Earl Anderson, Carrie Bell Scott, Sharon Anderson, Evance Anderson, Bill Burton, Willie Mae Anderson, and Jerry J. Anderson (Smith) v. Robert Louis Durham ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            ACCEPTED
    12-15-00169-CV
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    10/20/2015 8:06:36 PM
    Pam Estes
    CLERK
    NO. 12-15-00169-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS               FILED IN
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF     TEXAS
    10/20/2015 8:06:36 PM
    AT TYLER                      PAM ESTES
    Clerk
    EARL ANDERSON, CARRIE BELL SCOTT, SHARON ANDERSON,
    EVANCE ANDERSON, BILL BURTON, WILLIE MAE ANDERSON
    AND JERRY J. ANDERSON (SMITH),
    Appellants,
    V.
    ROBERT LOUIS DURHAM AND FRANK L. ZELLERS, III,
    Appellees
    _____________________________________________________
    On appeal from the 173rd District Court
    Henderson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2012A-0662
    _____________________________________________________
    REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
    ______________________________________________________________
    LANA JOHNSON
    State Bar number 10763650
    P. O. Box 816325
    Dallas, TX 75381-6325
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Page
    TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................                     ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................                    iii
    I.    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .........                       1
    II. REPLY _________________                                   2
    A. Appellee has Failed to address the issue            2
    that Durham’s summary judgment was not the
    proper vehicle to address Appellants’
    failure to state a cause of action.
    B.   Fact questions exist regarding the Warranty    3
    Deed from B. A. Anderson due to alterations.
    C.   Appellants were denied the opportunity to      4
    discover the nature of Durham’s claim that
    actually established the controversy.
    D.   Appellants were denied the opportunity to       5
    prove the elements of trespass to try title.
    E.   Durham failed to verify his challenge to        5
    his alleged defect of parties.
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................                   6
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE _................                   6
    -ii-
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES                                                 Page
    Horizon v. Auld, 
    34 S.W.3d 887
    (Tex. 2000).....        3
    Perry v. Cohen, 
    285 S.W.3d 137
    ...............             3
    (Tex.App.-Austin 2009)
    Spivy v. March, 
    151 S.W. 1037
    (Tex. 1912)                 4
    TEXAS CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND RULES
    Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(f) and 38.3    1
    T.R.C.P, Rule 90, 91 & 93 ........................     3
    -iii-
    TO THE HONORABLE TWELFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS:
    Appellants submit this Reply Brief praying that
    this Court reverse the trial court’s order granting
    summary judgment dismissing Appellants’ claims.
    I.
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    Appellee attempts to mislead this Court by
    asserting that the trial court imposed a deadline for
    Appellants to amend their petition.   The record does not
    support his assertion.   Appellee improperly attacked
    Appellant’s petition with a no evidence motion for
    summary judgment rather than properly filing special
    exceptions.   (CR 32) The trial court erred by allowing
    amendment of Appellants’ petition rather than requiring
    Appellee to properly file special exceptions, conducting
    a hearing with a proper order so that Appellants could
    cure any defects in their petition.   The Texas Rules of
    Civil Procedure provide for pleading amendments during
    the pendency of summary judgment hearings.    The trial
    court thereby denied Appellants due process of law and
    Appellants’ rights were fatally violated.    Appellants
    1
    are entitled to a new trial.    Further, Appellants were
    denied the opportunity to cure any defects in their
    affidavits and to conduct discovery on Appellee’s
    amended answer and counterclaim.    The trial court abused
    its discretion by striking Appellants’ evidence.
    Because the trial court abused its discretion, this
    Court should reverse the order granting summary and
    dismissal of Appellants’ claims.
    II.
    REPLY
    A.   Appellee has failed to address the issue that
    Durham’s summary judgment was not the proper
    vehicle to address Appellants’ failure to state a
    cause of action.
    Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(f) and 38.3
    provide for statement of issues in Appellants’ brief and
    reply brief.   Appellants raised the issue in their brief
    and Durham simply failed to adequately address the
    issue.   Appellants raised the issue of Durham’s failure
    to file special exceptions to raise the defect of
    Appellants’ standing as Plaintiffs in this suit.     Tex.
