in Re Elizabeth Harper ( 2016 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-16-00156-CV
IN RE ELIZABETH HARPER
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Elizabeth Harper seeks mandamus relief pertaining to the trial court’s
denial of her plea to the jurisdiction in the underlying original SAPCR filed by Dawn and
Michael Caldwell.1 Harper’s plea to the jurisdiction alleges that the Caldwells lack
standing under Family Code subsection 102.003(a)(9), which provides that an original
suit may be filed at any time by “a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual
care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90
days preceding the date of the filing of the petition.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9)
1
Briefly, the factual background is that Harper gave birth to G.C.H. in Oklahoma, and under an agreement
with the Caldwells, they took G.C.H. from the hospital, ostensibly for an anticipated adoption, but Harper
changed her mind and sought possession of G.C.H. When she gained possession of G.C.H. through
Oklahoma proceedings, she returned to Texas with him.
(West Supp. 2016). Harper argues that the Caldwells did not timely file their suit within
90 days of the end of the period in which they had “actual control” of G.C.H. and thus
lack standing under subsection 102.003(a)(9).
The Caldwells had been appointed guardians of G.C.H. in Oklahoma, but in
Harper’s mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma
district court was directed to remove the Caldwells as G.C.H.’s guardians in a September
14, 2015 order that is filed-marked September 15, 2015. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
order does not mention care, control, or possession of G.C.H.
In an order file-marked September 16, 2015, the Oklahoma district court removed
the Caldwells as guardians and revoked their guardianship letters, but it too does not
mention care, control, or possession of G.C.H. The reporter’s record from a September
22, 2015 hearing on Harper’s petition for writ of habeas corpus reflects that the Oklahoma
district court signed a writ of assistance on September 17, 2015, but that writ is not in the
record, and nothing in the record otherwise indicates if it was served on the Caldwells or
the content of that writ, including whether it states anything pertaining to the care,
control, or possession of G.C.H.
The reporter’s record of the September 22 hearing on Harper’s habeas petition
indicates that Harper’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in Oklahoma district
court on September 21, 2015 and that the writ of habeas corpus issued that day. While
the writ of habeas corpus is not in the record, it is obvious from the reporter’s record that
the writ of habeas corpus required the Caldwells to produce G.C.H. at the September 22
hearing. The only mention of service of the writ of habeas corpus on the Caldwells is a
In re Harper Page 2
statement by the Caldwells’ attorney during the September 22 hearing that the writ had
been received “today.” The reporter’s record further reflects that Harper obtained
possession of G.C.H. at that hearing.
Harper contends that, based on the above events and Oklahoma orders, the 90-
day time period in which the Caldwells had to file their SAPCR in Texas began to run on
either September 14 or 15 and that the Caldwells had to file their SAPCR no later than
December 14 or 15, but they filed it on December 17. Harper asserts that when the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma district court entered their respective
orders on September 15 and September 16 pertaining to the guardianship of G.C.H., the
Caldwells’ continued possession of G.C.H. ceased to be “legal” (or lawful) and they thus
did not have “actual control” of G.C.H. as of one of those dates. Accordingly, Harper
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her plea to the jurisdiction,
which asserted that the Caldwells lack standing because they filed suit after the 90-day
period in subsection 102.003(a)(9) had expired.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when
the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and there is no adequate
remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36,
137 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). A clear abuse of discretion occurs when
a trial court “reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount
to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839
(Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in determining
what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Id. Therefore, a clear failure
by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an
abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary
writ. Id. at 840.
The improper denial of a plea to the jurisdiction is generally not
reviewable by mandamus because it involves a question of law that can be
addressed by ordinary appeal. See In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 734
In re Harper Page 3
(Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). However, mandamus review is appropriate
when there is a jurisdictional dispute in a proceeding involving
conservatorship issues. See Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding); In re Green, 352 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2011, orig. proceeding). This is due to the unique and compelling
circumstances presented when the trial court decides issues of
conservatorship. See Geary, 878 S.W.2d at 603. Because temporary orders
are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a trial court
abuses its discretion in issuing temporary orders in a SAPCR. See In re
Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding).
