rj-meridian-care-of-alice-ltd-aka-meridian-care-of-alice-v-elias ( 2014 )


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  •                                Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-14-00195-CV
    RJ MERIDIAN CARE OF ALICE, LTD. a/k/a Meridian Care of Alice,
    Appellant
    v.
    Elias ROBLEDO and Eleal E. Robledo, Individually and as Heirs/Administrators and
    Representatives of the Estate of Adelaida Ortiz Robledo, Deceased,
    Appellees
    From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 13-07-52422-CV
    Honorable Richard C. Terrell, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Sitting:          Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Karen Angelini, Justice
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: June 25, 2014
    DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
    RJ Meridian Care of Alice, Ltd. (“RJ Meridian Care”) attempts to appeal the trial court’s
    order that denied its motion to dismiss based on the alleged failure to file an expert report that
    complies with the requirements of Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
    Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending the interlocutory order
    is not appealable. We agree and dismiss the appeal.
    04-14-00195-CV
    BACKGROUND
    Adelaida Ortiz Robledo was a patient at RJ Meridian Care’s assisted nursing facility in
    Alice, Texas. After Ms. Robledo died, appellees filed a healthcare liability suit against RJ
    Meridian Care of Alice, Dr. Jifi-Bahlool, and others. The petition alleges in part that Ms. Robledo
    died because she was not properly treated for a wound and an infection while she was at the RJ
    Meridian Care facility. The petition alleges direct and vicarious liability claims against RJ
    Meridian Care, based on the negligent acts of its agents and employees, specifically including
    those of Dr. Jifi-Bahlool.
    The Robledos timely served a written expert report prepared by Dr. Amit Shah on RJ
    Meridian Care. The report states that Dr. Jifi-Bahlool’s treatment of Ms. Robledo during her stay
    at RJ Meridian Care fell below the standard of medical care. The report sets forth Dr. Shah’s
    opinion that Dr. Jifi-Bahlool’s “timing and choice of antibiotics given to treat wound and urine
    cultures[,] . . . inadequate documentation of care, wound assessments, and escalation of wound
    care” fell below the standard of care and contributed to Ms. Robledo’s death. RJ Meridian Care
    filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 74.351(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
    Code. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and granted appellees a thirty-day
    extension of time to file an amended expert report as to RJ Meridian Care and Dr. Jifi-Bahlool.
    Before the date the amended report was due, RJ Meridian Care filed this interlocutory appeal.
    Appellees argue we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    “[I]f a deficient report is served and the trial court grants a thirty day extension, that
    decision—even if coupled with a denial of a motion to dismiss—is not subject to appellate review.”
    Ogletree v. Matthews, 
    262 S.W.3d 316
    , 321 (Tex. 2007); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 51.014(a)(9) (prohibiting appeal of order granting extension of time under section 74.351(c)).
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    04-14-00195-CV
    On the other hand, if no timely expert report is filed, the trial court’s order denying the motion to
    dismiss may be interlocutorily appealed, even if the trial court purports to grant an extension of
    time to file a report. Badiga v. Lopez, 
    274 S.W.3d 681
    , 684-85 (Tex. 2009).
    In Scoresby v. Santillan, 
    346 S.W.3d 546
    (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court held that
    to qualify as a “report” and authorize the trial court to grant an extension of time to cure any
    deficiencies, the expert report need only (1) be served by the statutory deadline, (2) contain the
    opinion of an individual with expertise that the claim has merit, and (3) implicate the defendant’s
    conduct. 
    Id. at 557.
    The court recognized this is a “minimal standard,” but concluded it was
    necessary in order to avoid multiple interlocutory appeals and “appropriate to give a claimant the
    opportunity provided by the Act’s thirty-day extension to show that a claim has merit.” 
    Id. “All deficiencies,
    whether in the expert’s opinions or qualifications, are subject to being cured before
    an appeal may be taken from the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case.” 
    Id. If an
    expert report
    meets the minimal standard and the trial court grants an extension of time to cure any deficiencies
    in the report, the trial court’s order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss is not appealable. See
    
