweke filed this certificate to confuse the
    public.
    3
    On November 19, 2010, Nweke filed a suit in Harris County district
    court against the members of the Corporation, using the assumed
    name “Anambra State Community, Houston,” knowing that he had no
    standing to bring the suit.
    To avoid confusion, it is necessary for the ousted executives to refrain
    from acting in their former capacities.
    The Corporation asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
    misrepresentation, invasion of privacy by appropriation of the Corporation’s name
    and likeness, and criminal liability based upon the Individuals’ alleged violation of
    section 71.203 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Corporation
    seeks actual damages based upon the alleged loss of funds, loss of good name, and
    loss of exclusive use of the Corporation’s name. The Corporation also seeks
    nominal damages, attorney’s fees, court costs, and injunctive relief restraining the
    Individuals from acting on behalf of the Corporation in executing contracts, and
    from filing suits in the name of the Corporation or as a representative of the
    Corporation.
    The Corporation moved for summary judgment. In its summary-judgment
    motion, the Corporation argued that injunctive relief is necessary, in part, because
    the Anambra State Association, USA (hereinafter, “Anambra USA”) has
    recognized the Corporation as the authentic affiliate chapter of Anambra USA in
    Houston. The Corporation also asserted that Ulasi breached his fiduciary duty as
    President by withdrawing the Corporation’s funds from a bank account for his
    personal use. The Corporation also alleged that Ulasi committed fraud relating to
    Ulasi’s alleged embezzlement of the Corporation’s funds resulting in damages of
    $8,667.37. It appears based upon the Corporation’s pleadings that most of the
    Individuals’ allegedly actionable conduct occurred before the formation of the
    Corporation, which allegedly occurred on October 1, 2010. The Corporation,
    however, asserts that it is the successor to a prior unincorporated association that
    4
    was formed at least by October 2002 (hereinafter “the Association”).
    The Individuals deny the Corporation’s allegations. They assert that the
    Corporation is not a continuation of the Association. Ulasi asserts that he has been
    president of the Association since 2008. According to Ulasi, the name of the
    Association is Anambra State Community, Houston, a non-profit association which
    has been in existence since “around 1998.” Ulasi states that he has never been a
    member of the Corporation.          Ulasi asserts that the Association’s treasurer
    “colluded with [s]ome unhappy members and formed a similarly named entity in
    October 2010 and withdrew the funds in the [Association’s bank account], without
    authorization.” The Individuals filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
    the crux of this lawsuit was the Corporation’s contention that the Association had
    dissolved and that only the Corporation existed. The Individuals argued that this
    issue had become moot because (1) Anambra USA has recognized both the
    Corporation and the group led by Ulasi (hereinafter “the Community”) as authentic
    Houston chapters of Anambra USA, and (2) it is uncontroverted that the two
    entities exist and are unrelated. The Individuals asserted that, as a matter of law,
    the Corporation was not entitled to the relief it sought.
    The trial court granted the Individuals’ summary-judgment motion. The
    Corporation timely filed a motion for new trial. The trial court then signed an
    order, in which the court stated that (1) it inadvertently had granted the
    Individuals’ summary-judgment motion, (2) it appeared to the court that the case
    presented no justiciable controversy within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
    and (3) to the extent that the case presented a justiciable controversy within the
    court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
    the internal affairs of a private, non-profit organization. The trial court cited in its
    order this court’s opinion in Stevens v. Anatolian Shepherd Dog Club of America,
    5
    Inc., 
    231 S.W.3d 71
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). The
    trial court vacated its prior summary-judgment order, declined to rule on the
    competing summary-judgment motions, and dismissed all of the Corporation’s
    claims on the court’s own motion.
    II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
    On appeal, in its first issue, the Corporation asserts that the trial court erred
    in dismissing its claims.1 In its second issue, the Corporation asserts that the trial
    court erred in refusing to rule on the Corporation’s summary-judgment motion and
    argues that this court should grant its summary-judgment motion.2
    A.      Did the trial court err in dismissing the claim in which the Corporation
    attempted to impose criminal liability on the Individuals?
    In one of its claims, the Corporation seeks to impose criminal liability on the
    Individuals for allegedly committing the criminal offense set forth in section
    71.203(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
    Rem. Code Ann. § 71.203 (West 2013). In a civil case, a court lacks jurisdiction to
    impose criminal liability on a defendant. See State v. Morales, 
    869 S.W.2d 941
    ,
    947 (Tex. 1994); Ryan v. Rosenthal, 
    314 S.W.3d 136
    , 143 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Trantham v. Isaacks, 
    218 S.W.3d 750
    , 753–54
    1
    In the trial court, the Corporation did not object to the trial court’s dismissal of its claims on the
    court’s own motion or request an opportunity to present or submit evidence or be heard
    regarding the basis for the trial court’s dismissal. The Corporation has not raised any such issues
    on appeal. Therefore, the propriety of the trial court acting on its own motion is not before us.