    Rules of Civ. Pro., Rule 91 provides that special
    2
    exceptions are required to raise the issue.     The Court
    stated in Perry v. Cohen, 
    285 S.W.3d 137
    (Tex.App.-
    Austin 2009) in footnote 4 “[4] Special exceptions
    inform the opposing party of defects in its pleadings,
    so the party may have an opportunity to cure the defect.
    See Horizon v. Auld, 
    34 S.W.3d 887
    , 897 (Tex.2000).”
    Further, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 90 waives
    defect of parties unless objection by special exceptions
    is filed.   T.R.C.P Rule 93   requires verification of
    pleadings asserting defect of parties and Durham failed
    to verify his operative pleading.    Therefore, the trial
    court erred by granting summary judgment based upon the
    lack of evidence on the defect of parties concerning
    standing, by striking Appellants’ evidence, concerning
    limitations and concerning the sufficiency of
    allegations of title to real property.    Durham waived
    any defects and the issues were not ripe for
    determination by summary judgment.
    B.   Fact questions exist regarding the Warranty Deed
    from B. A. Anderson due to alterations.
    The alterations in the deed are substantial and not
    3
    technical defects.   Durham failed to address the
    alterations and strike outs on the deed that
    distinguishes this case from the result in Spivy v.
    March, 
    151 S.W. 1037
    (Tex. 1912) Further, Spivy involved
    a well developed record allowing the Texas Supreme Court
    to properly analyze the issue.   The instant case
    involves denial of due process to properly develop the
    issues concerning laches and limitations.   None of the
    cases that Durham cited involve strike outs on a deed
    and therefore fail to address the issue.
    C.   Appellants were denied the opportunity to discover
    the nature of Durham’s claim that actually
    established the controversy.
    Durham’s Answer and Counterclaim placed title to the
    property Appellants claim.   Appellant’s had outstanding
    discovery to clarify the chain of title.    Durham’s deed
    was outside the chain of title and Appellants were
    prejudiced by the trial court refusal to grant a
    continuance to allow sufficient time for discovery of
    facts Durham alleged within six months prior to
    rendition of summary judgment.
    4
    D.   Appellants were denied the opportunity to prove the
    elements of trespass to try title.
    Appellants alleged title from a purported common
    source relating back to B. A. Anderson.     A short delay
    for adequate discovery would not prejudice Durham.        The
    Zeller’s deed from Durham’s predecessor traces back to
    an unpublished instrument and Appellants had outstanding
    discovery to determine Durham’s claim and substantiate
    Appellants’ claim.
    E.   Durham failed to verify his challenge to his alleged
    defect of parties.
    Appellants had standing to challenge the deed from
    B. A. Anderson and Durham waived any defect.     Durham
    failed to address the exception to hearsay concerning
    family history.   The trial court erred by striking
    Appellants’ recitation of family history.
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellants
    respectfully pray that this court grant review in this
    case and vacate the trial court's summary judgment. The
    Andersons also request any other relief to which he may
    be entitled.
    5
    Respectfully submitted,
    Lana Johnson
    _____________________________
    LANA JOHNSON
    Texas Bar No. 10763650
    P. O. Box 816325
    Dallas, TX 75381-6325
    Tel. (903) 646-0672
    Fax. (866) 447-7148
    Attorney for Appellants
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that on October 20, 2015 a true and correct
    copy of the foregoing document was served to Appellee’s
    Attorney of Record, by e-mail.
    Lana Johnson
    ____________________________
    LANA JOHNSON
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, I hereby certify
    that this Reply Brief contains 1,170 words. This
    computer-generated document created in Word Perfect
    using 14-point typeface for all text. In making this
    certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word
    count provided by the software used to prepare the
    document.
    Lana Johnson
    ________________________
    LANA JOHNSON
    6
    Texas Rules
    TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    Part II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND
    COUNTY COURTS
    § 4. Pleading.
    C. Pleadings of Defendant
    As amended through June 10, 2014
    Rule 90. WAIVER OF DEFECTS IN PLEADING
    General demurrers shall not be used. Every defect,
    omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of
    substance, which is not specifically pointed out by
    exception in writing and brought to the attention of the
    judge in the trial court before the instruction or charge to
    the jury or, in a non-jury case, before the judgment is
    signed, shall be deemed to have been waived by the party
    seeking reversal on such account; provided that this rule
    shall not apply as to any party against whom default
    judgment is rendered.
