Randall Ray Lyle v. State ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-17-00227-CR
___________________________
RANDALL RAY LYLE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 371st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1239400D
Before Gabriel, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
Justice Bassel Dissents and Concurs without Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Randall Ray Lyle appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
community supervision, adjudication of his guilt for theft of property valued at
$20,000 or more but less than $100,000, and imposition of a four-year sentence. He
raises challenges to his original guilty plea, which resulted in the order of deferred
adjudication, and to the later revocation and adjudication. We conclude that we do
not have jurisdiction to address Lyle’s challenges to his original guilty plea. Further,
we conclude that the trial court’s sentencing determination upon revocation and
adjudication was not an abuse of discretion and that the record sufficiently supported
the trial court’s imposition of unpaid community-supervision fees as reparations in the
adjudication judgment. But $50 of the ordered reparations is not specifically
identified and must be subtracted from the $590 in reparations in the adjudication
judgment. And because the adjudication judgment incorrectly imposed a $980 fine
and $34,297.62 in restitution, which were not orally pronounced upon revocation and
adjudication, we modify the adjudication judgment to delete those amounts. As
modified, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. GUILTY PLEA AND DEFERRED ADJUDICATION
In 2011, Lyle was indicted for theft of property valued at more than $20,000
but less than $100,000—a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a),
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(e)(5).1 Five years later,2 Lyle agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State’s
recommendation that the adjudication of his guilt be deferred and that he be placed
on community supervision for ten years. As part of the plea agreement, Lyle affirmed
that his plea was voluntary, that his retained attorney had provided “fully effective and
competent representation,”3 and that he waived his right to appeal. Lyle also signed a
judicial confession confirming that he was guilty of the charged offense. On
September 7, 2016, Lyle pleaded guilty to the charged offense in open court and orally
confirmed that his plea was voluntary. The trial court followed the plea-bargain
recommendation and entered an order deferring any guilt adjudication and placing
Lyle on community supervision for ten years. At the conclusion of the guilty-plea
hearing, Lyle’s retained counsel questioned Lyle about his plea:
Q. [By Lyle’s counsel] Mr. Lyle, when we originally came to court
today, it was your understanding that I was going to seek the Court’s
permission to withdraw as your attorney of record; is that correct?
A. Yes.
1
In 2015, the legislature amended section 31.03(e) to increase the minimum
value of stolen property to qualify as a third-degree felony from $20,000 to $30,000.
Act of May 31, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1251, § 10, sec. 31.03(e), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4208, 4212 (effective Sept. 1, 2015).
2
The five-year delay is not clearly explained in the record other than the fact
that an arrest warrant was issued on May 12, 2011; bond was set at $5,000 that same
day; and Lyle was again arrested on April 18, 2016.
3
Lyle, who affirmed that he was not entitled to appointed counsel, retained
counsel in June 2016—three months before the guilty-plea hearing.
3
Q. And upon approaching the bench, you were informed that
you would have to either hire another attorney or, according to the
prosecutor, take your plea today or all plea offers would be withdrawn; is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And during this short time period, have you had an
opportunity to ask me any question that you’ve wondered about?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have I answered all of your questions?
A. Yes, you have.
Q. Are you pleased with my services?
A. Yes.
The trial court certified that Lyle had no right to appeal because of the plea bargain
and because of his express waiver. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 1.14(a), 44.02.
B. REVOCATION AND ADJUDICATION
During the community-supervision period, the State filed a petition to proceed
to an adjudication, alleging that Lyle had failed to report to his community-
supervision officer several times and had not been paying his community-supervision
fees or restitution as previously ordered. At the adjudication hearing, Lyle pleaded
true to the State’s allegations. The trial court heard evidence that Lyle had issues with
alcohol but revoked Lyle’s community supervision, adjudicated his guilt of the
underlying offense, and sentenced him to four years’ confinement. The trial court
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certified that Lyle had the right to appeal the judgment adjudicating his guilt. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.755(e) (“When the defendant is notified that the
defendant’s community supervision is revoked . . . and the defendant is called on to
serve a sentence [of confinement], the defendant may appeal the revocation.”). On
appeal, Lyle challenges his original guilty plea, the adjudication and revocation, and
the reparation and restitution amounts included in the adjudication judgment.
II. GUILTY PLEA
In his first two points, Lyle argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because it
was made under duress and based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Lyle relies on
his allegation that counsel threatened to withdraw if Lyle did not accept the State’s
plea-bargain offer, which Lyle argues was deficient performance and rendered his plea
involuntary.