    2
    The Individuals argue that, though the Corporation has appealed, the Corporation was never a
    party in the trial court because the “Anambra State Community in Houston a/k/a ANASCO”
    rather than the Corporation filed the original petition. Thus, the Individuals ask this court to
    dismiss this appeal as being improperly filed by an entity that was not a party in the trial court.
    This argument is based upon a false premise because an amended petition was filed in the trial
    court denominating the Corporation as the plaintiff; therefore, the Corporation was the plaintiff
    when the trial court dismissed its claims.
    6
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied). Thus, as to this claim, the trial court
    did not err in concluding that there is no justiciable controversy within the court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction and in dismissing this claim. See 
    Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 947
    ; 
    Ryan, 314 S.W.3d at 143
    ; 
    Trantham, 218 S.W.3d at 753
    –54.
    B.    Do the remaining claims present a justiciable controversy within the
    trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction?
    In the Corporation’s remaining claims, it seeks a money judgment based on
    alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and invasion of
    privacy by appropriation of the Corporation’s name and likeness. The Corporation
    also seeks injunctive relief.   We first address whether these claims present a
    justiciable controversy within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. For a
    justiciable controversy to exist, there must be a real and substantial controversy
    involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical
    dispute. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 
    907 S.W.2d 465
    , 467 (Tex. 1995).
    The record reflects that a real and substantial controversy exists between the
    Corporation and the Individuals as to many issues relevant to the remaining claims,
    including (1) whether the Corporation is the successor to the Association, (2)
    whether the Community is the same organization as the Association, (3) whether
    the Corporation may assert the Association’s claims and property rights regarding
    conduct that occurred before formation of the Corporation, (4) whether the
    Individuals owed the Corporation or the Association a fiduciary duty when they
    allegedly engaged in their allegedly actionable conduct, (5) whether the Individuals
    committed fraud, (6) whether the Individuals improperly withdrew the
    Corporation’s or the Association’s funds from a bank account for their personal
    use, (7) whether the Individuals appropriated the Corporation’s name or likeness
    for their own use or benefit, (8) whether the Corporation is entitled to a money
    7
    judgment based on its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
    misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy by appropriation of the Corporation’s
    name and likeness, and (9) whether the Corporation is entitled to injunctive relief.3
    The Corporation and the Individuals dispute these issues and many of the facts
    relating to them. In addition, the remaining claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
    fraudulent misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy are within the subject-matter
    jurisdiction of the trial court. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
    24.007 (West 2013).
    In their motion for summary judgment, the Individuals asserted that the
    Corporation’s claims had become moot because (1) Anambra USA has recognized
    both the Corporation and the Community as authentic Houston chapters of
    Anambra USA, and (2) it is uncontroverted that the two entities exist and are
    unrelated. But, the record reflects that a real and substantial controversy remains
    between the Corporation and the Individuals as to these issues. The Individuals
    assert that Anambra USA has recognized both the Corporation and the Community
    as authentic Houston chapters of Anambra USA. But, in its summary-judgment
    motion, the Corporation asserted that Anambra USA has recognized only the
    Corporation as the authentic Houston chapter of Anambra USA and that, as far as
    Anambra USA is concerned, the Community does not exist. In addition, the
    Corporation asserts that there is a relationship between the Association and the
    Corporation. The Corporation asserts that it is the successor of the Association and
    may assert the claims and right of the Association, as it seeks to do in its live
    petition.
    The remaining claims present bona fide, concrete controversies ripe for
    3
    In determining whether these claims present a justiciable controversy within the trial court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction, we do not address the merits of these claims.
    8
    judicial resolution. The record reflects real and substantial controversies involving
    a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute. We
    conclude that the remaining claims present justiciable controversies within the trial
    court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bonham State 
    Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467
    –
    69; WesternGeco, L.L.C. v. Input/Output, Inc., 
    246 S.W.3d 776
    , 781–82 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Thus, the trial court erred to the extent
    it concluded to the contrary.
    C.    Did the trial court err to the extent it declined to exercise jurisdiction
    over the Corporation’s remaining claims?
    To the extent that the Corporation’s claims present justiciable controversies
    within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court declined to
    exercise jurisdiction over these claims under the rule in Stevens v. Anatolian
    Shepherd Dog Club of America, Inc. See 
    231 S.W.3d 71
    , 74–77 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). Therefore, we now address whether the
    trial court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the Corporation’s
    remaining claims.