    Texas Rules
    TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
    Part II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND
    COUNTY COURTS
    § 4. Pleading.
    C. Pleadings of Defendant
    As amended through June 10, 2014
    Rule 91. SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS
    A special exception shall not only point out the particular
    pleading excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly
    and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity,
    duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the
    allegations in the pleading excepted to.
    Texas Rules                                                     consideration of the same has failed in whole or in part.
    TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE                                  10. A denial of an account which is the foundation of the
    plaintiffs action, and supported by affidavit.
    Part II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND
    COUNTY COURTS                                                   11. That a contract sued upon is usurious. Unless such
    plea is filed, no evidence of usurious interest as a defense
    § 4. Pleading.                                                  shall be received.
    C. Pleadings of Defendant                                       12. That notice and proof of loss or claim for damage has
    not been given as alleged. Unless such plea is filed such
    As amended through June 10, 2014                                notice and proof shall be presumed and no evidence to
    the contrary shall be admitted. A denial of such notice or
    Rule 93. CERTAIN PLEAS TO BE VERIFIED
    such proof shall be made specifically and with
    A pleading setting up any of the following matters, unless      particularity.
    the truth of such matters appear of record, shall be
    13. In the trial of any case appealed to the court from the
    verified by affidavit.
    Industrial Accident Board the following, if pleaded, shall
    1. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue or that     be presumed to be true as pleaded and have been done
    the defendant has not legal capacity to be sued.                and filed in legal time and manner, unless denied by
    verified pleadings:
    2. That the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the
    capacity in which he sues, or that the defendant is not         (a) Notice of injury.
    liable in the capacity in which he is sued.
    (b) Claim for Compensation.
    3. That there is another suit pending in this State between
    (c) Award of the Board.
    the same parties involving the same claim.
    (d) Notice of intention not to abide by the award of the
    4. That there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant.
    Board.
    5. A denial of partnership as alleged in any pleading as to
    (e) Filing of suit to set aside the award.
    any party to the suit.
    (f) That the insurance company alleged to have been the
    6. That any party alleged in any pleading to be a
    carrier of the workers' compensation insurance at the
    corporation is not incorporated as alleged.
    time of the alleged injury was in fact the carrier thereof.
    7. Denial of the execution by himself or by his authority
    (g) That there was good cause for not filing claim with
    of any instrument in writing, upon which any pleading is
    the Industrial Accident Board within the one year period
    founded, in whole or in part and charged to have been
    provided by statute.
    executed by him or by his authority, and not alleged to be
    lost or destroyed. Where such instrument in writing is          (h) Wage rate.
    charged to have been executed by a person then
    deceased, the affidavit shall be sufficient if it states that   A denial of any of the matters set forth in subdivisions (a)
    the affiant has reason to believe and does believe that         or (g) of paragraph 13 may be made on information and
    such instrument was not executed by the decedent or by          belief.
    his authority. In the absence of such a sworn plea, the
    instrument shall be received in evidence as fully proved.       Any such denial may be made in original or amended
    pleadings; but if in amended pleadings the same must be
    8. A denial of the genuineness of the indorsement or            filed not less than seven days before the case proceeds to
    assignment of a written instrument upon which suit is           trial. In case of such denial the things so denied shall not
    brought by an indorsee or assignee and in the absence of        be presumed to be true, and if essential to the case of the
    such a sworn plea, the indorsement or assignment thereof        party alleging them, must be proved.
    shall be held as fully proved. The denial required by this
    subdivision of the rule may be made upon information            14. That a party plaintiff or defendant is not doing
    and belief.                                                     business under an assumed name or trade name as
    alleged.
    9. That a written instrument upon which a pleading is
    founded is without consideration, or that the                   15. In the trial of any case brought against an automobile
    insurance company by an insured under the provisions of
    an insurance policy in force providing protection against
    uninsured motorists, an allegation that the insured has
    complied with all the terms of the policy as a condition
    precedent to bringing the suit shall be presumed to be
    true unless denied by verified pleadings which may be
    upon information and belief.
    16. Any other matter required by statute to be pleaded
    under oath.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-15-00169-CV

Filed Date: 10/20/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016