    id. Dr. Shah’s
    report recites that he reviewed the records of RJ Meridian Care and that Ms.
    Robledo was treated by Dr. Jifi-Bahlool during her stay at RJ Meridian Care. Otherwise, there is
    no mention of RJ Meridian Care in the report. RJ Meridian Care contends that Dr. Shah’s report
    fails to meet the “minimal standard” set out in Scoresby and therefore constitutes “no report”
    because it does not implicate the conduct of RJ Meridian Care or that of any of its agents.
    RJ Meridian Care first argues the report fails to meet the Scoresby standard with respect to
    RJ Meridian Care because the report does not attribute any conduct to it. We disagree. “[W]hen
    a health care liability claim involves a vicarious liability theory, either alone or in combination
    with other theories, an expert report that meets the statutory standards as to the employee is
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    04-14-00195-CV
    sufficient to implicate the employer’s conduct under the vicarious theory.” Certified EMS, Inc. v.
    Potts, 
    392 S.W.3d 625
    , 632 (Tex. 2013); see Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 
    274 S.W.3d 669
    , 671-
    72 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that report was sufficient as to owner where petition alleged
    owner was vicariously liable for acts of doctor and report adequately implicated acts of doctor).
    The Robledos’ petition specifically pleads that Dr. Jifi-Bahlool is an agent or employee of
    RJ Meridian Care, that the actions complained of were committed within the course and scope of
    his employment with RJ Meridian Care, and that RJ Meridian Care is liable for Dr. Jifi-Bahlool’s
    actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is no contention that Dr. Shah’s expert
    report was not timely served. The report states Dr. Shah’s opinion that Dr. Jifi-Bahlool failed to
    meet the standard of care regarding antibiotic use, documentation of the wound, and plan for
    following up with the patient and states a causal relationship between Dr. Jifi-Bahlool’s allegedly
    sub-standard care and Ms. Robledo’s death. The report contains the opinion of an individual with
    expertise that the Robledos’ claim has merit and implicates the conduct of Dr. Jifi-Bahlool.
    Because RJ Meridian Care is alleged to be vicariously liable for the conduct of Dr. Jifi-Bahlool,
    the report implicates RJ Meridian Care and meets the minimal standard set out in Scoresby, thus
    authorizing the trial court to grant an extension of time to cure all the asserted deficiencies. See
    
    Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 557
    .
    RJ Meridian Care next argues the report is nevertheless insufficient to pass the Scoresby
    threshold because it does not set forth facts that establish an agency or employer/employee
    relationship between RJ Meridian Care and Dr. Jifi-Bahlool or anyone else or that otherwise show
    RJ Meridian Care would be vicariously liable. We again disagree. The Robledos’ petition gave
    RJ Meridian Care notice of the claimed agency relationship and that the Robledos sought to hold
    it liable for the conduct of Dr. Jifi-Bahlool under a vicarious liability theory. The Robledos would
    be required to provide proof of that relationship to prevail on their vicarious liability theory at trial.
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    04-14-00195-CV
    However, Dr. Shah is likely unqualified to provide an expert opinion on the legal relationship
    between Dr. Jifi-Bahlool and RJ Meridian Care. And Chapter 74 does not require such proof in
    an expert report. See Cedar Senior Servs., L.P. v. Nevarez, No. 04-13-00790-CV, 
    2014 WL 1047039
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 19, 2014, no pet.); see also 
    Gardner, 274 S.W.3d at 671-72
    (holding that report that adequately implicated conduct of doctor was sufficient as to
    owner/operator of facility alleged in petition to be vicariously liable even though report did not
    mention owner/operator).
    CONCLUSION
    Because the Robledos served an expert report that implicated RJ Meridian Care’s conduct
    and the trial court granted an extension of time to cure the deficiencies, we do not have jurisdiction
    over RJ Meridian Care’s appeal of the denial of its motion to dismiss. See 
    Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 321
    . We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-14-00195-CV

Filed Date: 6/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2016