    Texas courts are not disposed to interfere with the internal management of a
    voluntary association. See 
    id. at 74.
    A member of such an association is subject to
    the organization’s power to make and administer its rules, including rules
    regarding membership in the association. See 
    id. at 74–75.
    Despite this general
    rule, courts will interfere in the inner dealings of a private association if a valuable
    right or property interest is at stake or if the association fails to give its members
    something similar to due process.       See 
    id. at 75.
       This rule of judicial non-
    interference is not a jurisdictional rule; we review the trial court’s decision
    declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims for an abuse of
    9
    discretion.4 See 
    id. at 75–76.
    The record shows that Anambra USA, the Corporation, and the Community
    are all voluntary associations. In its remaining claims, the Corporation asserts in
    part that it is the only authentic affiliate chapter of Anambra USA in Houston. The
    Corporation has not shown or argued that the determination of this issue involves a
    valuable right or property interest or that Anambra USA has failed to provide the
    Corporation with something similar to due process. We conclude that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
    remaining claims to the extent that the Corporation seeks an adjudication of
    whether it is the only authentic affiliate chapter of Anambra USA in Houston. See
    
    id. at 76–77.
    In the remainder of its suit, the Corporation seeks a money judgment and
    injunctive relief based upon claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
    misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy by appropriation of the Corporation’s
    name and likeness. The Corporation asserts that Ulasi breached his fiduciary duty
    as President by withdrawing the Corporation’s funds from a bank account for his
    personal use. The Corporation also alleges that Ulasi committed fraud relating to
    Ulasi’s alleged embezzlement of the Corporation’s funds resulting in damages of
    $8,667.37. Whether the Corporation’s claims have merit is not an issue before this
    court; however, the record reflects that these claims involve a valuable right or
    property interest. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
    4
    In Swonke v. First Colony Community Servs. Assoc., this court held that, if such a decision is
    made in a summary-judgment order, we review this decision de novo. See No. 14-09-00019-CV,
    
    2010 WL 2361691
    , at *6, n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 15, 2010, pet. granted,
    judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (mem. op.). In the case under review, the trial court did not decline to
    exercise jurisdiction in a summary-judgment order, and we review this decision for an abuse of
    discretion consistent with this court’s opinion in Stevens. See 
    Stevens, 231 S.W.3d at 75
    –76.
    10
    to the extent it declined to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. See Swonke v.
    First Colony Community Servs. Assoc., No. 14-09-00019-CV, 
    2010 WL 2361691
    ,
    at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 15, 2010, pet. granted, judgm’t
    vacated w.r.m.) (mem. op.); Owens Entertainment Club v. Owens Community Imp.
    Club, 
    466 S.W.2d 70
    , 72 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1971, no pet.).
    III. CONCLUSION
    Regarding the claim in which the Corporation seeks to impose criminal
    liability on the Individuals for allegedly committing the criminal offense set forth
    in section 71.203(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the trial court
    did not err in concluding that there is no justiciable controversy within the court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction and in dismissing this claim. But, the Corporation’s
    remaining claims present justiciable controversies within the trial court’s subject-
    matter jurisdiction, and the trial court erred to the extent it concluded otherwise.
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
    jurisdiction over the remaining claims to the extent that the Corporation seeks an
    adjudication of whether it is the only authentic affiliate chapter of Anambra USA
    in Houston. But, because the Corporation’s other claims involve a valuable right
    or property interest, the trial court abused its discretion to the extent it declined to
    exercise jurisdiction over them.
    Accordingly, we sustain the Corporation’s first issue in part and overrule it
    in part. We affirm the trial court’s judgment to the extent the trial court dismissed
    (1) the claim in which the Corporation seeks to impose criminal liability on the
    Individuals, and (2) the claims to the extent that the Corporation seeks an
    adjudication of whether it is the only authentic affiliate chapter of Anambra USA
    in Houston. We reverse the remainder of the trial court’s judgment and remand for
    11
    further proceedings.5
    /s/    Kem Thompson Frost
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Busby.
    5
    In its second issue, the Corporation asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to rule on the
    Corporation’s motion for summary judgment, and the Corporation requests that we grant this
    summary-judgment motion. Given the trial court’s conclusion that it either lacked jurisdiction or
    declined to exercise jurisdiction over all of the Corporation’s claims, it was not appropriate for
    the trial court to rule on the pending summary-judgment motions. In the posture of this appeal, it
    is not appropriate for this court to address whether the Corporation is entitled to summary
    judgment. As to the claims that we remand to the trial court, the Corporation and the Individuals
    are free to assert entitlement to summary judgment on remand. Accordingly, we overrule the
    second issue.
    12