patrick-mclaughlin-v-wells-fargo-bank-na-as-trustee-under-pooling-and ( 2011 )


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  •                                 IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00109-CV
    PATRICK MCLAUGHLIN,
    Appellant
    v.
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE
    UNDER POOLING AND SERVICING
    AGREEMENT DATED AS OF AUGUST 1, 2005
    ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH
    CERTIFICATES SERIES 2005-WHQ4
    Appellee
    From the County Court
    Hamilton County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CV2208
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee under Pooling and Servicing Agreement
    Dated as of August 1, 2005 Assett-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-WHQ4
    (Wells Fargo) brought a forcible detainer action in justice court against Patrick
    McLaughlin. Wells Fargo prevailed and obtained a judgment awarding it possession.
    McLaughlin appealed to the County Court of Hamilton County. Wells Fargo moved for
    and was granted summary judgment on its forcible detainer claim and again obtained a
    judgment awarding it possession. Raising two issues, McLaughlin appeals. We will
    affirm.
    We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident
    Ins. Co. v. Knott, 
    128 S.W.3d 211
    , 215 (Tex. 2003).
    In his first issue, McLaughlin asserts that the County Court lacked jurisdiction
    over the forcible detainer action because his wife had filed a trespass-to-try-title claim
    over the same property in federal court.
    Jurisdiction of forcible detainer actions is expressly given to the
    justice court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal,
    to county courts for a trial de novo. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004
    (Vernon 2000); Goggins v. Leo, 
    849 S.W.2d 373
    , 375 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Ramirez, 
    600 S.W.2d 911
    , 913
    (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
    Aguilar v. Weber, 
    72 S.W.3d 729
    , 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
    The sole issue in a forcible detainer suit is to determine who has the right to
    immediate possession of the premises. 
    Id. at 732
    (citing Rice v. Pinney, 
    51 S.W.3d 705
    ,
    709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)).
    Because a forcible detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any
    other remedy that a party may have in the courts of this state, the
    displaced party is entitled to bring a separate suit in the district court to
    determine the question of title. Scott v. Hewitt, 
    127 Tex. 31
    , 35, 
    90 S.W.2d 816
    , 818-19 (1936); 
    Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d at 913
    ; Martinez v. Beasley, 
    572 S.W.2d 83
    , 85 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). Forcible
    detainer actions in justice courts may be brought and prosecuted
    concurrently with suits to try title in district court. 
    Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 196
    ; Hartzog v. Seeger Coal Co., 
    163 S.W. 1055
    , 1060 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
    1914, no writ).
    
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709
    ; see Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 10-07-00296-CV, 2008 WL
    McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo                                                                 Page 2
    4212571, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 3, 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); 
    Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 732
    . “This is so ‘even if the other action adjudicates matters that could result in a
    different determination of possession from that rendered in the forcible detainer suit.’ ”
    Mitchell, 
    2008 WL 4212571
    , at *1 (citing Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 
    229 S.W.3d 415
    ,
    437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).
    The summary-judgment evidence shows that the subject property was sold at
    foreclosure to Wells Fargo. Under the express terms of Paragraph 22 of the deed of
    trust, McLaughlin became a tenant at sufferance and thereafter refused to vacate the
    premises, leading to Wells Fargo’s forcible detainer suit.               Accordingly, despite the
    concurrent federal suit,1 the County Court had jurisdiction. See id.; 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710-13
    . Issue one is overruled.
    In his second issue, McLaughlin asserts that Wells Fargo lacked standing because
    it failed to demonstrate any interest in the subject property. Wells Fargo presented
    summary-judgment evidence that it is the owner of the subject property under a
    substitute trustee’s deed relating to the above-mentioned foreclosure sale. Because the
    evidence shows that Wells Fargo owned the property after having purchased it at
    foreclosure, it had standing to bring the forcible detainer action and to show its right to
    immediate possession of the premises. See 
    Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 732
    . Issue two is
    overruled.
    1 The record contains information about the federal suit against Wells Fargo, and McLaughlin included
    the federal complaint in his brief’s appendix. That suit was dismissed with prejudice, and McLaughlin
    and his wife were declared vexatious litigants under chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
    See McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. W-09-CA-025 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009).
    McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo                                                                        Page 3
    Having overruled both of McLaughlin’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed July 13, 2011
    [CV06]
    McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo                                                  Page 4