In general, a defendant placed on deferred adjudication community supervision
may raise issues regarding the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when the
trial court first imposes deferred adjudication community supervision. See Manuel v.
State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 42A.755(e) (“The right of the defendant to appeal . . . shall be accorded the
defendant at the time the defendant is placed on community supervision.”). Unless
the order placing Lyle on deferred adjudication community supervision was void, he
may not raise issues related to the original plea proceeding—including voluntariness
and ineffective-assistance issues—in his appeal from the subsequent adjudication
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proceeding. See Robinson v. State, Nos. 02-17-00054-CR, 02-17-00055-CR, 2018 WL
1095793, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Ebiana v. State, 77 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburgh 2002, pet. ref’d); Hanson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 285, 287–88 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). Neither an involuntary guilty plea nor
an ineffective-assistance claim renders the resulting deferred-adjudication order void.
See Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Pena v. State, 551 S.W.3d
367, 370 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, no pet.). Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to
address points one and two directed to the original plea proceeding, and we dismiss
them.4
III. REVOCATION AND ADJUDICATION
In his remaining three points, Lyle contends that the revocation and
adjudication were abuses of discretion because the trial court did not follow a
progressive sanction short of revocation and that the resulting adjudication judgment
contained improper restitution and reparations amounts. Lyle does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation and adjudication, which were
based on his pleas of true to the violation allegations. See generally Tapia v. State, 462
Were we to have jurisdiction, we would conclude that the record shows that
4
Lyle entered his guilty plea freely and voluntarily with the effective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Dominguez v. State, 535 S.W.3d 125, 133–35 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2017, no pet.).
6
S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient
to support the revocation of community supervision and adjudicate guilt.”).
A. SENTENCE
In his brief, Lyle posits that the legislative intent behind community
supervision reveals that its primary objective is rehabilitation. He relies on a bench
manual prepared by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s community-justice
assistance division, which indicates that trial courts should focus on empirical
evidence of the effectiveness of a particular punishment to achieve a “sustained
reduction in criminal behavior.” Based on the primary objective of community
supervision and the information in the bench manual, Lyle asserts that the trial court
should have ordered him “to specialized treatment for substance abuse” instead of
revoking his community supervision and adjudicating his guilt.5
Lyle concedes that no binding authority required the trial court to impose
substance-abuse treatment in lieu of revocation and adjudication. Indeed, a trial court
has broad sentencing discretion after revoking community supervision and
adjudicating guilt. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42A.110, 42A.751(d); see also
State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (recognizing nature of
revocation proceedings is “highly discretionary”). The trial court’s decision to revoke,
5
In orally pronouncing Lyle’s sentence, the trial court recognized that Lyle had
a history of alcohol abuse, which the court considered “mitigating”; however, the trial
court was “trouble[ed]” by Lyle’s “pattern of behavior [and decisions], which certainly
[were] not due to alcoholism.”
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adjudicate, and sentence Lyle, instead of continuing his community supervision and
placing him in an alcohol-treatment program, was not outside its broad sentencing
discretion. See Lake v. State, No. 02-13-00521-CR, 2017 WL 3821902, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); Shephard v. State, No. 05-13-00291-CR, 2014 WL 2151975, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 20, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). We overrule point three.
B. ADJUDICATION JUDGMENT
In points four and five, Lyle argues that the reparations and restitution amounts
in the adjudication judgment are not supported by the record.
1. Restitution and Fine
The State concedes that the restitution included in the adjudication judgment
must be deleted because that amount was not orally pronounced by the trial court.
We agree that restitution, which is similar to a fine in that it is punitive, must be orally
pronounced. See Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);
Cantrell v. State, No. 10-12-00269-CR, 2014 WL 2069279, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco
May 15, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Similarly, the trial
court did not orally pronounce the $980 fine that was included in the judgment
adjudicating guilt.6 Because the oral pronouncement of sentence controls, we must
Although the fine was noted as being “Not Suspended” on the order of
6
deferred adjudication and on the judgment adjudicating guilt, the fine must be orally
8
modify the judgment adjudicating guilt to delete the $34,297.62 ordered as restitution
and the $980 fine. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
Mitchell v. State, No. 02-17-00112-CR, 2017 WL 6759032, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Cantrell,
2014 WL 2069279, at *4. We sustain point five.
2. Reparations
The adjudication judgment included the imposition of $590 in reparations. See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 2(b). Lyle argues that this amount is not
supported by the record because although the balance sheet prepared by Tarrant
County’s Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) shows that
$590 in “PROBATION FEES” were owed as reparations, the district clerk’s list of
fee breakdowns shows that “0.00” was owed for “Probation Fees” and for “Due to
CSCD.” Lyle asserts this irreconcilable conflict requires the deletion of the
reparations amount.
