elida-ramirez-individually-and-as-representative-of-the-estate-of ( 2011 )


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  •                    NUMBER 13-09-00076-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    ELIDA RAMIREZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
    REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
    ENRIQUETA GOMEZ, DECEASED, CRUZ
    GOMEZ, DIANA CONTRERAS, GUADALUPE
    SALAZAR, JOE GOMEZ, JOSEFA GOMEZ,
    JUAN GOMEZ, LEO GOMEZ, MANUELA G. REYNA,
    PABLO GOMEZ, PEDRO GOMEZ, AND VIRGINIA
    GONZALEZ,                                                Appellants,
    v.
    DOCTORS HOSPITAL AT RENAISSANCE, LTD.,                     Appellee.
    On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
    of Hidalgo County, Texas.
    OPINION
    Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela
    Opinion by Justice Benavides
    Appellants, Elida Ramirez, individually and as representative of the estate of
    Enriqueta Gomez, Deceased, Cruz Gomez, Diana Contreras, Guadalupe Salazar, Joe
    Gomez, Josefa Gomez, Juan Gomez, Leo Gomez, Manuela G. Reyna, Pablo Gomez,
    Pedro Gomez, and Virginia Gonzalez (collectively “Ramirez”), appeal the trial court’s
    order granting attorneys’ fees in favor of appellee, Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd.
    (the “hospital”) after their health care liability claims were dismissed.                See TEX. CIV.
    PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b) (Vernon Supp. 2010). By a single issue, Ramirez
    argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorneys’ fees based on Ramirez’s failure to
    file an expert report because the hospital failed to provide medical records in a timely
    manner.     See 
    id. § 74.051(d)
    (Vernon 2005). We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    This is the second time this case has been before this Court.               See Doctors Hosp.
    at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Ramirez, No. 13-07-00608-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5124
    (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi July 10, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Ramirez I”).1 In Ramirez
    I, we addressed the trial court’s dismissal of Ramirez’s health care liability claims for
    failure to file an expert report.      
    Id. at **5-6.
    The order at issue in Ramirez I dismissed
    1
    The factual background of this case is set forth in Ramirez I and will not be repeated here except
    as necessary to explain the basis of our holding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must
    hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and
    necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
    2
    Ramirez’s claims and awarded attorneys’ fees to the hospital in the event that Ramirez
    appealed but not for fees incurred in obtaining the dismissal by the trial court.                   
    Id. at **3-4.
    The hospital argued on appeal that this was error, and we agreed.                      
    Id. at *13.
    We reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded to the trial court to determine the
    appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees.          
    Id. We noted
    in Ramirez I that Ramirez argued that the trial court improperly granted
    the motion to dismiss because the hospital “willfully, knowingly, and intentionally failed to
    provide medical records on four occasions,” preventing Ramirez from filing an expert
    report within 120 days of filing suit.         
    Id. at *3
    n.2. We held, however, that Ramirez
    waived this argument by failing to file a notice of appeal.                
    Id. (citing TEX.
    R. APP. P.
    25.1(c) (“A party who seeks to alter the trial court's judgment or other appealable order
    must file a notice of appeal. . . . The appellate court may not grant a party who does not
    file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just
    cause.”)).
    On remand, the trial court awarded the hospital attorneys’ fees of $22,000 in the
    trial court, $6,000 if the award was unsuccessfully appealed to this Court, $5,000 if
    Ramirez files a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, and $4,000 if the
    petition is granted. This appeal ensued.2
    2
    The trial court signed the order granting attorneys’ fees on November 20, 2008. Ramirez did not
    file a notice of appeal until January 12, 2009. Thus, the hospital filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the
    notice of appeal was untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. Thereafter, Ramirez filed a rule 306a(5) motion
    in the trial court, which the trial court granted, finding that Ramirez’s counsel did not receive notice or
    acquire actual knowledge of the judgment until January 5, 2009. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5). The
    3
    II. ANALYSIS
    By a single issue, Ramirez argues that the hospital waived its entitlement to
    attorneys’ fees by failing to provide medical records as required by section 74.051(d) of
    the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.                 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
    74.051(d).3 The hospital argues that Ramirez waived this argument by failing to file a
    cross-appeal in Ramirez I.            Assuming, without deciding, that this issue is properly
    before us, we disagree that the failure of a defendant to produce medical records
    excuses a health care liability plaintiff’s duty to file a timely expert report.
    Ramirez contends that the hospital’s failure to provide the medical records is
    conduct inconsistent with an intent to rely upon the protections of chapter 74, including
    the right to dismissal under section 74.351.              See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
    74.351(a)-(b). However, a claimant’s efforts to obtain medical records under section
    74.051 do not serve to toll or extend the expert report deadline.                 See Estate of Regis v.
    Harris County Hosp. Dist., 
    208 S.W.3d 64
    , 68 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no
    pet.) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to an equitable extension of the deadline
    appellate timetable, therefore, did not start until January 5, 2009, and the notice of appeal was timely.
    Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss.
    3
    Section 74.051(d) provides:
    All parties shall be entitled to obtain complete and unaltered copies of the patient's medical
    records from any other party within 45 days from the date of receipt of a written request for
    such records; provided, however, that the receipt of a medical authorization in the form
    required by Section 74.052 executed by the claimant herein shall be considered
    compliance by the claimant with this subsection.
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(d) (Vernon 2005).
    4
    for filing her medical report on the basis that she made a good-faith effort to obtain her
    medical records from the defendant and the defendant did not provide them); see also
    Garza v. Saenz, No. 13-09-00111-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1615, at *1 (Tex.
    App.–Corpus Christi Mar. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gulf Coast Med. Ctr., LLC v.
    Temple, No. 13-09-00350-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 405, at *14 (Tex. App.–Corpus
    Christi Jan. 21, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Offenbach v. Stockton, 
    285 S.W.3d 517
    , 521
    (Tex. App.–Dallas 2009, no pet.) (noting that section 74.351 does not contain a “good
    faith” or “due diligence” exception to the 120-day expert report deadline).
    A claimant’s efforts to obtain medical records under section 74.051 do not affect a
    court’s mandate to award attorneys’ fees in the case of dismissal, either. Although the
    Texas Supreme Court in Garcia v. Gomez left open the possibility that “discovery
    sanctions might offset an award of fees and costs under section 74.351(b),” it refused to
    excuse the failure to file an expert report where the trial court has not made a finding of
    discovery abuse. 
    319 S.W.3d 638
    , 643 (Tex. 2010).                        Because there is no finding of
    discovery abuse in this case,4 we similarly refuse to consider whether an offset is
    appropriate here.
    It is undisputed that Ramirez did not file an expert report before the 120-day
    deadline expired.        Accordingly, as we held in Ramirez I, the trial court had no discretion
    but to dismiss the case and to award attorneys’ fees.                  See 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5124,
    4
    Although the clerk’s record indicates that a motion to compel and a motion for sanctions were filed
    at one point in this case, it is unclear from the record which party filed these motions. Further, the trial court
    never ruled on either motion. Thus, there is no formal “finding of discovery abuse.”
    5
    at *12. We overrule Ramirez’s sole issue.
    III. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Ramirez’s issue, we affirm.
    ________________________
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    27th day of January, 2011.
    6