A party seeking conservatorship of a child must have standing to do
so. In re McDaniel, 408 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, orig. proceeding). Because standing is implicit in the concept of
subject matter jurisdiction, it is a threshold issue in a conservatorship
proceeding. In re N.L.D., 344 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no
pet.). A party’s lack of standing deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction and renders subsequent trial court action void. In re Smith, 260
S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
which we review de novo. In re K.D.H., 426 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
In re Lankford, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, 2016 WL 4447697, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 24, 2016,
no pet. h.).
Additionally, the relator bears the burden of providing a sufficient record to
establish a right to mandamus relief. See In re Schuttpelz, 10-15-00072-CV, 2015 WL
1967834, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 30, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
In Lankford, the Tyler court addressed the contention that “actual control” to
establish standing under subsection 102.003(a)(9) means “legal control.”2 Lankford, ---
2
In Lankford, the court discussed In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding),
noting that there the
court opined that “‘control,’ as used in subsection (a)(9), must mean something more than
the control implicit in having care and possession of the child if the word is to be given
effect and treated as more than surplusage.” Id. at 792. Therefore, “[t]he word must be
In re Harper Page 4
S.W.3d at ---, 2016 WL 4447697, at *3. After surveying the split in authority among Texas
courts on the issue,3 the Tyler court agreed with the Austin court in Jasek:
[W]e conclude that, had the legislature intended “control” to mean
“legal control” instead of “control” in its ordinary sense, it could easily have
defined it as such. Or it could have defined “actual control” to mean “legal
control.” But it did neither. Therefore, we agree with the reasoning in Jasek
and hold that its definition of “actual control” reflects the legislature’s
intent when it enacted the “control” requirement of section 102.003(a)(9).
Id., --- S.W.3d at ---, 2016 WL 4447697, at *3.
Harper also cites to a common-law exception to standing that is similar to the
“legal control” argument: “The courts have carved out one exception to this standing
rule. If possession is maintained in violation of a valid court order, that possession does
not confer standing to bring suit affecting the parent-child relationship.” In re S.S.G., 208
S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) (citing Perez v. Williamson, 726 S.W.2d
634, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
Assuming without deciding that either the “legal control” theory or the Perez
exception applies, we conclude that, based on the record before us, Harper has not shown
understood in the context of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a parent.” Id. The
court then concluded that “control” refers to “the power or authority to guide and manage,
and includes the authority to make decisions of legal significance for the child.” Id. at 793.
Lankford, --- S.W.3d at ---, 2016 WL 4447697, at *4.
3
Compare Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Prot. Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.); In re
K.G., No. 05-14-01171-CV, 2016 WL 3265215, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In
re K.S., No. 14-15-00008-CV, 2016 WL 1660366, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, pet.
denied); In re B.A.G., No. 11-11-00354-CV, 2013 WL 364240, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 13, 2013, no
pet.) (mem. op.); and In re K.K.T., No. 07-11-00306-CV, 2012 WL 3553006, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug.
17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) with In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig.
proceeding); In re H.S., No. 02-15-00303-CV, 2016 WL 4040497, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 28, 2016,
pet. filed) (mem. op.); In re N.I.V.S., No. 04-14-00108-CV, 2015 WL 1120913, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Mar. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In re Harper Page 5
that the Caldwells had illegal control of G.C.H.—or control of him in defiance of a court
order—such that they did not file their SAPCR after the expiration of 90 days from when
their allegedly illegal or defiant control began.
As noted above, neither the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s September 15 order nor
the Oklahoma district court’s September 16 order pertaining to the Caldwell’s
guardianship of G.C.H. mention the care, control, or possession of G.C.H. And while the
record refers to the Oklahoma district court’s issuance of a writ of assistance on
September 17, that writ is not in the record, and nothing else in the record indicates that
it pertains to the Caldwells’ care, control, or possession of G.C.H. and their possible
defiance of the writ.
In conclusion, Harper has not provided a sufficient record that would establish
her right to mandamus relief under her legal theory. Accordingly, we deny the petition
for writ of mandamus.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the judgment denying the petition for writ of
mandamus. A separate opinion will not issue. He notes, however, that he would
deny the petition solely on the merits that have nothing to do with the sufficiency
of the record. See Chief Justice Gray’s Dissent to Request for Response in this
proceeding issued on June 2, 2016.)
Petition denied
Opinion delivered and filed October 26, 2016
[OT06]
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