The district clerk’s certified bill of cost assessed only court costs and did not
address community-supervision fees or reparations. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 103.001. The CSCD balance sheet shows that Lyle owed $540 in owed
community-supervision fees and $50 as “DUE TO CSCD,” both of which had been
pronounced at revocation and adjudication because the judgment adjudicating guilt
set aside the prior order of deferred adjudication. See Demerson v. State, No. 02-18-
00003-CR, 2018 WL 3580893, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 26, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
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categorized as reparations. See Ayala v. State, No. 02-17-00385-CR, 2018 WL 2727954,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (recognizing CSCD may categorize community-supervision fees as
reparations). The district clerk’s list of fee breakdowns reflected that no probation
fees or other CSCD amounts remained due because they had been categorized as
reparations as reflected in the CSCD balance sheet. See Hongpathoum v. State, Nos. 02-
18-00061-CR, 02-18-00062-CR, 02-18-00063-CR, 2019 WL 2432152, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 6, 2019, no pet. h.) (“Viewing [the balance sheet and list of
fee breakdowns] collectively and in the light most favorable to the reparations award,
Hongpathoum’s unpaid probation fees were transferred from one ledger . . . to
another ledger . . ., which explains why the ‘List of Fee Breakdowns’ shows a zero
balance.”); Ayala, 2018 WL 2727954, at *1 (“Because these [unpaid community-
supervision] fees were characterized as reparations in CSCD’s balance sheet, the
clerk’s fee-breakdown list correctly noted that there were no amounts due as fees.”).
The CSCD’s balance sheet is sufficient to support $540 of the ordered reparations in
the judgment adjudicating guilt. See Hongpathoum, 2019 WL 2432152, at *3. But the
$50 categorized as “DUE TO CSCD” on the balance sheet has no further identifying
information allowing us to specifically trace this amount to either a statutorily
authorized cost or to a community-supervision condition without impermissible
speculation. See Demerson, 2018 WL 3580893, at *3. We therefore subtract $50 from
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the ordered $590 in reparations for a total of $540. See id.; Lewis v. State, 423 S.W.3d
451, 461 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d).
Lyle additionally attacks the imposed reparations because they were not orally
pronounced. These reparations, which were owed community-supervision fees, were
not punitive and therefore were not required to be orally pronounced. See Demerson,
2018 WL 3580893, at *2. We overrule issue four.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that we have no jurisdiction to address Lyle’s attacks on his
original guilty plea, which do not assert that the order of deferred adjudication was
void. Further, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Lyle’s community supervision, adjudicating his guilt, and imposing sentence instead of
continuing his community supervision. And $540 of the ordered reparations amount,
which was comprised of unpaid community-supervision fees, was supported by
sufficient evidence in the record. However, because (1) the restitution and fine
amounts were punitive and were not orally pronounced by the trial court at
revocation and adjudication and (2) $50 of the reparations amount is characterized as
“DUE TO CSCD” with no further identifying information, those amounts must be
deleted from the trial court’s adjudication judgment. Accordingly, we modify the
judgment adjudicating guilt to delete the $980 fine, the $34,297.62 in restitution, and
$50 of the ordered $590 in reparations. We additionally modify the attached order to
withdraw funds to delete $1,030 from the incurred “[c]ourt costs, fees and/or fines
11
and/or restitution” for a remaining total of $854.7 As modified, we affirm the trial
court’s June 30, 2017 judgment adjudicating guilt. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).
/s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: July 11, 2019
7
The order to withdraw funds authorized withdrawals from Lyle’s inmate trust
account to satisfy $1,884 in incurred “[c]ourt costs, fees and/or fines and/or
restitution.” This amount is the result of $314 in court costs, the $980 fine, and $590
in reparations. Because $540 of the reparations amount and the court costs are
collectible, the order to withdraw funds may authorize withdrawal of $854. Although
the order states that the withdrawal amount includes restitution, which must be
deleted from the judgment, the $34,297.62 restitution amount was clearly not included
in the order to withdraw funds.
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